To What Extent Has Information Security Professionalism Achieved Recognition? by Reece, Richard
1 
 
 
 
 
To What Extent Has Information 
Security Professionalism Achieved 
Recognition? 
 
A thesis submitted in partial  
fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Phillip Reece 
De Montfort University  
December 2016 (Approved July 2017) 
 
ii 
Abstract
The practice of securing information was until recently associated strongly with securing the 
Information Technology systems which store and process it. As it has developed as a specialised 
area of work however, particularly as the critical importance of human and social factors has 
increasingly been recognised, it has acquired an identity separate from that of computing. The 
separation has been sufficient for the formation of a new, distinct occupation, with specialised 
credentialing bodies being established to attest to practitioners’ professional competence.  
This study is the first empirical academic investigation into the professionalisation of UK 
Information Security. It considers attitudes towards professional status, the desirability and 
practicality of licensing, the current standing of the occupation and its prospects for the future. 
The analysis draws heavily from the substantial Sociology of the Professions, both from the 
structural and procedural theory of profession-forming and the later critiques of motivation, 
class and power. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with twenty-seven individuals 
comprising security analysts, managers, academics, professional bodies and the UK 
Government. Interviews took place between November 2012 and March 2015. Results are 
presented in two stages of analysis, using Actor–Network Theory as a theoretical lens. 
Whilst significant progress has been made towards forming a recognisable Information Security 
profession, its status is not yet comparable to more established peers. Aligned with US National 
Research Council findings but using a broader basis in professionalisation theory, the UK 
occupation was found to be too diffusely demarcated both internally and with respect to its 
bordering professions. It has yet to coalesce around distinct internal specialities with discrete 
qualification routes and establish the hierarchical arrangement of its major branches. Without 
such stratification of roles and a well-accepted claim to controlling a clearly demarcated body of 
knowledge, it is not possible to establish the boundaries of a graduate profession superior to any 
supporting para-professions, and thus position itself as requiring an advanced abstract education 
comparable to its peers. A rationalisation of credentials and institutions is required to produce a 
strong professional body which can advance the cause of the profession and properly establish 
and embed these roles. At present however – contrary to the tenor of much of the relevant 
sociology – neither the pursuit of professional status nor the exclusion of unqualified workers 
were found to be major motivators for current practitioners. By contrast government, the final 
arbiter of professional monopoly, is attempting urgently to increase the appeal of the profession 
to address a national skills shortfall, but is wary of direct market intervention in the form of 
licensing. Therefore, whilst change is rapid, significant impediments to full professional 
recognition remain. 
iii 
 
List of Related Publications 
Reece, R. and Stahl, B. (2015) “The Professionalisation of Information Security: Perspectives 
of UK Practitioners”, Computers and Security, Vol. 48, pp.182–195. 
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
My greatest and first thanks must of course be to Professor Bernd Carsten Stahl, who from the 
initial exploratory interview onwards has been a constant source of good-humoured and helpful 
support, and without whose generosity of his extremely limited time and his great patience the 
entire project would not have been possible. I am hugely grateful that Bernd was able to act as 
first supervisor for the vast majority of the project and as co-author of the paper which arose 
from this work. 
Alongside Bernd, I must record my sincere thanks to many other members of the De Montfort 
University staff who have rendered indispensable professional and personal help: Dr Iryna 
Yevseyeva, for her advice and support as second supervisor during the critical period of crafting 
the dissertation itself, and Dr Yingqin Zheng (now of Royal Holloway, University of London), 
who as the first supervisor during much of the first year of the project contributed greatly to 
setting me along the correct path and directing my early reading in subjects outside my previous 
academic training. Amongst her other contributions, I must thank Yingqin for introducing me to 
Actor–Network Theory and the philosophical work of its major proponents. I am also indebted 
to Professor Tim Watson (now of Warwick University) for his years as second supervisor and 
his introduction to many of the key contacts who contributed to the project either directly or 
indirectly. From outside the supervisory team, whilst many of the staff gave of their time and 
talents, I should note in particular the help and encouragement of Dr Helge Janicke, who acted 
as an independent assessor of progress on several occasions and made a large number of helpful 
comments and suggestions on each occasion. 
Whilst all fees and expenses for the work were met personally, I must record (formally for 
disclosure but with all due gratitude) the contribution of paid study leave amounting to 98 days 
by my employer Airbus Defence and Space Ltd., whilst noting that their contribution was for 
my development alone and thus all opinions and conclusions in this dissertation are not ascribed 
to nor necessarily shared by that institution. In particular I would like to note the efforts of 
Kevin Stanley, Gareth Davis and Claire Roberts who were instrumental in granting the leave as 
well as being hugely supportive personally. 
Obviously I must thank the twenty-seven volunteers who agreed to be interviewed, many 
holding very senior positions in multinational companies, universities, professional bodies and 
the UK government, whose time is extremely valuable. The contributions of these individuals, 
v 
although for obvious reasons anonymous, were in each case a profoundly generous and 
altruistic contribution to the advancement of the understanding of their profession. 
I have been the extremely fortunate recipient of relevant professional expertise and assistance 
from amongst my personal friends. Chief of these, I would like to express my thanks to Dr 
Matthew Andrews, erstwhile Chair of the Association of University Administrators Board of 
Trustees. Dr Andrews was a source of very helpful expert advice and background information 
concerning the genesis and sustainability of university courses as well as encouraging me to 
consider undertaking the entire process. I am profoundly grateful to Miss Sophia Anderton, both 
for professional advice from her career as editor of several prestigious academic journals 
particularly during the preparation of the paper produced from the work, and for committing so 
much of her time to eradicating some of my typographical errors. I am also much obliged to Dr 
Lisa Mackenzie, Consultant in Emergency Medicine, for much informal discussion concerning 
the modern reality of working as a UK medical professional, providing crucial insight to the 
training and socialisation of the archetypal profession as practised today. 
Finally I must acknowledge the huge debt owed to my wife Sarah for expressing no hesitation 
in allowing me to start this project, and for the time, expense and other sacrifices my family 
have made to allow me to pursue it. 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ii 
List of Related Publications iii 
Acknowledgements iv 
Table of Contents vi 
List of Figures viii 
List of Tables viii 
List of Acronyms ix 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Information Security  1 
1.2 Profession  1 
1.3 Research Questions  3 
1.4 Actor–Network Theory  3 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation  4 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Introduction  6 
2.2 Information Security  6 
2.3 The Sociology of the Professions  22 
2.4 The Information Security Profession  40 
2.5 Summary and Statement of the Research Questions  49 
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Basis .................................................................................................... 52 
3.1. Introduction and Glossary  52 
3.2. Prior Trends  56 
3.3. Selection of Theoretical Perspective  57 
3.4. Actor–Network Theory  61 
3.5. Controversies: Sources of Uncertainty  64 
3.6. Moments of Translation  66 
3.7. Success  68 
3.8. Criticism  69 
3.9. Actor–Network Theory in Information Systems and Security Studies  70 
3.10 Summary  71 
 
Chapter 4: Methodology .......................................................................................................... 75 
4.1. Introduction  75 
4.2. Data Gathering Methods  75 
4.3. General Factors Affecting Methodological Selection  87 
4.4. Data Gathering: Summary  92 
4.5. Data Analysis and Coding   95 
4.6. Research Plan at Outset  99 
4.7. Execution of Research Plan  99 
 
Chapter 5: Conceptual Analysis ............................................................................................. 110 
5.1. Introduction  110 
5.2. Housekeeping and Interview Administration  110 
5.3. Personal Aspects  111 
5.4. Certifications  116 
vii 
5.5. Professionalism  134 
5.6. Work Context  145 
5.7. Summary  168 
 
Chapter 6: Secondary Analysis .............................................................................................. 170 
6.1. The State and Stability of the Current Network  171 
6.2. Roles Within the Profession  178 
6.3. Preparation for Practice  184 
6.4. Professionalisation, Licensing and Regulation   191 
6.5. Summary  198 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 200 
7.1 Answers to the Research Questions  200 
7.2 Theoretical Considerations   205 
7.3 Implications for Practice  208 
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge  209 
7.5 Limitations  209 
7.6 Recommendations for Further Work  210 
 
References .............................................................................................................................. 212 
 
Appendix 1: Interview Instruments  239 
Notes for Participants  240 
Interview Protocol  248 
Appendix 2: Coding Frame Details  263 
Appendix 3: Interview Codes and Details  270 
Appendix 4: Transcription Rules as Used  272 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
 
List of Figures 
1  Common computing career flows (from Bond, 1975). 8 
2  A simple example of competition between existing professions relating to 
this study (examples given are purely for argument), based on the Abbot 
(1988) model. 
33 
3  A hypothetical example of Abbott splinter-based formation of a new group 
from amongst existing professions. 
34 
4 Subjective–Objective dimension (from Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.3). 54 
5 A model of four sociological paradigms (from Burrell and Morgan 1979, 
p.22). 
55 
6 Illustration of OPP formation, from Callon (1986, pp.206–207). 67 
7 Credentialing institutions as a possible “Obligatory Passage Point”. 72 
8 Comparison of the “basic” research designs, from Flick (2009, pp.127–145). 79 
9 Potential relationships explored in some potential case studies. 81 
10 Key to later network fragment representations. 114 
11 Derived network fragment observed in the certification market. 114 
12 Network fragment observed with respect to academic qualifications. 120 
13 Network fragment observed with relation to GCHQ accreditation of master’s 
degrees. 
122 
14 Network as inferred from the perspective of the practitioner. 130 
15 Modified network seen from the perspective of the practitioner. 131 
16 Credential network from the perspective of the practitioner. 134 
17 Representation of a partial traditional professional status network (unified 
body). 
135 
18 Representation of professional status as the nexus of a partial network. 136 
19 Partial view of an orthodox model of professional status. 141 
20 Network instability caused by dissent to restrictions from security policy. 155 
21 Potentially peer-symbiotic relationship between security manager and 
technician. 
161 
 
 
List of Tables 
1 Regulation–Radical Change dimension (from Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.18) 55 
2 Comparison of positivist concepts with anti-positivist analogues 88 
3 A summary of candidate methods following the initial filter 93 
 
ix 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
(ISC)² International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium 
ANT Actor–Network Theory 
BCS British Computer Society 
BERR [UK Department for] Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
CAQDAS Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
CESG Communications–Electronics Security Group 
CPHC Council of Professors and Heads of Computing 
CREST Council of Registered Ethical Security Testers 
DBIS [UK] Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
DCMS [UK] Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
DoD [US] Department of Defense 
DoHHS [US] Department of Health and Human Services 
DoHS [US] Department of Homeland Security 
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters 
IISP Institute of Information Security Professionals 
ISACA Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
IS Information Systems 
IT Information Technology 
(N)CISSE ([US] National) Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education 
NCSC [UK] National Cyber Security Centre 
NICCS [US] National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies 
NRC [US] National Research Council 
NSC [US] National Security Council 
NSTISS [US] National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security 
OPP Obligatory Passage Point 
PC Personal Computer 
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Information Security 
The security of information has been a critical topic since antiquity. Julius Caesar’s use of his 
eponymous substitution cypher (Suetonius Tranquillus 121, s.56) is perhaps the most famous 
illustration of ancient communications confidentiality, but is by no means the earliest example. 
It is probably since the advent of mass internetworking and ubiquitous processing of personal 
and corporate data however that Information Security has gained its modern prominence and 
significance. Information has long been liberated from behind a physical perimeter; the modern 
enterprise demands secure constant access to its data, as do its customers, partners, regulators 
and myriad other parties, at any time or place convenient to them.  
At one point, keeping that information secure principally involved maintaining confidentiality, 
but no longer. Today there is no choice but to balance connecting to the rest of the world – with 
its attendant risks – against the certainty of commercial disadvantage from remaining 
unavailable. Furthermore, as the impact of failing to protect information has increased, a 
panoply of standards, regulations and statutes have come to shape the practice of ensuring that 
protection. Whilst the technical actions of defending against and forensically investigating such 
attacks are still vital aspects of practice and continue to evolve, to these have been added a new 
raft of activities. The modern enterprise boasts governance structures, processes for policy 
creation, awareness training, assurance auditing and so on. Understanding and developing all 
the factors involved has thus become the preserve of specialists. 
Both history and sociology have much to say on the formation of new occupations. 
Occupations, if they sufficiently resemble knowledge-based, self-governing trades may graduate 
into “professions”, with consequences for the practitioners, their clients and society as a whole. 
The central question of this study is to what degree this has occurred in the field of Information 
Security. 
1.2 Profession 
The nebulous concept of “profession”, and the mechanisms by which groups sought and gained 
control over practice in an area of knowledge, fascinated and frustrated sociologists from the 
early twentieth century onwards. The early search for a definition bore poor fruit, producing 
only lists of traits seen in established professions, who themselves began only recently to 
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resemble today’s concept of an ethical and qualified worker. Any hopes of a positivist empirical 
test arising from theory to separate occupations into “the professions” and “others”, were 
eventually abandoned. 
Whilst that early work is highly useful when identifying evidence of a campaign to 
professionalise an industry, the later more critical work is equally an essential foundation for 
placing this study in its proper context. Professions which obtain monopoly of practice control a 
market for work, and since they are frequently in high demand from paying customers they have 
developed significant wealth and influence in society. Sociologists therefore became more 
concerned with – and critical of – the motives and behaviour of these groups. Were their claims 
of disinterested practice and highly-educated expertise well-founded? Was it truly necessary to 
grant monopoly to an upper-middle-class cartel in league with the very top layers of society to 
the exclusion of others? This era, led by the prolific Eliot Freidson (e.g. 1970) but perhaps 
crowned by the (1977) work of Margali Larson, provides the background to why nation states 
have been so reluctant to grant licensing powers unless absolutely necessary, and hence the 
obstacles faced by a new candidate profession. 
It is however the later (1988) work of Andrew Abbott which highlights the dynamic nature of 
profession-forming and competition between existing groups for the control of new ground. 
Abbott shows that far from being static entities immutably fixed into society, professions and 
their governing bodies are the product of dispute, negotiation and border conflicts with rival 
occupations in a constant struggle to maintain control of current areas of knowledge whilst 
competing for jurisdiction over territory opened by progress. 
The literature review, then, establishes that the new field of “Information Security” (or 
increasingly commonly “Cybersecurity” although the former term will be used here) has 
emerged from its parent disciplines, and that it is a candidate to be considered amongst the 
professions. What it means to be a profession and the ramifications of that status are then 
considered, alongside how and why professionalisation of an occupation takes place. Prior work 
in the field is examined, particularly (2013) work by the US National Research Council on 
behalf of the US Government concerning under what circumstances the latter should consider 
“professionalising” the industry. 
Whilst professionalisation has been painted merely as guilds self-interestedly desiring monopoly 
for private gain, the status and success of the Information Security profession has implications 
well beyond the welfare of its own members. As is reviewed in the next chapter and shown 
further in the later analysis, a combination of factors both technical and social have combined to 
produce the conditions where a rapid expansion of practitioner numbers and skills is required. 
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Whilst Anglo-American models of profession suggest a ground-up campaign for recognition by 
a sceptical state, by contrast the UK government is so concerned by the predicted shortfall of 
workers that it is itself taking active steps to catalyse the development of a “Cyber Security 
Profession” (DBIS, 2014). This unusual engagement extends not just into the education and 
certification of the profession but even to its status; the lure of other, more established career 
pathways dissuading technical graduates from entering a security career is listed as a principal 
cause of a skills shortage within the industry. That status therefore is in itself under scrutiny 
from those looking to drive the next steps in Information Security’s evolution. This study seeks 
not just to join this debate, but also to ground the discussion of these topics more deeply in a 
theoretical context from the substantial professionalisation literature than has typically been 
forthcoming from the existing work by national governments and industry bodies. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The literature review concludes that while there is evidence of professionalisation in 
Information Security, it is not yet clear to what extent this has been successful, what has caused 
or led this process, what its aims are and what if any obstacles remain. The following specific 
research questions are enumerated to state the current gaps in knowledge for these themes: 
 What are the origins of the modern Information Security profession?  
◦ When and why did Information Security roles emerge and separate from 
Information Technology to form a new profession? 
 What is the current status of the Information Security profession? 
◦ To what extent does a discrete area of practice exist with which the practitioners 
associate and what is its status? 
 What are the prospects of further professionalisation? 
◦ Are there ongoing projects to professionalise the industry, what are their aims and 
are these being achieved? 
1.4 Actor–Network Theory 
The question of how and from what apparently stable social structures (such as professional 
bodies) are formed is the core of Actor–Network Theory (ANT). This approach is characterised 
by a symmetric treatment of human and non-human actors, in recognising that the “social 
world” comprises webs of interactions of both human and technical components to be 
considered even-handedly in judging their effect. Although based in earlier theory, starting with 
Callon’s (1986) paper its proponents emphasised accounts which describe how a focal actor 
establishes itself as the sole proxy or conduit for a desirable state for other actors, against a 
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background of competing actors seeking to do the same. Combined with its insistence that such 
arrangements are transitory and maintained rather than inherently stable and reified once 
created, and with Abbot’s thesis mentioned above, it will be seen that this is an ideal lens 
through which to view the association of disparate elements into the beginnings of professional 
associations which compete for control of a highly technical area of knowledge. 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
In the next chapter the literatures of Information Security and professionalisation are reviewed, 
followed by the existing work in the area of the Information Security profession. Having placed 
the subject in context and identified the specific research questions, a review of the applicable 
theoretical basis and its own literature is presented. This outlines concepts of ontology and 
epistemology and identifies the overall sociological paradigm which applies to the work using 
the model of Burrell and Morgan (1979). The selection is explained with reference to the nature 
of the work and the prevailing research traditions in the field. The principles of Actor–Network 
Theory and its particular suitability as a theoretical approach to this study are then set out. 
The Methodology chapter comprises two major sections. The previous discussion of 
epistemology supports the identification of compatible methodological strategies, followed by 
the selection and justification of the specific data gathering method (semi-structured interview) 
and the overall research plan. Secondly, the execution of that plan is reported, laying out the 
work as actually performed and the sources of the obtained data, the deviations from the original 
plan, the issues experienced in the field and how the process of analysis was undertaken. 
The analysis is presented in two chapters, which together form the bulk of the dissertation. 
Firstly the Conceptual Analysis sets out a description of and commentary on the data, organised 
according to the major codes from the categories created during the coding and annotation 
process. Secondly a more general second-stage analysis is presented, organised along the 
overarching themes which emerged during the study, leading to a number of conclusions. As 
Larson (1977) showed, professionalisation campaigns include an element of persuasion and 
campaigning; they must win subjective acceptance, not merely qualify against objective target 
traits however much they may resemble the behaviour of those who are so accepted. There is 
therefore no attempt to apply a binary “professional or other” model nor some quasi-quantitative 
ticking-off of a checklist against a set of metrics. Instead the analysis comprises a descriptive 
Actor–Network Theory account of the status, successes and failures of the professionalisation 
process to date and its subjects’ future prospects.  
Finally the Conclusion summarises the findings from the previous chapter and juxtaposes them 
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with the specific research questions to bring the study to a close, noting its limitations and how 
these might be addressed by future work. 
To begin, therefore, it is necessary to review the literature to examine each of the two 
fundamental topics from which the rest of the work follows: what is Information Security, and 
what is a profession? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
To put this study into context and establish a contribution to knowledge, it is necessary to 
survey the literatures of two disciplines
1
. Firstly, by examining the history of Information 
Security itself, it is possible to trace its gradual separation from Information Technology into a 
discrete area of work. As this field is substantial, the aim is to highlight those themes which 
demonstrate how questions of risk management, governance, standards and regulatory 
compliance, policy and culture have created a discrete candidate profession. Any claim to 
professional status however must be grounded in an understanding of that term: what is a 
profession and why do occupations professionalise? Again, with such a vast field of work 
spanning nearly a century, the objective is to touch on those aspects which support the 
examination of professionalisation in an industry. The third area of review is the confluence of 
these themes: the Information Security profession itself. Whilst this area has been recently 
stimulated by government action, it remains a relatively new research domain academically. 
This chapter concludes therefore by summarising the opportunities for novel work and stating 
the research questions to be addressed. 
2.2 Information Security 
Information forms the heart of the modern enterprise, thus its protection is one of the key 
concerns of any organisation (Gordon et al., 2003b). In the era of ubiquitous computing 
Information Security is virtually synonymous with the protection of data held in information 
systems (Wang, 1988). “Information Security” and “Cybersecurity” are sometimes used 
interchangeably, however to some the latter term includes protection of the human user as an 
intrinsic part of protecting their information (von Solms and van Niekerk, 2013). No distinction 
is made in this study but the former term is preferred, capitalised when referring to the area of 
professional practice or academic research under consideration here. 
One definition for Information Security is given as: 
"…protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction." 
(Fuchs et al., 2011) 
                                                     
1
 In doing so, this chapter includes material adapted from the paper linked to this study (Reece and Stahl, 
2015). 
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Such statements are however descriptive rather than genuinely definitive, there being no well-
established hard edge to the subject domain (Manunta, 1999); the certification provider (ISC)² 
for example includes at least a rudimentary treatment of physical security in its Book of 
Knowledge (Miller and Gregory, 2007) however this overlaps considerably with Corporate 
Security (Griffiths et al, 2010; Coole et al., 2015). The field has matured to comprise both 
technical and non-technical dimensions (Werlinger et al., 2009; von Solms, 2001a; Brocaglia, 
2005; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Bunker, 2012) through the abstraction of the 
practitioner from a role of computer data protection to that of governance (von Solms, 2006). 
2.2.1 The Origins of the Information Security Occupation 
The history of computer security is relatively brief and not extensively covered (de Leeuw, 
2007; Greenwald, 1998), however Information Security’s origins arguably begin with Spartan 
cryptography in the fifth century BCE (Kahn 1974, pp.67–71) since cryptography is included in 
the curricula of many of today’s professional security certifications (White et al., 2003; Miller 
and Gregory, 2007) although considered as mathematics by Siponen (2005). Cryptography was 
responsible for the simultaneous birth of modern computing and Information Security during the 
first automated attack on the Enigma system by the Colossus at Bletchley Park (de Leeuw, 
2007).  
Early computers were however single-user single-machine systems with little interconnectivity, 
thus their own security could be provided by physical protection of the equipment (Whitman 
and Mattord 2009, p4; Dlamini et al., 2009). Following the development of multi-user systems, 
work was presented to the NSA in 1967 acknowledging the risk of information passing between 
users (Mackenzie and Pottinger, 1997), requiring logical security measures.  
In military circles the scale of the computing security threat, and particularly the holistic 
technical and social response needed, was understood from early on (see Ware, 1970). Military 
work to protect independent tasks on mainframes resulted in formal access protocols such as the 
Bell–LaPadula model (Bell and LaPadula, 1973). Conversely, in the mainly educational civilian 
environment, protection of resources at that time was entirely optional (Mackenzie and 
Pottinger, 1997), particularly for commercial and home users (Greenwald, 1998). The advent of 
the Personal Computer (PC) in 1980 and later Apple Macintosh in 1984 introduced networks of 
small, single-user systems and pushed the computer into the hands of the untrained general 
public (Gollman 2011, p.4).  
In early commercial computing the priorities were availability and functionality. No specialised 
security function was felt required (van Biene-Hershey, 2007); the field consisted almost 
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entirely of programmer and analyst roles, as can be seen in Fig. 1, reproduced from a trade 
newspaper. 
Programmer
Management
Careerist 
programmer
Specialist 
programmer
Systems designer
Systems analyst
Systems programmer
Senior programmer
 
Fig. 1: Common early computing career flows (from Bond, 1975). 
As computing became central to operations, security came to the attention of management (van 
Biene-Hershey, 2007) along with the requirement to balance user acceptance with secure 
practice, however security-minded analysts in the late 1970s were still struggling to gain 
acceptance of even basic password security (Morris and Thompson, 1979). Some future echoes 
can be seen however. Wooldridge et al. (1973) identify a role of a non-technical and senior 
“Security Officer” and devote a small chapter to its definition. Van Tassel (1972, pp.131–136) 
cites the importance of service bureaux separating clients’ data to avoid potential confidentiality 
breaches; a familiar topic for cloud computing today. One 1977 reference further suggests that 
the main principles of qualitative risk management were in use by this time (Courtney, 1977) 
which are reviewed later. 
Moving to the 1980s, as the PC replaced the terminal, information systems research was turning 
its attention to IT management (Myers and Avison, 2002). Security was still not a real priority 
for management and few organisations supported a full-time manager (Straub, 1990). There is 
however some evidence of the Security Consultant. Talbot (1981) notes the corporate manager’s 
dilemma over whether to leave this important area purely to internal staff or seek external 
expertise from a specialist. In the same text there is also differentiation of technical security 
tasks and security management, noting that the manager must ensure that they remain in control 
of their assets but do not necessarily need to be technical experts to frame policy. “Management 
must manage. Actions can be delegated, responsibility cannot,” (p.13).  
The security manager role which emerged in more advanced organisations had  responsibility 
for policy, privacy, confidentiality and integrity (van Biene-Hershey, 2007). The role was a 
mixture of technical and organisational skills, able to understand the issues but also needing to 
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command respect within the organisation to be effective (Watt, 1989). Whilst security 
management became more common – Watt states that by the middle of the decade one was 
present in around 60% of organisations – this was typically at a junior level within IT. 
In other enterprises security management at this stage was seen as a drain on profitability (Yost, 
2015). Indeed, there is some evidence the position of security officer did not initially command 
professional respect as one might assume today. Watt (1989) states that it is “quite often … 
thought of as the solution for the placement of an employee whose career may be ailing”. 
Christmas (1992), in a sister publication, allocated responsibility to senior IT and operational 
management streams and not to any defined security management function. This is somewhat 
curious, since the book is entitled “Network Security Manager”; possibly this specific role was 
considered a technical position. Such a world was ill-prepared for the advent of malware. In 
1988 the first self-replicating computer virus was launched with devastating effects. The 
payload for this virus was simply the processing overhead of replicating itself, however the 
potential for damage had been proven (DeNardis, 2007).  
In the 1990s the growth of personal and commercial internet usage put huge pressure on the 
still-new IT Security function (Dlamini et al., 2009) which expanded strongly during the decade 
(Cresson-Wood, 1997). Viruses and hacking became a major problem for business (see Loch et 
al., 1992), resulting in both technical security responses (anti-virus and firewall products) and 
personnel responses (social engineering awareness and behavioural training). The use of 
standards to structure proper security management became more common (von Solms, 1999). 
“Ten years ago, information security policies were more or less unheard of outside the 
world of secret military and government IT networks. Now they are regarded by 
security professionals as one of the most important of the foundations of information 
security.” 
(Lindup, 1995) 
 “The web” in the 1990s must be seen as a hybrid entity; the underlying connectivity, protocols, 
hardware and software had been in existence for many years; the significant change came 
during the mass uptake of the applications by the human user (Gollman, 2011). With the rise in 
online commerce came the opportunity for fraud, changing the focus of hacking from teenage 
prank to serious organised crime (DeNardis, 2007). 
Moving into the new century, whilst the focus on IT Security has gradually increased, overall 
companies were still not resourcing the function adequately (Gordon and Loeb, 2002). 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2011) found that towards the end of the 2000s security funding had 
become stable and was maintained throughout the economic downturn, but that it was 
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vulnerable to ever-changing priorities. Compliance as a principal driver of spending tailed off 
after a peak caused by the Sarbanes–Oxley legislation (Johnson and Goetz, 2007), for example. 
Transitory management attention is a strong theme in the literature. Spending is often associated 
with specific events skewing perceptions of risk (Ezingeard and Bowen-Schrire, 2007) and 
hence proper Risk Management, which will be examined later. 
2.2.2 Expanding Horizons: CIA and Successor Models 
Information Security is frequently said to comprise Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
(“CIA”) (Brotby 2009, p6; NSTISS, 1994; Gollman, 2011; Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; 
von Solms and von Solms, 2008). This model is so well-entrenched that it bears scrutiny here 
before proceeding. 
 Confidentiality refers to ensuring that information is available only to authorised parties, 
or “the protection of information from exposure to others” (Buche and Vician, 2005). 
Alongside concealment of information in transit through encryption, confidentiality 
requires the protection of stored data through access control, which requires 
authentication. Most users will be familiar with usernames and passwords, which 
become essential once remote access became available (Morris and Thompson, 1979), 
again bringing human factors into play. Passwords can usually be more easily 
compromised through social engineering against the human user than by technical 
attacks, particularly if policies do not respect the limitations of human memory (CESG, 
2015; Alexander 2008, p.52; Adams and Sasse, 1999). 
 Integrity similarly relies on good access control. “Information has integrity when it is 
whole, complete and uncorrupted” (Whitman and Mattord 2009, p.12). In other words, 
it is not sufficient for data to be available and private, it must remain reliable and correct 
to be useful. Freely available documents may still require protection against alteration 
depending on their use (NCSC, 1992). Malice is not the only threat to integrity; systems 
without inherent error correction are susceptible to alteration through fault or mistake 
(Humphreys, 2008; Whitman and Mattord, 2009). 
 Availability (whether information is available to authorised users when it is needed) is 
often compromised in the pursuit of the two aspects above, but is just as vital. Besnard 
and Arief (2004) use the analogy of a car: at rest it is safe but also an expensive, useless 
object; the car must move (placing it and its occupants at risk) to actually function in 
any real sense as a vehicle. 
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Beyond “CIA”, since the expansion of e-commerce and computing in general, concerns now 
include non-repudiation and accountability (Brotby 2009, p.6; Whitman and Mattord 2009, p.9; 
Hamati, 2008; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Whitman and Mattord (2009) add 
Accuracy, Authenticity, Utility and Possession, although these are arguably augmentations of 
the original three. More generally however, narrow “CIA”-type classifications are inadequate if 
they over-emphasise individual threats and controls, but fail to include the social and ethical 
elements involved in the integration of the security management process into the organisation 
(Ashenden, 2008; Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Trompeter and Eloff, 2001).  
Modern Information Security requires a holistic approach which includes the entire 
organisational infrastructure and staff (Bunker, 2012; Fink et al., 2008). Demands for constant 
and wide-ranging information access from remote users who are able to distribute it further, 
give opportunities for misuse. To the original “CIA” aspects must therefore be added the (non-
technical and traditional) qualities of Responsibility, Integrity, Trust and Ethicality (Dhillon and 
Backhouse, 2000). Modern security therefore places the human at the centre of its study. 
2.2.3 An Overview of Human Factors in Information Security 
Information Security concerns comprise technology, processes and people (Okenyi and Owens, 
2007; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007; Eloff and Eloff, 2003; Werlinger et al., 2009). Technology has 
no pre-eminence; it is a tool available to both attacker and defender equally (Schneier 2008, 
pp.1–7). Of these, people are the least logical and predictable and the most likely to make 
errors; they are able to become dissatisfied, commit deliberate sabotage and are prone to 
external influence (Frangopoulos et al., 2013). However, humans are also necessarily involved 
in any effective solution, through exhibiting secure behaviour and vigilance (Stewart and Lacey, 
2012; Straub, 1990). Whilst implementing a security policy requires technical controls, these are 
not in themselves sufficient. Therefore, after a slow start (Cannoy et al., 2006; Furnell and 
Clarke, 2012; Hitchings, 1995) security is now recognised in the literature as a multi-
dimensional technical and human behavioural management discipline (Dhillon and Backhouse, 
2001; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Ashenden, 2008; Ruighaver et al., 2007; von Solms, 
2001a; von Solms and von Solms, 2004; McFadzean et al., 2006; Coles-Kemp, 2009; Besnard 
and Arief, 2004; Kayworth and Whitten, 2010; Soomro et al., 2016).  
The creation of a tailored and mission-appropriate policy, stating objectives and strategy rather 
than simply detailed rules and enforcement action, is a fundamental first step towards security 
(Blakley et al., 2001; von Solms, 2001a; Doherty and Fulford, 2006; Stanton et al., 2005; 
Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). Mere creation of a policy however does not lead automatically 
to acceptance, compliance and a secure state (Fulford and Doherty, 2003; Doherty and Fulford, 
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2005; Höne and Eloff, 2002b). Since they are as much instruments of internal power and control 
as a detailed statement of security principles and required behaviours (Stahl et al., 2012), policy 
creation requires a negotiated process amongst several internal stakeholders (Flowerday and 
Tuyikeze, 2016). The security manager’s organisational and diplomatic prowess therefore 
becomes as important as their technical knowledge. 
Within the policy’s scope and target, the “Insider Threat” remains a concern (Humphreys, 2008; 
Renaud, 2012) however it is perhaps now competing with other pressing topics for attention 
(Hovav and D'Arcy, 2003). Indeed, “inside” is now somewhat anachronistic (Leuprecht et al., 
2016; Palmer, 2005); networks became more porous as mobility dissolved the physical 
perimeter and network interconnection with partners and customers created hazy boundaries 
(Swindle and Conner, 2004).  
Alongside malicious action, policy is challenged by non-compliance, wilful or otherwise. 
Human users of information systems have considerable freedom of thought and their own 
priorities for their interaction (Lamb and Kling, 2003). Where policies and controls disrupt or 
complicate operations there is clear incentive for users to circumvent them, at least where the 
cost of non-compliance and the effectiveness of any awareness training are not sufficient to 
counter this (Post and Kagan, 2007; Renaud, 2012; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Besnard and Arief, 
2004; Furnell and Thomson, 2009; Straub, 1990; Albrechtsen, 2007; Thomson and von Solms, 
1998; Thomson and van Niekerk, 2012). Similarly as security managers rarely have direct line 
control over the employees, they rely on local management to convey the importance and 
mandatory nature of the controls (Boss et al., 2009), which may conflict with their own interests 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). A policy which relies on execution by others must win their 
assent by some means, persuading the managers of key resources that it is in their interests to 
comply (Ashenden and Sasse, 2013; Johnson and Goetz, 2007), but assent (if won) strongly aids 
with gaining compliance (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010; Safa et al., 2016).  
Aside from questions of obedience, if writers do not sufficiently consider practicality and 
human limitations, policies and controls may become impossible for users to follow even if 
motivated to do so (Renaud, 2012; Sasse et al., 2001). This has been erroneously addressed in 
terms of correcting the human “failure” however the failure point is not expecting humans to be 
fallible (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Dlamini et al., 2009; Kraemer et al., 2009) and failing to 
ensure that secure systems remain effective and useable for their function (Dhillon et al., 2016). 
Compliance relies on human attitudes and habits: level and certainty of threat perceived, self-
efficacy (confidence in one’s ability to perform a task) and belief that the task is necessary and 
effective are highly relevant in persuading users to follow policy (Albrechtson, 2007; Ng et al., 
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2009; Vance et al., 2012; Safa et al., 2016). Moreover where the user can somehow justify their 
actions as necessary to perform their role or not damaging to the organisation (neutralisation) 
they will tend not to comply (Barlow et al., 2013; Siponen and Vance, 2010; Hedström et al. 
2011).  
Internal education is often through awareness campaigns, however these are often unwisely 
structured top-down, assuming that technical content and the importance of compliance will be 
readily digestible and relevant to people whose primary roles are not security-related (Stewart 
and Lacey, 2012; Siponen, 2000; Guzman et al., 2004; 2008). Better compliance is actually seen 
where the security function engages with the lived work of their clients in an involving and 
personally-relevant manner (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009; 2010; Siponen et al., 2014; 
Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010; Fulford and Doherty, 2003).  
Security comes from policy being accepted and lived as part of the organisation’s day-to-day 
life (Thomson and von Solms, 2005) however today’s newer workers were born knowing 
ubiquitous mobile internet access and powerful search engines, and for whom there is little 
boundary between work and home lives, therefore the challenge is to incorporate this mindset 
into company culture (Leuprecht et al., 2016). Attempting compliance through pure disciplinary 
coercion, although partially effective if the threat is severe (Son, 2011; D’Arcy et al., 2009; 
Herath and Rao, 2009a; 2009b) is not fully understood (Guo, 2013; Crossler et al., 2013) and is 
rarely seen as the optimal strategy for gaining co-operation (Sasse, 2015; Kolkowska and 
Dhillon, 2013; Whitman, 2003; Vroom and von Solms, 2004; Ifinedo, 2014; Kankanhalli et al., 
2003). The security function if badly represented can appear to become a pure policing function 
and apparent antagonist for the user (Whitman and Mattord 2009, p.471).  
To foreshadow the discussion of Actor–Network Theory, true cultural acceptance of security is 
where the desired behaviour is seen in the values of the staff because they have been enrolled in 
the security effort (van Niekerk and von Solms, 2010; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010; Kolkowska 
and Dhillon, 2013). Instilling that security culture is the subject of a considerable amount of 
research, albeit empirically difficult to verify the effectiveness of a strategy. It is not proposed to 
explore this here – the interested reader may be directed to Karlsson et al. (2015) – it is simply 
necessary to note the importance of this topic for later argument. Rather than reifying security 
into a commodity to be bought, it is necessary to make the behavioural and cultural adjustments 
necessary to respond properly to the entire spectrum of threats (Stahl et al., 2008). 
2.2.4 Standards and Legislation 
So far the internal choices and pressures for the security manager have been noted. There are 
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however several sources of externally-derived structured constraints on security practice, which 
vary significantly for intention and sanction but which together constitute coercive isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Gerber and von Solms, 2008). These pressures may however 
actually empower the security manager and lead to greater internal resource allocation 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2015). The degree to which organisations are subject to these influences 
depends on their market area, however even unregulated industries will be subject to general 
statutory controls such as data protection legislation, creating further pressure for security staff 
to master non-technical policy and compliance skills (Burdon et al., 2016). In some 
environments the preponderance of regulation may even require a dedicated compliance officer 
to prevent private or corporate sanction (Freeman, 2007).  
Standards are in theory merely instruments of compatibility; they embody agreements between 
interested parties on a common set of objective criteria for determining whether an item 
complies with a given specification. They are however created by an interest group for some 
motivating reason and when adopted translate the priorities of the author and adopter into 
internal compliance and policy action; they are also instruments of politics and power 
(Backhouse et al., 2006), prescribing a common set of processes for all, often regardless of their 
individual circumstances (Siponen and Willison, 2009).  
Adoption may be uncontroversial commercially, for example apparent non-compliance with 
PCI-DSS
2
 may be unthinkable in retail industries. Similarly the ISO27000/BS7799 standard 
suite is a frequent cause of IT Security management formalisation in the twenty-first century 
due to its widespread adoption (Humphreys, 2008; von Solms, 2000). To preview the discussion 
of Actor–Network Theory, the real power of a voluntary standard comes when its adoption 
gathers momentum and displaces even potentially superior competitors through market share 
and general recognition (Heinrich, 2013). For less well-accepted standards, benefits may be less 
clear-cut (Johnson and Goetz, 2007), requiring security practitioners to prove (or rather sell) 
their commercial advantages to management. Similarly the pressure may well be to simply 
achieve certification for its own sake rather than truly accept and adopt its ethos unless the 
correct cultural change is achieved (Ruighaver et al., 2007). 
Data for which a company is liable are increasingly processed by others. Whilst it is sometimes 
a statutory duty to specify a standard contractually to the processor such as under Sarbanes– 
Oxley (Mahdavi and Elliot, 2005) to mitigate risks from mishandling, it is uncertain whether 
this genuinely ensures good internal security hygiene and robust protection of data (see 
                                                     
2
 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, mandatory for merchants processing card payments 
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Humphreys, 2008). It may simply provide a defence against criticism by complying with due 
diligence requirements. The content of the standard in the latter instance is then all but 
irrelevant, the material point being the act of adoption itself (Siponen, 2006), becoming a black 
box as will be discussed later.  
Legislation is often broader than more detailed standards, and need not have computing systems 
as its focus; Sarbanes–Oxley for example requires the organisation to have effective controls, 
which compels a technical response internally (von Solms, 2006). In like manner, the Health 
Insurance Portability Act was the first US legislation to require standards to be set for protection 
of health-related data (US DoHHS, 2011). Enforcement action has raised compliance awareness 
(Grandison and Bhatti, 2010) catalysing changes which hitherto had been politically difficult to 
obtain inside organisations (Johnson and Goetz, 2007). Statutes however are difficult to keep 
current and relevant (Walton, 2006) therefore secondary legislation by regulations is often used. 
Similarly standards such as ISO27000, COBIT and similar models prescribe policies but avoid 
mandating detailed controls lest they become swiftly outdated (Höne and Eloff, 2002a). 
Legislation has mandated changes to the industry itself. The US “Information Assurance 
Workforce Improvement Program” mandates minimum qualifications for assurance roles in the 
US Department of Defense (US DoD, 2010) thus driving the certification market reviewed later. 
The EU General Data Protection Regulations mandate a data protection officer (Tankard, 2016) 
but their full impact is not yet fully known. 
2.2.5 Security Governance 
In the sections above, the increasing complexity and decreasingly techno-centric nature of 
Information Security were seen. Von Solms (2000) initially characterised the development of 
Information Security into three phases (“waves”): 
 Technical: Hardware is isolated, physical security and rudimentary controls are 
sufficient. 
 Management: Security is a key task recognised by senior management, accompanied by 
the introduction of “policies, Information Security managers and organisational 
structures”. 
 Institutionalisation: Realisation that the human was central thus creating a culture where 
secure practices are routinely included in the everyday work and custom of the average 
employee was necessary, rather than individual controls (see also Da Veiga and Eloff, 
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2007). 
After a number of corporate scandals raised the profile of corporate governance, legislative 
responses such as Sarbanes–Oxley made directors personally liable for corporate failings, thus 
ensuring management attention (Dhillon and Mishra, 2008; Freeman, 2007). A “Fourth Wave” 
followed (von Solms, 2006) where security moved from an important part of IT management to 
an aspect of corporate governance. This is the point at which the security manager perhaps 
gained most prominence and – crucially – separation from the IT infrastructure. In the story of 
the Information Security profession therefore this is a critical turning point: responsibility has 
been passed to the board, but the board must in turn rely on specialist advice.  
 “[Governance is] the set of responsibilities exercised by the board and executive 
management with the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that objectives are 
achieved, ascertaining that risks are managed appropriately and verifying that the 
enterprise’s resources are used responsibly.” 
(ISACA cited in Brotby 2009, p.5, emphasis original) 
In other words, management aspects of Information Security practice may be labelled – in order 
to separate them from technical implementation and procedural controls – as “governance”, or 
the Information Security Management System (ISMS) (see Broderick, 2006). This refers to the 
organisational forms which manage not the actual movement of the information, but review and 
direct the mechanisms by which this is controlled. Through this, implementation of the required 
controls becomes systematic and aligned with the management of other business areas 
(Ashenden, 2008). The organisation must establish that it (verifiably) complies with all statutory 
and regulatory requirements, and standards of best practice (Calder and Watkins 2008, p.2) as a 
separate dimension from simple operations and performance management (Fink et al., 2008).  
Several models for information security governance exist and it is not proposed to review each 
in detail, since this has been done elsewhere and most relevant here is in the pressure they create 
rather than their exact composition. See for example the comparison by Da Veiga and Eloff 
(2007) of four prominent models (ISO27001, PROTECT, the Capability Maturity Model and 
Tudor) and their synthesis of a composite framework from them. Many other governance 
structures are similarly influenced by the ISO27001 or COBIT frameworks and mandate 
positions for specialist security staff; see Eloff and Eloff (2003), or the Calder and Watkins 
(2008) model which assumes an Information Security Manager and accompanying expert (but 
not exclusively technical) adviser. The recent model of Carcary et al. (2016) provides a maturity 
assessment substantially based on these standards. 
Whereas technical controls are implemented and operated by operational staff, security strategy 
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sits squarely with the board to instigate and delegate down through an effective structure where 
appropriate. Many authors and standards stress this point (Barton et al., 2016; Hu et al., 2012; 
Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010; Neal, 2008; Knapp et al., 2006; von Solms, 2001b; Fink et al., 
2008; Ezingeard and Bowen-Schrire, 2007; Kankanhalli et al., 2003), however McFazdean et 
al. (2006) provide a very useful summary of the rationale, paraphrased below: 
 Without the authority of the directors, it is impossible to implement the controls 
required for adequate security and force compliance, 
 Security must become a part of corporate culture, which can only be achieved by those 
who lead and create that culture, 
 All enterprise risk management is the responsibility of the board because they are 
ultimately responsible to shareholders and regulators, 
 Directors have the unique perspective which allows them to judge the value of 
information assets, 
 The board’s duty is to ensure the company remains competitive and therefore secure. 
This creates the pressure to ensure good governance but not necessarily direct control of detail; 
directors are after all responsible for legal compliance and financial performance but are not all 
accountants or lawyers; executives direct, whilst policy is created in the management layer 
(Posthumus and von Solms, 2004). Boards must therefore create the conditions whereby 
technical decisions are organised and taken well, since many technical areas are simply 
“invisible” to them without professional guidance (Rainer et al., 2007; McFadzean et al., 2007) 
or which they will struggle to judge on an informed basis (Straub, 1990). This provides a 
foundation for Information Security as a distinct function. 
The positioning of this function in the organisation is significant. There is no well-established 
single model for this (Cannoy et al., 2006); security practitioners were historically found in IT 
reporting through the CIO (Ayoub, 2011; Johnson and Goetz, 2007) at least in part because of 
its origins as a technical discipline (Brotby 2009, p.1). Many practitioners will have come from 
non-security technical backgrounds; refusal to acquire the additional skills and attitude required 
to broaden competence creates a de facto glass ceiling (Brocaglia, 2005; E-Skills UK, 2013). 
The effects of technical controls however (and particularly any failure of them) are still one of 
the security team’s most visible “products” within an organisation. 
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Neal (2008) identified three broad types of security management role distribution in orthodox 
hierarchies: 
 No formal security manager exists. Technical functions are carried out, potentially in 
isolation, by individuals in technical groups. Responses to technical threats may be 
mitigated however there is a lower emphasis on policies and standards. 
 A role is established with responsibility for policy, procedure and disaster recovery but 
without direct authority over implementation. 
 A formal CISO figure exists with direct prescriptive authority over technical security 
specialists, possibly through line management authority. 
Neal’s (2008) suggestion that these types represent an evolution linked to size through simple 
division of labour is in principle reasonable: unless there are sufficient numbers of security 
employees the management, technical and non-technical roles cannot be separated and split 
hierarchies formed. The main sources here cannot assist in this enquiry; purely data-driven 
demographics studies (such as E-Skills UK, 2013), whilst producing useful information on 
certification and age data for example, are rather unsatisfying in delivering conclusions which 
are theoretically interesting since they lack any context to the decisions and choices represented. 
Qualitative, exploratory work would be useful in this field. 
More recently, it appears that security’s reporting lines are increasingly to senior business 
management (possibly the CEO) as well as senior information management (Winder, 2009). A 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2011) survey showed that whereas in 2007 38% of principal security 
officers reported through IT, by 2010 this had reduced to 23% in favour of operational directors. 
This was attributed to an increasing appreciation by company boards that the protection of 
information assets was a business goal rather than a technology function. 
Can IT Security management be positioned effectively within the IT hierarchy, given its 
regulatory or policing function? Hayes (2002) quotes two contrasting views from industry; one 
notes a potential conflict of interest between the policer and the policed, since a key role of IS 
security is one of audit, however the other sees reporting through the CIO as both a method to 
gain heavyweight management support and to introduce an expert champion able to understand 
the issues. Whitman and Mattord (2009, pp.28–32) place the CISO role as a direct report of the 
CIO, seeing security as a function of the IT department. Even in larger organisations there may 
even be intervening management, suggesting that this is not a form of “CxO” top leadership role 
implied by the word “Chief” which to some will devalue the position (Brocaglia, 2005). It is 
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important that the role tasked with audit or risk assessment is not placed too low in the 
organisation however since this will lead to judgement being affected by internal political 
pressure from operational management. The needs of a production department may be at odds 
with security requirements, it might be possible to bring a system into production more quickly 
if security controls are not imposed (Alexander 2008, p.17; p.114). 
2.2.6 Risk Management 
Risk Management is central to security governance and therefore effective modern security 
practice (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; von Solms and von Solms, 2008; Wang, 1988; Whitman 
and Mattord, 2009). It has gained particular prominence since the rise of governance structures 
(von Solms, 2006) and continues to increase in importance (DBER, 2008) reflecting the 
increasingly information-dependent nature of the modern enterprise (Gerber and von Solms, 
2001). The assessment and balance of competing factors required is important for the claim of 
security management as a relatively non-technical business-centred area of professional 
judgement and thus part of a discrete area of work. 
Risk Management is the systematic enumeration and evaluation of the likelihood and impact of 
potential undesirable events and devising a strategy for accepting or reducing each within an 
overall tolerance for uncertainty or “risk appetite”. It requires judgement to implement, since 
absolute protection of every asset is unnecessary and unprofitable if not impossible (Campbell 
et al., 2003; Brocaglia, 2005). It forms part of an effective governance programme, to identify 
unacceptable risks and design a response to the principal threats (Straub and Welke, 1998). 
Security exists within corporate commercial reality; just as accountants cannot refuse to spend 
any money, security managers must balance risk against restraining productivity, otherwise 
products cannot be brought to market and the business will fail (Neal, 2008). Consequently the 
function must understand the mainstream business to contextualise their judgement, establishing 
interfaces with enterprise senior management (Rainer et al., 2007; Fitzgerald, 2007). Security 
incidents are an inevitable cost of operations, which can be reduced to some extent by 
optimising security spending to reduce that loss (Fink et al., 2008; Gordon and Loeb, 2002; 
Campbell et al., 2003; Brotby 2009, p.2). To do so, security must understand each area of the 
business in order to identify weaknesses before they are exploited (Mahdavi and Elliot, 2005; 
Raywood, 2012). They must be able to understand the business impact of information loss to 
judge how much effort to expend towards its avoidance (Bunker, 2012). 
The risk manager is not a system owner, they are a consultant in its welfare and their advice 
must be fully aligned with the organisation’s strategy and goals (Foster, 2005; Johnson and 
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Goetz, 2007). They must display a positive attitude as an enabler rather than a preventer 
(Brocaglia, 2005). Ensuring that the function is (and is perceived to be) opportunity- and 
business-led is crucial to the inclusion of the security function during the development of 
strategy. Prior to security moving out from technical obscurity, business managers deliberately 
avoided engaging and requesting advice as the answer tended towards the restraint of novel 
ideas or greater flexibility; such a conservative and restrictive model is no longer sustainable 
(Moritz, 2005). The CISO must ensure that security strategy is aligned with both IT and 
corporate strategies (Seeholzer, 2012). Attitudes to security are heavily dependent on market 
context; agility is still the over-riding priority for organisations in fast-moving sectors thus it is 
vital that risk analysis and security culture are aligned with the organisation’s own major values 
and strategy (Johnson et al., 2009). 
Organisations naturally choose different attitudes to risk as another variable in normal 
commercial competition (McBride, 2005; McFadzean et al., 2007). Strategies for exercising that 
choice vary; ISO27001 for example supports accepting the risk and factoring in its cost, 
avoiding it by somehow reducing the frequency of occurrence, transferring the risk outside 
(possibly to specialists in controlling it) or reducing the impact through some mitigating action 
(Humphreys, 2008; Blakley et al., 2001). The security manager as risk assessor has a role in 
shaping enterprise strategy and must thus be able to advise senior management in business terms 
(Brocaglia, 2005).  
A structured framework for dispassionate and regular prior assessment of risks is important 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2015). Security policies which are created as counter-measures after the fact 
may be ill-considered and are rarely well implemented (Cannoy et al., 2006). Corporate 
leadership however often requires some external impetus to take a direct interest in security 
matters (Ezingeard and Bowen-Schrire, 2007; Doherty and Fulford, 2006). Outside such crises, 
risk decisions are frequently taken on the basis of unwarranted optimism in the assessment of 
the risk, partially due to the illusion of controllability (Rhee et al., 2012). 
Qualitative and quantitative variants of risk management exist; both estimate risk as the product 
of likelihood and impact, however they differ on how this information is assessed and what 
level of precision is claimed (von Solms and von Solms 2008, p.87). Quantitative approaches 
attempt to assign a value to the loss, often to calculate whether proposed discretionary security 
spending would represent a good investment (Gollman 2011, p.29). Qualitative methods by 
contrast classify risks into multi-dimensional strata based on impact and likelihood using either 
objective criteria or by simple assessment (White et al. 2003, p.486). An organisation can 
therefore rank risks to be mitigated or set a maximum score as a method for selective 
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acceptance. 
The most widely-known quantitative model is Annualised Loss Expectancy (ALE), where the 
statistical chance of a scenario and the cost of its impact are multiplied to give an annual spend 
for that scenario, the sum of all such events representing the overall loss due to risk (Blakley et 
al., 2001). This is of course only a simple model and ignores some relevant factors; some risks 
may not be morally acceptable to assess purely on financial costs for example, since there may 
be a social, personal or reputational cost of inaction which cannot be ignored (Courtney, 1977; 
Oppliger, 2015). Similarly unsurvivable impacts are terminal and thus prevent costs from being 
averaged out over the longer term, thus avoidance of these must be prioritised (Bodin et al., 
2008). 
The principal criticism of quantitative measures is that the probabilities of many events cannot 
be predicted reliably since accurate occurrence data is not available (Oppliger, 2015; Anderson, 
2003) and anyway will vary according to sector and resources available to respond to incidents 
(Humphreys, 2008). What data is available are often from badly constructed work or with poor 
levels of statistical analysis (Ryan and Jefferson, 2003). Similarly the reduction in occurrence 
for mitigating actions cannot be known accurately; it is challenging for example to calculate 
whether an action has deterred an attack (Stewart, 2012; Ryan and Ryan, 2006).  
Gordon et al. (2003a) counsel using the enterprise’s own experience for incidence and loss 
figures, however even if this data is well known, the impacts – particularly to such intangibles 
as reputation, morale and goodwill – are similarly problematic to predict accurately (Hovav and 
D'Arcy, 2003). Quantitative data is therefore in reality often estimated and the result somewhat 
subjective. Moreover even well-intentioned human nature can lead the author to err towards the 
value which is most convenient for their argument (Hovav and D'Arcy, 2003; Anderson, 2003) 
or use information from parties with an inherent interest in supplying the data (Stewart, 2012). 
The use of “objective” risks as a political lever for justifying extra resources is therefore noted 
as a point of interest. 
Since an insurance sector is growing to respond to such risks it can be expected that work will 
continue on accurately gauging the financial impact of breaches (Johnson et al., 2009) however 
this may only be practical for insurers with access to a substantial data set. Such efforts will be 
hampered by a general reluctance to publish security-related data due to stock market effects 
(Campbell et al., 2003; Spanos and Angelis, 2016; Hovav and D'Arcy, 2003; Kotulic and Clark, 
2004) however legislation in the US and EU should force companies to reveal this information 
(Tankard, 2016).  
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Quantitative analysis has the benefit of simplicity and clarity. Executives comprehend a three 
million dollar loss from bad publicity more readily than a risk rated as “16” (Miller and 
Gregory, 2007). Qualitative risk analyses however can be challenged where perceptions of risks 
vary from those presented. McFazdean et al. (2007) found that risk perception amongst senior 
managers varied greatly, even amongst those in apparently similar organisational contexts or 
business sectors. They posited that there was a continuum of “perceived risk” according to the 
individual’s own values and attitudes which, when combined with the degree to which the 
organisation’s use of technology was strategic, affected the stance of that organisation towards 
security spending and acceptance of controversial policy items. An ambitious security function 
in those organisations whose executives perceive the prevailing risk to be too low will therefore 
need to engage politically to alter those perceptions.  
Much work has been undertaken in the area of risk metrics, both to improve the level of Risk 
Analysis (Anderson and Moore, 2007) and to aid the process of measuring compliance for 
assurance purposes (von Solms, 2001a). If risk management is the business of reducing risk to 
acceptable levels, is there a mechanism for translating the potentially subjective statements of 
risk appetite from the board into an objective set of criteria for what constitutes acceptability? 
There is the opportunity for this “mechanism” to be the security specialist. 
In summary, security therefore is no longer a merely technical domain; it consists both of 
technical threats which can be quantified and systems configured to detect or prevent, and of 
less predictable and human-based aspects which must be understood and incorporated into a 
strategy of defence and awareness (Spagnoletti and Resca, 2008). The discipline finds material 
form in the policy document and organisational form in the ISMS. It includes operational details 
of policy enforcement but goes beyond them. Supporting this is the Information Security 
practitioner, a possible candidate profession. What then does it mean to be a “profession”? 
2.3 The Sociology of the Professions 
It was argued above that the emergence of Information Security had potentially created a 
discrete “profession”, therefore it is necessary to understand what this entails. Information 
Security workers have become a more active topic for researchers recently following 
government intervention, however this has rarely been linked with the study of 
professionalisation, which represents a very substantial area of twentieth and twenty-first 
century sociology. The sheer scale of work in this area defies ready summary, however the key 
history and theory of that discipline are reviewed below, in order to support the later stages of 
analysis. 
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2.3.1 Introduction 
The principal sine qua non distinction of “the professions” in the modern age is work requiring 
a proven, advanced level of knowledge or education, however this is usually coupled to a 
commitment to ethical practice, some form of altruistic conduct, and regulation by a body of 
peers (Saks, 2012; Millerson, 1964). Beyond this, regional variations exist in concepts of 
“profession” and in the modes of their formation (Freidson 1986, p.13), thus in 
professionalisation studies it is necessary either to contrast these or work within a single cultural 
model. In keeping with the UK-centric scope of the overall study and the bulk of the English-
language literature, the state-sponsored Anglo–American concept is the focus of this study, 
rather than the top-down state-imposed continental model (Neal and Morgan, 2000; Saks, 2015). 
European sociology has indeed sometimes regarded the British and American discussions as 
curious, since many non-Anglophone cultures have no equivalent concept (Sciulli, 2007). Some 
of this discrepancy may originate in European professions being mainly employed and 
controlled by the state whereas in the UK and US they are seen as more autonomous, however 
even this is not a clean comparison of types (Evetts, 2003). 
Professionals became identifiable once university degrees distinguished priests, physicians, and 
lawyers by higher levels of general learning through liberal education (Crook, 2008). 
Universities themselves were originally influenced heavily by the Church and in many cases 
even secular professions were originally comprised mainly of those in orders (Goode, 1960). 
Indeed, the etymology of “profession” is related to the monastic act taking of a sacred vow 
(Freidson 1986, p.21).  
It is no coincidence that professions are linked with status; when livings were made from the 
land and indivisible estates entailed as a self-supporting entity to a single scion in turn, an 
income and purpose was needed for any younger sons. Careers with suitable status and income 
were not readily available and appointments made by patronage rather than on merit (Reader 
1966, pp.2–10). The industrial revolution however created a wealthier middle class, able to pay 
for professional services but with less control over the professional’s work, given their new 
wider source of potential clients (Johnson 1972, p.52).  
Thus our society inherits “the professions” as an apparently ancient concept. In reality however, 
that concept has evolved with the rest of society. Medicine, as one would now recognise it, is for 
example far more recent than the foundation of the Royal College of Physicians under Henry 
VIII in 1518 (Saks 2015, p.27). Despite its long history, a recognisable unified occupation 
(formed from apothecaries, surgeons and physicians, with the druggists distinct in the 
Pharmaceutical Society), undertaking ethically regulated practice with systematic education and 
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legally-enforced training was not present until at least the late nineteenth century, following the 
passage of the Medical Act 1858 (Reader 1966, p.41; p.67), and arguably later still. What then is 
a profession and why does its definition allow such leeway? 
2.3.2 Traits, Definition and Function: Division of Labour in an Ordered Society  
“To define profession is to invite controversy.” 
(Cogan 1955, p.105) 
Whilst professions are hugely significant for both citizen and corporation alike, representing 
some of society's most powerful and influential entities (Abbot 1988, p.1), it is not clear 
precisely how a profession truly differs from any other occupation. A profession, as understood 
in earlier studies, is an occupation whose competent undertaking is important; it is considered at 
least partially altruistic and a valuable service to society, or
 “good” work (Freidson 1994, 
p.200). It requires substantial, abstract knowledge learned as theory, which is then combined 
with judgement and practical skills to be applied to the particular situation of a client in an 
ethical manner, to a standard acceptable in the eyes of their peers; standards are typically 
maintained through membership of an institution which issues credentials and can revoke these 
for misbehaviour or incompetence (Millerson 1964, pp.148–180). Since the professions 
typically handle sensitive information and the vital interests of their client (Evetts, 2013), their 
probity must be beyond question (Reader 1966, p.159); where the state has been persuaded that 
sufficient risk is associated with incompetent or unethical practice and hence caveat emptor is 
not desirable (Larson 1977, p.49), and that there exists a body which can regulate it and agitates 
for that (Freidson 1986, p.35), membership of this institution becomes mandatory and the 
professionalisation process (or “project”) is complete.  
As a result of the training, knowledge and ethical standards achieved (and responsibility which 
flows from technical autonomy) the profession is usually granted high status by society and 
frequently able to charge a high fee (Cogan, 1955; Gorman and Sandefur, 2011; Freidson 1994, 
p.200; Sciulli, 2007; Macdonald 1995, pp.157–171). The degree to which practitioners had 
associated, organised themselves and claimed monopoly over their areas of expertise was once 
seen as a continuum on which all professions could be placed, assessed by case study (Abbott, 
1988; Gorman and Sandefur, 2011; Greenwood, 1957). The full profession then is at heart a 
bargain: the state awards control – over an area of knowledge so complex and esoteric that 
competence can only be judged by peers – to an organisation of practitioners in exchange for 
accepting responsibility to ensure that it is competently and ethically performed (Susskind and 
Susskind 2015, p.23; Freidson 1986, p.33).  
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The attempt to create a taxonomy of profession is often divided into the trait model – what 
specific behaviour, characteristics or properties mark out professions from other occupations – 
and the functionalist model– what function do they fulfil in society. The trait model could be 
seen as the positivist aspect of the field, concerned with developing a basis for empirically 
determining professional status (if criteria could be established), or even the degree of 
professionalisation if one assumes a calculable metric. The earliest attempt to establish an 
analytical literature is usually credited to the substantial (1933) trait-based work of Carr-
Saunders and Wilson (Abbott 1988, p.4; Freidson 1986, p.27; Crook, 2008) who surveyed 
around thirty professions, almost entirely still extant and generally recognised (pp.7–288) 
followed by a comparison of the similarities and differences between them. 
This was the start of a period of many such analyses and lists of criteria. Cogan’s (1955) 
attempted definition is typical:  
“A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the 
theoretical structure of some department of learning or science, and upon the abilities 
accompanying such understanding. This understanding and these abilities are applied to 
the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the profession are modified by 
knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience of 
mankind, which serve to correct the errors of specialism. The profession, serving the 
vital needs of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the 
client.” 
(Cogan, 1955) 
Millerson however both created such a set of criteria and immediately challenged the concept. 
His list itself is similar: 
 “a profession involves a skill based on theoretical knowledge  
 the skill requires training and education  
 the professional must demonstrate competence by passing a test  
 integrity is maintained by adherence to a code of conduct  
 the service is for the public good  
 the profession is organised” 
(Millerson 1964, p.4) 
Millerson himself notes however that these are descriptive of an ideal type; since even medicine 
has not always possessed all of the above therefore they cannot be considered essential. The 
distinctions identified were rarely theoretically-based, often being a simple retrospective 
deconstruction of the claims of existing dominant professions (Mangan, 2014). Furthermore, as 
Millerson goes on to show (1964, p.7), taking atheoretical assumptions that professions must 
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resemble prototypes leads to problems when work takes these as qualifying criteria. For 
example, the concept of deprofessionalisation (that professions have lost some essential 
component by moving from autonomous practice in small cells of practice to controlled work in 
managed bureaucracies) is based on acceptance of that autonomy as a criterion, however that 
acceptance is merely observational with little basis in an accepted “general theory” of the 
professions. 
In search of alternative models, Susskind and Susskind (2015, p.15) cite the Wittgensteinian 
analogy repeated by Downie (1990) of four brothers sharing similar characteristics without 
being clearly identical. This is an alluring but unconvincing comparison, since fraternal 
similarity has an external rationale for the selection criterion, whereas to select on the basis of 
similarity without a theoretical basis and then define by that similarity is surely not a useful 
taxonomy for many purposes. 
Ultimately therefore this attempt to create a strict definition of a nebulous concept by trait was 
unfruitful. More successful were functionalist descriptions of their role in society. Society needs 
to control that work which results in damage if performed badly, but is corporately inexpert, 
thus those with equivalent specialist knowledge must do the judging (Rueschemeyer, 1983). 
Altruism for example, is seen here as not simply a trait but as a useful function in the ordering 
of society (Saks, 1995, p.15). Functionalists such as Parsons and Goode (e.g. 1960) looked for 
the essentials of a professional’s practice in its work context (Johnson 1972, p.37) and were 
granted their status in exchange for diligent execution of important and responsible work (Saks, 
2012). 
These earlier analyses tend to assume that professions are both clearly distinct in some manner 
from other occupations (Johnson 1972, p.10) and positive for society (reflecting their 
contemporary high social standing), seeing them as moral bulwarks in the maelstrom of social 
life and guards against an interfering state (Macdonald 1995, p.2; Johnson 1972, pp.21–38; 
Millerson 1964, p.220). This can be overstated however and even in the early work there is 
acceptance of the possibility of self-interest (Saks 1995, p.16; Parsons, 1939) and a risk 
acknowledged in granting monopoly (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, p.1). As will be seen 
below, even the relatively unquestioning early acceptance of the claims of professions to be a 
force for social good were short-lived. As the concept of profession is malleable according to 
the prevailing ordering of society, so is the attitude of its critics to its central claim: altruism. 
What then of a definition? Simply, if it is possible for professions to be described from a 
theoretical basis, it has not yet occurred. In any case to be a profession involves subjective 
recognition not simply objective compliance with some criteria (Millerson 1964, p.9). As 
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Bennis (1973) noted, the act of even questioning one’s own professional status is a sign of 
insecurity and thus presumably a professional project which is not yet complete.  
For some, establishing an exact definition is simply not important; the search for a precise 
definition is an unhelpful distraction (Evetts, 2003; 2006). For others (for example Freidson 
1986, p.30) it is essential when drawing and comparing analyses of phenomena to ensure that all 
parties are comparing like concepts and are agreed on the scope and nature of the object studied, 
since the only practical alternative is for each to use their assumed working definition which 
remains unchallengeable. Moreover if you make an arbitrary choice of a certain subset of 
candidates without foundation, such as defining professions by their power or influence – as 
many did, for example Johnson and Freidson respectively – it surely becomes circular to then 
describe the attainment and abuse of power of professions as being inherent to the class. Others 
reflect the later, pragmatic position that a strict definition is unnecessary; provided that the 
writer can identify a subject and apply his chosen theory to it (Abbott 1988, p.318; Evetts, 2013) 
no further precision is necessary, given that there is “general agreement” about what constitutes 
a profession (Larson 1977, p.x).  
There must be careful treatment of motive; status descriptions, as writers such as Macdonald 
(1995, p.3) describe them, became an attempt to describe one end of a continuum rather than a 
binary state. “Professional” is thus seen as purely adjectival, in the same way that defining 
someone as “educated” must either indicate a general state or that an arbitrary razor has been 
applied which suits the context. This view is dangerously attractive; for those looking to 
conduct case studies to assign or deny the status itself, the issue of definition is fundamental. 
Interactionists looking to criticise the self-interested actions and unjustified status of the 
professions will not need to look for a point of acceptance on a continuum of professionalisation 
since they will gravitate towards the worst offenders (Evetts, 2013). It is perhaps convenient to 
avoid matters of definition where one’s thesis is one of criticising power and domination; a 
definition which included more lowly trades such as physiotherapists into professional status 
would rather upset a declamation of the huge financial rewards of membership of the 
professional caste, particularly as Hall (1968) suggested there is increased vocational feeling in 
lower-paid professions. Abbot’s interest was less judgemental, studying the interactions of the 
professions as they strive to maintain their status in existing spheres of knowledge and capture 
new domains as they open up (Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995, p.33), thus definitional precision 
was simply less important than observing their creation. 
As an important aside, a fundamental challenge was made by Ritzer (1973), who criticised 
focussing on the general rather than individual cases. He suggested that whereas a profession 
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could be placed on a continuum, the individual practitioner could themselves vary in 
professionalism, and indeed a “professional” could be any person discharging their duties in a 
competent and diligent manner; a polysemy which persists today and is often used in place of a 
definition in modern writing. Public acceptance of this alternative model undermines the claims 
of a professional to be, by virtue of their career alone, the possessor of any particular distinction. 
Professionalism can today can be considered a question of moral and ethical choices in a 
particular organisational context rather than a binary state for which an occupation might 
qualify (Delattre and Ocler, 2013). It must be stressed though that this is not novel; in the 
fifteenth century the term meant all occupations and went on to mean work done sufficiently 
well to charge money (Freidson 1986, pp.22–23). Being “professional” has undergone so much 
change that it can now be seen simply as whatever it is perceived to be (Hanlon, 1998). Focus 
switched to the motivations of the agitators rather than the strict enumeration of qualifying 
criteria. Famously Hughes reported his “Damascene” conversion: 
“in my own studies I passed from the false question ‘Is this occupation a profession’ to 
the more fundamental one ‘what are the circumstances in which people in an occupation 
attempt to turn it into a profession and themselves into professional people?’” 
(Hughes, 1963 cited in Macdonald 1995, p.6). 
To conclude therefore, this study should not attempt to simply classify but rather describe. The 
aspects which are relevant to such a description will now be reviewed. 
2.3.3 Theories of Formation 
Wilensky (1964) was something of a turning point between the trait writers and those criticising 
privilege born of a claim of altruism (Collins, 1990). In the 1960s the US workplace had shifted 
from predominantly mechanical labour to more post-industrial work where managers were not 
fully able to rule on technical matters, producing more hybrid roles and a less stratified 
workforce (Freidson, 1973). Not coincidentally, the “semi-professions” begin to be recognised 
here: those whose claim to specialised training and to service orientation is partial or incomplete 
(Goode, 1960). 
Wilensky’s contribution was interesting in two ways. Firstly, he developed a highly positivist 
theory of staged professionalisation based on statistically-treated hypotheses, which although 
not unique – Abbott (1988, pp.15–16) reviews this and others in a general denouncement of 
such structured process-driven work – is the most widely-known. These proposed stages were 
(paraphrased): 
 People begin full-time work in the relevant area, forming an occupation. 
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 A training school is established, eventually supervising university tuition.  
 The practitioners combine to form a professional association, which starts to shun as 
incompetent those outsiders who claim equal status, whilst forming synergistic 
hierarchies with semi-professions who do not. This eventually leads to control over 
entry, which creates conflict between the “old guard” who learned their trade more as 
craft skills and newcomers who followed the course they proscribed. Competition with 
other disciplines begins. This stage pre-dated the establishment of a training school in 
the most established professions. 
 The association begins political agitation for legal monopoly, licensing and certification. 
 A formal code of ethics and a “way to behave” is defined and enforced. 
(From Wilensky, 1964) 
Whilst the paper itself and successor work by Neal and Morgan (2000) show many variations on 
this sequence, it remains a useful model for discussion. The potential for tension between new 
and old practitioners as training evolves from inferred to taught can be observed, for example. 
Secondly, alongside mastering an area of abstract knowledge, Wilensky (1964) uses service 
orientation as a qualifying criterion as a theoretical basis for the identification of professions, 
but does not accept uncritically the claims of the professionals on the matter. That interactions 
between patient and doctor are more likely to prioritise the client’s interests than those with a 
used car salesman is largely accepted. He foreshadows however works such as Freidson (1970) 
in discussing self-interest in medicine and Abbott (1988) for competition amongst groups for 
control. It is indeed around the 1970s that research focus moved from UK to US schools 
(Freidson 1986, p.28) and authors in that more anti-establishment age (Larson 2013, p.xix) 
became highly critical of the motivations of professionalisation projects. 
2.3.4 Power, Autonomy, Exclusion and Self Interest 
Following the lead of the Chicago School of Sociology (Larson 1977, p.xii), during the 1960s 
the questions moved from functionalist accounts of what professions are and what role they 
play to why they form and why they are granted privilege (Macdonald 1995, p.6). Notions of 
altruistic professionals as a positive “naturally present” social concept gave way to a more 
cynical evaluation of motive and self-interest. Authors emphasised the pursuit of power and 
status rather than the proper administration of a domain of knowledge; this drive for monopoly 
and exclusion through autonomy being pursued in a professionalisation “project” (Freidson 
1986, p.29). 
“Indeed, I believe that expertise is more and more in danger of being used as a mask for 
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privilege and power rather than, as it claims, as a mode of advancing the public interest” 
 (Freidson 1970, p.337) 
Two schools emerged. The first followed the work of Weber which saw professionalism as a 
form of social closure, excluding others from an area of work by arrangement with the state 
(Saks, 2012). This usefully challenged the assumptions of previous writers that professions were 
a necessary social fact fulfilling some pressing need, by challenging the basis on which control 
was exerted and examining whether the claims of these groups were valid. This phase saw 
professionalism as a tactic to self-protect; by restricting the entry into the profession, supply and 
demand could be manipulated in favour of the credentialed (Macdonald 1995, pp.27–29; Saks, 
1983).  
The “closure” emphasis of Larson and Freidson moves away from describing an education and 
socialisation process, towards criticising the claim that mastery of the knowledge so imparted 
gives the profession the right to self-governance and self-certification of competence 
(Macdonald 1995, pp.27–29). Knowledge was alleged to unfairly set the profession apart, 
reduce its accountability outside those with equivalent knowledge and produce an asymmetry of 
power in the professional–client relationship. The professional thus becomes the route to “what 
is best for” the client, without the client being allowed to choose their priorities since they are 
not qualified to hold such an opinion.  
It is clearly necessary to at least note the interest of the professions in excluding some of the 
competitive forces which would otherwise have diluted their income or status. Some (see 
Freidson 1970, p.363) advanced that by restricting the supply of the labour market, the aim of a 
profession is to recruit a sufficient number of like-minded individuals of requisite quality and 
maintain a good living from the inflated wage. Macdonald (1995, p.196) notes that early 
accountancy had to train unsalaried and under a master who demanded a fee. For the larger 
firms at least, this ensured that the entrants into the profession were gentlemen, with an 
independent private income, thus ensuring the continued prestige of the firm. Such writings 
however did become rather political, for example: 
“I do not believe that it is anyone’s prerogative … to impose his notion of good on 
another. I believe that the greatest good is each man’s freedom to choose his own good”  
(Freidson 1970, p.376) 
Under particular pressure here was the claim to altruistic service, itself a foundation of being 
trusted to self-govern. Authors did not necessarily reject the necessity of organising vital 
occupations to ensure competence (see Freidson 1994, p.194); their criticism was that the 
altruism enshrined in the ideal type put forward as a justification for disproportionate reward 
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was not demonstrable (see particularly Saks, 1995 and Freidson, 1970). As claims of altruism 
supporting monopoly are not a theme in the security literature this is perhaps not a priority for 
research, however it is the claim to ethical and disinterested practice entirely to the benefit of 
the client (outside a fee) which underpins the rationale for the state granting monopoly of 
practice.  
Ownership of knowledge then excludes others from meaningful debate and hence places the 
professions as powerful gatekeepers to needed services (Freidson, 1986; Johnson, 1972). Power 
however is a relative term; as Freidson admits, ultimately only the apparatus of government 
actually possesses true compulsive power and can override advice for political ends. See for 
example the debate (Dyer, 2008) on cannabis classification, which saw the UK Government 
politically overrule its own professional scientific advisors. Society speaks of doctors’ “orders” 
but with no ill-effects from insubordination (Parsons, 1939). Ultimately the power balance 
between state, profession and client dictates the degree of autonomy, since powerful clients are 
more able to dictate what services will be received, within overall regulatory limits (Downie, 
1990; Larson 1977, p.xii).  
The element of security’s power over the client is therefore a potential angle for study, however 
not to excess. Power discourse became overly cynical (Evetts, 2003); Freidson for example later 
admitted (1988, p.384) that his criticism of 1970s medicine related to the privileges of a 
dominant profession during its most powerful period and not the general case. Saks (1983; 
2015, pp.13–14) is critical of the contemporary tendency towards invective rather than 
empirically-grounded critique, which is noted ahead of the methodological discussion later. 
Freidson (1970, p.80) cites pharmacy’s inability to prescribe as a sign of domination by 
medicine; this seems to confuse diagnosis and treatment of biological disorder (medicine) with 
absorption, interaction and pharmacokinetics of drug substances (pharmacy). Larson (2013, 
p.xxx) and Freidson’s (2001) later work is more generous as seeing professional control as more 
acceptable than control by institutional management, however Saks’s criticism remains a 
convincing warning against an obsession with power. 
Professions could potentially compete to form hierarchies within their sector of society 
(Liljegren, 2012) which will be revisited below. Professions are after all strongly associated 
with high status and remuneration (Millerson 1964, p.13) and tend to remain in an educated 
section of society (Susskind and Susskind 2015, p.11). For Marxists however, viewing society 
as comprising the proletariat under the oppression of the bourgeoisie, the central question was 
where professions could be located in the overall social order. As professions grew from the 
expansion of higher education, they were variously seen as collaborators with the bourgeoisie 
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due to possession of knowledge capital (in lieu of actual capital), an educated subset of the 
proletariat by virtue of being co-controlled by the bourgeoisie, or as above a new stratum in 
society altogether (Saks 1983, Macdonald 1995, pp.41–50). Perhaps the most prominent such 
argument was Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich’s (1979) “Professional–Managerial Class” which 
sought to position the professional, scientist and other intellectual as an interlocutor between the 
two outer layers of the former Marxist class dichotomy. Routine work is to be undertaken by the 
dominated proletariat separately from that of the privileged thinking class; professions ensure 
that anything resembling the routine (work which could be performed by a lower class) is 
removed to a subordinate profession or to trainees, to maintain their distinctiveness (Saks, 1983; 
Abbot 1988, p.126). 
In vital public areas, even though ideological market closure rhetoric (see Freidson 1970, p.187) 
now seems almost reckless with respect to pragmatic protection of people from themselves, 
public debate concerning vaccination shows that for many freedom to distrust is still important. 
For specialist areas such as security, a case for granting regulation may become even harder to 
establish since the public may not appreciate the impact of poor practice (Stahl, 2008). As for 
self-interest, this should not fatally weaken the case for regulation provided the impact of 
incompetence is sufficient (Saks, 1995; Evetts, 2003; Stahl, 2006). Still, any progress towards 
self-regulation must therefore succeed against a presumption against monopoly born from this 
more critical phase.  
It has therefore been discussed what professions are, what signs to look for during their 
professionalisation and why they face resistance to being granted monopoly. The section now 
goes on to observe how new professions jostle for jurisdiction over areas of knowledge. 
2.3.5 The System of the Professions: Dynamic Formation and Competition 
Professions claim exclusive competence over areas of knowledge and practice, however this is 
highly dynamic (Abbott 1988, pp.93–97). Whilst many never achieve this, the ultimate act of 
closure for a profession is to establish a legally mandated monopoly over their area of work, 
which must thus be granted by the state (Macdonald 1995, p.66; Freidson 1994, p.173) in its 
role as arbiter and legislator. Wherever there is a market niche however it is natural that there 
will be pressure on any monopoly. Defining the domain itself is not trivial; the applicant society 
must be able to show unity and competence in that domain, in addition to some great public 
need which is answered by granting this exclusive licence (Macdonald 1995, p.199) 
outweighing the corrupting concerns outlined above. 
The contribution of Abbott’s The System of Professions (1988), building on earlier work, was to 
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move conceptually from a model of stable professions which had achieved final closure in their 
fields, to a dynamic and territorially competitive model where professions compete vigorously 
and continually to gain control over contested areas of knowledge (Wilensky, 1964; Goode, 
1960; Millerson, 1964; Muzio et al., 2013). Where human advance and greater learning opens 
new areas of knowledge (Larson 1977, p.179; Millerson 1964, pp.79–84), the challenge to the 
existing professions is to defend their existing territory, or enter an agreement with an allied 
occupation. Alternatively, if the volume of work begins to routinise and dilute the skills required 
to perform its major operations, the elite profession can delegate to a subordinate semi-
profession (Liljegren, 2012) as medicine has done with pharmacy, nursing and physiotherapy 
(Freidson 1970, p.47). A study by Davis (2011) of nursing competing for jurisdiction in the care 
of diabetes patients shows the potential of this model for examining professional identity. 
Where control is only weakly established, competition can comprise direct challenges between 
professions, however this is impractical where legal regulation or monopoly has been achieved 
(Abbott 1988, p.95). More relevant to this study is expansion through technological evolution 
causing novel domains to appear, allowing the existing professions to fill the void of 
occupational control through competition, for example by expanding their certifications to 
include the new discipline and thus making a claim of ownership, illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2: A simple example of competition between existing professions relating to this study 
(examples given are purely for argument), based on the Abbot (1988) model. 
In this modality, specialist sub-groups begin to form within the established professions. 
Although these professions may themselves lobby for control, if they fail (for example their 
resources are committed elsewhere or the claim leaves the body of knowledge incoherent) those 
specialists may consider it in their interests to collaborate. Should they no longer feel well-
represented by the existing bodies, their internal networks can splinter to create a new 
professional group (Fig. 3). This can even be acrimonious, since the new group makes an 
indirect accusation of incompetence by distancing itself from the old (Goode, 1960). 
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Fig. 3: A hypothetical example of Abbott splinter-based formation of a new group from amongst 
existing professions. 
Whilst Abbott's approach is not without criticism (see Macdonald 1995, pp.14–17), it acts as a 
useful model, informing both data capture and analysis. Furthermore, it sensitises the researcher 
to concepts of fracture, competition, distancing from perceived subordinate groups, hierarchy 
amongst sub-professions, dissatisfaction with existing professions and the growth of new areas 
of practice. With its overlapping specialities and bodies one can see this movement alive in 
today’s practice. Similarly, as security moves away from purely technical operations, the 
domain of physical security (itself multi-disciplinary) could make a move towards Information 
Security (see Griffiths et al., 2010). Conversely since much recent movement comes from 
standards and regulation (Sundt, 2006), Information Security may border the knowledge 
domains of law and audit.  
These areas of practice have developed certification bodies, with some supporting graduate 
qualification. The review moves on now to education and qualification, which are fundamental 
to a professionalisation project. 
2.3.6 Education, Certification and Monopoly 
Professions claim jurisdiction over a deep, discrete area of knowledge (Abbott 1988, pp.59–85). 
Universities have thus been fundamental to the transformation of the professions, both for their 
students and the professional academics who staff them (Freidson 1986, pp.15–59). As the 
acquisition of knowledge became central to control, training by apprenticeship gave way to 
formal prior education at university, exposing novices to cognitive standardisation. Larson 
(1977, pp.36–45) sees this as a vital step in the formation of professional unity with a shared 
and common understanding and orientation. It homogenises the professional association, 
therefore establishment of a monopoly over training is key to stability. Eventually, she argues, it 
becomes difficult to criticise eminent practitioners without criticising the structures of 
legitimation which attest to their qualification and knowledge. Similarly, once a project is 
sufficiently progressed for an orthodoxy to be established through control of a body of 
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knowledge, non-qualified practitioners can be criticised for their charlatanism and quackery 
(Johnson 1972, p.57) which is eventually used to justify monopoly. 
Medicine is the “first amongst equals” of the professions (Crook, 2008) therefore one might 
expect medical education to be the seminal case. Physicians have long been required to be 
certified by a Royal College, however fellowship was originally restricted to graduates of the 
universities. This was absolutely not however because this guaranteed vocation learning: the 
insistence on graduate entry was to maintain the dignity and social status of the profession; early 
medical degrees had little to no medical content, there being very little scientific medical 
knowledge to learn (Reader 1966, pp.16–20; Larson 1977, p.4; Collins, 1990).  
Education outside work is expensive, thus credentialed professions must achieve a monopoly on 
practice (or at least a sufficient premium) to have the prospect of recouping that investment 
(Larson 1977, p.15) and universities must ensure that their product is relevant to the job market. 
Professionals are socialised and educated at university and go on to learn the practical 
vocational aspects during the pre-qualification work period. Universities teach theory rather 
than train, such that the knowledge imparted is timeless and theoretical. There exists therefore 
an interplay between academic practice and professional practice, with the possibility of the 
academics and practitioners sharing a discipline but not fully each other’s working contexts 
(Becher, 1990). 
An early step in the formation of a profession is the institutionalisation of control of entry, 
ethical conduct, discipline and quality (Lunt, 2008), of which credentials are a crucial stage. The 
formation of a central, controlling body to maintain standards condenses a group of like 
individuals into a coherent actor to which the state may corporately delegate jurisdiction 
(Freidson 1994, p.173) and which legitimates the claim to status through recognisable 
professional symbols (Greenwood et al., 2002). Whether this represents the coordinated will of 
those individuals or the translation of the concerns of another actor will be explored later in the 
discussion of Actor–Network Theory. It is however well-established amongst the major writers 
(Freidson 1986, p.58; Larson 1977, p.5; 2013, p.xxiv) that it is the presence of a well-motivated 
and effective campaign by such a body which is significant in terms of progress, more so even 
than the quality of the claim itself. Larson (1977, pp.25–31) argues for example that engineering 
should have no inherent disadvantage compared to medicine in terms of status, but that the 
organisation of and claim by the latter was more effective, in part because the layperson has a 
more direct sense of success for a tangible engineered product (see also Freidson 1970, p.22). 
According to many professionalisation models (for example Wilensky (1964) and for the first 
qualification by apothecaries in Reader (1966, p.52)), once specialists emerge and desire 
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certification of their specialist skills, influence is obtained first by the establishment of an 
association, then ultimately by this body establishing a monopoly over an area of knowledge, 
ideally granted by the state (Wilensky, 1964; Macdonald 1995, p.66; Freidson 1994, p.173). 
Unlike mainland European models (Neal and Morgan, 2000; Collins, 1990) which prefer top-
down regulatory action by the authorities, Anglo–American governments have been wary of 
granting this delegation of power; candidates must first show that there is some greater public 
need which is thus answered (Macdonald 1995, p.199; Millerson 1964, p.216), and then that a 
profession has “the especially reliable knowledge by which to make decisions in the lay 
interest” (Freidson 1988, p.338). It is thus no surprise to see concerns about handing power to a 
professional body being raised in the current American debate (see NRC, 2013).  
Professions must organise themselves into distinct roles, and delegate routine tasks to semi-
professions or between the profession’s elite and its junior ranks (see the discussion of medicine 
in Larson 1977, pp.38–43). Nursing for example grew from craft to science-led profession, but 
its progress was hampered by failure to agree internal strata or create a professional identity 
(Elzinga, 1990). State control is often extended to the use of a title identity, linked to trusted 
roles such as “doctor” (Freidson 1986, p.65). A consideration of known and accepted roles in 
Information Security is therefore essential, as is whether a hierarchy of specialities is known and 
accepted. 
Ultimately the professional is selling their learned wisdom; they are the “gatekeepers of 
desirable services or goods” (Freidson 1986, p.166) and credentialed professionals achieve that 
gateway status through exclusion. In the absence of regulation, credentials may gain de facto 
qualification status or count towards an unofficial tally of professional “points” (Freidson 1986, 
pp.63–81), but the ultimate goal of professionalisation is to control the production of the 
producers. The professional body must own the education and formation process in order to 
establish the necessary knowledge-superiority of professional over client (Larson 1977, pp.48–
50). Credentials are required as markers for those seeking competent specialist advice (Freidson 
1994, p.159; Collins, 1990). Their knowledge must have an apparently scientific and unified 
basis so that the knowledge foundation of the profession appears to be objective and dissociated 
with the preferences or opinions of the practitioner; the credential legitimates the professional’s 
opinion by being rooted in the entire profession and not the fallible word of the individual 
(Larson 1977, p.41; Wilensky, 1964). A binary status of qualified or not supported by a body of 
peers supports a claim to self-governance (Johnson 1972, p.55) particularly where this claim is 
based on the blessing of the neutral state (Larson 1977, p.70). What then if others suppress that 
independence? 
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2.3.7 Deprofessionalisation 
Professions have the privilege of self-regulation (Larson 1977, p.x). Professionals generally 
accept technical control only by superordinate members of their profession, outside lay matters 
such as institutional targets and resources (Freidson 1986, pp.154–166). Much of the work in 
the field however concentrates on the suggestion that the professions have declined in influence 
(power) and independence as they have traded autonomy in sole practice for positions in 
bureaucratic organisations (Evetts, 2003; Clark, 2005). This external socialising force on 
internal workers leads to conflicting loyalties to employer and profession (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
Kahn et al. (1964) describe role conflict as “the simultaneous occurrence of two or more sets of 
pressures, such that compliance with one would make compliance with the other more 
difficult”. In itself Liu et al. (2001) found this to be a highly destructive event, associated with 
low job satisfaction and high propensity to leave, however they also found that a strong 
commitment to the profession moderated this effect as the professional would ally themselves 
principally with the profession and avoid the conflict. Moreover, aside from mere conflict Evetts 
(2003) argues that the modern professional is being entranced by romantic notions of status and 
dignity into being controlled by a species of imposed professionalisation (with its attendant high 
output, best practice and dedication to duty). This is even more relevant to this present study 
when one considers the necessity of intention towards seeking status on a professionalisation 
campaign (Millerson 1964, p.49; 1964, p.187), thus examining this intent is key. 
“Deprofessionalisation” must be seen in context; professionals have always been employed even 
when in sole practice or retained by a patron, and thus have never had absolute control of their 
work (Freidson 1986, pp.110–123). Furthermore Kitchener (2000) found that when senior 
medics took up posts as clinical directors and gained financial responsibility, whilst they did 
adapt to bureaucratic priorities, the case for deprofessionalisation as hypothesised was less 
clear. Freidson’s “Third Logic” thesis (2001) positions ideal professional work between the 
extremes of bureaucratic control and market whim, as an example of a useful way to organise 
knowledge-based bespoke work. This is echoed by Fournier (1999) who sees the 
professionalised ethic and work-identity (with its emphasis on self-development and high levels 
of competence) as a positive model for controlling complex work within modern organisations.  
Much modern writing therefore disputes the centrality of independence and emphasises the 
opportunities for the modern profession to control an area of work within large organisations 
(Muzio et al., 2013) and the hybrid nature of manager–professionals (Noordegraaf, 2007). It is 
to this more modern world that the chapter now turns. 
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2.3.8 Professions in Modern Society  
Development of the sociological theory of the professions has calmed following its “golden 
age” described above, despite the expansion of the professions and increasing emphasis on 
professional development (Gorman and Sandefur, 2011). Some interesting theoretical work has 
been forthcoming however. Sciulli (2007) for example challenged the understanding of the 
professions as an predominantly Anglo–American concept dating from the late nineteenth 
century by identifying a continental proto-profession which far pre-dates our received original 
cases. Brante (2011) revisited definition by proposing professions as “occupations conducting 
interventions derived from scientific knowledge of mechanisms, structures, and contexts”. This 
perhaps fits our more techno-centric society, but does not allow for the subjective nature of 
recognition.  
As precedent, more relevant to this study are the numerous case studies of emerging professions 
and their identity formation; despite the decreasing prominence of the “self-serving monopoly” 
concept, interest remains high in the formation of new professions and the process by which this 
occurs (Adams, 2014). Gilmore and Williams (2007) as an example, took a pragmatic approach 
to definition in their analysis of the professionalisation efforts of Human Resources 
practitioners. Konstantinou (2015) examined Project Management as a profession with 
emphasis on whether the abstract nature of the archetypal professional knowledge base could be 
found in that discipline. There is perhaps no value to a complete survey of these studies, 
however their far higher emphasis on empirical work relative to the major works of sociological 
theory is noted. In such studies and following Ritzer (1973), a distinction can be drawn 
between:  
 studies rooted in the traditional sense of concerted social action using the existing 
sociological texts as a lens for describing emerging cases, such as Swedish medical 
autonomy (Levay and Waks, 2009) or UK Matrons (Currie et al., 2009), or the 
interesting suggestion that Information Technology is not professionalised (Mok, 2010), 
and 
 the more modern status-neutral meaning of most ethical best practice which van de 
Kamp et al. (2004) preferred even whilst distilling concepts of medical professional 
behaviour. This reflects a particularly strong trend in medical papers noted during 
searches for this study which associate “professional” with “properly performed work” 
in that discipline. 
Social and power concerns remain extant threads, however this stream now generally discusses 
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inclusiveness within professions across possible lines of (illegitimate) discrimination, alongside 
the declining power and increasing external regulation of modern professions (Adams, 2014). 
Whilst the development of professions by name has arguably waned, professionalism-related 
issues such as knowledge and power, status, inequality of reward and normative influences 
persist but subsumed into the sociology of organisations and management (Gorman and 
Sandefur, 2011). 
Branching out from the traditional Anglo–American bias, more emphasis is being placed on 
work in a globalised workplace and other cultural professionalism models, for example in 
emerging markets (Brock, 2016). Similarly Saks (2015) contrasted Russian, British and 
American models of the medical profession to explore how the state’s interest and degree of 
engagement affects the independence of the profession from it. Taking this further, 
internationalisation of the business context and the existence of supranational regulators (such 
as the WTO and EU) has affected the interplay of actors which the older texts could assume to 
be national. Faulconbridge and Muzio (2012) survey the effects of these changes on and from 
the globalised professional service firms, particularly with regards to the differing nation-
specific relationships with the state and degrees of autonomy of national bodies. Suddaby et al. 
(2007) similarly explore the regulation of professions with international reach, arguing that the 
traditional bargain of power in exchange for good governance between the profession and the 
state is being replaced by the global professional service firms and transnational trade 
organisations. Whilst the professional service firms’ market in international security practice is 
not as advanced as for the legal and accounting professions, this is an angle to be considered in 
a modern case study. 
A more radical recent thesis however is that of Susskind and Susskind (2015), who see the 
growth of technology as fatal to the future claims of knowledge-based professionals. 
Extrapolating from the rapid advances in recent computing history and projecting towards 
intelligent search systems, they argue an expensive professional as a gateway to specialised 
knowledge will become an anachronism. They see no fundamental difference of type between 
currently retrievable information and that controlled by experts. 
Their thesis is only partly convincing. Insofar as professional work is divisible into routine tasks 
and applied judgement, it is clear that the routine can always be more automated as technology 
allows; what is today a matter of judgement might in future be made more reliable by intelligent 
algorithms. Professional work however, particularly in organisations, is not exclusively based on 
clients asking factual questions for which there is a single right answer. Firstly, how does 
tomorrow’s body of evidence and knowledge continue to develop? It appears rather an 
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asymmetric analysis to imagine that everything other than technology remains static and 
predictable. Until legal systems are formalised it is difficult to imagine the lawyer; before 
computing the graphic designer; before YouTube’s invention in 2005 the video blogger, yet all 
exist today. As the authors point out (Susskind and Susskind, p.290) there is a latent demand for 
professional tasks; more people need advice than can afford it. Surely therefore the greater 
ability of technology to perform tasks which can be routinised means that the professionals of 
the future will be engaged either in developing that technology or building upon its distributive 
potential rather than necessarily replaced by it. 
Since little of today’s use of technology could have been predicted ahead of its creation, it 
seems unlikely that one could predict how the availability of better tools will affect tomorrow’s 
work. Since much professional work applies to human concerns and human life involves 
subjectivity, whereas a robot doctor could select treatments based on outcomes data, could it 
make a judgement about whether quality of life gains justify risk or discomfort? Could it 
counsel a divorcing couple, or predict the reaction of a judge to an individual’s plea for 
mitigation based on contrition? Will the pace of technology change itself, as predicted by 
Larson (1977, p.27) render the routinisation of knowledge work permanently impossible? It is 
not possible to answer this today, however it is clear that professionalisation remains a relevant 
topic to research. 
2.4 The Information Security Profession  
Section 2.2 showed that Information Security has developed and grown in both scope, depth and 
importance to join the ranks of discrete occupations. In particular the emphasis on judgement, 
governance, risk management and cultural factors highlights the range of specialities vying for 
inclusion in this new candidate profession. Stepping back, section 2.3 considered precisely what 
a profession might be, and found it to be imprecise; more subjective acceptance than objective 
compliance with criteria. The section moves now to the confluence of these literatures and the 
subject of this study: the Information Security profession, its certification structures, roles and 
identities, ambitions and successes. To begin however it must be established why such a study is 
relevant and interesting today. 
2.4.1 Why Study the Professionalisation of the Information Security Occupation? 
The motivation for this work is two-fold. Firstly, from an academic perspective the 
professionalisation of Information Security is sparsely covered in the literature relative to the 
importance of its subject matter. Whilst there is much written by governments on the importance 
of training practitioners and by the associations attempting to support this growth, very little 
41 
independent scholarly scrutiny has been applied to either. Moreover, much of the work 
published is statistical and demographics data based on large-scale questionnaires and surveys, 
leaving opportunities for further work to explore their conclusions further. From a theoretical 
perspective, for example, how has a nascent profession – employed to protect intellectual 
property (likely to be held by corporations and governments) – fared relative to the more 
established professions which developed in smaller practices and which are potentially facing 
“deprofessionalisation” in bureaucratic organisations? How aligned are these new professionals 
with their peers? When people express views on certifications, what is behind that view and 
upon what is it based? 
Secondly, although a professionalisation process can be conducted for benign reasons, many 
writers have warned of allowing monopoly and self-regulation. For some, to professionalise is 
necessarily to monopolise; without proper scrutiny and exposure to external judgement the 
profession moves from being concerned with what clients want to what they are “allowed to 
have” (Freidson 1970, p.350). For Larson (1977, p.xiii) autonomy allows the profession to 
choose which factors they will deign to consider, excluding the laity from their decisions and 
priorities. Similarly, Illich (1977) sees professions as self-interestedly defining what needs to be 
a professionally-treated problem in order to require more and more professionals (“They not 
only recommend what is good, they ordain what is right”). Security practitioners who establish 
power within their employer’s bureaucracies are in a position to act with a negative effect: 
security policies control people; control is of course sometimes required, however it is entirely 
legitimate to examine that control and criticise it where necessary (Stahl et al., 2014). 
Calls to license the profession require deep examination, to ensure that the motives, model and 
transition arrangements are fully considered (Pemble, 2001). If it does ultimately pass through 
regulation into monopoly, there is a substantial difference, as Freidson (1970, p.356) noted, 
between regulating people who charge money for their services, and requiring others to 
purchase those services. But exactly what services would one license? What is an “Information 
Security practitioner”? 
2.4.2 Roles in Information Security 
The identity of an individual exercising a role comprises organisational, social and personal 
elements (Ashenden, 2008). Having proposed that security now includes both technical and 
semi-technical management components, issues complicating a clear single profession include 
the lack of an identified and distinct role identity (Everett, 2011) and career structure (Hoffman 
et al., 2012). The character of the Information Security practitioner is changing rapidly; whilst  
currently technical implementation skills are in short supply (DBIS, 2014a) there is a severe 
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projected shortfall of security staff with interpersonal communications skills (Frost & Sullivan 
and (ISC)², 2015a). The slowly-changing gender demographics in the occupation have been 
suggested as a possible source of more balanced skills (Frost & Sullivan and (ISC)², 2015b). 
Where are the boundaries of the occupation? Much security policy is actually executed by 
network administrators (Adnan et. al, 2015); are these Information Security professionals? It 
might be possible to distinguish between technicians (firewall operators, network engineers, 
programmers) from the potentially professional security practitioner. The former are highly 
skilled tasks requiring detailed knowledge of specific aspects of technology, concerned with 
detecting and defending against attack with real-time systems, with an emphasis on staying 
abreast of current threats and techniques for using the various tools available (Kandogan and 
Haber, 2005). The professional security practitioner must be able to understand such technical 
risks and the responses available, but also assess the risk and produce business-led judgements.  
As noted above, the security practitioner’s role, title and even existence vary widely according 
to the security governance model in use at their employing organisation (Neal, 2008), as the 
new occupation struggles to define itself (Bowen-Schrire et al., 2004). Named roles in the 
military hierarchy are well-established; the “Turquoise Book” for example (NCSC, 1992) lists 
the responsibilities of a US Government installation’s Information Systems Security Officer 
(ISSO), however this is a hierarchical position rather than a professional identity. Similarly 
Ezingeard and Bowen-Schrire (2007) found that in many organisations the primary functions of 
the “CISO” were in fact undertaken by IT managers, and that even where nominated individuals 
exist their job titles are “Risk Management Officer” and “Chief Security Officer”. Whilst such 
titles may bring a cachet to the role, what does the putative profession advance as its own name? 
Any medical practitioner, in addition to their speciality, will identify as a doctor. A Chief 
Financial Officer could well be an accountant by profession, CFO itself like CISO is a rank. 
The roles of managers and board members with regards to security have changed since the topic 
became more prominent, however this distribution of responsibilities has received relatively 
little attention in the academic literature (McFazdean et al., 2007).  
Within the profession, it is also not clear what the progression and hierarchy of roles should be. 
Colley (2008) argues that the technical and managerial aspects of the profession are linked and 
that too much emphasis on the separation risks losing career continuity. This argument advances 
a directionality which implies progression from a technical role to a managerial one, accepting 
that technical knowledge may drop slightly upon entering a management role. This is not fully 
convincing; it does not address for example how the different skill sets of a technical and 
political role can be squared, since it is not clear that effective human-centric communication 
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and negotiation skills flow naturally from a technical role. As presented later, this progression 
was strongly contested in this study’s data. 
This identity incoherence was a founding concern for the Institute of Information Security 
Professionals (IISP) (Lacey, 2006) which codified a suite of roles in their Skills Framework, 
which has been taken up by government as the basis for their own certification scheme. 
Meanwhile “The Tech Partnership” (an association of employers, academics and like parties) 
maintains a comprehensive list of National Occupational Standards (Tech Partnership, 2016) 
which are then linked to the learning and certification schemes across the range of examinations 
above. Outside the UK, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) 
has developed a similarly extensive “National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework” which lists 
a large number of roles with descriptions of key skills and example job descriptions. 
Others will examine these roles in detail but the former chapter prompts the question: are these 
lived? Are they recognised and accepted in the profession and outside? And how are they 
identified? Whilst stratification is important for structure, for the profession to achieve formal 
state recognition there must be a clear boundary and criterion of competence; the state has an 
interest only in creating a list of the qualified (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, pp.304–307); it 
is not interested in hierarchies and grades of membership. 
2.4.3 The Certification Market and Professional Associations 
Credentials are hugely important to practice; 87% of polled UK employers indicated that they 
would look for the CISSP when recruiting staff (DBIS 2014b). Today’s IT practitioner in search 
of qualifications does not lack choice, both in provider (for example amongst many others IISP, 
(ISC)², BCS, City and Guilds, CREST and ISACA
3
) and grades of membership and 
examination. Some such as CREST cover a narrow band of practice, others such as the CISSP 
are more broad. Many have strong emphases on ethical behaviour, continuing professional 
development and professional practice skills. It is not proposed to review the entire credentials 
market; it is important simply to note its existence, properties, intent and range and move on to 
why they are offered and by whom. 
The evolution of Information Security into a domain with constituent non-technical aspects has 
occurred very rapidly; so much so that many workers have predominantly had to acquire the 
new “soft” skills mid-career, rather than during their initial education and socialisation process, 
                                                     
3
Full names given on page ix, however many of these no longer use their expanded form. 
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as would be the case for the more established professions (Siponen, 2000; Ashenden, 2008; 
NRC, 2013; Stewart and Lacey, 2012; E-Skills UK, 2013; Lacey, 2006). Although key aspects 
of their role, current practitioners lack confidence in their command of these new competencies 
(Ashenden and Sasse, 2013). This leaves a particular challenge for how to attain and establish 
competence for the modern professional, which is mainly achieved – fully in line with the 
sociological analyses of formation seen above – through certification by a professional body.  
Without a common body of knowledge enforced by the profession, there cannot be a unified 
professional identity (Everett, 2011; Burley et al., 2014; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1988). The 
definition and delineation of a formal body of knowledge which can be assessed through 
certification is a fundamental part of claiming professional status (Griffiths et al., 2010). Indeed 
professional identity is clearly the aim of many certifications, requiring both examinations and 
qualifying periods of experience. Since tests of knowledge should not require a mandatory 
preparatory period, these credentials are clearly meant to be the foundation to a professional 
claim of experience, skill and judgement, not simply the recall of learned facts. Whilst DBIS 
(2014a; 2014b) has investigated this from industry and academia to frame its next steps, this 
work was based on questionnaires and did not support a deeper analysis to discuss the point 
further.  
The substantial range of certification schemes for security professionals available in the UK 
(issued by both international and national bodies) is not currently regulated by a single, national 
governing body authorised and delegated by government. When challenged to rationalise them 
during its own research, government refused to disrupt what it saw as a purely commercial 
marketplace (DBIS, 2014b). Knowles et al. (2016) however found that penetration testers saw 
visible CESG and CREST involvement as crucial to the standardisation of that part of the 
industry. Whilst it was seen above that this reticence to interfere in a profession unless necessary 
is common, it has hindered professional recognition since there is no clear single certification to 
recognise as a standard (Furnell, 2004; Tate et al., 2008; Schultz, 2005; Everett, 2009) partially 
because of the wide variation in rigour and study time (Mansfield-Devine, 2013). 
If these certifications can appeal to a sufficiently distinguished market based on some 
differentiated branding or emphasis then the status quo may be maintained, otherwise it may tip 
in favour of one particular qualification (Katz and Shapiro, 1994) making that organisation a de 
facto controller of entry to practice. This effect has been studied with interest in relation to IT 
standards, since the relatively swift rate of development and the degree to which standards 
interoperate and feed back within different sub-disciplines makes network effects particularly 
noticeable (Heinrich, 2013). 
45 
Why does this matter? A central organisation plays a critical role in advancing 
professionalisation; it distils member opinion, directs and represents their ambition, centralises 
their campaign, provides resources for development and facilitates networking (Millerson, 
1964). By forming a society of practitioners apparently adhering to certain principles and of 
certified levels of competence, the institution provides legitimacy (Bloland, 1997). To that end, 
Lacey (2006) sets out the agenda for the IISP, founded in the UK in 2005: 
“A new profession is struggling to emerge, in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion, with 
little formality and structure. The contemporary scene is one of largely self-trained 
industry leaders supported by an up-and-coming group of ambitious individuals … 
There is a need for a greater emphasis on professional development to develop future 
generations of well-rounded, fully trained leaders who can demonstrate … that they are 
competent and effective” 
(Lacey, 2006) 
Lacey also builds an argument for the increasing importance of security (citing the increasing 
threat and increasing regulation) and thus the importance of ensuring competent management 
through better regulation and more formalised training. The latter part, supported by a complaint 
that security practitioners are self-taught invaders from other IT disciplines, is most interesting 
seen through the work of Abbott (1988), reviewed above.  
Furthermore, the UK has a computing charter body (the BCS) with an active security chapter, 
therefore it is interesting that the IISP has also formed in the spaces around computer security, 
audit and computer law. The BCS also maintains qualifications and would appear to have a 
claim for supremacy from its Royal charter: 
“to establish and maintain appropriate standards of education and experience for 
persons engaged in the profession of Computing or entering upon courses of study in 
Computing and allied subjects” 
(Privy Council, 2003[1984]) 
Lacey (2006) mentions the BCS in passing, principally as a peer along with a number of 
engineering associations, implying that they would be advisory and supportive to a new institute 
representing Information Security practitioners. That the IISP and BCS both run security 
certification schemes (and that the IISP's framework has apparently found favour with the 
government with regards to assessing education) however is arguably an example of Abbot-type 
splinter competition for control of a body of knowledge, albeit that the organisations greatly 
overlap and cooperate (Mansfield-Devine, 2013). Whilst an argument can be made that the 
domains of IT Security (which the BCS might fully own) and Information Security (the focus of 
the IISP) are separate, writers such as Abbott (1988) and Freidson (1970) show that professions 
such as law and medicine have extended their reaches to cover gaps far wider than this in search 
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of dominance over an area of practice. 
Ultimately such bodies allow security professionals to participate in industry and collegiate 
events (Brocaglia, 2005) which is a vital step to establishing an identity. Institutions are not 
necessarily benign forces however, even if established with pure motives; those at the top can be 
very well rewarded which may skew the priorities and behaviour of the organisation if an 
effective democratising process is not present (Schultz, 2005). 
Perhaps the most significant recent work on the Information Security profession was the study 
by the US National Research Council (NRC, 2013) and subsequent paper by its lead 
contributors (Burley et al., 2014), published after the data for this study was collected. The NRC 
was tasked with determining criteria for whether government should professionalise the US 
industry. This study, whilst extensive, took a relatively basic, trait-based model of profession 
(see also the online white papers on the subject by NICCS (2012a; 2012b)) and was based on 
public testimony from a large number of institutions, expert witnesses and professionals. The 
poorly-defined scope of Information Security practice and myriad potential roles and inter-
relationships led the report to conclude that the occupation was not mature enough to be 
regulated as a profession. Whatever roles have been defined for the industry had apparently not 
taken root in the US context by 2013. 
Whilst governments have been slow to introduce mandatory qualifications in private practice, 
they have taken steps to regularise entry into their own security ranks. The US 8570.01-M 
"Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program" mandates baseline technical and 
management skills of staff occupying Information Assurance roles in the US Department of 
Defense (US DoD, 2010). Personnel fulfilling these roles (which are defined in some detail) are 
required to acquire and maintain particular qualifications, which may only be waived in cases of 
“severe operational or personnel constraints”, the certification level required being 
commensurate with the designated seniority or technical skill level of the role.  
Similarly, as part of the UK Cyber Security Strategy, the UK Government intention is to 
increase the level of professionalism amongst national security workers (CESG 2012a, p.3; 
DBIS 2014a). The stated aim appears to be one of ensuring a level of competence to a set 
standard of knowledge and awareness, as defined by the IISP. A hierarchy of competence status 
levels is defined and a series of body of knowledge streams identified. There is a directly 
implied link between professionalisation and competence to respond to increased threat (CESG 
2012b, p.7). The hierarchy is cumulative for technical knowledge but not for other skills, such 
that it is possible to manage a team without being able to perform every job within it, however 
an “expert” must possess also relevant basic and intermediate technical skills (CESG 2012b, 
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pp.25–26). A brief code of conduct is included (CESG 2012b, p.31). 
2.4.4 Security Education 
It is not clear that a mid-career certificate alone can ever grant the holder professional status in 
its greatest sense; a graduate qualification usually providing a far greater symbol of learning 
than a certification (Schultz, 2005; Horrocks, 2001). Education, as opposed to training, is 
concerned not simply with learning techniques but also the rationale behind and basis for the 
action (Horrocks, 2001). Professionalisation is predicated upon control of the entire educational 
curriculum (Larson 1977, p.72). Professionalism is the application of substantial and abstract 
learning to the specific concerns of a client (Sciulli, 2007), which usually implies vocational 
graduate education (Evetts, 2003; Larson 1977, p.242). Hentea et al. (2006) see a preparatory 
graduate education as an essential foundation to the more transitory technical knowledge 
learned later in the career. Indeed the US DoHS (2012) and UK DBIS (2014a) see the expansion 
of tertiary education as key parts of their plan for their respective national workforces (albeit as 
a mix of paths to practice (DBIS, 2014b)).  
Development of a recognised curriculum for security professionals has long been the subject of 
concerted efforts to harmonise and raise standards (Wright, 1998; Hentea et al., 2006; Furnell, 
2004) using inputs from all relevant contributors in an integrated manner (Hoffman et al., 
2012), teaching practical skills alongside theory (Sharma and Sefchek, 2007). Futcher et al. 
(2010) argued in a study of South African tertiary Information Security education that the 
growing importance of this topic and the breadth of the study domain was leading to an increase 
in study, mainly postgraduate. In addition to the technical aspects, the higher level courses refer 
to more human-oriented issues such as ethics, adversarial thinking, privacy and the creation of 
policy, something found to be lacking in other courses but essential for modern practice (Ahmad 
and Maynard, 2014; Schneider, 2013).  
Originally in the US but now looking wider, the National Colloquium for Information Systems 
Security Education was formed in 1996 to formalise the development of suitable programmes as 
a partnership between academics, government and industry (CISSE, 2016; Frinke and Bishop, 
2004). Similarly after discovering resistance from computer science departments to include 
security as part of the computer science curriculum, a consortium of UK Government, (ISC)² 
and academia has cooperated to introduce cybersecurity as a component in all UK computing 
science degrees under the watch of the BCS as accreditor (Irons et al., 2016; (ISC)² and CPHC, 
2015).  
It is instructive in both cases that these are the result of cooperative action by consortia. 
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Whether any body other than the UK Government could have forced the changes to UK 
academia for example seems unlikely. In one sense the action shows progress by those bodies in 
their control of educating the next professionals, however it is also the action of a security body 
in the realm of computing via another body. This suggests an incomplete level of 
professionalisation according to the models reviewed previously, since although there is 
therefore evidence of organisation, security curricula are clearly not yet set by a regulatory body 
for the occupation. Notably, CESG
4
 (2014) chose the IISP Skills Framework as a basis for the 
assessment of postgraduate academic study. It has also intervened in the market for master’s 
degrees and academic study (DCMS, 2016), is extending this to bachelor’s degrees (CESG, 
2016) and is encouraging students into the profession (Ensor, 2016) but it has used its own 
branding to promote the result rather than empowering the IISP or BCS. The latter action, after a 
campaign for recognition, would have been predicted by orthodox theoretical models of British 
professionalisation (Neal and Morgan, 2000).  
Given the high value placed in the literature upon the socialisation process at university 
(teaching of “norms” to new inductees aligned with their professional identity rather than any 
later specific appointment) (Olmsted and Paget, 1969) it would be interesting to note how any 
increase in graduate training homogenises the identity of the profession. 
2.4.5 The Role of Ethics 
Security management has a strong ethical dimension, needing to balance protection of a person's 
livelihood with restricting their freedom and personal rights. It can both protect a person's 
privacy from some colleagues and compromise it for others. Moreover, systems introduced for 
one benign purpose can be later misused for another far less pleasant purpose (Neumann, 2004). 
It may even, in certain defence and military applications, carry a moral dimension where the 
individual’s skill is being used deliberately to target others (Fairweather, 2004). This places an 
ethical responsibility on the professional, a common trait seen in the professionalism literature.  
Gotterbarn (2004) reviews many codes proposed for regulating behaviour, which some will put 
forward as a foundation of ethical professional practice, whereas the more cynical later 
professionalism writers (e.g. Freidson (1994, p.174)) see them simply as symbols of persuasion 
for those desiring the trappings of professional privilege. If calls for an ethical code are 
cynically motivated, they are not outwardly so; Oz (1992) argues that the need for a unified 
professional code (which should guide the professional during employer–profession conflict) is 
                                                     
4
 CESG is at the time of writing rebranding as the National Cyber Security Centre. 
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rooted purely in the obligation a consulting profession has to the public. Blakley et al. (2001) 
were strongly critical of risk management practice outside a framework of ethical commitment 
to follow an approved methodology, favouring a licence which could be withdrawn under 
circumstances of poor performance or unethical behaviour. The researcher must be ready to look 
for such codes, albeit understanding that the presence or absence of such a code does not signify 
professional, or non-professional status since its necessity depends heavily on the domain of 
practice (Millerson 1964, pp.6–9). 
Having established a research tradition for the Information Security profession but also the 
existence of several relatively unexplored areas, the chapter concludes by identifying and 
summarising the specific focus of this study. 
2.5 Summary and Statement of the Research Questions 
It was seen that the field of Information Security became prominent as society became 
increasingly dependent on computer processing systems which were vulnerable to attack. Whilst 
the protection of earlier systems was mainly a concern for their technical operators, gradually 
the importance of socio-technical and pure behavioural aspects created a sufficiently wide body 
of knowledge to support the creation of a new occupation.  
The boundaries and specialist roles of that occupation are the subject of ongoing efforts of 
definition. Whilst governments and professional bodies have created frameworks to describe 
and contain the whole continuum of the occupation’s area of knowledge within one overall 
label, it is not clear how much unity and identity of that over-arching “security” role is shared 
between its practitioners, nor how well-accepted those specialisms have become. The necessity 
for the modern security function to attract senior management support for its policies and 
interventions in operational processes, to ensure awareness of security topics amongst 
colleagues and to win support and co-operation with policy implementation and compliance 
efforts, whilst at the same time ensuring the competent detection of technically-based attacks, 
defend against them and prosecute the attacker, creates heterogeneity of skills under a single 
banner. The work of Abbott and others showed that this can be fertile soil for disharmony and 
incoherency. Myriad training and certification schemes exist in this occupation’s name, 
however. Degrees are offered, professional bodies exist and now governments are dictating its 
shape and form. This field of work therefore is ripe for study. 
The title question cannot be answered simply and objectively; there is no metric which can be 
applied nor binary status to be awarded. One can only observe the occupation and frame an 
answer descriptively based on the theoretically-predicted journey of a professional project. The 
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opportunities to advance the field therefore  start with that project’s origins. It was seen above 
that professions are formed through fragmentation, amalgamation and competition between 
neighbouring disciplines. Juxtaposing this with the history of security suggests that some events 
within Computing created tension and eventually fracture to create a distinct occupation; whilst 
some academic and historical accounts exist for the practice, this question of the origin of the 
profession and its identity formation is not firmly settled. Furthermore, examination of this 
empirically amongst those in the industry itself is particularly suitable for research since it is 
relatively unexplored. 
Once a new specialisation emerges, theory suggests that it will need to form a distinct identity 
with its own culture and customs, therefore this represents the second main thrust to an account 
of that project. The knowledge base of this occupation is well-described by several bodies 
precluding useful addition, however the real-world distinctiveness and separateness of the 
occupation from its parent are not. For example, aside from a panoply of rather mechanistic and 
unconvincingly positivistic accounts of how to cause obedient behaviour in human policy 
targets, there is little research into how human factors are incorporated into facets of the actual 
practice and training of this profession. How are these new skills learned? How do those 
practising them coexist with technical specialists? It can be seen from Neal (2008) and from 
numerous surveys that there are a variety of reporting lines and titles within businesses, but as 
Information Security has occasionally claimed to be greater than mere technical implementation 
of policy, should the CISO continue to report to the CIO (from their own perspective), and why? 
The status of Information Security’s professionalisation has been explored only at a high level, 
under a rather basic model of profession. What is the orientation of the occupation’s own 
workforce with regards to professional status? The literature remarks on the actions of 
governments on the national stage and others have commented and will doubtless continue to 
comment on them. What is not clear however is to what extent these are supported by and 
representative of opinion within the industry, which is made relevant by the import placed on 
this by the professionalisation theory. Which of the concepts of “profession” actually find 
resonance within the occupation and how is this label received or desired by them? What is the 
extent and influence of credentialism, which the professionalisation literature regards as central 
to the success of a professional claim? Is licensing desired and would the government support 
it? These topics have not been explored fully and present an interesting opportunity for 
empirical study. Therefore, distilling and filtering these areas for research the following specific 
questions were proposed: 
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 What are the origins of the modern Information Security profession?  
◦ When and why did Information Security roles emerge and separate from 
Information Technology to form a new profession? 
 What is the current status of the Information Security profession? 
◦ To what extent does a discrete area of practice exist with which the practitioners 
associate and what is its status? 
 What are the prospects of further professionalisation? 
◦ Are there ongoing projects to professionalise the industry, what are their aims and 
are these being achieved? 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Basis 
In responding to the research questions it will be necessary to develop a research strategy and 
methodology, in preparation for which this chapter explores the socio-philosophical perspective 
from which the work is approached. The use of Actor–Network Theory within the work will be 
explained and a summary of the philosophical foundations of this approach presented. 
3.1 Introduction and Glossary 
Before social research can be undertaken one must select the philosophical approach to be 
taken, however variations in definition for philosophical terms create challenges. “Positivism” 
for example can be found used as representing an entire philosophical perspective or simply an 
epistemology (Hollis 1994, pp.41–42). In this section therefore the usage of these terms here is 
clarified below, drawing from the well-accepted conventions of Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
Ontology A theory as to the nature of reality, in other words: what exists. The principal 
point of discussion is whether there exists an objective social truth 
(knowledge about concrete social structures “exists” ready to collect, 
realism) or whether reality exists only for the individual as artificial 
concepts which are given shared names (nominalism) (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). Since it defines what can exist, ontology is the foundation for all later 
considerations (Holden and Lynch, 2004). 
 
Epistemology How knowledge can be obtained or experienced. It is necessarily coupled to 
ontology, since one cannot “know” what one does not accept exists. Can one 
“know” social reality by hypothesising, testing and measuring it (positivism) 
or is it individual and can only be understood by interpreting the positions of 
others? The latter position is occasionally referred to as “interpretive” 
epistemology, however this will cause confusion with interpretivism as a 
paradigm (see below) thus the Burrell and Morgan (1979) adoption of the 
general term anti-positivism is useful. 
 
Voluntarism and 
Determinism 
(Agency) 
Is a person constrained by their surroundings: are they an “actor” with free 
will to choose how to act (voluntarism), or an “agent” playing out their role 
in a social structure (determinism)? Hollis (1994, p.107) actually places this 
in ontological terms: one accepts individualism (the individual exists) or 
holism (social structures exist) whereas Burrell and Morgan (1979) place it 
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external to ontology. Between these extremes, Jones et al., (2004) note that 
Giddens’ Structuration Theory acknowledges both that the human is affected 
by structure (by learned and reproduced behaviours) but makes choices 
which – albeit potentially with consequences – they are free to have made 
differently. 
 
Methodology 
and Method 
“Methodology” will be used to describe the underlying logic of the research 
approach, whereas “method” will refer to the specific techniques. 
Nomothetic approaches look at the general behaviour of groups, considering 
the individual to be a member of that group and affected by common laws. 
These approaches are often linked to systematic measurement and testing of 
hypotheses, and hence are frequently linked to the positivist epistemology of 
natural science. Ideographic approaches focus on the individual, aiming to 
produce a full description of a particular case and recognising its 
uniqueness, without necessarily taking a highly regimented and reproducible 
empirical approach (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.6; Gibbs 2007, pp.5–6). 
A study will choose methods which produce the type of data which aligns 
with the chosen methodology. A nomothetic methodology will tend to desire 
the production of quantitative data, to demonstrate correlations between 
observable variables, observe trends or test hypotheses. It will therefore 
favour methods which produce population data minimising the role of the 
individual, such as the survey. Ideographic studies will conversely look to 
observe and collect the idiosyncrasies of the specific case, such as by 
interview (Burrell and Morgan 1979, pp.6–7).  
Method selection is output-specific. To review the performance of a drug it 
is desirable to remove any bias or placebo effect from the results. Where 
understanding is less well developed and the question less distinct, 
numerical data cannot completely explain nuance in the meaning and 
intention of actions, for example what it means to contract the relevant 
illness (Flick, 2009). 
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Paradigm Clearly ontology, epistemology and methodology are linked. Taking the 
nominalist ontology that there is no objective truth but then adopting a 
positivist epistemology, to measure and test reality objectively, creates an 
internally inconsistent position. Some authors have therefore identified 
paradigms which describe a reasonably coherent philosophical approach, 
analogues of political parties or schools of thought, grouped for convenience 
of reference (Burrell and Morgan 1979, pp.23–24). As these authors state 
(p.36), this is far looser than the Kuhnian paradigm which defines the 
exclusive mindset for a generation. They suggest that sociological positions 
can be classified on two independent dimensions, which together give four 
paradigms. The first dimension (“subjective–objective”, illustrated in Fig. 4) 
is an axis between a natural science approach to social questions 
(sociological positivism) and requiring understanding from within rather 
than describing from without (derived from German Idealism). 
Nominalism RealismOntology
Anti-positivism PositivismEpistemology
Voluntarism DeterminismHuman Nature
Ideographic NomotheticMethodology
SUBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE
 
Fig. 4: Subjective–Objective dimension (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.3). 
The second dimension, shown in Table 1, considers order and conflict; work 
might account for the status quo with well-established and integrated 
elements, whereas other work will describe change, instability and coercion 
rather than consensus. Since well-ordered change can be part of the 
maintenance of the status quo, they draw the distinction between regulation 
(which can include integrated processes of evolution) and radical change 
(which is an agitation).  
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Regulation  Radical Change 
(a) The status quo  (a) Radical change 
(b) Social order  (b) Structural conflict 
(c) Consensus  (c) Modes of domination 
(d) Social integration and cohesion  (d) Contradiction 
(e) Solidarity  (e) Emancipation 
(f) Need satisfaction*  (f) Deprivation 
(g) Actuality  (g) Potentiality 
Table 1:Regulation–Radical Change dimension 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.18) 
* In other words, whether the system is geared towards the satisfaction of 
individual needs. 
The poles of these two dimensions produce four paradigms, shown in Fig. 5: 
Radical 
Humanist
Radical 
Structuralist
Interpretive Functionalist
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Fig. 5: A model of four sociological paradigms (from Burrell and Morgan 
1979, p.22). 
Chua (1986) rejects both such strict dichotomies and the separation of 
Radical Humanism and Radical Structuralism, preferring mainstream and 
interpretative positions (akin to functionalist and interpretative paradigms 
above) with the Critical tradition as the final perspective. Critical perspectives 
are distinguished by emancipation and ethical evaluation; interactions are 
viewed in terms of their restrictive effects on the individual, who cannot reach 
their full potential due to structures of domination (Chua, 1986).  
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3.2 Prior Trends 
Having defined our terms, to position this as an evolution of the existing literature and thus 
support a claim to advancing it, it is useful to consider the prevailing theoretical traditions. 
3.2.1 Dominance of Positivism in Social Studies 
In its exploration of the physical world, natural science has adopted and honed the hypothetico-
deductive model attributed to Newton (Bernard 2000, p.12; Chua, 1986; Galliers and Land, 
2002). Implicitly this assumes objective truth, where objects will obey set laws regardless of the 
understanding of any observer. Hypotheses which are tested repeatedly and successfully become 
theories, which can then be used inductively to create other hypotheses, growing stepwise the 
body of known truth (Hollis 1994, pp.40–65). Eventually new techniques of testing and 
observing create results which disprove those theories which are fundamental to that paradigm 
and hence the paradigm itself must shift to encompass the new observations (Kuhn, 1970). 
Whether or not the study of natural phenomena is genuinely as divorced from the social reality 
of the human researcher as is claimed (see Latour, 1988), this model, variously described as 
positivist or functionalist, remains the dominant position in natural science research. 
Positivism can also be applied to social studies however here it is more controversial. Although 
a considerable number of social scientists still favour such a “natural science” approach (Lee, 
2002; Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.25) many philosophers of social science have moved away 
from a positivist position. Dilthey, for example, argued that there is a distinction between 
descriptions of inanimate objects – which cannot interpret the context in which they exist – and 
humans to whom the world exists as a web of meanings and from which they are inseparable 
(Barnard 2000, p.19). They must therefore be understood rather than explained, including such 
concepts as value which do not apply to the natural sciences (Hollis 1994, p.17). 
Of particular note is the substantial amount of work examining user security behaviours and 
policy compliance. Such studies often take a positivist stance, through hypothesis-testing by 
survey. Demonstrating direct effects of awareness and policy, even if accepted 
epistemologically, is challenging in practice due to the difficulty of gathering data on real 
behaviour (Crossler et al., 2013). Behavioural constructs such as General Deterrence Theory, 
Protection Motivation Theory and Value-Focused Approaches are invoked in these studies to 
explore why behaviours vary from those expected or desired. These studies are still of interest to 
the constructivist however, by describing a conceptual and motivational tension between 
context, policy author and subject. This study, following Siponen (2005), considers that whilst 
positivism is well-accepted in the study of computing science, the mechanistic “cause and 
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effect” studies of user behaviour and compliance might be viewed with some caution and 
empirical interpretative work has much to offer. 
3.2.2 Research Traditions in Information Systems Studies  
It is useful to adopt the distinction made by Stowell and Mingers (1997) between Computing 
Sciences (CS): a technical domain concerned with computer systems, and Information Systems 
(IS): the application of those systems where they are put to use. IS research arguably began in 
the 1960s within the study of the development and use of IT in a business context (Myers and 
Avison, 2002) however the precise boundary between the two areas is not universally accepted 
(Stowell and Mingers, 1997).  
This is not surprising since it is reasonable to assume that the two are in dialogue; commercial 
computing systems (at least) would not be financially viable were they of no use, and the 
application of computing systems within IS is linked to the capabilities of current technology. 
There are clear parallels between the CS/IS distinction noted above and that made between the 
technical aspects of security (such as the design and analysis of the algorithms used for 
encryption) and the policy and governance aspects noted in the previous chapter. In the 
discussion of research trends below therefore, this will refer predominantly to IS research rather 
than computing. 
Historically, like its natural science origins, IS has been associated primarily with a realist, 
positivist approach using quantitative data. (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 2002; Siponen, 2001; 
Myers and Avison, 2002; Galliers and Land, 2002; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; 
Dhillon, 1997, pp.8–22). Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) describe this as aimed at producing 
“practical solutions for practical problems”, characterising the approach as in the Durkheim 
school, using natural science empirical methods upon a social order which possesses concrete 
artefacts.  
By (2001), Dhillon and Backhouse saw movement in the IS literature towards a more holistic 
and socially-informed outlook, but this was not often apparent in the security subset of the 
literature. In this, they report a preponderance of checklists, procedural and mathematical risk 
analysis models and evaluation criteria which fail due to offering a “rational explanation of 
social affairs” whereas emancipatory (Critical) approaches still appeared scarce. Since security 
policies restrict personal freedoms and Critical theorists seek out areas where forms of 
domination prevent the fullest expression of human freedom (Chua, 1986), this is surprising, 
since Critical Theory should be highly suited to this line of investigation (Stahl et al., 2008). 
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By contrast, much of the security management literature is conceptual, elucidating novel 
frameworks or perspectives. Whilst some is of high quality, the lack of empirical work, rigour 
and theory overall has been criticised (Siponen et al., 2008; Cannoy et al., 2006; Silic and Back, 
2014; Willison and Siponen, 2007). Fulford and Doherty claimed as late as (2003) to present the 
first serious empirical work on security policy. This is strikingly similar to McGee’s (2006) 
review of physical security literature which found little quality empirical academic material and 
much subjective opinion and proposals for frameworks. 
There is a clear recent trend away from this dominance. Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen’s (2007) 
review of early 2000s literature reports the continued dominance of mathematical, procedural 
and technical approaches, stating the need for more theory-creating qualitative empirical work 
in the area of security management. McFadzean et al. in (2006) still reported a dominance of 
functionalist research in the traditional mould, but with a significant strand of human-centred 
holistic work emanating from security’s shift from a technical to a socially-informed topic. 
More recently still, Myers (2011) reports more interpretive work, estimating that it constituted 
around a quarter of contemporary research, albeit that Critical research was still under-
represented.  
3.3 Selection of Theoretical Perspectives 
It was shown above that whilst positivism has dominated early security work, Information 
Security studies are increasingly taking an interpretative approach due to the increasing 
recognition of human and governance factors. The review moves on therefore by positioning 
this study within that context by identifying its theoretical foundation. 
3.3.1 Selection of a Socio-Philosophical Paradigm 
There is some freedom here. This study, as an examination of the status of the profession rather 
than the technical work they supervise, is not bound to continue in the functionalist “tradition” 
since there is a substantial precedent for work in other, more interpretative, paradigms. Much of 
the previous work is not empirical (Silic and Back, 2014; Willison and Siponen, 2007); whilst 
empirical work is not necessarily superior (Stahl, 2014) this bias provides an opportunity for 
novel contribution to empirical work. 
Critical theory, the third of Chua’s (1986) “world views” (paradigms), would be a useful 
platform to explore the impact of a rise of a professionalism movement within security 
governance, especially with regard to the impact on privacy, freedom and workplace dignity 
which could potentially be curtailed in the name of security (Stahl et al., 2014). It is particularly 
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suited to the exploration of a new breed of manager exercising control over employees using a 
lever which has considerable purchase with senior management, with considerations of 
liberation or emancipation (Klein and Huynh 2004, pp.167–168).  
Although by no means the only benefit of the approach – much can be learned by management 
as well as the advancement of the managed (Stahl et al., 2008) – this broader emphasis on 
emancipation is not aligned with the research questions identified; the nature of such a study 
would be to advance such a particular liberal cause. Whilst the exploration of such themes of 
dominance is highly valid for future work, there is no such agenda available to advance in this 
specific study. 
Attention moves then to the more neutral functionalist–interpretative continuum. A fully 
functionalist approach is troublesome; the aim is to explore and explain the existence, status and 
aims of a professionalism movement, however the review of the professionalism literature 
concluded that an objective definition of professional status cannot be achieved as it is so highly 
subjective. Leaving aside an ontological discussion about the reality of such status, how could 
one adopt a positivist epistemology when there is nothing clearly defined to test and measure 
outside any given individual’s understanding? 
So is an entirely interpretive approach suitable? There will be a core group of any occupation 
who consider themselves professional and wish to be perceived as such. It must be identified 
whether this is a significant or influential group matching a general intention in the group. This 
could be approached with a positivist epistemology using surveys, which would give a good 
claim to generalisability amongst the population, however as noted the subjectivity inherent in 
professional status discussions aligns well with an interpretive standpoint. Knowledge of reality 
is, in this approach, gained through social constructions (Klein and Myers, 1999).  
An ontology whereby social reality is entirely constructed is also difficult. Abbottonian 
professionalism can be seen either as a movement from within or the opening of space by an 
external cause widening a field due to technological advance. Viewing a professional movement 
purely from a subjective viewpoint may hide the action of non-human events. The approach 
must be neutral on this point and not pre-judge the causes of such a movement.  
3.3.2 Consideration and Selection of a Theoretical “Lens” 
In addition to the selection of a philosophical basis for the project, it is possible to use a lens or 
sensitizing device as an additional theory component to aid interpretation. Gregor (2006) 
identifies various categories of theory, from those used to simply frame the analysis (such as 
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schema, taxonomies and frameworks) through to comprehensive prescriptions of method and 
technique. Between these lie theory used to explain or predict phenomena; these are more 
abstract and represent ways of viewing or explaining the world.  
Such theories are typically philosophical and sociological in origin and require adaptation to 
ensure the technical aspects of IS-related study are included. Johnston (2001) proposes “we 
should not be borrowing theories fully-made from other disciplines bur rather taking the 
essential features of these theories which are useful to IS studies”. Lee (2001) elaborates on 
these features: 
 “[IS] research … examines more than just the technological system, or just the social 
system, or even the two side by side; in addition, it investigates the phenomena that 
emerge when the two interact… our field's so-called ‘reference disciplines’ are actually 
poor models for our own field. They focus on the behavioural or the technological, but 
not on the emergent sociotechnical phenomena that set our field apart.”  
(Lee, 2001) 
Within the group of theories for “understanding”, Gregor (2006) identifies high-level theories 
which are used to form a world view (such as Situated Action, Actor–Network and Structuration 
Theories) and low-level theories used to explain specific phenomena (field studies, surveys, 
ethnography, hermeneutics and phenomenology).  
Hermeneutics is concerned with interpreting the meaning of text, from the point of view of a 
subject where the same event has different meanings for people with different life experiences. 
Myers (2004) suggests that its core principles of finding meaning in text (along with 
phenomenology) underlie the interpretivism concept. Alternatively it can guide the research 
process, understanding a controversy from the viewpoints of the conflicting observers, working 
until all apparent contradictions have been explained using all available information. A key 
concept is the hermeneutic circle: one’s understanding of the whole of a phenomenon is 
informed by studying its parts, however those parts are likewise understood in terms of the 
understanding of the whole. While useful in the IS context, it is most applicable to situations 
where a controversy needs to be understood within a particular context (Myers, 2004), whereas 
at design time it was not known whether the viewpoints of the various actors in IS Security 
necessarily conflict. 
Phenomenology similarly includes elements of pure philosophy as well as a structure of 
application. Husserl’s transcendental approach attempts to disregard what is not truly 
fundamental to reduce the concept to its pure “essence”, achieved through deep analysis of the 
term’s meaning and even etymology (Introna and Ilharco, 2004). It was considered impractical 
to view security professionalism through such a lens since both security and especially 
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professionalism are notable for their manifest lack of a satisfactory definition. Such an analysis 
could find it difficult to identify the essence of what a generation of sociologists struggled even 
to define in broad terms. 
For Jones et al. (2004) Giddens’s highly influential theory of “structuration” intervenes in 
whether action is constrained by pre-existing structures or whether these structures emerge from 
action. He suggested that actors learn and reproduce certain patterns of social behaviour which 
become accepted in organisations or society, however these are not fixed properties and the 
person is not fully constrained by them. By electing to follow them according to a scheme of 
inducements and penalties, the actor reproduces the pattern for another instance. To Walsham 
(1997), Giddens’s own work does not reference technology in much depth and does not provide 
substantial methodological support to those wishing to make use of it in IS studies. To address 
this and deepen the theory in this area, the “duality of structure” was referenced and developed 
by Orlikowski (1992) to apply these concepts to a mixed technology/organisation context, 
where technical features (which could include security policies, controls and enforcement 
methods) both shaped and were shaped by the patterns of usage. Later, Atkinson and Brooks 
(2003) combined the structural elements of Structuration with the symmetry of ANT to focus on 
and fully recognise the distinctiveness of the human–machine entity created by user–technology 
interaction, proposing “StructurANTion”. 
These approaches are potentially extremely useful ways to view a movement in security 
professionalism. This is particularly true in terms of the analysis of a case study of security 
technology within an organisation and its interaction with user behaviour (as developed further 
by Orlikowski and Robey (1991)). With its emphasis on identifying the work of a change-
driving actor in human–technical networks (Brooks and Atkinson, 2004), Actor–Network 
Theory (ANT) however was seen to offer the most useful insights for the study of population 
movements strongly influenced by a technical context and the competition in a dynamic area to 
achieve social closure. It is particularly promising when combined with Abbott’s theory of the 
“System of Professions” reviewed in the last chapter. The dynamic and competitive nature of 
the claims for jurisdiction in new areas and peripheral areas echoes the ANT concept of groups 
not being fixed entities but in existence only as long as the network stays stable (in this case that 
the profession continues to defend its domain against other networks and actors).  
3.4 Actor–Network Theory 
To explain the selection of ANT as a lens, it is necessary to offer a summary of its principal 
tenets.  
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3.4.1 Introduction 
Actor–Network Theory – or the sociology of translation – grew out of the area of Science and 
Technology Studies in the late 1980s (Law, 1992), principally concerned with the study of 
scientific method by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law.  
3.4.2 Sociological Roots: Knowledge and Facts 
Law (1986, pp.1–17) traces the history of the sociology of knowledge in three phases. The first 
is seen as the work at the birth of the sociological discipline in the nineteenth century by Marx 
and Durkheim. Whilst both of these writers make a wider contribution, Law was interested in 
the dialectical relationship between social structure and knowledge. Marx, interested in the 
relations between classes and the continuation of that structure, was reported to see ideology as 
a mechanism for maintaining an (unequal) social order against the interests of those 
disadvantaged by it, thus that the individual can be encouraged to accept a social structure 
through a learned experience. Durkheim is cast in the debate between empiricism and 
rationalism, or rather as going beyond it to suggest that neither is completely satisfying in 
explaining behaviour; instead suggesting that: 
“Our social classifications provide, so to speak, a template upon which we build our 
structures of thought. The social, as always for Durkheim, describes a reality that is 
prior to individuals.” 
(Law 1986, p.5) 
Whilst not noted in Law’s summary, Latour (2005, pp.13–16) also cites the work of Tarde as an 
influence, placing it in opposition to Durkheim’s views on society. In Tarde’s work, Latour sees 
the beginnings of the attack on an ill-defined “social” explanation for behaviour criticism of 
which later became a theme in ANT. This school (he says) would reverse the arrow of causality, 
turning society from an established and stable container for agents eternally “condemned” to be 
shaped by it, into microscopic actors whose independent actions create macroscopically 
observable effects which are labelled as social.  
Law’s (1986) concept of the “first phase” ends with a hiatus in the 1950s as a number of 
intractable problems derailed the contemporary writers, following which the second wave 
emerges in the 1960s to re-examine those issues. This comprised a number of relatively 
independent threads based on the above two schools; of these, the most interesting in this 
context was also influenced by Douglas and the scientific history of Kuhn: 
“Scientific knowledge was treated as a culture like any other form of knowledge, and 
was seen as being directed by social interests with the corresponding social control 
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implications.”  
(Law 1986, p.2) 
Law suggests that Actor–Network Theory emerged during a third wave in the 1980s. It proposed 
an approach which described the establishment of facts via networks of those who are persuaded 
to accept them rather than because of any inherent objective truth which they may possess: 
“By itself a given sentence is neither a fact nor a fiction; it is made so by others, later 
on.” 
(Latour 1987, p25) 
Compare: 
“As there is no neutral, objective world of facts which acts as the final arbitrator, the 
adequacy of a theory (or explanation of intention) is assessed via the extent to which the 
actors agree with the explanation of their intentions.” 
(Chua, 1986) 
Latour (1987) builds on this to criticise the foundations of modern natural science functionalism 
and positivism, questioning the view of science as an egalitarian pursuit of hidden natural truth, 
disseminating strictly vetted facts between peers. Latour offers an alternative mechanism, how 
the work of previous researchers is not in a binary and intrinsically held state of right or wrong, 
but rather accepted, enshrined and eventually invoked in a hierarchy of persuasion. Scientific 
writers attempt to convince the reader to accept their work as fact and recruit allies to his or her 
theory, not merely through writing but equipment, graphs, tables and any other medium. This 
theory grew to explain the provenance of established facts and how the network which accepts 
them develops and strengthens (Scott-Smith, 2013) opening the “black boxes” which represent 
those established facts (Latour, 1987) and how power relationships come to be embedded 
without assuming that a person is imbued natively with “power” as a property (Law, 1992).  
ANT moved away from contemporary thinking by stressing the importance of the non-human 
actor (“actant” is sometimes used (Latour 2005, p.55) to avoid being drawn into a discussion of 
human agency). The early movement is fairly coherent and stresses agnosticism on the part of 
the observer of the physical nature of an actor and strict symmetry of treatment for human and 
non-human actors alike (Latour, 1987; 2005; Law, 1986; Callon, 1986). Later, however, the 
field so diverged that there is no longer a common body of knowledge, unity of application or 
standard for account structure (Cho et al., 2008; Walsham, 1997; McLean and Hassard, 2004). 
3.4.3 What is the “Social”? 
The proponents of ANT emphasise that they are not proposing a novel research method but 
rather an ontology, or possibly even simply a challenge to the existing sociological mindset. 
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Certainly Latour’s (1987, p.7) language of “abandon[ing] knowledge about knowledge” implies 
an epistemological and ontological position; Sayes (2014) positions it as primarily a research 
methodology however as Gad and Jensen (2010) note, little detailed method is provided by its 
main proponents other than to reject prior assumptions of macro effects. 
It can indeed be difficult to define the project exactly as its proponents seem keener to detail 
what it is not. Callon (1999, p.194) for example states, “ANT is not a theory. It is this which 
gives it its strength and adaptability”. Observers might then query “theory” in the title (Gad and 
Jensen, 2010) however Callon (1999) suggests this was applied from outside rather than a claim 
by its proponents. Latour has also addressed (1999a) the technical, predictable and inflexible 
associations which have become attached to “network” since the explosion of internetworking, 
and the controversy surrounding the “actor” as a source of intentional action. ANT might be 
thought of at the level of ontology or even paradigm rather than a specific and procedural 
method.  
One of ANT’s principal criticisms is of the existence of “social stuff”, that there is a social 
mechanism routinely invoked for explanations of phenomena without justification (Latour, 
2005). Law (1992) notes that one cannot, when trying to explain the existence of social 
structures, begin by assuming that they exist; to do so is akin to a teleological position that 
infers the presence of an ethereal “social force” from observing what are taken to be its effects. 
Similarly, Law claims that one cannot assume the rich and powerful to be constructed from 
essentially different social materials from the poor and lowly but must explain how this unequal 
situation arose and how one set acted in their environment to enlist the co-operation of others.  
“…the social is nothing other than patterned networks of heterogeneous materials” 
(Law, 1992) 
3.5 Controversies: Sources of Uncertainty 
Latour’s seminal work “Reassembling the Social” (2005) lists five key areas (pp.27–139), 
which might be loosely classed as dimensions, where ANT departs from traditional thought, 
which are paraphrased below. 
3.5.1 Groups 
ANT suggests that groups are not static, fixed and settled items, but rather dynamic and in 
continual formation (Latour 2005, pp.27–42). There are no pre-existing innate groupings or 
classes which can be brought unexamined into an explanation of action. Rather there are 
associations of individuals, seen in the act of association and in the attempts to defend the group 
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integrity against externals (who may be attempting to recruit members to their own cause). Such 
movements leave traces which can be seen and thus included in the account. Once the 
association is no longer active it is no longer doing any work, and thus it has been disbanded, 
regardless of any remaining inactive artefacts (Latour 2005, p.53). ANT wishes to liberate the 
actor, its individual actions and success in recruiting allies and forming associations without 
attempting to force them into a role (Callon and Latour, 1981). A researcher must therefore 
examine any rise of professionalism by engaging with those who seek to be spokesmen for the 
general population, rather than simply assuming every security manager adopts an aligned 
desire upon signing their contract. 
3.5.2 Action 
The non-purposive, non-sentient or unaware actor is explained by the assertion that the actor is 
not themselves the source of an action but is that which is made to act at the nexus of other 
entities (Latour 2005, p.46). Again, the ambition is to remove the assumption that actions are 
caused by a pre-determined range of social forces which constrain the individual, who must then 
rest in an accepted groove. The study must reject the concept that “a profession” acts in a 
unified way and see this instead as individuals organised to act in concert by some action. As 
seen below, commentators such as Walsham (1997) suggest that a wholly local approach 
rejecting pre-made social “forces” can lead the observer to overlook the effect of outside 
influences; those seeking greater depth to theory were invited to consider Structuration Theory 
(see also Johnston, 2001). 
3.5.3 Objects 
Society, as mentioned above cannot be accepted as an externality – a pre-existing force shaping 
the lives of its constituents – but must be treated as the result of actions to render established 
associations more durable. Objects participate in action (Latour 2005, p.70). The “actor” in ANT 
must be independent and have the ability to surprise. They cannot merely be a “mere 
intermediary” functioning as a push-rod, they must play a part in action and leave a trace. 
Latour (2005, pp.37–42) states firmly that anything whose work is not visible cannot be an 
actor. An actor is frequently itself a “punctualised”5 assembly (Law, 1992), something briefly 
constructed from its constituent parts. 
                                                     
5
 as in made into a point, or appear as if a single point 
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3.5.4 Facts 
Latour (1987) in particular proposes firmly that facts are black boxes which form as a particular 
theory gains acceptance. That which today is an “unproven” theory of one research federation 
and the subject of robust debate later, after it has gained acceptance becomes “true” and 
axiomatic without further discussion. That humans are now seen as central to security rather 
than viewing the subject in entirely technical terms is an example of such a transformation. 
ANT seeks to open these black-boxed facts to enquire how they were formed or to watch their 
creation or decline. An analogy is given (Latour 1987, p.30) of the passage of a parliamentary 
bill – the fluid focus potentially of considerable debate, controversy, persuasion, politicking and 
eventually the recruitment of a sufficient number of allies whose interests one way or another 
appear to be advanced by its enactment – through to being a solid piece of legislation, handed 
down as unarguable, enforceable law. Like justice however, the settlement of a controversy into 
a fact must be “seen to have been done”; the settlement must be visible and mobilised by others 
as fact in later controversies to be considered stable (Latour 2005, p.40). This effect is evident in 
the stabilisation of the BS7799 security standard (as was) from highly political and controversial 
proposal to well-accepted global benchmark (Backhouse et al., 2006). 
3.5.5 Descriptions 
An ANT study is a description of a network caught at a moment in time– an account of the 
visible products of actors’ work “where all the actors do something and don’t just sit there” 
(Latour 2005, p.128). Without the pre-fabricated social forces which can be used to explain the 
observed phenomena in terms of the expected, the actors must be followed and their empirically 
visible traces and their results described. Networks are however potentially infinite; a somewhat 
arbitrary boundary must be drawn according to the resources at hand and the space available to 
report the findings (Latour 2005, pp.121–148). 
3.6 Moments of Translation 
An Actor–Network is a "heterogeneous network of aligned interests, including people, 
organizations and standards" (Walsham, 1997). ANT accounts describe the process whereby an 
entity becomes the exclusive spokesman for the interests of other actors who accept them as the 
gateway to satisfaction of their own interests (Callon, 1986). In ANT’s most important 
methodological work, Callon (1986) distilled the stages (“moments”) of translation into four 
steps. 
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3.6.1 Problematisation 
ANT is concerned with action, thus it is frequently used to describe the formation of a set of 
alliances which developed into an Actor–Network. The actors themselves are identified and 
their interdependencies established. For the formation of a durable network, the actors must 
come to accept that their various interests are advanced through some process on which they all 
rely, an Obligatory Passage Point (OPP) as illustrated in Fig. 6. This requires these problems to 
be framed in such a way that the focal actor can make an offer to assist the others through an 
association with them. 
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Fig. 6: Illustration of OPP formation, from Callon (1986, pp.206–207). 
Problematisation thus “describes a system of alliances, or associations, between entities, thereby 
defining the identity and what they ‘want’” (Law 1986, p.206).  
3.6.2 Interessement 
Once the actors are defined, an actor hoping to become a spokesman for the entire network must 
begin interesting the others in their work. Simultaneously they begin divorcing them from any 
rival actors which allow an alternative route to the state being offered (alternative passage 
points). A campaign of sorts is undertaken (through devices: tactics or some physical entity) 
which lobbies the actors to be recruited to the endeavour. The attempt is – through negotiation – 
to align the actor’s interests with those of the putative spokesman and hence consent to the 
alliance and strengthening the emerging network. This process is the incarnation of the concepts 
advanced during Problematisation (Callon, 1986). 
3.6.3 Enrolment 
If Interessement is successful, the various actors will be enrolled by the focal actor (Callon, 
1986), in that they will consent to the alliance and accept their roles in the network and donate 
68 
their own capabilities to supporting it. Callon is quick to point out that these are not roles in the 
sense of generally accepted societal positions; rather this stage defines what each actor does and 
wants and how it relates to the others. The actor allows himself to be represented by the focal 
actor as a “spokesman” for the aligned group’s interests. 
3.6.4 Mobilisation 
“An actant can gain strength only by associating with others.” 
(Latour 1988, p.160) 
Representation of those mobilised may be indirect, performed through negotiation with a 
spokesman. Such a spokesman may be a representative as traditionally understood (such as a 
union shop steward), the representation of a subset of objects through a sample or the 
presentation of a set of actors’ interests through a mouthpiece such as the representation of the 
behaviour of some object through a figure or instrument. This facilitates the mobilisation of a 
large number of allies to a cause through that figurehead, however this only holds whilst that 
support continues (which might be checked using a test of strength and whilst the spokesman 
does not betray the represented through self-interest, or at least is not found out). 
“In our definition the crucial element is not the quality of the represented but only their 
number and the unity of the representative”. 
(Latour 1987, p.72) 
Callon (1986) mentions the comparison of a spokesman as a political form of induction, the 
assumption that where one leads all will follow.  
3.7 Success 
A project, according to ANT, succeeds or fails on the basis of its ability to form a sufficiently 
durable alliance of interested parties who have been convinced that the project is the gateway to 
advancing their own interests. In Latour’s (1987) language, the price of dissent is raised by 
accumulating so many allies for which one can speak (and who can be protected from poaching 
by the challenger) that it is impractical to form a counter proposal.  
Dery et al. (2013) note that the “neat” process above as described by Callon (1986) is not 
necessarily seen empirically in a perfect linear and sequential fashion thus success may only be 
visible after several attempts to fulfil the stages identified. Gonzales and Cox (2010) by way of 
example present an account of HR process implementation which partially failed due to lack of 
enrolment of key actors. An ANT account does not look at the morality of the movement, 
whether it is in general terms “beneficial” or achieves an externally-imposed success criterion 
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(Scott-Smith, 2013) but simply aims to describe the formation of the alliances through which 
the various interests are mobilised.  
3.8 Criticism  
ANT is not the work of a unified political organisation with a well-polished party line; it has 
evolved and developed through debate and even fracture (Walsham, 1997). Proponents and 
critics of ANT (not necessarily exclusive groups) have argued at length on the topic and it is not 
proposed to fully cover the area here, however some note must be taken of the limits of certain 
concepts.  
The “symmetry” of treatment of human and non-human actants in terms of agency or ability to 
cause action is probably the most controversial aspect of ANT, even though the intent to 
introduce the non-human generally has had overall success (Sayes, 2014). Perhaps the most 
well-known criticism of the symmetry was by Collins and Yearley (1992) who, pointing to the 
absurdity of that symmetry taken to extremes, prefer to advance and retain the differentness of 
human intention. As many have noted (see McLean and Hassard (2004) for a useful summary) 
the principle of symmetry is useful in reminding the analyst that whilst humans can make 
strategic decisions – albeit as Callon (1999) notes, not all actors are in a position to make perfect 
choices with a full view of all available strategic options – non-human entities can cause effects 
and take their place in the network surrounding those human choices and acts. “Action” in this 
sense however is not a straightforward statement of direct intentional cause (Latour 2005, 
pp.70–72; Johnston, 2001).  
Following the argument of Callon and Latour (1992), it is accepted that the position of ANT is a 
reaction to a sociology of human separateness and specialness which underplayed the 
interactions of heterogeneous materials and that the extreme equivalence positions alleged by 
some critics are straw man arguments. There are clearly differences of agency and intent 
between human and non-human, however it is not accepted a priori that all interesting events 
and translations inside the Information Security network – which is so completely dominated by 
the effects of and changing possibilities created from technological change – are the result of 
deliberate human action. 
Further criticism must be answered concerning the lack of taking a moral position or judgement. 
By taking no stance on the motivation of the action and concentrating purely on describing it, it 
is possible to level accusations of relativism; much of the criticism of ANT has centred on this 
lack of moral comment (see Winner, 1993; Amsterdamska, 1990). On the point of ethics, Law 
(1992) notes that this is an analytical position only which seeks to recognise the involvement of 
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objects in the networks which shape behaviour, which does not seek to make human and 
machine morally equivalent. As explored by Johnston (2001) it is possible also to consider some 
automatic processes which favour a given outcome (such as evolution) to be thus intentional, 
even if not rational or strategic.  
Callon (1999, p.193) characterises some of the criticism as centred on the actor as “guided by 
the quest for power and solely interested in spreading networks and their influence” (see also 
Latour’s (1999a) defence). Indeed, the actor may have no intention or motivation and be 
enrolled by others (Callon, 1999). Studies using ANT have however been published which show 
a moral angle; some (such as Latour (1991)) argue that it is possible or indeed necessary to use 
an apolitical tool to describe a network before making a judgement. That emphasis on adopting 
no a priori assumptions about the nature of associations between entities which must be traced 
carefully and empirically arguably makes ANT a firmer basis for Critical studies to examine 
relationships of concern (Doolin and Lowe, 2002). Moreover, this study sets out to examine the 
state of a network but has no “mandate” from its title question to seek to cast judgement except 
where analytically necessary, therefore an amorality argument does not deter here.  
3.9 Actor–Network Theory in Information Systems and Security Studies 
ANT has been found increasingly to be a useful approach in some computing studies (Cordella 
and Shaikh, 2006) due to its refusal to allow a distinction between the “material” and “social” 
worlds, which are inherent parts of any IS study (Tatnall and Burgess, 2002). It seems at least 
superficially well suited to a study at the nexus of human–computer interaction since it rejects 
the concept of a boundary, seeing only patterns in associations between entities (Law, 1992; 
Latour, 1999a). From an ANT perspective, whilst it is possible to draw a boundary around the 
physical machinery which runs a new piece of software, it is impossible truly to distinguish 
which parts are “entirely technical” which are not the result or driver of some interaction 
between other actors (Tatnall and Gilding, 1999). As discussed above, Walsham (1997), 
although no eager proponent of ANT, suggests that although the full symmetry of technical and 
human actor need not be accepted to make use of the concept in IS studies; it is not a 
coincidence that such a theory should have arisen within the “increasingly complex socio-
technical world in which we live” and the compatibility of the approach with this study is in 
accord with this statement.  
ANT remains a popular and valid approach in this area. It was used well by Dery et al. (2013) 
for example to show how the competing interplay of interests can explain “surprises” not 
otherwise predicted by solely technical models. Similarly, Wang et al. (2015) used ANT as a 
lens as part of an investigation into the Chinese mobile telephony market to enrich the 
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identification and description of key interactions. The elements of competition to enrol others 
and the consequent unpredictable nature of network formation according to different levels of 
success of different interests were used by Rhodes (2009) in an interpretative study of IT 
systems in Africa. Díaz Andrade and Urquhart (2010) similarly employ ANT as a lens and use it 
to structure the report into the stages suggested by Callon (1986). In another interpretative study, 
Cho et al. (2008) use ANT to examine particular moments (events) where translations occurred 
during the implementation of health systems. 
The relevance of ANT to Information Security topics was demonstrated by Hedström et al. 
(2010). They convincingly describe the hacking of a university computer system in terms of an 
Actor–Network where the aims of the security function were incompletely translated. An 
approach which favoured a purely technical solution to security problems over negotiating with 
human actors, coupled with an assumption that the network once formed was static rather than 
fragile and temporary, fatally undermined the network’s ability to defend itself from rival focal 
actors (in this case, the hacker). Whilst inscriptions were produced in the shape of policy 
documents, these were not successful in convincing the free actors to align with their substance 
and commit to the cost of maintaining the required discipline. Komatsu et al. (2013) 
demonstrate this empirically, showing that a rational or claimed intention to behave securely 
does not always translate to decision-making in the general user community.  
Guo (2013) goes on to show how these networks are highly complex; underestimating the 
interaction within the network or presenting it in simplistic terms is unwise and led to flaws in 
pre-behavioural security literature and approaches. Bonner and Chiasson (2005) traced such a 
network describing the adoption of Fair Information Principles as a privacy standard which 
became itself a black box within a network. 
As an example of work attempting to explain the divergence in theoretical perspectives on 
security strategy, Seeholzer (2012) identified multiple strategies for organisations, ranging from 
clients of standards or best practice documents and procedural approaches, authoritarian power-
based policy execution through to merely portraying secure behaviour for public consumption. 
From this it is evident that the motivations behind the behaviour of companies are varied and 
complex. 
3.10 Summary 
The professions are most effective when they can be seen as collapsed single actors or “black 
boxes” (Law 1992), consisting internally of professional bodies, curricula, schools, their 
members and others (Abbott 1988, p.79-83). ANT’s concept of irreversibility is key here as it 
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has a strong analogue with the professional goal of achieving state-sanctioned monopoly. Using 
Callon’s (1986) terminology, the professional body, using credentials of competence as devices 
of interessement, persuades the state that it is an OPP to proper regulation of the industry by 
enrolling and acting as the spokesman for the professionals, who are mobilised in supporting its 
claim in order to gain status and wealth (illustrated in Fig. 7).  
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Fig. 7: Credentialing institutions as a possible “Obligatory Passage Point”. 
According to Abbott (1988, p. 93-97) this network might break down in two ways, either 
externally where expanding domains cause a new area of practice to appear where professions 
compete to fill the void of occupational control, or alternatively the professionals within the 
point actors (the professions) may feel that they no longer wish to be represented by the existing 
professions, thus their internal networks may split to create new professional groups (as seen in 
Fig. 3). ANT is clearly appropriate for an account which must account for and support the 
agency of both technical and social factors. ANT’s core concept of pragmatism toward the 
physical form of actors – treating human and non-human symmetrically (Latour, 1987; 2005; 
Law, 1986; Callon, 1986) – is similarly clearly applicable. 
Aligning ANT with the overall interpretative approach and placing it in the paradigms described 
at the head of the chapter is not straightforward. Whilst some writers such as Rhodes (2009) 
have published full ANT studies as interpretive without qualification, describing ANT as an 
interpretative approach is not without controversy. Whilst it is often deployed as a lens within an 
interpretative study, interpretivism is associated with an ontology where reality is constructed 
subjectively. ANT, on the other hand is concerned with tracing but not judging the movements 
of multiple actors as they form and reinforce structures through their actions, thus in its purest 
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form ANT is arguably positivist and realist (Whittle and Spicer, 2008; Cordella and Shaikh, 
2006; Elder-Vass, 2015). Similarly Bird (2009) notes that whilst interpretivism “has a 
constructivist ontology”, ANT insists that the actors are free to express themselves and the 
researcher must not put words into their mouths (see Latour, 2005). The researcher, by adopting 
an interpretive stance is, to Bird, forcing the actor into their constructed universe through 
controlling the medium of interaction. It is difficult to see however how this is ever avoided in 
any non-positivist study, there always being an element of interpretation, and must surely be 
accepted as an inherent part of the research process and limitation of the degree to which that 
philosophy can shape research in its purest form. As Johnston (2001) notes, even which actor is 
the focal entity is a choice of the analyst. 
In reality, any account must at least summarise and reduce the data, and to have any relevance 
comment upon it. Therefore it is accepted that ANT must be seen as a sensitising concept rather 
than an absolute and pure philosophical position: the “lens” approach criticised by Cordella and 
Shaikh (2006) as importing concepts from but not recognising the realism implied by ANT. 
Since it was seen above that a profession means little without recognition of its status, its 
certifications mean little unless they can be used to cause an effect, and even the concept only 
exists in those societies where such a “special trade” has meaning; it is clear that “profession” is 
an entirely constructed concept. Whilst pure ANT would regard the reality of a profession as 
constructed in the interplay between the elements, since that interplay only ever has meaning in 
symbols and attitudes it is difficult to imagine an interesting or useful account of the 
construction of that meaning in this context which does not include a degree of interpretation 
through the author’s inevitably filtered vision (McLean and Hassard, 2004; Collins and Yearley, 
1992). Thus ANT will inform the analysis and shape the research questions in several ways:  
 It has been seen that many developments have influenced the ability of a (more 
powerful) security profession to form, such as the creation of standards, the maturation 
of the discipline, the emergence of human-centred governance topics and the 
increasingly severe threat to business viability from the emergence of malicious code 
and actors. It is not clear whether these are themselves the works of actors, the devices 
which have been used to mobilise others to the cause of a particular actor or they 
themselves are actors. ANT and Abbot’s theory of the “System” of professions jointly 
form an interesting and useful perspective for analysis. 
 The questions surrounding the origin and intention of the profession, the identification 
of the actors as separate from the inert, the openness to the non-human (especially in 
such a highly technical domain) as a source of those actors, together with the element of 
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intentionality flow from taking an ANT perspective.  
 The epistemology and methodology are also informed by the principle of following 
those actors, identifying them by observing their traces (for example in understanding 
their motivations and their view of the significant actants which competed to represent 
them).  
When the results of each question area have been presented separately, the general discussion 
will aim to draw a description of the movement towards professionalism if this is indeed 
observed from the data. The findings will be presented from an ANT perspective but 
interpreting the meaning and acceptance of the symbols seen in this constructed entity of “a 
profession”. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers how most effectively to respond to the research questions by justifying 
the experimental approach taken and the selection of the most appropriate method for data 
gathering and analysis. The data gathering section begins by reflecting the epistemological 
choice described in the last chapter and using this to show how those methods which do not 
produce the types of data desired were excluded, as an initial filter. The basic research design is 
then discussed, followed by a consideration of which methods are compatible with the positions 
chosen. After noting issues of methodological consistency and practical considerations the 
chapter then compares the candidate methods and details the approach proposed prior to entry 
into the field.  
Following this, the chapter then presents a report of the work as carried out, including the 
ethical issues raised, lessons learned during the pilot study, the recruitment of participants, the 
creation and adaptation of instruments and the analysis steps used in the following chapters. 
4.2 Data Gathering Methods 
The following section considers the candidate empirical methods, considering first the types of 
data to be gathered. 
4.2.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Data 
The first question concerns the type of data to be collected, although in practice most studies 
can usefully include methods which collect both textual and numerical results and validly 
present results in either format (Remenyi 2012, p.2). As Myers and Avison (2002) noted, there is 
also no completely inflexible link between a particular form of data and a particular paradigm. 
Whilst positivist studies may frequently wish to use numerical data to confirm that a hypothesis 
is highly likely to be true, positivism is entirely compatible with the use of qualitative data 
(Walsham, 1993) and neither is inherently superior.  
Originally, qualitative approaches were seen as non-systematic or non-rigorous. They were tools 
to explore a new area where there was no theory available to explain observations or possibly to 
guide what should be observed. Once a plausible explanation had been imagined which 
appeared to fit the facts, this could then be turned over to “more solid” quantitative techniques 
for scientific testing and verification (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p.16). There is now more 
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agreement that the two are complementary and a pragmatic approach can be taken to applying 
methods on the basis of applicability to the research question (Flick 2009, p.32; Silverman 
2000, p.1; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; Myers and Avison, 2002).  
Whilst it is sometimes the case that quantitative work is seen in natural science circles as the 
superior form (Flick 2009, p.25), representing the trial of the qualitative hunch in the rational 
and objective court of proof, both types of research can be applied inappropriately and 
performed badly, thus neither selection lowers the requirement for rigour, consistency and a 
systematic approach (Silverman 2000, p.12).  
4.2.2 Compatibility with Overall Paradigm 
The design of experimental method reflects the epistemology with which it is most often 
associated. Positivism, with its emphasis on rigorously measuring and testing, will tend to prefer 
reproducible studies whose output can give a reliable judgement of how well a hypothesis 
matches reality. Conversely, an anti-positivist epistemology, which favours a rich description of 
the respondent’s view, will reject a method which repeatedly asks a relatively superficial 
question. This latter action is well-accepted for determining whether a population acts in a 
certain way but does not explore why (Flick 2009, p.16).  
The title question is compatible with a functionalist approach if it could be established that there 
is a metric for testing whether professionalisation has succeeded, however no such scale is 
universally accepted and in any case such a study would be unsatisfying at the level of 
explanation. This research adopts an anti-positivist position and seeks to form a deep 
understanding through a rich explanation of individual cases and allowing actors to speak in 
their own terms. The strategy was thus to seek methods which allow freedom for the 
participants to answer freely without imposing a structure of pre-determined acceptable answers 
and thus the following three classes were rejected. 
4.2.2.1 Forced Choice Methods 
Popular sources of quantitative data for social studies are forced-choice surveys: questionnaires 
and structured interviews (Bernard, 2000). With limited resources, collecting data through 
automated means such as an online survey would be highly efficient as no per-respondent time 
is required from the researcher. It is also useful for capturing data quickly within a fixed time 
frame, such that the answers of the later interviewees are not shaped by an event reported at 
some point in the fieldwork. Impersonal methods prevent the interviewer from unintentionally 
steering or indicating the “correct” answer, subject fatigue affecting the attitude of the 
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researcher or the participant being affected by how they perceive or react to the researcher 
(Bernard 2000, p.230). 
A key benefit of forced-choice approaches in positivist studies (which will frequently present 
correlations in numerical data statistically) is enabling generalisation, since random sampling 
and statistical weighting can be used to ensure that the conclusions are as generally applicable 
as possible (Bernard, 2000). This has particular relevance here in terms of claiming to represent 
the larger population. These techniques are also very widely accepted with well-established 
methods for analysis and presentation, potentially making defence of the study more 
straightforward. 
As discussed below, the sensitivity of the subject matter could have influenced participation; 
refusal rates reduce according to the perceived “threat” of the questions, although the perceived 
anonymity and reduced tendency to alter the response to impress or avoid the moral judgement 
of the interviewer gained from a self-administered instrument can reduce this effect (Bernard 
2000, pp.229–232) which was seen as a potential benefit.  
Ultimately however, whilst this would be highly fruitful for studies adopting a different 
paradigm, such a method would be extremely difficult to adopt whilst still complying with the 
strategy of allowing the actor to generate their own ideas and signify their own concepts of what 
is relevant and these approaches are rejected as incompatible with the epistemology. As Drever 
(2003, p.3) notes, with such techniques “you never learn anything you didn’t ask”. 
4.2.2.2 Laboratory Experiments 
When attempting to demonstrate a correlation between variables, it is necessary to control the 
environment to hold equal or account for all other factors. Controlled conditions are excellent 
for removing external influences, however for the same reason laboratory experiments are 
poorly applicable to areas involving risk, judgement or decision making (which clearly applies 
here). Galliers and Land (2002) cite two reasons for this: 
 It is not possible to accurately model the selection of real world actions under conditions 
where the pressures, stress and variable amounts of information completeness do not 
apply, and 
 The introduction of metrics requires the elimination (or treatment as irrelevant) of those 
aspects which are difficult to quantify but which do have an influence. 
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As above, attempts to investigate and isolate the pre-determined factors under study prevent the 
subject being the generator of their own truth. 
4.2.2.3 Action Research  
“Action research aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an 
immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration 
within a mutually acceptable ethical framework.” 
(Rapoport, 1970, cited in Myers and Avison, 2002) 
Action research originated in the 1950s as a method for conducting psychological research. It 
involves two stages: firstly the researcher collaborates directly with the subjects to diagnose a 
problem (develop a hypothesis), then addresses the issue based on that hypothesis. Although 
popular in Education (Berg, 2004) it has generally not found favour in IS studies (Baskerville 
and Wood-Harper, 2002); a notable and relevant exception is the study of policy compliance 
awareness training by Puhakainen and Siponen (2010). 
The strategy has some parallels with ethnography in that it involves sustained single-case 
participation, however it centres on collaborating with the subjects with a particular practical 
outcome in mind to improve the lot of an identified group. Whilst this emancipatory model of 
undertaking research which itself effects change would be particularly compatible with the aims 
of much Critical Theory work, Olesen and Myers (1999) adopted an interpretivist position 
within Structuration Theory and noted the theoretical kinship with ANT (see also Atkinson and 
Brooks, 2003). It is arguable however that without the element of change present in the research 
aim, the “action” aspect becomes somewhat moot. Since no requirement to effect change exists 
this approach was rejected. 
4.2.3 Basic Research Designs 
Having rejected incompatible classes of method, it is appropriate to turn now to design. Flick 
(2009, pp.127–145) suggests four basic designs: retrospective, snapshot, longitudinal and 
comparative. Each will now be considered (and illustrated in Fig. 8) and their potential in this 
study discussed. 
4.2.3.1 Snapshot Studies 
Snapshot designs capture a state of affairs at a particular moment in time (Flick 2009, p,137). 
This is something of a default as the investigation of a topic “as it is found” is clearly a natural 
approach to inquiry.  
4.2.3.2 Retrospective Studies 
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Retrospective studies attempt to reconstruct a historical case (often biographical using narrative 
methods) to elicit data on some significant event or process and its meaning for the individual 
(Flick 2009, pp.136–137). It is not an ideal approach for seeking a highly factually correct 
historical account given inaccuracy of recall and bias from post-event re-evaluation, the 
unverifiable and secondary nature of some of the data collected on the influencing events, the 
selection of respondents and the difficulty of exploring retrospectively the alternative paths 
which would have been available (Raffaelli and Ontai, 2004; Flick 2009, p.136), but has the 
advantage of capturing an individual’s point of view. 
4.2.3.3 Comparative Studies 
These compare specific aspects across several case studies, seeking contrast between them or 
variation along a particular dimension, holding all other factors as constant as possible (Flick 
2009, pp.135–136). This might examine whether particular factors influence professionalisation 
(such as industry size), therefore elements of this approach could be included. Care must be 
taken however in an interpretative study not to stray into a positivist perspective of comparing 
scores on variables whilst controlling for confounding factors; the intention of this study is to 
examine the cases individually (being essential also for actor freedom in ANT). 
4.2.3.4 Longitudinal Studies  
Longitudinal studies sample some property repeatedly over a time period sufficient to allow 
substantive developments to take place to compare observable changes (Flick 2009, p.138). This 
is potentially a fruitful line of enquiry, as the development of an emerging profession could be 
repeatedly examined to observe any change in status, professionalisation activity and adoption 
of credentials or similar standards as de facto or de jure barriers to entry. 
4.2.3.5 Summary  
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Fig. 8: Comparison of the “basic” research designs, based on Flick (2009, pp.127–145). 
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The research question asks to what extent something in progress has been achieved, thus the 
time period considered is highly relevant. It is split into three sections, which map to concepts of 
origin, current status and future direction. Neal and Morgan’s (2000) first two stages of 
professionalisation – full-time work and specialist training – have clearly begun, thus a 
retrospective component implied by the element of origin is required. 
A longitudinal component is in principle suitable to observe current and future status, 
particularly coupled to the ANT desire to see actors moving. Professionalisation is however a 
slow process: Wilensky (1964) and Neal and Morgan (2000) describe professionalisation 
processes over several decades. It is therefore not sensible to attempt observation of such 
changes during a relatively short study since it risks not capturing any useful output. 
Professionalisation can be seen as simply a homogenous movement of the entire community, of 
like intent and mind but dispersed throughout a range of environments and hence exposed to 
varying pressures. In this case taking a snapshot of the overall community and examining the 
interrelationships already built and the motivations of the key actors for the future would have 
been valid.  
Since the actors may not be exclusively people (they could be technologies, standards, 
legislation, malware or a multitude of others) it might be legitimate to undertake a comparative 
study to identify these other factors and suggest correlation. ANT discourages pre-selecting 
which actors the researcher will “permit to act”; any approach which attempts to follow some 
factors and control for others is therefore incompatible. The project seeks to enquire from the 
available sources what made them act and identify these other actors during analysis of what is 
said, rather than deciding at design time what to see. 
No single design from the above was therefore applicable. The chosen methodology must 
support a retrospective approach to reconstruct past movement as well as being able to capture 
the status quo and direction. 
4.2.4 Candidate Strategies and Methods 
The remaining strategies and methods are considered below, before a “suitability and 
practicality” filter is applied and the remaining options tabulated. From Bernard (2000, p.8), 
“method” here will refer to a technique which generates data, whereas “strategy” will be applied 
to the organised execution of one or more techniques in a particular pattern or setting. 
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4.2.4.1 Case Studies 
“A case study may be defined as an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident, and which multiple sources of evidence are used.” 
(Yin, 1989 cited in Remenyi, 2012) 
Case studies are a widely-deployed strategy used in qualitative information systems research 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 2002) and widely and increasingly used in Management Information 
Systems studies (Lee, 2002; Remenyi 2012, p.14). They are often used in situations in which 
research and theory are at their “early, formative stages” (Cepeda and Martin, 2005) as was seen 
in the literature review. Collection of any form of data is possible and the approach is 
compatible with any epistemology: it can be used develop theory or to test it in the field. 
Multiple case studies may be performed in order to provide contrasting data and deepen the 
scope of the study, although this does not equate to “generalisability” comparable to a large-
scope random-selection survey (Remenyi 2012, pp.5–13). 
Case studies were in principle a highly promising strategy for this project. It was shown above 
that professional status is subjective, in the gift of the beholder. A potentially fruitful avenue of 
enquiry would have been to explore the interfaces for interaction illustrated in Fig. 9: 
 The professionals themselves: do they consider themselves part of a profession and do 
they consider themselves separate from IT? 
 Their IT colleagues: do they similarly recognise the separateness of the discipline? 
 Their employers: are they accorded status and respect by their clients? 
 Their would-be peers: are they treated as peers by established professionals? 
IT Security 
Manager
IT Security 
Technician
IT Practitioner
Peer
Professional
Peer
Senior Management
Similar
Status?
Separate?
Viewed as
Professional?
Viewed as Senior Professional 
or merely Manager?
Fi
xe
d
 c
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l a
n
d
 r
is
k-
to
le
ra
n
ce
 e
n
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
t
 
Fig. 9: Possible relationships explored in some potential case studies. 
82 
The context of practice for each respondent however would be different, introducing 
inconsistencies in the comparison. It was noted, for example, that the power of the security 
function can vary according to size and which legislative pressures are present, but could also 
vary according to factors either not or only weakly identified so far. Brady (2007a; 2007b) 
claims that IT professionalism varies internationally, thus it would be necessary either to 
acknowledge nationality as a variable (which presents practical issues of expense and language) 
or, as was the case, acknowledge the limitation of the work being UK-centric research. 
Even if it might be possible to limit those variations known and considered at the outset, at 
present the enumeration of such factors in the literature is incomplete. Thus case studies would 
be useful in ensuring that all respondents in one study are fixed in a particular context. Any 
exploration of where such variances are to be found could then have been guided by both 
theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967, pp.45–77) and the two advance directions 
mentioned above (Flick 2009, p.116). Whilst generalisability is a potential problem for such 
research (see below) this would certainly aid reliability since it allows for a greater number of 
responses than a single case.  
In each case, representatives of each group could be interviewed on their impressions of role 
and status of several professions, including the more established examples also found in that 
setting (e.g. accountant) and the IS profession for comparison. Given that there is a comparative 
element, any data collection would need to be at least partially structured, however since the 
respondents must not be led and there would likely be great interpretive flexibility there must be 
some freedom to explore the perceptions of each person.  
4.2.4.2 Ethnography, and Direct and Indirect Observation 
It is common to immerse the researcher into the culture of the group being studied and their 
environment (Flick 2009, pp.222–238; Bernard 2000, pp.318–409), typically over an extended 
period of time with one year being typical (Bernard 2000, p.318; Cresswell 2009, p.13). This 
strategy emphasises validity through ensuring the researcher is properly grounded in the data 
whilst remaining as objective as possible (Bernard 2000, pp.324–325). 
Some of the output of a security manager is public textual product, for example policy, however 
this will be the negotiated product of a political process. In assessing professional status, 
observing the negotiation of that output would be relevant, since it would be a test of power to 
determine (for example) how much of the manager’s desired text passed into the final document 
against resistance. Without a prolonged case study producing highly developed knowledge of 
the culture of that organisation it would be difficult to know how controversial the proposals are 
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to others in that culture (and thus how successful the manager needs to be to drive them 
forward). It would be difficult to remove elements such as effectiveness derived from a 
practitioner’s personal qualities from the status of the profession they represent, if these are 
even separable. 
This would therefore in principle be valid, although a major question would be whether 
sufficient breadth of data could be amassed in order to make it useable beyond the context of the 
specific study. This question of generalisation or transferability is discussed below. 
As an aside, immersion into the world of the subject does have a number of wider benefits. 
Bernard (2000, p.325) for example believes that increased familiarity and trust can reduce the 
observation effect of the subject’s behaviour changing when they are conscious of being 
watched, and that a familiarity with the lexicon of those being studied can assist with the 
development of data gathering instruments. Even if the decision is not to undertake an 
ethnographic study, the experience of the student as an IT professional working in a parallel 
field arguably produced some of the benefits Bernard describes. 
4.2.4.3 Interviews 
The interview is the most common method of data gathering in qualitative research (Myers and 
Newman, 2007). Flick (2009, pp.150–172) lists several forms. 
4.2.4.3.1 Focussed 
A uniform stimulus is shown to the subject (such as a film or piece of literature) and its effect 
noted through a series of related questions (Flick 2009, pp.150–152). No such stimulus 
particularly suggested itself for this subject which would helpfully focus an interview on the 
selected topics, thus this method was not considered. 
4.2.4.3.2 Unstructured 
Here the interviewer does not strictly refer to a schedule of questions and minimises the control 
exerted over the interview direction by the interviewer. They are not simply informal 
conversations however since the interviewer still maintains a direction of interest rather than 
engaging in natural dialogue (Bernard 2000, pp.191–195), which is highly aligned with the ANT 
approach. Biographical or narrative accounts may benefit from a looser structure, however as 
the respondents had limited time during a single interview and some inter-session comparability 
was required for drawing contrasts and general inferences, a more structured approach was 
considered the better choice (Bernard 2000, p.191). 
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4.2.4.3.3 Semi-Structured 
This is the most common type of interview in IS research (Myers and Newman, 2007) and is 
seen regularly in work with a similar intent to this study, for example that of Werlinger et al. 
(2009). It is centred around a guiding instrument to provide a spine to the discussion and ensure 
that required topics are addressed, but allows for exploration of emerging points of interest. In 
addition it has the practical advantage of efficiency and is thus useful for interviewing busy 
professionals who will expect efficient use of time (Bernard 2000, p.191). As a widely deployed 
method, it carries the advantage of precedence, aiding design acceptance by a reader familiar 
with the field. 
The ANT lens requires giving freedom to the actor to express their view of their professional 
environment and its formation, whilst concerns of generalisability or transferability (discussed 
below) requires that at least some structure is present to aid comparison and rigour in the 
approach. This method thus had considerable potential, either within a wider strategy (as a tool 
during a series of case studies) or as a standalone method.  
In its standalone form, this method has particular application to the examination of the current 
status of the professional, by interviewing both themselves and potentially (as discussed under 
“Case Study”) those who interact with them. For those with sufficient career history, it allows 
access to views on the formation and future of the profession, allowing them to nominate their 
own actors in the network (their memory represents the necessary traces). The future of the 
profession could also be addressed with those seeking to advance the profession, for example 
those in computer societies and credentialing institutions. These could be seen, in an ANT sense, 
as attempting to form an OPP as spokesmen for the profession. Such people are (in contrast to 
the general security worker) likely to have relatively well-developed views on 
professionalisation of the industry and advanced knowledge of current developments in the area. 
4.2.4.3.4 Expert 
People with highly developed knowledge in a particular subject area can contribute either by 
supplying specific insights or information, or by validating or interpreting information learned 
from others. They are supplying information in terms of that expertise and not in their private 
role. Care must be taken in the preparation and execution of the interview protocol to avoid the 
expert taking a lead role in the discussion and moving the topic to their own areas of interest 
rather than the interview subject (Bernard 2000, pp.165–169).  
This method could be used as triangulation in the “corroborative” sense described by Bernard 
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(as exegesis or confirmation of the conclusions in the analysis of accounts given by others), 
however this description might also validly apply to interactions with those seeking to advance 
the professional state of Information Security workers described above. These would however 
qualify only partly as “expert” interviews according to Flick’s (2009, pp.165–169) definition, 
since the respondents are experts in the subject area, however as proponents of 
professionalisation they are not wholly disinterested informants and the study is interested in the 
views of the person in these aspects (as spokesmen for their organisations and therefore 
potentially for the practitioners they wish to enrol). 
Whilst not all professions attain or even aspire to legal protection for their monopoly, 
professionalisation movements tend towards seeking sanctioned jurisdiction (Abbot 1988, p.71). 
Therefore as well as the viewpoint of those who are candidates to seek that status and those who 
agitate in that direction, the state is the ultimate grantor of jurisdiction and thus its attitudes to 
the industry are also very highly relevant. Another source of quasi-expert interview is thus that 
part of government which would regulate Information Security. Fortunately movements had 
already begun in this area thus identifying a specific target department had become more 
practical. As above however, whilst representatives of government could be interviewed in their 
role as experts on government policy, they are also involved in determining what it should be 
and would therefore not have been disinterested experts.  
4.2.4.3.5 Narrative 
Narrative accounts are useful for investigating a development from a participant’s point of view. 
“Narration or story-telling is one of the fundamental ways that people organize their 
understanding of the world” (Gibbs 2007, pp.56–59). The intention is to elicit an extended 
response using a wide, generative question which suggests several areas which could be 
considered by the respondent. The interviewer will be less conversational, encouraging the 
interviewee to continue and to expand on their points until reaching a natural conclusion (Flick 
2009, p.178). Flick notes that the account required should not simply be an elongated answer to 
a question but must include as far as possible an entire story of how a particular event came to 
be, from inception to completion. 
This has potential in an ANT study allowing the respondent’s account to show the traces of 
actors which formed their local network. Where interviewees possessed the relevant degree of 
experience, it was considered useful to include a broad-based question concerning which factors 
led to the creation of their role in their organisation and the formation of the profession in 
general. 
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4.2.4.4 Focus Groups and Dyadic Interviews 
Focus groups involve multiple participants in conversation. Whilst this can be useful purely for 
convenience (gathering information from several sources simultaneously), the interactivity itself 
adds a dimension, exploring the homogeneity of opinions held and how the subjects came to 
their views (Kitzinger, 1995). Dyadic interviews study interaction in a dyad (two person 
partnership or close relationship) compared to engaging the participants separately (Eisikovits 
and Koren, 2010). As an example, McGee (2006) considered examining the discourse between a 
physical security manager and their internal customer. This approach was however rejected due 
to concerns that these internal customers would be in many cases senior managers thus 
consistently gaining access to time with comparable dyads presented a design problem.  
Any group discussion concerning the professional role of one member was felt likely to inhibit 
the participants from speaking freely, it being difficult to dissociate the role from the person. In 
seeking the subjective viewpoint of the various actors, the priority here is to ensure honesty. 
This has resonance with a difficulty McGee (2006) reports, in that discussion about the status of 
a profession within the organisation in a case study or interview was difficult to separate from 
asking an individual for an assessment of their personal success in gaining status, thus likely to 
introduce issues of either modesty or puffery depending on the personality of the participant. 
Drever (2003, p.16) suggests that group-based techniques are best reserved for where the group 
interaction itself is the focus of the research; this was accepted and the approach not considered 
further. 
4.2.4.5 Media Analysis 
The investigation of origin requires retrospective identification of how IT Security became an 
important, mainstream topic. Professional status implies acknowledgement as a domain and 
those practising it must establish at least partial jurisdiction, ideally in public but at least in the 
workplace (Abbot 1988, pp.59–85). It was theorised that successful separation would leave 
visible traces in the IT press, akin to a longitudinal study but without control over the data 
collected. As Abbot (1988, p.61) observes, the general public may not be able to understand a 
nuanced separation (since to the layman, all doctors are doctors) however within the parent 
field, sufficient knowledge should exist wherein this contest could occur. The emergence of 
security-focussed academic journals similarly would reflect the claim to a specialised common 
body of knowledge. Walsham (1995) for example, sympathetic to Latour’s (1987) view of the 
construction of scientific facts, sees journals as enrolment devices where editors exert control 
over a network. As records of security controversies settling into facts they are therefore well 
placed and much potential was seen here. 
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4.3 General Factors Affecting Methodological Selection 
In the preceding section some candidate data gathering methods were listed, those less suitable 
for epistemological or practical reasons identified and those with most potential noted. Before a 
selection can be made however some further factors must be taken into consideration: 
methodological and practical. The former ensure that the research output can be accepted 
according to the conventions and standards of the applicable literature, whilst the latter ensure 
that no undue risks are accepted which might prevent the project from being completed 
successfully. 
4.3.1 Quality Considerations 
Three areas from methodological theory require some discussion in the context of an 
interpretative, qualitative study to ensure that the research is of publishable quality, which 
introduces some concepts which will shape the research design.  
Three aspects of research quality are routinely assessed for quantitative work in the positivist 
tradition: 
 Validity: the degree to which the research correctly captures and reports the reality of 
the phenomenon being studied. 
 Reliability: whether the results of the study would be consistent if repeated elsewhere.  
 Generalisability: whether the findings apply to any group wider than the subjects of the 
study themselves. 
(paraphrased from Gibbs 2007, p.91) 
Applicability of these quality criteria to qualitative work is controversial. Assessing reliability 
through consistency of results for interview data for example is problematic, since each subject 
will be explaining their subjective viewpoint, thus comparing responses will always be inexact. 
Exact repetition between respondents might even be deeply suspicious and be suggestive of 
learned or somehow replicated responses (Kirk and Miller, 1986 cited in Flick 2009, p.385). 
Procedural reliability can however be assessed to ensure that gathering and coding is done 
consistently and validity increased by referring the interview back to the respondent for 
confirmation (Flick 2009, pp.386–9).  
Frameworks have been suggested for assessing quality in qualitative research, adopting 
functionalist [positivist] (Lee, 1989), interpretive (Cepeda and Martin, 2005; Klein and Myers, 
1999) and Critical (Myers and Klein, 2011; Riege, 2003) paradigms, although these sources 
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focus particularly on case studies. Studies taking an interpretative approach using primarily 
qualitative data for theory building (in other words those not looking to prove a hypothesis) can 
arguably not be assessed on the criteria above and instead these concepts should map to more 
suitable alternatives, shown in Table 2. 
Positivist Term Meaning Anti-Positivist 
Equivalent 
Meaning 
Validity  Accuracy of capture Credibility Conclusions coherent and 
justifiable from the data 
Reliability  Consistency of 
capture 
Dependability Procedures appropriate 
and correctly executed 
Generalisability  Represents the general 
case 
Transferability, 
Usability 
Results able to be used or 
relevant beyond the 
immediate setting 
Table 2: Comparison of positivist concepts with anti-positivist analogues (from Remenyi, 2012 
p.21; Flick, 2009; Riege, 2003). 
The requirements to produce credible, dependable and transferable data are noted and taken 
forward into the final selection, however before proceeding, some more detailed consideration is 
needed of triangulation, sometimes suggested for increasing credibility, and generalisation 
when discussing populations in interpretative work. 
4.3.1.1 Triangulation 
The potential of any specific method is finite, therefore some studies aim to enrich data-based 
theory using triangulation of multiple methods (Flick 2009, p.444). The ultimate expression of 
this is the pragmatic approach, where methodological purity is disregarded and the researcher 
uses all available resources (Creswell 2009, pp.10–11).  
Denzin (1978, cited in Jick, 1979) defines triangulation as “the combination of methodologies in 
the study of the same phenomenon.” It is an attempt to compare data from multiple types of 
studies in order to improve the reliability of the conclusions or theory drawn from it. This can be 
differentiated as “within-method” or “between-method”. The latter refers to where discrete 
methods are employed but the data sets are comparable, such that multiple views of the same 
object produce the same conclusions and hence increase confidence in validity. In contrast, 
within-method triangulation seeks to examine the same output in multiple ways thus increasing 
the confidence in the study’s internal consistency (Jick, 1979). 
Mixed methods can include combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, to validate or 
objectively disprove hypotheses raised from exploratory work (Flick 2009, p.30); this is 
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explored in the next section. Conversely, since social science work is frequently value- and 
motivation-driven (Silverman, 2000) and more often adopts interpretive approaches (Gibbs 
2007, pp.6–7) it may be that rather than validating results, qualitative data may provide causal 
insights to statistical correlations. Together both approaches can contribute the nomothetic and 
idiographic angles to the study of a phenomenon (Gibbs 2007, p.5).  
In this case, the aim is to provide data for an ANT account, which is itself the presentation of 
those parts of the participants’ stories, views or accounts as the author identifies as the critical 
stages of some observed action. The selection of those events and interactions, and the extent of 
the network described, are inherently subjective (Collins and Yearley, 1992). The use of multiple 
techniques purely to improve access to objective truth (as implied by a more Realist ontology) 
was therefore rejected here. No claim is made to objective determination of absolute social truth 
by this work, thus it was not felt useful to dilute the available resources by attempting to pursue 
positivist concepts of reliability. 
4.3.1.2 Generalisation 
The research refers to a population (the Information Security profession) and the environments 
in which it operates. In the interpretive paradigm the prevailing ontology denies a universal 
social “truth”, considering each respondent to generate their own, but as also noted above, 
qualitative research is expected to be useful and applicable beyond a simple description of a 
unique case. This creates a dilemma. As Hume is credited with proposing, induction has no 
basis in strict logic, a problem which requires an act of pragmatic judgement to square (Lee 
2005, pp.19–23). 
Generalisation can have multiple meanings, which span from a positivist statistical proof at 
accepted confidence levels to moderatum generalisation. The latter is “where aspects of [a 
specific case] can be seen to be instances of a broader recognisable set of features … then they 
can form the basis of theories about process or structure”, thus allowing useful inferences to be 
drawn without rejecting any proposition which cannot be proven to the satisfaction of the 
positivist (Williams, 2000). The research design must consider whether to fully make claims for 
a population, in which case those analytical inferences could form hypotheses to be tested in 
corroborative quantitative work. 
This study tends towards Dhillon’s (1995) position that it would be difficult convincingly to 
combine positivist methods of hypothesis testing and interpretive work based on qualitative 
data. Whilst it is in principle valid to take the result of one piece of work, formulate a hypothesis 
from it and test this in a second, it is felt that to pursue this approach within a single work shows 
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insufficient ontological and epistemological coherence. It is surely inconsistent to present an 
epistemology which presents a nuanced report of its subjects’ constructed truth but then 
immediately attempt to test some simplified reduction of this output to prove its universal 
correctness. Both parts of the study would have internal consistency and each would be valid, 
however that which is carried over between them is necessarily altered and partial. 
Cross-paradigm triangulation was therefore rejected to ensure coherence of the single study. It 
was resolved instead to note from a succession of cases what can usefully be learned from them 
individually and also abstract what can be generally seen. The usefulness of the study therefore 
rests on the quality and coherency of the narrative produced. 
“… from an interpretive position, the validity of an extrapolation from an individual 
case or cases depends not on the representativeness of such cases in a statistical sense, 
but on the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used in describing the 
results from the cases, and in drawing conclusions from them.” 
 
(Walsham, 1993 cited in Dhillon, 1995) 
4.3.2 Practical Considerations 
Alongside those from theory, further restrictions on method arise from proper assessment of risk 
and resource to ensure that the chosen strategy is practical and achievable. 
4.3.2.1 Sensitivity of Data 
Security presents particular challenges for participant-based research. For example, the artificial 
situation and lack of trust inherent in the execution of an interview might translate to reticence 
on the part of the interviewee to discuss sensitive issues (Myers and Newman, 2007). Kotulic 
and Clark (2004) attempted to validate a risk management model by survey, which attracted a 
response rate of less than one per cent; they concluded this to be a particularly intrusive subject 
area where approaches with no prior introduction are unlikely to be fruitful. Fulford and 
Doherty (2003) surveyed on security policy and achieved a slightly higher response rate of just 
over seven per cent however the design factor which increased the response is not clear. 
Access to data was therefore considered a significant challenge for discourse analysis, since 
access to natural exchanges between a security manager and their clients would be difficult to 
obtain due to its sensitivity and confidentiality. Analysing the discourse of security managers 
talking amongst peers would be far less controversial as the conversation would be general 
rather than specific, however problems have been experienced here also. Bowen-Schrire et al. 
(2004) conducted such research however their analysed text was eventually derived from 
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interviews rather than genuine inter-subject dialogue due to a paucity of suitable data. The 
authors noted this as a limitation and the potential for inter-subject data enhancing the study. 
Ethnographies would similarly have been particularly challenging. It is difficult to imagine how 
it would be possible to engage in (or even simply observe) a meeting where security managers 
were at work without being exposed to confidential or sensitive information. In addition, 
ethnographic approaches frequently cannot specify at design time exactly what they aim to 
achieve, which can be unhelpful during negotiations with managers who will usually wish to 
know the boundaries of the work to which they are agreeing (Harvey and Myers, 2002). 
Al-Awadi (2009) found whilst researching security policy in Oman that she did not gain the 
permission of any of her participants to tape-record their interviews but was able to use the 
“blessing” of the Omani governmental technology agency to achieve an 81% response rate to a 
related questionnaire. Conversely McGee (2006) in a study of physical security managers found 
few problems with recording interviews and reported widespread compliance, which he partially 
attributed to the novelty of being personally worthy of study. McGee however similarly 
benefited from support from the industry body which translated to contacts who were 
particularly interested in professionalisation, something which he acknowledged was a potential 
factor. Therefore if analysis of a verbatim transcript is required, this principle should be 
validated during a pilot to confirm likely participant compliance. 
4.3.2.2 Risks of Extended Duration of Access to Data 
This project was conducted in the part-time learning mode alongside permanent employment. 
This doubled the total elapsed time between entering and leaving the field and hence enabled 
more serious consideration of longitudinal studies in terms of the opportunity for subject 
change. Case or ethnographic studies embedded onsite into an organisation were however 
impractical unless a very infrequent access protocol could have been agreed, both with the 
participants and the student’s own employer. 
Alternatively an ethnographic study might have been undertaken within that enterprise, which 
would have presented fewer issues of time and access, however this raised its own challenges. 
Firstly, the fieldwork stage could potentially have lasted several years, presenting a risk that the 
employment might be terminated for uncontrollable personal or professional reasons (see 
Harvey and Myers, 2002). Secondly, changes in management attitude, trading climate or other 
factors could have led to the co-operation being withdrawn. As there would be no comparison 
study possible unless the change happened at a convenient time and the new employer was 
amenable, this represented a wholly unacceptable risk that the project would have been 
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abandoned with a total loss of data. As noted in previous sections, ethnographic and 
observational approaches were therefore discounted on practical grounds. For similar reasons, 
longitudinal studies were felt to be impractical along with other approaches which were 
unacceptably exposed to the risk of losing a long-term commitment to the project, such as 
participative action research. 
4.3.2.3 Finance 
As this project was privately financed, this acted as an additional filter on those methods which 
might be considered, although it was important that this did not prevent the project from 
answering the research question convincingly and defensibly. A strategy which would have 
required regular long distance travel would have been problematic. In addition, subject 
engagements could not be compensated and needed to rely purely on the altruism of the 
respondent. The risk to the quality of the output cannot easily be mitigated thus must be 
accepted and acknowledged as a potential deficiency of the overall work. 
4.3.2.4 Group Activity 
Again, as the study had to rely purely on the altruism of its subjects for co-operation, the 
selection of group activities such as a focus group or multiple-interview case study represented a 
considerable resource challenge. Even dyadic interviews were considered challenging; while a 
security manager may sanction a single hour of their own time, to commit several person-hours’ 
resource to such a session was unlikely to be justifiable to management. This method would 
therefore have required the demonstration of a very clear benefit to be considered in a business 
environment. 
Online forums (suggested by Flick 2009, p.269) were considered more practical than in-person 
focus groups since the subjects would be participating in their own time. Since the human 
interaction would be reduced, which is the key differentiator of the method, problems of 
arranging access across multiple subjects simultaneously were not felt to be outweighed by the 
minor benefit of allowing the participants to compare their own experiences directly. 
4.4 Data Gathering Summary 
Bringing together the theory, practical and methodological aspects from above, the choice of 
data gathering method is presented below. 
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4.4.1 Initial Selection 
A filtering step was first applied to identify those methods which were still considered to be 
both applicable and practical, after which they were considered in more detail. For expediency, 
the methods are summarised as Table 3 below giving a short discussion of each. 
Method Challenges 
Single Case Study, 
Ethnography 
Rejected. The exposure to the risk of a single late withdrawal was 
unacceptable and this approach might not have provided sufficient 
data, particularly on the historical and regulatory perspectives. 
Multiple Case Studies Rejected. This approach would have required co-operation from 
multiple internal sources on a sensitive subject, some of whom 
would be at a senior level, thus the risk of not gaining sufficient 
access to data was not acceptable. 
Focussed Interview Not preferred. No suitable focussing device was identified and the 
method was not considered to have any characteristic making it 
especially suitable. 
Unstructured Interview Not preferred. It was likely that analysis would wish to compare 
differing answers on the same topic. 
Semi-Structured 
Interview 
Considered. See below. 
Expert Interview Considered. See below. 
Problem-Centred 
Interview 
Not preferred. This method is aimed principally at researching 
social problems and had no particular advantage to justify the 
additional complexity. 
Narrative Interview Considered. See below. 
Dyadic Interview, Focus 
Groups 
Not preferred due to the access challenges of reliably obtaining 
similar joint resources in a sufficient number of companies, relative 
to the limited additional insights gained. 
Media Analysis Considered. See below. 
Table 3: A summary of candidate methods following the initial filter. 
4.4.2 Media Analysis Trial Study 
Data was sought for a historical account of the formation of a candidate profession of IT 
Security. An early strategy for the collection of this historical data was to search the archives of 
the security or general IT press, to attempt to observe any split from an IT parent profession 
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being reflected in contemporary reports. A numerical count of security-related positions 
advertised would also represent an interesting minor addition to the account, indicating how and 
when the security roles developed. 
A trial study was undertaken by reviewing articles from the “Computer Weekly” newspaper, 
available in physical archive at the British Library covering 1966 to 2011, when it moved 
online. A preliminary perusal of around one hundred and twenty issues was conducted, selected 
at random. A trial coding frame was constructed using the procedures of Qualitative Content 
Analysis (QCA). QCA was chosen for two reasons: firstly its ability to reduce large amounts of 
data quickly given the scale of the data available, and secondly as the material could not be 
easily removed from the archive and could not practically be copied, coding needed to be 
possible directly from source. 
It became clear that where security-related articles were examined, these were reported, not 
unreasonably, as fact rather than the nexus of a set of opinions in an unresolved controversy. It 
was felt that while interpretation could possibly characterise contemporary attitudes during 
analysis, this would be at the risk of “over analysis”, requiring substantial amounts of inference 
to establish how a network had been constructed. 
Another avenue considered was to triangulate events reported with the interview data, which has 
some precedent. Chun and Mooney (2009) studied the emergence of the Chief Technology 
Officer using a triangulation approach, as they found this was the only way to achieve 
publication (M. Chun 3.3.2012, pers. comm.). In the trial however it was found that constructing 
a coding frame which could encompass almost any computer-related topic from four decades’ 
editions was difficult and a useful output impossible. The trial was therefore abandoned. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
The research questions comprise three elements: origin, status and direction. Three potential sets 
of actors are already visible: the people who wish to professionalise security, practitioners who 
may or may not wish to be professionalised, and government which may or may not wish to 
grant jurisdiction. At the outset it was proposed to limit the study to these sources to delineate 
the account according to the arbitrary property of the resources available (Latour 2005, p.148). 
Further groups could then be added (as was indeed the case, as described later) should the data 
collected direct this whilst “following the actor”. 
It was resolved to gather data in each of these three areas, each class being expected to bring a 
different perspective. The practitioner would advise which factors have led to the creation of 
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their role, as well as discussing their status as they perceived it during their working lives. Those 
who work in professional associations were expected to have more considered views on the 
professionalisation topic and could provide experience of that process, possibly including some 
historical details. Those in government would not necessarily have had a direct interest in the 
origins of the profession unless personally involved by chance, however they are experts in 
current policy and the factors which had caused any recent movement in the area. Therefore all 
three groups have valid information to contribute to all areas and each has an active part in 
shaping the future. Semi-structured interviews were selected, to strike a balance between 
imposing structure onto the respondent’s answer and a weakened analysis based on 
heterogeneous and incommensurable texts.  
4.5 Data Analysis and Coding  
Having identified that data would be gathered by interview, a method which generates a 
substantial amount of transcribed text, it was necessary to select a method of analysis, which 
almost inevitably for qualitative work involves coding the data.  
4.5.1 Coding Methods  
The analysis of data by assignment of one or more codes is an extremely popular choice for 
qualitative analysis (Bernard 2000, p.443) and can be used either to merely organise and reduce 
data or to question it, revealing new concepts (Schreier 2012, p.38). The codes applied can be 
determined in advance from other sources (possibly working hypotheses drawn from other 
research) and used deductively for confirmation (Bernard 2000, p.444) or as far as possible 
generated objectively from the data such as with Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
In reality it is accepted as impossible to exclude completely all pre-existing attitudes and 
theories (Gibbs 2007, pp.42–46), however the lack of a formal requirement for pre-existing 
codes can be useful where there is no accepted applicable theory (Orlikowski, 1993). Since 
there had been little work published at the point both of design and analysis (Burley et al.’s 
work for example not being published until (2014) and in any case taking a very different 
theoretical approach), an exploratory approach was appropriate. Whilst there is a large range of 
possible coding techniques (see Saldaña (2009) for a concise discussion of the field), perhaps 
the best-known and most widely used are Grounded Theory and the various forms of Content 
Analysis. 
Grounded Theory discovery is a reaction to what its developers saw as the contemporary 
prevailing thesis of sociological method. Rather than rigorously verifying hypotheses theorised 
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elsewhere, the analysis of data can itself generate theory grounded in that data (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967, p.1). The induction versus deduction directionality (from the data comes theory) is 
held by this school to be paramount, to avoid exampling, or the confirmation of a theory which 
was actually previously held with a conveniently selected empirical datum (Glaser and Strauss 
1967, pp.5–6). The authors therefore  argue that it is not simply a method for organising data 
(pp.132–133) or justifying hypotheses which originated elsewhere. The attempts to verify such 
hypotheses pollute the process of grounding theory in the data and then constantly comparing 
new data to that theory.  
Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) is a systematic but flexible approach for exposing meaning 
from within text (Schreier 2012, pp.1–19). There is in some cases a strong emphasis on validity, 
ideally through double coding (coding being performed by more than one researcher) or re-
coding after an interval. It differs from standard coding methods as its intention is to reduce data 
volumes by examining it from one distinct angle after the creation of a coding frame and 
summarising the data through the coding. To achieve this, codes are mutually exclusive, in that 
the target text is split into sections and each section assigned one code only, differing from the 
multiple codes and highly reflexive coding processes used in other techniques such as Grounded 
Theory coding. (Schreier 2012, pp.37–57).  
Content Analysis can be used in a positivist epistemology to verify a hypothesis but this is more 
usually associated with the quantitative form (hence this is not considered in detail here); QCA 
is also compatible with an interpretive ontology and an anti-positivist epistemology, requiring 
the reader to interpret the text to understand the viewpoint of the source (Graneheim and 
Lundman, 2004), although it is also deployed alongside quantisation and subsequent statistical 
analysis in mixed-methods studies (Sandelowski et al., 2009) and can also be used by those 
taking a realist ontology (Schreier 2012, p.47). As discussed above, this study takes a more 
interpretative approach which does not well support positivist or realist concepts, thus the 
flavour of QCA considered here would be its more usual role as interpreting, summarising and 
describing data. In this way the movements of actors over a long period should be visible. 
4.5.2 Selection  
Both forms of textual coding described above would be valid choices and are well-accepted for 
analysing fieldwork. Grounded Theory emphasises systemic abstraction and generation of 
theory from the text; QCA reduces and describes the text but shows less emphasis on the 
systematisation of theory generation. Although Grounded Theory is associated with a well-
respected method of coding (and that is not challenged here), the suggestion that by rigorous 
and systemic means the subjectivity of human analysis can be effectively mitigated is not 
97 
compatible with the interpretative position of this study. Similarly with a single researcher study 
it would be difficult to achieve such reproducibility and validity even if it were wished due to 
the necessarily consistent bias of the researcher. Moreover, the preparation of an ANT account is 
inescapably subjective, given that it is the re-telling by the researcher what they consider to be 
the pivotal events from stories heard from the subjects. No undue emphasis is therefore placed 
here on achieving objectivity and reliability through coding processes. Of greater importance 
was the construction of a frame to bring order and coherence to as many nuanced codes as could 
be practically supported without losing the ability to identify some common concepts or 
frequent assertions in the text. 
Those techniques which are interested principally in applying codes in an entirely reproducible 
way – if necessary at the cost of capturing nuance – such that the truth therein can be captured 
free of interference from subjectivity, are not useful for this purpose. ANT itself is a sensitising 
guide for the researcher and has been suggested as a way to generate theory well-grounded in 
the text (Whittle and Spicer, 2008). It is perhaps possible to become too fixated on technique at 
the expense of achieving an interesting and broad account for debate. In constructing a coding 
approach, the fundamentals of Schreier’s approach to coding and analysis were seen as 
marginally more compatible with the study’s ontology due to the higher flexibility and lower 
emphasis on systematisation (although it too emphasises validity more than is considered useful 
here). The necessity to code the entire text was seen to be beneficial in ensuring that the 
researcher was forced to consider the full data set, rather than those parts which appeared 
significant during the analysis, in case something not previously identified as salient is 
accidentally missed. As Saldaña (2009, p.15) warns, this is a particular risk for less experienced 
researchers. 
In this approach there is no theoretical limit on the number of levels or sub-categories allowed, 
however it is suggested that human coders are not practically able to cope with more than 
around forty such units in total. This limit may of course reflect an emphasis on validity and 
thus achieving high inter-coding Kappa values rather than achieving the widest possible range 
of captured concepts. Given that this study is interested in multiple related but not completely 
atomic concepts, to attempt to fit all data into such a narrow frame for exploratory work was 
considered impractical. In Schreier’s (2012) text it is proposed that categories might represent 
dimensions, where the data is examined in terms of each category. Sub-categories must be 
mutually exclusive (data matches only one category) and exhaustive (data can be accurately 
coded by a category). That is not seen as useful here (since data answering a discrete 
professionalisation section is unlikely to be usefully also coded into a history of security 
section), therefore a more straightforward hierarchical but single dimension frame is preferred.  
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With respect to frame construction, Schreier’s “hybrid” model was preferred, where an existing 
understanding of the subject area is used to create a conceptual frame (to seed the analysis and 
to show whether any of the underlying assumptions are not found in the data) but to extend this 
where the conceptual model is found wanting. Since the research questions identified discrete 
themes these were felt to be useful in allowing an entry-point for coding.  
Some departure from Schreier’s model was desired however, since in her (2012) model a coding 
frame is first established from around one tenth of the data, finalised and then applied to the rest 
of the material. That is explicitly rejected here, since this seems to imply that the coding is so 
general or the data so homogenous that a sample of the data contains everything which can be 
usefully learned concerning the frame. In this study it was determined that the frame should be 
developed as each additional text was added and analysed, with codes condensed either due to 
near-duplication or undesirable proliferation, thus allowing for being “surprised” by the data. 
This brings the method closer to the General Inductive Approach (Thomas, 2006). 
Given the volume of data expected to be analysed and coded, as is now common it was 
considered most efficient to make use of computer aids for coding and analysis, commonly 
termed Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software, or CAQDAS. 
4.5.3 Units of Analysis 
Coding is performed on three types of segment: units of analysis, coding and context. Choosing 
a unit of analysis in this case is straightforward, since as an interview represents an easily-
identified single, internally related text. Units of coding (or “units of meaning”) represent the 
block of text which is atomic (in other words which is assigned to a particular subcategory 
without further dissection), which varies between dimensions according to the information 
required. It comprises those sections of text which are “related to each other through their 
content and context” (Graneheim and Lundman, 2003). Whilst considerable debate can be had 
on the topic, this study is aligned with the assertion that “Social interaction does not occur in 
neat, isolated units” (Glesne, 2006 cited in Saldaña 2009, p.16), and suggests that to analyse in 
more regulated units is to deny the possibility of multiply-nuanced short passages of text in 
favour of achieving higher rates of reproducible but narrow coding. By choosing a variable 
length unit of coding, clearly the unit of context (that part of the text needed to understand the 
unit of coding) becomes similarly variable and this is discussed in the report of the work as 
performed. 
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4.6 Research Plan at Outset 
The original research plan was as follows: 
A series of semi-structured interviews will be undertaken with security practitioners. These 
interviews will include a narrative section designed to elicit the respondent’s view of the 
creation of their own role and the events which contributed to the formation and separation of a 
profession if they consider this to exist. They will also contain elements reflecting their 
perceived status in their role relative to other “benchmark” professions and their opinions 
concerning the professionalisation of the industry. Further interviews will be undertaken with 
professional associations in the IT Security sector, following similar topics using an instrument 
which reflects their expert status and which queries the direction and aims of their organisation 
with respect to professionalisation. Interviews will also be sought with government to capture 
(in addition to the general themes noted above) the perspective of the state with respect to the 
desirability and progress of the professionalisation of the security sector and delegation of 
regulation to a professional body. These interviews will be recorded (where the respondent 
agrees), transcribed verbatim and analysed by Qualitative Data Analysis using suitable software. 
4.7 Execution of Research Plan 
The research plan was executed first by fieldwork between September 2012 and February 2015, 
including an initial pilot phase of three practitioner interviews conducted between September 
and November 2012. In the following sections the practical details and developments to the 
project which occurred during this period are described.  
4.7.1 Instruments 
Two sets of instruments were created and submitted to the University ethical research process 
along with a research design and ethics statement, alongside details of how the data would be 
processed. The instruments as used are reproduced in Appendix 1; the following sections detail 
their creation and the ethical considerations involved. 
4.7.1.1 “Notes for Participants”  
A double-sided sheet was supplied to participants prior to the interview stating the purposes of 
the research, the background and identity of the student, the right to withdraw, the intended 
processing of the information and the uses to which it would be put, a signed copy of which was 
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kept to ensure a record of informed consent
6
. The document was prepared for the practitioner 
class of interviewee (for which amendments to data processing statements were required by the 
University) and then adapted for other classes as appropriate (reproduced in Appendix 1).  
4.7.1.2 Interview Protocol 
A semi-structured interview protocol was prepared from topics identified during the 
construction of the research question commentary given in the literature review chapter, after 
reviewing multiple qualitative research and interview technique resources, particularly Foddy 
(1993). This was again adapted for each class of interviewee according to the information 
sought and the emphases of each type of interview, along with modifications made to 
incorporate information learned during the pilot phase (see below). The protocols are also 
reproduced in Appendix 1. 
4.7.2 Ethical Considerations 
The principal ethical concerns and their mitigations as originally identified were:  
 Ensuring informed, positive consent. 
o Full disclosure of the research aims and the storage and use of the data were 
explained in the signed “notes” document. 
o Right to withdraw and freedom not to participate were drawn particularly to the 
interviewee’s attention. 
 Anonymity. Whilst interviews would not by design require discussion of security-
specific information, it was possible that some sensitive information may be divulged 
either because it was germane or as background to a general discussion or anecdote.  
o Interview transcripts were originally to be completely sanitised (that is to say 
with all potentially identifying information removed) and anonymised fully, 
referenced only with a non-identifying demographics tag, with the original 
recording deleted after accuracy verification. 
o Quite correctly the University reviewers suggested this would make it 
impossible to identify and remove the contribution of a particular participant 
                                                     
6
 For one telephone interview a copy was undertaken to be sent but was not received despite several 
requests. Verbal consent was gained immediately before the interview. 
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should they have chosen to withdraw. This was therefore changed to include an 
interview-specific code (see Appendix 3) but for this information to be linked to 
the identity of the participant only in a separate file stored elsewhere, which 
would only be accessed when necessary. 
o It was further suggested that the analysis could not practically be restarted 
should a participant withdraw, thus the notes were updated to state that 
contributions which had already been combined with others to form conclusions 
could not be guaranteed to be removed. 
o  Similarly it was planned to delete recordings of interviews, which would have 
made later examination of the transcription process impossible, thus this was 
changed to storage in encrypted format. 
o For the Central Government interviewee, given the almost unique nature of the 
interviewee’s role and hence far greater likelihood of their identity being 
deduced, it was particularly drawn to the interviewee’s attention that 
identification was a serious possibility. The interviewee was relaxed on this 
point since it is part of their paid role to speak on the record on the topic on 
behalf of government. The potential identification risk was therefore very 
effectively mitigated by the interviewee’s own terms of reference and 
considerable experience as a public official.  
 English Language 
o Participants whose first language was not English were offered the opportunity 
to request slower speech or bring a translator. 
 Potential for conflict of interest between the interviewer’s employment and the position 
of the interviewee (for example if the interviewee’s employer was a customer or 
supplier of the interviewer’s employer or if they were colleagues). 
o Cases where respective employers would create a conflict would be avoided 
where known and the notes asked the interviewee to bring this to the attention 
of the interviewer if they were aware of such a conflict. In one example case the 
situation was discussed prior to interview and it was determined after 
investigation that the two companies were not direct commercial rivals. 
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o The case of the interviewee being a colleague of the interviewer was mitigated 
purely by reference to the nature and type of interviewee sought, who would 
always be hierarchically superior to the interviewer and hence very unlikely to 
suffer any power imbalance. 
o The notes reflected that the interviewer was acting in their personal capacity, 
even if their professional identity had been somehow disclosed. This was 
important as the student’s professional level of national clearance was felt to be 
an advantage in establishing bona fides. 
 Protection of non-relevant personal characteristic data, such as gender, race and like 
matters. 
o These factors were not felt to be relevant to the specific research questions and 
hence were not included in the questioning. Wording around an undertaking not 
to record such details was changed however, as again the reviewers helpfully 
noted that where the interviewee offered this information spontaneously in the 
text it would be near-impossible not to record it during transcription even if it 
were not actually processed in the analysis. The element of “no intent” was 
therefore added. 
4.7.3 Pilot 
A pilot study of three interviews was conducted between September and November 2012. Two 
participants were recruited through contacts from the student’s own career, however neither 
participant had themselves at the time of interview worked with nor had any personal 
connection with the student. The third was contacted following a request to the Hertfordshire 
branch of the British Computer Society (BCS). All three readily agreed to participate. The pilot 
data underwent initial analysis for inclusion in an interim report to justify undertaking further 
research at doctoral level, which was submitted in December 2012. 
Aside from the above, the purpose of the pilot was to validate the methodology, research plan 
and instruments. The readiness of the interviewees to participate was highly positive given the 
risk of poor access to data to which the project was exposed. In addition, there was no resistance 
to voice recording nor hesitancy in accepting the confidentiality statement thus validating that 
aspect of the research design and assumptions. 
Aside from minor changes to question ordering and format to reflect the natural course of 
103 
conversations as observed, the following changes were made to the practitioner protocol 
following the pilot: 
 Interviewee’s Biography: Themes of professionalisation, credentialing and education 
were rich sources of data. Whilst the narrative questions (describing personal career and 
the origin of the interviewee’s role) were successful in producing a substantial amount 
of text, much of this was centred on career history which was much less directly 
relevant and these two questions often overlapped. In the next iteration of the protocol 
this aspect was down-played significantly. In addition, interviewees’ interest visibly 
waned after around 75 minutes thus the overall time required was reduced. 
 Interviewer’s Biography: The original protocol included a very short explanation of the 
interviewer’s own biography. This was later seen to be both unnecessary and potentially 
could change the answers of the interviewee if it changed the perception of the 
interviewer’s knowledge of the area, thus was removed. 
 Role Creation: More emphasis was made on drawing out the factors which led to the 
creation of roles or the expansion of security. These had varied considerably between 
respondents, often on industry lines. From the first interviews this naturally seemed to 
flow out of the career history section, particularly where the interviewee had longer 
experience as they had overseen or been part of that expansion. As a result, these 
questions were merged.  
 Mandatory Registration: Specific questioning was introduced about whether the 
interviewee supported a mandatory registration scheme and whether qualifications were 
seen as essential. Qualifications bodies have been identified as a possible actor 
attempting to represent the industry, so this questioning was designed to see whether the 
participant was aligned with this. Specific questions concerning hiring a CISO without a 
qualification were introduced to determine whether these were seen as de facto barriers 
to entry. More emphasis was placed on whether IT Security was seen as having an ideal 
career path (degree, pre-registration, experience, professional qualification and so on), 
similar to more established professions. Previously, in error, it had been assumed that 
there was such an ideal path however this was not seen in the early data. 
 Polysemy of “Profession”: In the question “What does ‘professional’ mean to you?” the 
word “professional” was replaced with “profession”. The former term was frequently 
not interpreted by the interviewee as was intended, viz. to stimulate debate on the class 
of occupation, something which could not be corrected without seeding their answer. 
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 User Education: The question concerning user education was re-worded as it was felt in 
retrospect to be in danger of "guiding" the interviewee to an expected answer and 
emphasis.  
 Security Responsibility: It was felt useful to explore whether security has lobbied to be 
treated as a business priority at board level and whether this was genuinely lived, 
following early interesting answers. 
 Leverage from Media Events and Incidents: Specific questioning was introduced 
following suggestions that this might be a possible mechanism of exerting influence.  
 Termination: Switching off the recording was delayed as it was found that the 
interviewee occasionally wished to stress something said earlier. 
The changes to the protocol were not considered sufficient to warrant excluding the answers 
gathered during the pilot from inclusion in the project’s overall data-set, since they were of 
emphasis and organisation rather than of substance. 
4.7.4 Main Phase Recruitment and Demographics 
For the main phase, “practitioner” interviewee recruitment was initially through direct mail 
application addressed by job title to a list of organisations. Approaches were made in four 
tranches to one hundred companies, selected from the FTSE250 to provide access to the UK 
large enterprise sector. Selection was on practical grounds of head office location and where 
possible to a variety of sectors. Due to the breadth of roles related to a classical definition of 
security as noted in Chapter 2, hard criteria for further participant selection could not be 
justified theoretically. It was considered that a wide range of participant viewpoints could 
usefully contribute to the study. Similarly as no statistical treatment of quantitative data was 
proposed which would have required correction for identifiable variables, it was preferred for 
participants to self-identify as having a job role relevant to the topic of research. Had a 
respondent volunteered whose role did not appear to include responsibility for securing an 
organisation’s data then these would have been declined. This eventuality fortunately did not 
occur and all offers of participation were able to be used. 
Invitation letters were addressed to “The Chief Information Security Officer”; whilst not every 
organisation was expected to employ a person with this exact title, it was expected that the most 
suitable person would be identified through internal mechanisms and ideally answered or 
delegated to another person considered relevant upon receipt. The letter explained the purpose 
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of the research and requested participation from the recipient or a member of their team. Five 
interviews were produced from these approaches. It was made clear in the initial approach letter 
that the scope was limited to the personal history and attitudes of the interviewee, rather than 
formally representing the position of their employer. This was assumed to be a less threatening 
prospect in terms of revealing data and more appealing in terms of subject interest, as well as 
requiring only that individual's time without expecting them to expend their own energy to 
secure time or clearance from others.  
Even so, as recruitment relied heavily on altruism, a degree of volunteer selection bias must be 
acknowledged. As altruism and alignment with the profession rather than the role are indicators 
for professionalisation, it is assumed that those willing to assist with an academic study are 
likely to be those most open to the prospect. It was not possible to exclude this bias from the 
study.  
Following the initial approach by letter, an additional vector was found by leaving invitations at 
a security conference with the permission of the organisers. The target audience of the 
conference was expected to be management and senior technical staff in the security and 
assurance communities. Invitations were addressed to all delegates, again allowing participants 
to self-identify as having relevant employment roles. This produced a far higher rate of return 
and was responsible for securing around two thirds of the interviews. A former colleague of the 
author was also recruited to provide access to smaller organisations as an approach to local 
SME-type organisations in the student’s local area was fruitless. Industry type and size have 
been suggested as factors in security outcomes (Chang and Ho, 2006) therefore some variation 
in this area was desired. 
It became clear during the interviews that the formation at university, already seen as a strong 
theme in the literature, would be an extremely interesting additional source of information, 
therefore permission was gained to add university security-related degree course leaders to the 
types of interviewee and tailored instruments were created. Approaches were made to almost all 
UK institutions offering security-related degrees within practical travelling range but with a 
view to avoiding academics who might be requested to examine the work produced. Response 
rates were low and the five such interviews represented all the offers received. 
In total 27 interviewees were recruited with no withdrawals post-interview. These comprised 
practitioners (18), course leaders and lecturers from UK universities (5), senior figures in 
credentialing bodies (3) and one representative of HM Government with overall internal 
responsibility for the Information Security profession. An anonymised list of the final 
participants according to industry type, participant type and company size is reproduced in 
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Appendix 3. 
4.7.5 Interview Execution 
Interviews took place at or near the participant’s place of work in all but two cases, which were 
conducted by telephone. An attempt was made to follow Foddy’s (1993, p.21) advice that the 
interviewee should understand the origin of the question, to establish a shared situational basis 
for the interaction. His argument was that if the interviewer does not give sufficient context for 
the question the interviewee will inevitably attempt to infer it, preventing the formation of a 
mutually held frame of reference. Pre-empting and signposting of questions of 
professionalisation were therefore avoided where possible during the interview. As 
recommended by Drever (2003, p.24), prompts were used to clarify or re-phrase questions, with 
a set of probes prepared on the protocol document to ensure that answers covered the main 
points required. Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The main area of variation was 
the length of the narrative element. 
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4.7.6 Transcription 
The transcription protocol is reproduced in Appendix 4. NCH ExpressScribe v.5.6.3 audio 
playback software was used to aid the transcription however no speech recognition system was 
used with all typing performed manually by the student. Following Flick (2009, p.300), speech 
was transcribed verbatim, however as the exchange was seen as a “medium” and not the focus 
of the research, non-words and aborted sentences where no substantial content had been 
forthcoming were deleted. Continuous text flow which contained multiple independent thoughts 
linked by conjunctions were divided as faithfully as possible into individual sentences for 
clarity. Despite some interviews taking place (at the request of the interviewee) in public 
catering spaces with consequent levels of background noise, very little text was lost to being 
indistinct or overlapped. Almost all of the latter was question clarification where the interviewee 
suddenly comprehended the question and answered quickly. Completed transcripts were mailed 
to interviewees to reduce the risk of error, prior to including the data to be analysed. A very few 
corrections were requested, which were duly made, and a similar number of positive 
confirmation messages were received. In the main, however, no response was made by the 
interviewee and this was taken to be that no changes were requested (as had been stated). In the 
case of the Central Government interviewee, because this was taken to be almost “on-record”, it 
was ensured that a positive message of consent was received prior to including the text in the 
database. 
4.7.7 Coding and Analysis Process 
As discussed above, coding of transcripts took place using Qualitative Content Analysis 
(principally following the methods of Schreier (2012)). NVivo v.10, the standard tool 
recommended and used by the University, was used to facilitate this coding process. 
The unit of analysis was chosen to be one interview and the context unit of an answer/question 
block. No obvious regular unit of segmentation was seen (since sentence structure was coder-
imposed during the transcription process and multiple themes could be introduced within one 
short block), thus codes were assigned to phrases or blocks of text and these blocks separated in 
NVivo using carriage returns. Each block was assigned a code, which was either substantive 
(true data) or procedural (question, “social” conversation, clarification or off-topic). 
Each interview’s data was added to the database immediately after transcription, however one 
interview at a time was coded in its entirety prior to the next unit being coded. It was not 
possible nor particularly intended to directly link categories to specific interview questions (see 
Schreier 2012, p.79), as it was found that (catalysed by the semi-structured format) interviewees 
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spontaneously introduced and interweaved many of the topics selected for discussion. Seed 
categories were therefore created that followed particular research question themes, however 
these were purely used as an entry and were regularly re-visited, expanded or condensed as the 
analysis continued. 
As data was coded, a commentary “memo” track was maintained in NVivo separately from the 
textual sources where comments, practical notes (concerning mainly creation, deletion and 
combination of codes) and concepts identified were stored. From this it was identified that a 
new type of interview (educator) would be helpful. During coding, additional codes were 
created only when this could be justified to avoid an unmanageable frame, and rationalised 
where codes appeared to be both too infrequently used to be justified and their low use was not 
in itself considered to be particularly instructive. Clearly, as new types of interview were added 
new codes tended to be generated more frequently, both because the questions were specific to 
the type but also because the different contexts often brought changes in perspective and 
priority. Codes were gathered into major and minor categories in a three-level hierarchy, which 
was a highly iterative process since in reality some early categorisations were unsuccessful in 
establishing unique dimensions of thought and needed to be adjusted.  
As with all such endeavours the frame represented the “best fit” distribution of general concepts 
across the major organising labels. A very widely-applied code for example was “Professional 
means...”, which was originally intended as a placeholder for problematic sections which proved 
difficult to code atomically. The attempt to break this data down into smaller codes however 
was somewhat unsuccessful. Due to the success of the “list of traits” model of professional 
status, most answers simply listed these traits, or very similar but nuanced variations on similar 
themes, to the point that individually coding traits would have left the text scattered as blocks of 
a few words over potentially dozens of individual codes. As the intent of the research is to look 
at the effect of the professional model and its homogeneity or otherwise across actors, this 
would have been unhelpful as there would have been few ways to truly see the notions of 
professional status side-by-side for comparison. Instead, the widely-applied code was left, then 
memos taken from an analysis of the text so coded, forming the basis of the following analysis. 
Following the coding of all interviews, a further pass was made of all the data (the frame by this 
point having been established and stabilised) to ensure that data which had been coded in some 
cases over a year apart were reasonably consistent and to identify whether any further 
rationalisation could usefully be done. Further memos were added during this process. The first 
cycle analysis was then undertaken, where for each sub-category the data assigned to that 
category was read through and summarised, and combined with the memos relating to that data 
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to form an initial analysis organised by major frame category and then sub-category. The data 
for each category was biased towards the codes which had been seen (mainly by coding 
frequency but also by perceived theoretical significance) to be the most significant for the 
discussion. During this process additional memos were created and a working narrative 
constructed from the more abstracted notes taken in the earlier stages. The first stage analysis is 
reported in the next chapter. 
A second-stage analysis was then made using the narrative and memos created during the 
previous work, whereby the major novel and unexpected contributions to knowledge were 
identified and grouped according to some overall themes. This allowed the tying together of 
elements from amongst the various branches of the frame into unified areas of theory, which 
were then argued and summarised in conclusions. This forms the basis for the secondary 
analysis in Chapter 6. The principal conclusions of the secondary analysis are then summarised 
and re-stated in the final chapter in juxtaposition to the original research questions. 
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Chapter 5: Conceptual Analysis 
The analysis is presented in two stages. In this chapter, the data is summarised broadly 
according to theme and category, noting any contrasting positions of the participant groups. Text 
seen during the memo-writing process to be of particular relevance is highlighted, sensitised by 
the principal concepts of Actor–Network Theory: references are made to individual actors’ 
visible traces rather than describing mechanisms with predictable patterns at the macro scale. 
This provides the foundation for the later secondary analysis. 
5.1 Introduction 
As an ANT account describes a network in the form of a web of interactions, that network defies 
easy reduction to a linear narrative. Indeed the linearity presented in other accounts is one of the 
criticisms made of macro-level sociology by ANT’s proponents. To bring some structure to the 
interpreted data, the over-arching themes and their constituent categories (identified during 
coding and analysis) were also used to organise the discussion presented in this chapter. In 
addition to a housekeeping section, these themes were: 
 Personal Aspects (the biography and career histories of the participants),  
 Certifications (including a comparison of “professional” and academic certification),  
 Professionalism (examining the profession qua profession), and  
 Work Context (the practice of the profession within the enterprise).  
After a brief review of the housekeeping text for completeness, each major theme is introduced 
and its significant data summarised in turn. 
5.2 Housekeeping and Interview Administration 
Six codes were created for topics which concerned the execution of the interview itself, rather 
than its substance: 
 Question: interrogative statements intended to produce a response on a new issue, even 
if only a minor progression of topic, rather than to clarify a previous exchange. 
 Clarification: statements used to gain more precision or address ambiguity relating to a 
question. 
 Conversation: exchanges and comments which were auxiliary to the main questions or 
off-topic. 
 Housekeeping: text related to the actual conduct of the interview, for example 
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interruptions, timekeeping and hospitality. Larger, contiguous sections were removed 
during transcription where possible. 
 Not comprehended: text which did not appear to make grammatical sense and meaning 
could not be inferred from context, and so could not be coded. 
 I don't know: the interviewee stated they could not answer a question and either refused 
or could not attempt to reply. 
These codes were speculatively subdivided into “interviewer” and “interviewee” types where 
appropriate during coding, however in retrospect no use was found for this distinction.  
One substantive code was included: “My thoughts on this subject are not fully formed.” This 
code was applied to text where the interviewee expressed the novelty of a topic, for example: 
"I think it's really, really interesting what you're doing and the things I've come out with 
I haven't really thought about, to be honest."  
[HEL42E-AN12] 
After much thought, this was created and left as a general code rather than placed within one of 
the themes. Some of these codes were generated in tail-end conversation and wrap-up 
statements which would have separated them from similar text expressed during a formal 
question, thus losing the ability to compare them. Overall, eleven people stated outright that the 
topics of professionalisation and licensing were not ones which had been significant for them 
prior to the interview. In addition, memos taken during the transcription process note that 
several of the answers concerning these topics produced hesitant, less confident or less coherent 
remarks. 
5.3 Personal Aspects 
5.3.1 Overview 
This theme concentrates on the interviewee as an individual, seeking the origins and context 
changes for practice as the interviewees recall their careers. The intention here is to observe 
actants shaping that context, identifying movements they may have caused— either directly or 
in actions they prompted in others. The theme is divided into two principal topics: Biography, 
the choices the participants made in their careers and how they relate to their roles, and Role 
Origin, how their current role came to be created. 
5.3.2 Biography 
From the literature it was theorised that participants would have seen substantial change during 
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their careers, and indeed for many Information Security practice would have emerged almost 
entirely within their working lives. As discussed in the Methodology chapter, the research 
design therefore adopted a part-biographical approach. This is now seen as an error in design. 
Whilst it fulfilled a minor aim of beginning with a comfortable topic which would relax the 
interviewee, the pilot study showed that by encouraging wide-ranging accounts of decades-long 
careers, a large amount of material was gathered which consumed coding and transcription time, 
without revealing evidence of any (interesting) actant.  
It was determined that the interview protocol needed to focus more on the moment of change; 
what was in the mind of the interviewee at the time that security matters became of interest and 
what caused this change. The earliest four interviews prior to this change therefore comprise 
around two-fifths of the text coded as “Security-neutral explanation of work experiences”, 
where no useful evidence of enticement to join a network was seen. Similarly, a substantial 
amount of text was coded as “Description of responsibilities, achievements and structure in a 
specific security role”. This was applied to recollections where the interviewee had entered the 
security domain but where the text was of a general nature and did not appear to show useful 
evidence of actants at work. 
The key role of this data is to signpost the disorganised and unintentional drift into security 
which is revealed later. The practitioner contributors were predominantly former IT workers, 
with two other voices: an auditor and a former secretary. Interestingly, the two non-IT-trained 
examples were both co-opted into Information Security sections for their advanced business and 
interpersonal skills. Only one (an outright technical analyst) had studied security pre-career with 
the intention of entering it, having been interested by the film War Games. After doctoral studies 
he joined his City consultancy employer and remains within their senior technical ranks. 
Similarly, the government representative trained as an engineer and when offered a choice of 
civil service careers was attracted to security more for salary reasons, being pragmatic on 
subject matter. In setting the context for the network, where “practitioner” is seen in its current 
context one should not assume the same degree of career intention, vocational training, 
socialisation and early alignment with peer groupings as is usually implied by “professional”. 
The black box of “professional status” in this network will come under scrutiny later. 
All the academic interviewees started their careers in computer science; the alignment observed 
with Information Security as a form of computing within academia was very noticeable. One 
lecturer, whose career had developed after the third and fourth “waves” described by von Solms 
(2004), had found an interest in security very early on in his academic career and had moved 
positively towards it. The others, whose careers pre-dated this, had necessarily entered in mid-
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career and attested to the lack of security focus in earlier computing research. 
There was some commonality to the careers of the representatives of the professional bodies. 
All were well into the established phases of their career and with graduate-level engineering or 
computer science backgrounds. The move into security was more chance opportunity than 
intention in all cases, however passionate their later attachment. All were very knowledgeable 
about the foundation of their organisations, in two cases from direct personal involvement.  
From the above it is seen that security as a topic developed during the careers of almost all the 
participants. In the following section the origins of their roles are explored. 
5.3.3 Role Origin 
The increased focus on security is relatively recent. Multiple attempts were made with the 
questioning to observe the causes of this change, both in general and the origin of the 
practitioners' own roles specifically. This was partly to provide an additional source of data – 
thought to be a relatively reliably-known matter relative more speculative recollections of 
history invited elsewhere – but also to explore individual incidents to avoid excessive 
generalisation concerning macro effects. 
An unexpected insight was that some practitioners had personally agitated for increased security 
resources in organisations where it had not been a priority, noting the increased focus which had 
emerged externally and lobbying for greater internal emphasis. 
“I was playing at being a team player and recognised that there was a bit that wasn't 
being done that needed to be done”  
[MAN86E-DS66] 
The management response in these cases was reluctantly to accept the need for change, but to 
delegate this back to the IT team. These agitators therefore reported gaining these additional 
responsibilities as a dubious “reward” for their efforts. This resonates with a code described 
later which notes where security is seen as a task to delegate rather than something to be owned 
by the board.  
A potential network fragment emerges here. Boards need to ensure that “security is done”, 
which requires someone to whom the task can be entrusted whose judgement can be relied 
upon. Given the impact if unsuccessful, management requires a method either to guarantee their 
delegate is competent or – as some here mentioned – at least prove all due efforts were made, 
which discharges their personal responsibility. Some potential actants can be observed: 
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 managers who must delegate security-focussed work to a specialist, 
 specialists to execute the task (a candidate profession), 
 a device for those specialists to prove they are competent, 
 a device for management to show due diligence, and 
 a body to issue those devices. 
This might be represented diagrammatically as in Fig. 11, using the key in Fig. 10. Throughout 
this chapter such diagrams will be used to illustrate the commentary in the text, identifying the 
principal actants, their interrelationships and the devices used to shape the network according to 
their interests. Such representations are of course only summaries, assisting simply by focussing 
attention on that part of the network under review. As networks are essentially unlimited and 
contain many potential alliances to examine, it is helpful to identify those fragments which 
appear most theoretically interesting, to help bound the discussion. 
Focal Actant
Device
Actant
Relationship, Action or Influence
Desired outcome
 
Fig. 10: Key to later network fragment representations. 
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Fig. 11: Derived network fragment observed in the certification market. 
115 
This particular network will only become irreversible when security becomes complex enough 
to require delegation to certified specialists and a recognised device exists which is sufficiently 
in demand to be effectively required for practice. At this point it moves beyond a device of 
interessement to an inscription: an unquestioningly accepted artefact which can be used as 
currency. At this time it appears that the network is not irreversible end-to-end, in that the 
lobbying of management for control or resources is recurrent, thus accepting the advice of the 
specialist is not taken as mandatory. 
“Unless you can get to the delivery stage of it, you're going to be forever fighting that 
battle. Communicating, getting an understanding, getting an agreement, getting some 
budget, doing it; you've got to get past to the ‘get the budget and do it’ and maintain.” 
[MIN48E-SM22] 
Similar stories were heard from the educationalists, who had to lobby for security to be 
introduced to courses rather than rely on external demand for degrees. 
“At the same time, we weren't actually teaching any IT Security here, so what I did was 
I got some IT Security lectures included in some of the modules that I was teaching on 
at that point in time.”  
[EDU45E-CL31] 
Naturally the recollections of the interviewees will reflect their own achievements and concerns, 
and they may not easily be able to describe the genesis of a role pre-dating their time in the 
enterprise. The analysis cannot therefore rely too much into the “statistics” of the data. It can 
however be reasonably inferred that the actions of independently-motivated internal individuals 
were a strong factor in the introduction of security roles in some organisations. It is also seen 
that there was no obvious compelling external pressure beyond mimesis to introduce security 
into computing courses; developments here were similarly influenced by internals taking the 
initiative. 
This is significant, because an ANT account must examine whether these practitioners are 
simply gears in a mechanism which translates some external event (such as the emergence of 
the I Love You virus) into internal action within an organisation (creation of a security role), 
possibly in the mimetic sense noted by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Alternatively it might see 
these people as actors in their own right, potentially using some artefact which can be used – 
exactly as occurred above – as a device of interessement. This might strengthen a campaign to 
secure resources by being the OPP to protection from the vaguely-defined external threat the 
item represents. There is some minor material suggesting that at least initially the new 
practitioners had some leeway in their actions given by the novelty of the topic and the lack of 
precedence for management to follow. To consider this fully, this data must be seen together 
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with that reported later, where the practitioners talk down the prospect of using external actions 
as internal levers.  
A number of the roles covered had rather vague origins, without a solid report indicating a fixed 
cause, particularly where the event was external but not specified.  
“Yes, it came from the head of department basically saying, ‘I believe we need an IT 
Security role.”’  
[CHA33M-SM54] 
These cases show only that an increased security focus was somehow being generated and 
presume this was by the commercial environment but without a clear view on the cause from 
this data. 
5.4 Certifications 
5.4.1 Overview 
As was noted in section 2.4.3, a number of certifications exist which may play differing roles in 
the network, or none. The data addressed in this section is mostly derived from questioning the 
interviewees' attitudes to certifications and attempting to detect what role these play in their 
worlds. The sections show firstly how academic certifications show similarities in network 
structure to their commercial equivalents but play a distinct role in a subtly different network, 
alongside considering how and why people are attracted to take each and what factors are in the 
mind of those who create them. 
5.4.2 Academic Versus Professional Qualifications 
Professionalism represents a monopoly of expertise over an area of deep, abstract knowledge. 
Many well-established professions are strongly associated with advanced academic learning; 
indeed the establishment of a degree programme is a key stage in the process described by 
Wilensky (1964). Whilst many comments discussed the role of “qualifications” as a general 
case, thereby creating a counter-argument for distinguishing between academic and professional 
qualifications at a coding level, this section looks mainly at academic education and where this 
is distinguished from qualifications in general. This is due partly to sensitisation from the 
literature review itself (suggesting that pre-career education is a success marker for a 
professionalisation campaign) and because the interviewee group included academic and 
professional certification providers allowing a contrast to be made. 
Whilst the literature insists a professional claim must be to theory-based expertise, a strong case 
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was made – by all interviewee types but particularly practitioners – for distinguishing between 
learned theory, and practical experience and judgement, stressing the pre-eminence of the latter. 
The data suggested not just that additional soft skills are needed in the workplace, but that 
theory and practice may even conflict. 
“When you're doing your ISACA exams ... you get questions which you've got to 
demonstrate a textbook response for, but actually in reality the question and the answer 
aren't what would happen in the real world.” 
[FIN31E-AN72] 
Although less common, there was even some scepticism shown towards those with 
qualifications. 
“Theoretical qualifications ... aren't all that great because they've got very little to do 
with real life. I've seen a lot of people come through here with computer science degrees 
who haven't got a clue how to send an email.” 
[TEC11S-ID48] 
Whilst obviously feeling that their courses did prepare students for an entry-level position in the 
workforce, even the educators noted the importance of going on to gain experience. 
“[Our students] all think they can walk out of this door and become a consultant. Now I 
worked for years before I went out as a consultant, and I still feel in every job that I've 
learned from the last one.” 
[EDU24E-CL05] 
The text in this section strongly questions whether possessing certificates is a guarantee of 
competence, deterring the enrolment of the practitioners and employers in the network 
described in Fig. 11. All of the professional bodies made particular reference to the requirement 
to have experience, which is significant since it marks a distinction between learned knowledge 
and taught facts, underlining the claim to professional status rather than simple examination 
success. 
With two exceptions, who were both technical analysts, the clear feeling from the practitioners 
was that a specialist degree was not a necessary step for employment in the industry (some 
unaware even that such qualifications existed). Generally although not hostile towards them 
there was little enthusiasm for vocational security degrees. The educationalists were predictably 
far more positive about their worth, feeling that although they did not create the finished article 
they form a useful grounding of knowledge for a later career.  
This is seen as highly significant as a negative finding seen against the professionalisation 
literature; if one were to contrast this with law lecturers and practising solicitors, a more 
powerful and harmonised statement of the almost essential nature of graduate pre-qualification 
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would surely be seen. Is this then a failure to professionalise, or a failure of the orthodox 
concept of professionalism in a modern profession? 
The educationalist attitude is in line with the literature with respect to abstract knowledge. The 
conceptual nature of academic study – upon which the more transient knowledge of 
contemporary fashions can be overlaid using timeless principles – was strongly emphasised. 
“I would prefer seeing a university degree [as] something that gives the ability to a 
student to adapt to any circumstances ... rather than making a graduate which is highly 
specialised but if you change something ... is completely useless.”  
[EDU54E-CL11] 
There is an interesting juxtaposition here with the distinction seen both in this data and in the 
literature between technical and social security concepts. Information about a particular state or 
moment in the development of technology was seen as a transient issue; by contrast “depth”, the 
principles of analysis and the underlying understanding behind the action, was seen as 
fundamental to the whole span of a career. Professional qualifications were seen as being far 
closer to tests of current knowledge and providing competent services, but without the intensity 
of contact time required to instil deep conceptual learning. 
“Degree courses demonstrate … an in-depth level of understanding and a demonstrable 
ability to analyse problems and apply new techniques and synthesise ideas. 
Accreditation does not do that. Accreditation demonstrates a broad understanding of a 
subject area.” 
[EDU27E-CL05] 
Interestingly there was little dissent from the professional groups, who were not interested in 
certifying abstract learning, rather attesting to well-maintained knowledge. 
“A security master's is about understanding … in reasonable depth security ... [Our 
credential] doesn't care about that, it just says, ‘Do you know at this level?’” 
[PRO29E-PO42] 
For those in mid-career, the prospect of undertaking a degree with its associated years of study 
is potentially impractical, with professional certification far more palatable. Thus from the 
standpoints of entry demographics, function and content, academic and professional 
qualification providers did not see themselves as in competition with each other, rather 
providing complementary products. Universities however did not see their role merely to teach 
the esoteric concepts of security theory but also to prepare students for employment and thus 
value industry speakers and even offer basic professional qualifications alongside their own 
courses. They are preparing a generation of students who have undertaken vocational courses 
with a view to employment who will gradually replace those who “migrated” from other 
disciplines. 
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In order for a course to be offered at a university (which educators reported must at least cover 
its own costs and should ideally generate income), sufficient student numbers must be enrolled. 
Students are attracted by the reputation of the university, which in turn translates to a more 
prestigious academic record. As competition increases, the fees chargeable by the more 
academically respected institutions can rise, particularly in the less regulated postgraduate 
market. Students in turn must justify the financial investment demanded, thus universities 
looking to enrol students must provide apparent guarantees of access to a career following the 
degree, thus employability statistics are highly relevant alongside the device of the degree 
certificate itself. 
In turn, university departments (who reluctantly noted they must successfully market themselves 
to fee-payers) are approaching industry to assist in the design of degree courses to ensure 
employability and thus (through employment statistics) maintain an attractive credential. This is 
important, since a concern from the practitioners was how academic institutions divorced from 
day-to-day security work could maintain a relevant curriculum given the high rate of change in 
the subject matter. One answer given was for academics to undertake professional consultancy 
work in industry, providing an interesting blurring of the actors' identities in the network. 
One educator reported a gap between their students’ expectations – or perhaps their original 
impressions of security practice – and their experiences during the course. 
“In the first year they have this concept of security as something fascinating, something 
joyful, but then they gradually start realising the seriousness of the situation.” 
[EDU54E-CL11] 
In terms of the network, although difficult without input from the students, it is necessary to 
attempt to see or predict the effect of this. Obviously it is important for the student and could 
even affect their choice of career afterwards, however university training is a socialisation 
process, therefore at the same time (according to orthodox models) they are being conditioned 
to align with the norms of the profession. Given this and the degree of investment into what is a 
relatively vocational qualification, it is predicted that the impression given pre-enrolment is the 
important one and subsequent change would be a less significant path to reversibility. The 
university is therefore initially an apparent passage point not simply to a career but an exciting 
role. Even if this impression changes during the course, the network’s “potential student” actant 
has done its work; individuals transform into different actants over time as they become more 
experienced. 
Within the course design elements, there is evidence of “security in its technical context” 
persisting. Whilst there was mention of the social aspects, on balance course content is 
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influenced by the technical background of the course lecturers amongst other factors. Given 
pressures of time and resourcing, each potential module must compete to win or keep its place 
in the curriculum. Each module can offer a passing grade to the student, thus there might be 
pragmatic or game-based reasons for their choices, however where choice was made available it 
appears that socially-informed courses are chosen at a reasonable rate and this will have an 
effect on the graduates produced. 
It is possible to represent the network fragment described above diagrammatically, as in Fig. 12: 
University
(Focal Actant)
DegreeEmployer
Student
Government
Device of Interessement
Discharge obligation 
to certify quality
OPP for establishing
Competence when 
Hiring
OPP for Employment and Training
University
Access to sufficient or 
higher student Fees
Translation achieves...
 
Fig. 12: Network fragment observed with respect to academic qualifications. 
Whilst security courses are increasingly popular, universities have not yet established 
themselves as the sole passage point to a security career. The translation in Fig. 12 is therefore 
unstable and incomplete, since not only can the provider be displaced by other institutions (and 
subjects with greater potential reward and/or status), but the degree itself is not indispensable. 
This said, other factors are not represented: the student will have contemporaries, cultural 
inclination and predictable workplace competition which might make graduate status appealing, 
for which the class “University” is an OPP and for which they have finite financial and 
academic capital to buy from the market.  
The data showed clear potential for change. Government action in answering industry’s call for 
more practitioners will surely increase the supply of graduates, potentially squeezing out those 
non-graduates who cannot compete on some other basis for entry; the degree device could 
therefore still be a powerful one. Universities certainly appeared to regard security careers as 
almost necessarily proceeding from graduate study, whereas neither government nor the 
practitioners are currently convinced. This may further undermine the unity of the role; 
government for example saw security as having too many constituent roles and too many levels 
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of practice to be an exclusively graduate profession, but acknowledged the positives of graduate 
study at master's level.  
“Doesn't have to be [a graduate profession]. I mean, we run an apprenticeship scheme ... 
for people coming through. I think you have to have a certain aptitude and it depends 
what the particular job is as well, what the particular work is. Because there's different 
roles, different skill sets needed and some of those skill sets are very attuned to people 
who have come through more vocational education and training. So no.” 
[GOV01E-GV01] 
Government actions will act to modify the market, introducing through CESG approval 
processes for master’s degrees in security (at the time of interview). Since security became a 
popular subject for study, alongside those with strong genuinely security-centred courses, others 
apparently relabelled existing programme modules as “security” to make them more marketable. 
Although surprising, this was confirmed by several sources, for example: 
“I know of higher education institutions that will call something an IT Security degree 
when in fact it is the computer science degree with maybe one module of IT Security 
attached to it, which is not entirely desirable.” 
[EDU45E-CL31] 
Within the network, therefore, the status of any given degree programme as a pathway to a 
quality security graduate becomes suspect. Universities must assess whether the likely 
commercial benefit to taking the steps needed to obtain the “quality marker” badge can be 
justified against the cost of doing so. Internally the academics may wish to have confirmation of 
the quality of their course for prestige or professional pride, however in the financial reality of 
higher education, it is seen simply as a business opportunity. 
“And so if it turned out that the cost of getting GCHQ certification was not justified by 
the perceived extra income that would result from it, then I think the department would 
not be interested in getting the certification.” 
[EDU66E-CL71] 
The network acted to push for a test of quality when government found itself being requested to 
recommend or certify the high-quality degrees from amongst the eighty-five then-available 
programmes. It therefore found itself with a role which it felt unable to discharge. 
“As a government department I can't say, ‘Go to that university rather than that 
university,’ because I have to be fair. And at the end of the day, I don't actually know 
whether that course is any good. So what we did was we set out doing that certification 
with the aim that it will help people to navigate through the complicated world of the 
education that’s out there.” 
[GOV1E-GV01, emphasis added] 
Seen against the professionalisation theses of authors such as Wilensky (1964), this is an 
opportunity to press for a professional body. The case for regulation of an area of knowledge has 
been made and accepted in this specific regard by government. Government needs to delegate 
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its by-default responsibility for national coordination, candidate bodies exist and yet the 
delegation of authority is to a panel; GCHQ retains the visible ownership of the badge which is 
awarded even though it does not directly assess the programmes.  
The driving focal actor here is therefore seen to be the government (shown in Fig. 13), which 
according to historical models is unusual in the UK. This suggests a weak or ineffective 
campaign for control of knowledge by the relevant nascent profession. 
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Fig. 13: Network fragment observed with relation to GCHQ accreditation of master’s degrees. 
The practitioners were cautious in their approach to university education, stressing the 
paramount importance of experience. Such people were however not themselves recruited from 
an academic background thus they are possibly suspicious of any mandatory graduate education 
for “competent” status (F. Piper, pers. comm.). This would either leave them unqualified for 
their own role or facing the considerable task of undertaking a degree alongside full-time 
employment to learn knowledge they would already claim mostly to have. Conversely they were 
themselves required to be pathfinders in a new field of practice, learning their trade from a 
variety of sources, thus naturally they would be expected to favour field experience over 
theoretical knowledge.  
“I didn't have any qualifications when I came into the role, no specific security 
qualifications, you just had to have an aptitude, a willingness, an interest, and that 
seemed to be enough to inspire people to give me a chance for the role.” 
[CHA31E-SM07] 
This is a serious threat to the irreversibility of the current network, but the increased supply of 
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security graduates will necessarily change the make-up of those entering security. Since it was 
already seen that the current generation of managers and CISOs in large part were unable to 
follow this entry path, it is surely reasonable to expect these new vocational graduate entrants to 
go on to occupy senior roles to a greater degree than at present, where they will in turn appoint 
future entrants. These people will surely consider graduate training to be more useful and hence 
increase the effectiveness of the universities’ degree device. In addition, it was acknowledged 
that graduates might have an advantage ceteris paribus over non-graduates as the wave of 
additional security graduates may address the current shortfall of talent; this may change the 
balance between hiring manager and entrant, thus generating more competition amongst 
entrants and favouring graduates. 
5.4.3 Professional Qualifications and the Certifications Market 
Professional credentials can be seen within a superficially very similar network to the academic 
degree, however their role can be understood very differently. The complementarity can be seen 
from the practice of some universities to encourage students to take basic practitioner technical 
examinations. This is not seen as competition to the degree’s greater and more in-depth learning 
and helps to improve employability. As with degrees, credentials such as the CISSP or CISM are 
potential devices of interessement for their issuing bodies, however rather than being the basis 
for a claim to being worthy of employment at a basic level, these are the start of a claim to 
professional status and competence.  
Such certifications are currently in a rather peculiar market. In one sense, it is beneficial for the 
network to solidify around a de facto requirement to possess a certification for practice. Without 
such a move there is an alternate path to employment (or competent status), with its own costs 
and benefits, which will be in perpetual competition with certification. The certification market 
might be able simply to agree some demarcation along a subject-matter or seniority axis and 
hence allow multiple certifications to co-exist. One might therefore expect an incentive for co-
operation between the certifications to ensure that one of their set becomes mandatory and as a 
whole they become an OPP. 
One provider however dismissed this, noting that certification schemes require substantial 
investment in advertising, with a questionable return if the advertising also benefits a rival. 
Providers therefore act to promote their product alone, even if in terms of game theory there 
might be better stratagems. Within the certification market itself, there would potentially be 
benefits to rationalisation. To become a true OPP, the market must coalesce discrete areas of 
knowledge into one qualification per specialist area, either through market forces or by 
regulatory action. Until that point the situation may be perfectly sustainable of course, but the 
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network will not be irreversible since it can be attacked by another established or up-and-
coming credential with a greater perceived benefit to the enrolled actants. Once market 
dominance is established, that should be a platform from which to offer credentials as 
reasonably essential (albeit de facto not de jure through licensing).  
So has market dominance been established? Put simply: no. The most widely-discussed 
credential by the practitioners was the CISSP from (ISC)², with CISM from ISACA also well-
known, both being reasonably well respected. The CISSP is thus arguably closest to being the 
“default”; it is seen as a broad test of general security knowledge, and thus aside from the feat of 
actually surviving its six-hour examination, it is seen as neither being nor claiming to be a 
“single criterion” test of outright competence as a security practitioner. There was no real 
criticism to be found for it, purely that a single multiple-choice examination could not replace 
real field experience for proving competence, nor threaten academic study for depth. 
There is an outright failure of the device to convince here. The CISSP has a substantial 
minimum criterion of five years’ experience in direct security work, with only one year waived 
if a degree is also held. It appears therefore that professional standing is reckoned to be acquired 
overwhelmingly through experience and currency of knowledge if only 20% can be substituted 
by prior very deep conceptual education. This qualification, then, exists to prove competence 
and thus become an OPP for professional status. It is strange however that this device of 
interessement so heavily based on prior experience should not successfully inscribe itself 
precisely because it can allegedly be bypassed by having sufficient experience. The danger of 
someone being able to practise incompetently for a long period of time and gain invalid 
experience was only mentioned sparingly.  
Also mentioned, albeit more by the educators rather than the practitioners, was membership of 
the IISP. As noted in section 2.4.3, this organisation is evidence of a challenge to security as a 
computing-related subject. Ultimately the BCS – despite charter body status for IT and despite 
its commercial arm offering the government-backed qualification – has not become an OPP for 
professional status. Whether this is because the community feels security is best represented 
outside the computing realm, or purely because the British Computer Society (BCS) did not 
perform with sufficient energy and purpose is not clear. Both points of view were advanced. 
“The IISP goes in deeper to the actual person, their characteristics and what they've 
done previously, where they are now and depending on the amount of experience, on 
what you understand and your practical knowledge they'll grade you, they don't just go, 
‘Here you go, there's a badge, you're now in IISP’, it's not like that.” 
[FIN91E-SM15] 
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Strangely, although the participant group was overwhelmingly from an IT background, the BCS 
was barely mentioned. Similarly the founders of the professional organisations were clearly 
from academic and industrial computing backgrounds, and yet chose to create new 
organisations. Whilst this is too insubstantial to be seen as “proof” of Abbot’s thesis of 
professional fracture, it is entirely in keeping with it. In this study of UK-based practitioners, 
there was a distinct antipathy (sometimes expressed off-record) towards the BCS which might 
explain the separate existence of the IISP.  
A potential challenge to the latter’s success will be its single-nation element, when security is 
not itself a national challenge. Within the accounts of the practitioners and the literature, some 
traces of non-human agency can be seen in the globalisation and additional regulation of the 
industries who have the biggest resources to address security concerns. As such organisations 
operate in multiple jurisdictions, a credential which is respected in one territory may have no 
such cachet in another, reducing its lure for the potential candidate or its likelihood to becoming 
a required credential for the organisation. An internationally-recognised qualification such as the 
CISSP or CISA may therefore have a greater claim to giving status, which may act to limit any 
perceived loss of quality. Of course multiple certification is possible, however this requires extra 
resources and also erodes the sense (common to regulated professions) of a binary status of 
“qualified” or “not qualified”. 
Furthermore, within the network it was very noticeable how data protection was used by many 
participants as the principal example of legislation which has forced Information Security issues 
into the boardroom, coercing action regardless of the organisation’s overall security posture. 
Risk management decisions are about selecting from the available options; for most 
organisations illegal non-compliance is not a genuine option. Even where the state-imposed 
punishment is relatively small, as was felt to be the case for example for Data Protection fines 
for a substantial multinational bank, avoiding the reputational damage from exposure as a 
compliance-evader was seen to be compelling.  
As a byword for “regulatory mimetic pressure” this can be seen as an inscription in the network, 
hinting at where the security function’s policy has significant power. This black box however 
suffers little unpacking; as the practitioners made clear, different territories address this topic 
very differently. The potential CISO must therefore ensure they have access to the relevant 
topics in all operational districts, which in turn requires them to be aware of this international 
variance and hence moving the international dimension for certification up the list of candidate 
priorities. 
Being internationally relevant similarly has an effect on the design of academic qualifications, 
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which are likewise offered competitively. International students can bring high fees, making 
courses viable and discharging internal obligations to bring in funding. As with above, the 
degree market operates both as competition between universities on reputation, for the best 
talent overall, and between courses to offer something novel. The most able students bring 
prestige and hence higher fees, thus the university can in turn use their reputation to compete for 
a sufficient uptake of places.  
“Some members of staff think that the primary determining factor for applicants to MSc 
courses – and even more so for undergraduate courses – is the entry qualifications that 
they need to get in and the perceived ranking of the university in pecking orders, and 
that students will go as high up the ranking table as they can according to the 
qualifications they've got.” 
[EDU66E-CL71] 
As seen above, a cynic might look at the attempts to present the subject matter of a course as 
being more aligned with current fashion than is necessarily true, to improve interessement. More 
charitably, one might look more towards the instinct of one contributor to look to find a unique 
selling point in order to stand out in a crowded market place. Whilst universities might en bloc 
be the OPP to “security graduate” status, individually this is not the case, thus a more esoteric 
course gives the opportunity to become OPP to that unique set of skills (albeit at a cost of 
potentially alienating the generalist, unless a more standard course is offered alongside).  
Unlike professional certifications, degrees make a claim to deep, conceptual learning which in 
turn justifies them being vocational and obligatory to practise, as they represent the fundamental 
truths of the trade. Too much attention to changeable laws renders them more comparable to 
training certificates than a timeless degree, and thus their position in the network can be 
destabilised by the more respected professional qualifications. The guardians of these courses 
will then be caught between wishing to ensure their students have sufficient knowledge to enter 
the workplace and not losing the mystique of academic rigour.  
In addition, in a network where the academic is expected by their management to act as a pure 
seeker of lucre, they may pay lip service internally to their obligations but without ideological 
commitment. Academics will not all be natural salespeople. 
“I think this is across the globe, I've seen gradually in the UK an attempt to 
commercialise education, and as an academic I don't particularly agree with this 
approach. I can't see students as consumers of education, I can see students as students.” 
[EDU54E-CL11] 
Like Callon’s (1986) scallops, they may then tend to betray the university financiers, who may 
believe that course designers are reliably concerned with student intake numbers and 
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employability statistics, whereas some (as above) may look more to the reputation of their 
department and the purity of the academic content. Similar pressures are seen by those who 
wish to achieve external validation with a non-commercial rate of return. Those looking to put 
pressure onto the academic system may have to cope with both sets of alignments that were 
visible from this data. 
5.4.4 Role 
In the previous section, the concern of some of the practitioners that their qualification should 
be recognised internationally was noted. Who, then, is performing this recognition? What 
fundamentally is a qualification for? 
This cannot have a uniform answer. As was observed above, the careers of the practitioners 
generally pre-dated specialist academic qualifications in security and in many cases even mid-
career qualifications. Some also pre-dated what they felt to be security being treated seriously as 
a topic. 
“Security was, in the 70s, really nothing more than cryptography.” 
[PRO62E-PO74] 
Surely therefore there will be a difference between how a qualification is perceived by a new 
entrant, where a vocational degree is available, and by those who have changed career but 
without any early opportunity to establish competence.  
Information Security expansion according to this sample occurred gradually from around the 
1970s onwards, as computing also expanded. This expansion is reviewed later, but most relevant 
here is the description given of security hiring practices prior to certification. The description is 
of security as a small and not necessarily outward-looking community whose members were 
known personally to each other. Recommendations could therefore be made on the basis of peer 
appraisal and informal assessment. As the community grew, this became unsustainable and thus 
this community sought a way to test competence. 
“We founded it to answer the question, ‘How do you recognise a good Information 
Security professional?’ Precisely that question.” 
[PRO62E-PO74] 
Does this indicate a change to the “group” way of thinking? This question is in some ways valid 
but not especially compatible with the ontological approach; ANT discourages talk of 
homogenous and predictable group behaviour, however the analysis must consider the contents 
of the network to view its irreversibility. Strong networks continually reinforce themselves, 
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however any network which contains “hiring manager”, “certification” or similar must be 
vulnerable to change if those entities are subject to change. There is already a minority visible 
who are particularly open to using certification as a criterion. One finance-based contributor 
noted that he would expect a candidate for senior office to be certified and “would be very 
interested to find out why they haven't done it” [FIN99E-SM92]. This was an interesting 
position, given that many others felt such schemes were more useful for early-career 
practitioners who could not trade on their experience and career accomplishments and thus 
required some proof of credibility and competence. 
Precisely what level of competence is attested to is difficult to assess. Unlike a qualification 
such as the Cisco CCIE, or perhaps the Royal College fellowships for medicine, there was no 
apparent comparable qualification which established advanced competence. Language such as 
baseline and benchmark predominated. The role of certifications therefore should be seen as 
evidence of having reached some minimum, basic standard of ability. It is presented as proof of 
a claim of skill and knowledge as verified by an independent body of knowledgeable peers. This 
immediately draws the question of why then it should not be mandatory, since a genuine test of 
competence by definition is achievable by a competent person.  
To establish why a test of competence has a market, requires examination of the job roles 
available in security. Generally as seen above it is the role of security to police internal 
processes; to audit, to correct and to permit or deny. Mostly if security has won these powers it 
is because they have persuaded their senior management that they must “procure” security in 
some way, and that the OPP for this is their specialist team. As we will see later, however, this is 
a fragile network. Security’s strength tends to be transitory after the latest major incident 
(supported both by this study’s data and the literature review), with efficiency and profitable 
processes rapidly re-ascending the priority list afterwards. Management will tolerate a degree of 
interference from its security and audit function where it has no other choice, however at a local 
level the practitioners report resistance.  
In ANT terms, this can be seen as a settled network with a firm interlocked array of components 
which have an interest in remaining in their current arrangement. An auditor attempting to 
change such an established network is competing with one of the established links and 
attempting to break into it. As the auditor probably has few assets in the existing network, 
unless they can insert themselves without affecting the main relationships and the insertion 
lessens some other threat, such as that of highly disruptive external management disciplinary 
action, the auditor has little to offer. Ultimately what the internal human actors need to achieve 
is continuation of employment and lack of management sanction. A security function which can 
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compel the network’s own hierarchical setup might therefore have a coercive power, and this 
indeed may be necessary. 
But to use such a lever implies that the auditor or security analyst is absolutely sure of their 
ground, requiring confidence. In some scenarios where outcomes are binary and the auditor’s 
decision is unlikely to be challengeable this has little controversy. Security however, as was 
established in the literature review, is very strongly related to risk management, balancing cost 
of action against penalties. These cost decisions are those of a generalist auditor and questioned 
by operations specialists who bear those costs; that decision is therefore legitimately arguable. 
The audit-trained practitioners stated that they derived considerable confidence and authority 
from their certification, which transformed their opinion into professional judgement. 
It is possible therefore that although the certification acts on the network, it does not interact 
directly with the internal peer or client, unlike scenarios such as medicine where that 
certification plays a major role in convincing the client of the expertise of the professional. 
Why? Many practitioners spoke of the certification proving competence and establishing 
standing in front of internal clients. This was indeed the major theme after the role in securing 
eligibility for employment, but did not advance a mechanism of action. On the face of it, a black 
box might be imagined: certification as a reference to “Professional Status” or some analogue of 
it; an unarguable touchstone which anchors the otherwise subjective position of the individual, 
by inheriting the gravitas and technical infallibility of the apparatus of professionalism. And 
indeed there was some evidence of this. 
“That's a key thing for me, it's partly to put on your business card and on emails and 
things like that, it makes you look more professional, whatever that may mean, but it 
does imply that you do know the subject; you understand.”  
[MAN61E-SM05] 
This would produce a network as shown in Fig. 14. 
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Fig. 14: Network as inferred from the perspective of the practitioner. 
This must be challenged, however. In not all cases will someone’s qualifications be visibly 
displayed. Immediate peers may be aware of the certification, however it is unlikely that others 
in the organisation, particularly during an audit or similar situation, would be presented with 
evidence of a qualification as part of their introduction. It was also apparent from the interviews 
that most non-specialists were perceived to not particularly recognise the separate existence of 
Information Security and hence would have no frame of reference for assessing the skill even of 
a credentialed person, yet this was a continual theme. 
“And also the recognition of your peers, to know that you do actually know what you’re 
talking about, you do know what you're doing.” 
[TEC11S-ID48] 
Where certification appears to have its greatest effect then is in confidence, particularly notable 
when juxtaposed with the lack of formal training in the current set of practitioners, which would 
tend to undermine confidence when dealing with qualified internal expert clients. The 
certification also proves to employers that their employee is qualified and is the gateway to the 
staff profile required. The status and understanding of the occupation from the perspective of 
those trades closest to security is sufficient to allow the certification to directly carry weight. 
This is in some ways the aim of the certification. 
“My aim is to get people who have [our certification] recognised and valued, because 
it's an indication of commitment, knowledge, expertise, skills and so on.” 
[PRO29E-PO42] 
Outside this immediate circle, it seems more likely from the data that the credential creates self-
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confidence in the practitioner during the negotiation of any changes to the existing network 
which might be necessary. The linkages themselves however suggest that the practitioner has 
the extended authority of senior management, and thus an implied authority through the 
hierarchy. Since the other participants’ own hierarchical superiors will have been a part of the 
original settled network, the practitioner is competing with the existing arrangements to become 
the OPP to a satisfied management structure, as shown in Fig. 15. 
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Fig. 15: Modified network seen from the perspective of the practitioner. 
Certification was also seen to have positive effects on the perception of the occupation itself, 
whereby the actual physical presence of a credential implied the system of preparation and 
examination common to other professions whose authority could then be referenced as part of 
the presented claim. This is in some ways similar to the alleged action of scientists referencing 
previous papers as a form of foundation-building (see Latour, 1987). 
“Certifications are important because from a professional point of view it puts across 
the right message that we're actually organised and we're structured. We have 
professional bodies that promote what we do, and actually measure what we do.” 
[FIN91E-SM15] 
Seen next to the quote from PRO29E-PO42 above, it is clear that the professional bodies and 
practitioners generally may well benefit from this increased perceived status, which will tend to 
add to the strength of the bond between the practitioners and the professional body. The more 
“professional status” is seen to be associated with certification, the clearer the role of the 
professional body becomes in the problematisation and the stronger the interessement. 
Interestingly, as in the previous section, having too many qualifications was seen to lower the 
perceived status of all, since a plethora of certificates weakened the claim of there existing a 
single state of being “qualified”. 
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Alongside competence, the aspects of commitment and intent were more prominent in the data 
than in the literature. Undertaking a certification is a demonstration to a potential employer that 
a person is serious in their career. In a world where security has not established itself fully as a 
completely separate profession which requires vocational training, this was seen to show that 
the job candidate had invested significant time in their own development.  
“…to be able to demonstrate to potential employers that I had actually invested time and 
effort to attain a degree of proficiency.” 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
The undertaking of a certification process in order to learn new material rather than simply 
demonstrate mastery of it was also mentioned. Several late-career entrants noted a chance 
encounter with security but then voraciously reading into the subject during preparation for 
certification. Combined with the Continuing Professional Development aspects, this translated 
to potential for importing best practice into organisations. Association with best practice means 
that the gravitas of the profession can be drawn upon to compel a client to accept the judgement 
of the security manager. 
Personal development then, rather than financial gain? One provider noted that people 
possessing their certification are on average more highly paid, however this wasn’t mentioned 
by the practitioners to any noticeable degree as a motivation. One reported an increased salary 
as a pleasant post hoc benefit but was apparently not aware of this potential beforehand. There 
will be reticence towards admitting such a self-interested motivation, however this could have 
been done with reference to others or in some de-personalised way and this was also not seen. 
There were some general suggestions of being “good for one’s career” or similar sentiment, 
however outright financial gain was not seen to be a particular benefit and this seems more 
likely to have been meant in terms of hierarchical promotion or quality of projects undertaken. 
This is not to suggest that the security community is a selfless collection of people working for 
the greater good; it is more likely that they simply do not equate certification to significantly 
higher salary. An exception was in the arena of contracting, where recruitment of a consultant 
was seen to be far more a question of obtaining a commodity and hence a benchmark was 
required to assure a minimum quality to the services being procured. 
The employers in this network (either the interviewees’ managers or their own role as senior 
staff) were looking to encourage certification. Although they could use certified staff to meet 
some internal or external customer demand, this seemed relatively minor compared to the desire 
of the security team to have employees with a formal development and education programme as 
part of normal personnel management. 
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“[We] are doing our CISM trainer in a few weeks; that's part of our commitment to the 
business to continue our professional development, but also the business has given it to 
us. They're investing in us from a career perspective.” 
[MAN61E-SM05] 
“Employer” as a concept requires some additional inspection. The practitioners in this study 
were mostly hiring managers and were able to describe some of that hiring process, particularly 
with regards to the balance of experience, qualification, social skills, technical prowess and so 
on being sought. Unpacking this, or rather de-coupling “employer” from one of the internal 
forces at work during recruitment, they were also able to suggest that prior to the hiring 
manager making a determination at interview, HR departments and recruiters were keen to find 
a way to sift applications quickly. Given that the hiring managers did not always support this 
where the claim of competence could be validly made in other ways, this breaks down any 
notion of “the employer” as a unit acting in a particular and unified manner. Similarly, it may be 
commercially expedient for an organisation to have “qualified” security staff in order to claim 
competently-managed security processes should their customers be felt to favour such things, 
even if the security manager would prefer not to put such an emphasis on qualifications.  
“In the local government environment, those qualifications help to demonstrate to the 
various governance bodies we have to deal with that the council's taking security 
seriously, in that they're hiring qualified people to do the job.” 
[GOV21E-DM38] 
Such motivations of course do not represent a commitment to the substance of the qualification, 
only the badge, therefore this might not be coupled with board-level intent to genuinely secure 
the organisation’s information or impart resources to the security function, merely to obtain a 
benefit through meeting some criteria. This particular network fragment would therefore be only 
superficially assembled, and would be vulnerable should the market conditions (or even one key 
contract) vary. In particular, conflict could even be seen if undertaking the certification brought 
in the Iron Cage effect (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), with the professionals insisting on best 
practice from outside rather than acting purely as an employee (behaviour which was criticised 
by one of the contributors). 
By breaking into “employer” further, evidence is provided for the credentials as due diligence 
mechanisms which was theorised as a network fragment above. There is an opportunity for 
other actors to affect the credential market for their own purposes, for example senior 
management. 
“If someone employs a CISSP qualified or certified practitioner or whatever they can 
say ‘I did that, I’ve covered my back.’”  
[MAN86E-DS66] 
134 
Similarly, an auditor who has to come to a determination of a security team’s effectiveness can 
appeal to a common agreement that there is a standard at play. For the professional bodies this 
gives another potential avenue to market; if they cannot convince the current practitioner set that 
qualification is vital, is it possible to convince the rest of the network to create a qualified-
practitioner role which they are forced to fill? 
“I saw a lot of contracts where it said ... ‘The Information Security Manager will hold 
[our credential] or equivalent’. So that was nice from [our] perspective. What that is, it's 
a way of signalling to the supplier, ‘If you're serious about this contract and security, 
you're going to have people who have something I recognise’. Again, with contracts and 
procurement people they don't care what security is, they don't care what [our 
credential] is, they will go and check does it have this role – tick – does he have that 
qualification – tick.” 
[PRO29E-PO42] 
Examining and opening the “employer” entity gives a network expansion as shown in Fig. 16. 
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Fig. 16: Credential network from the perspective of the practitioner. 
5.5 Professionalism 
5.5.1 Overview 
As was seen from the discussion of certification, the various actants have not completed the 
professionalisation project which can be predicted from theory as shown in Fig. 17. 
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Fig. 17: Representation of a partial traditional professional status network (unified body). 
In order to investigate further where the failure mode exists in this network formation, this 
section aims to examine these concepts of professionalism in the data. As no clear definition of 
professional status exists, to describe the progress of any campaign requires an understanding of 
what would actually represent success. It must be established whether: 
 the practitioners who would need to be represented, 
 the actors attempting to represent and ultimately enrol the professionals, and 
 those who might regulate that process 
all share a common understanding of the concepts, and whether professionalisation is desirable. 
Four categories emerged during the analysis: what actually is a professional and how do they 
behave, the desirability of licensing, the role of government and the current professional status 
of Information Security. 
5.5.2 Definition and Characteristics 
There was little controversy over what constitutes a professional in the traditional sense, the 
group reciting the orthodox model when asked to define the term. It was seen positively overall 
and a status to be in general respected and sought, although not necessarily something with 
which this group particularly identified nor aspired to themselves. It was associated with 
seniority, at times both over subordinate trades of lower skill, and within the hierarchy of the 
profession. A rather egalitarian theme was expressed, particularly in the educators and 
practitioners, whereby models of profession which maintained a difference between profession 
and trade were rejected.  
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The most common traits mentioned were: adherence to ethical principles, advanced and 
specialist knowledge, competence (ideally qualified, although this was less prominent), and 
experience. The existence of a body of knowledge, a governing body, graduate training and 
application of abstract knowledge to a client's concerns were minor additional themes. The 
concept of professional purely as someone paid to do any activity was surprisingly minor. 
No striking difference was observed between practitioners, educators and governance bodies, 
however significantly the government response was unusual:  
“…a body of knowledge, it's got some sort of ethics, it's got development pathways, it's 
got a community, it's got a clear set of skills that are needed.”  
[GOV01E-GV01] 
That interviewee went on to draw very heavily on comparisons with medicine – the epitome of 
regulated and qualified practice – for his concepts of profession. As will be seen later, most 
practitioners distanced themselves from claiming anything like equal status to medicine. 
Competence was a far higher theme than outright qualification (implying that competence could 
exist aside from a formal examination) and the question of status itself was not particularly 
pressing. For practitioners in particular, experience and competence were linked rather than 
qualification and competence. As was noted above, many such qualifications were created after 
their entry to the profession. The traditional professional network model as shown in Fig. 17 is 
attacked at this point. The black box of “professional status” as being a highly desirable and 
objectively attested state of competence (Fig. 18) is much less powerful in this arrangement. 
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Fig. 18: Representation of professional status as the nexus of a partial network. 
The traditional model implies that such status is reasonably solid, although notable for many of 
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the respondents here was a hesitancy in answering questions about the definition of professional 
within Information Security. Indeed, the discussion was a source of much of the material coded 
under the housekeeping code “My thoughts on this subject are not fully formed”. As will be 
seen later, whilst some of the deliberation was due to the subject being novel, there was also 
uncertainty when defining what they believed was generally seen as “a professional” alongside 
their own lived definition which varied from it. This confusion was particularly evident when 
the participants were asked if they were professionals; some claimed to be professional but not 
in the strict orthodox sense which they had just described.  
Ongoing professional development was seen by many as important, rooted in the scale and pace 
of change in the industry and industrial context rather than mimetic pressure from the standard 
professional model and practice; there was little mention of the “appearance of professional 
status”. There was some cynicism towards the question of enforcing this for those with 
qualifications however this was not especially prominent and most answers were positive in 
tone.  
Very few people identified with a strict separation of professions and trades. A typical response, 
allied to Ritzer (1973), was:  
“Listen, you can be the guy who empties the ashtrays, you can do that professionally or 
unprofessionally, that's up to you.”  
[EDU79E-ID24] 
This understanding of professional status weakens many of the links in Fig. 18; if degrees, 
certification, licensing and tacit government approval are not required and merely simple 
employment, best practice and apparent competence in a field are the criteria, then the network 
is ripe for attack. Similarly, if status is not a driver then the practitioner is not so easily driven by 
the professional body, which must then persuade rather than command. In one case a contributor 
even sounded apologetic for suggesting that call centre agents might not be seen as professional 
and was at pains to note the potential for sounding elitist. It appears that overtly referring to 
social employment strata is now countercultural. 
Due to this failure of the “professional status” black box to represent the interests of the 
practitioners, the traditional model cannot easily succeed here. It must therefore be established 
whether changes in the network can and will be forcibly re-established by the only actant with 
the power to actually compel other actants: government. 
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5.5.3 Government 
This section describes the role of government in the regulation of security, distinct from the 
benefits and challenges of licensing itself (covered below). Much of this was contributed by the 
government interviewee due to directed questioning informed by earlier interviews, however 
one strand stood out generally, viz. reluctance for the government to directly regulate 
Information Security.  
Contrasting motives for this were seen; the most striking being scrupulous fairness from the 
government itself, who felt it should not prefer one body over another because it had no 
business doing so, provided the market was consistent. It is therefore clearly not currently 
convinced that the impact of incompetent practice exceeds the cost of monopoly. This is hugely 
important given the power of this actor and the importance of state sanction for professional 
bodies. One professional body felt that government intervention would stifle change, setting the 
status quo in stone. Another felt that governments were not trusted by the profession to 
administer regulation competently, even suggesting that government backing would be 
unwelcome if they were seen to be the government’s proxy. According to that thesis, if a body 
could not command respect on its own merits, it ought not to have it. In terms of the traditional 
professional network, this is also highly significant. Whereas in other professions government 
action is seen as recognising the pre-eminence of the body which represents the voice of the 
profession, in this case no such group representation has been fully established and thus state 
recognition of it would be precipitate. 
The government’s position suggests the lack of an obvious nucleus to which delegation could 
occur. Since policy is mainly driven at the political level, if change is not strongly desired from 
within it would need to be imposed by ministers. The topic was clearly not on the agenda 
internally, as many answers indicated directly or indirectly that this was not a topic which had 
been discussed extensively. Where the position was clear, it was that security was not 
necessarily a discipline itself requiring its own professional body, rather that it should be 
included as part of the regulation of the relevant industry. The likes of Ofgem in the network 
directly acting to control a profession would not have been predicted by the literature and were 
not mentioned by the practitioners, thus again this is a striking finding. 
Government however has been far from idle, its actions being driven by a need to increase the 
supply of competent security staff. It will therefore tend pragmatically to pull any convenient 
lever, rather than its actions arising from a campaign driven ideologically according to some 
fixed goal. There was a clear sense that a test of skills should be available, however this was 
apparently driven in response to external requests for the government to define such a test, 
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which was delegated to the market, as the government had no mechanism to build and 
administer such a test itself. Additionally this was felt to be useful in raising competence levels 
generally. 
“[If ministers never introduce regulation] then that's not the end of the world because 
you're encouraging people to use people with the right skills and the right competence”  
[GOV01E-GV01] 
The role of the government's professionalisation group was seen as ensuring its own protection 
through standards within government, and in the national infrastructure for which it was 
vicariously liable; as part of the civil service it has limited ability to impose its wishes on others 
without political instruction. The black box of “government” from the professionalism texts 
opens on inspection to reveal that it does not function as an integrated unit which “has power”. 
This section of the network appears only to be in the stage of problematisation. The actants are 
declaring their ground and establishing causes between each other with various aims and 
devices of interessement, however at the moment the government has not been successfully 
enrolled (lobbied to introduce licensing) and hence the key aspect of the translation is missing. 
In the following section that key as-yet failed translation is examined: power delegated from 
government to a “spokesman” professional body in order to regulate the profession. 
5.5.4 Licensing 
It might be inferred from coding values for this section (see Appendix 2) that licensing the 
profession was well-supported, however the reality is more balanced. 
The educators were unanimously in favour, some strongly. 
“I would see that as very positive. I would see that as very positive. Some kind of 
chartered status I think would be very useful.”  
[EDU27E-CL05]  
Similarly two of the three professional bodies were in favour, although not with the enthusiasm 
which might be predicted from theory; these were no passionate agitators to “exclude the 
quacks”. The third emphasised the need for a reliable badge but was not convinced it should be 
imposed universally. For the traditional professional network in Fig. 17, this represents far less 
support for actively promoting and advancing their power than might be assumed. 
Contrary to the inherently monopolistic assertion of theory, when asked whether there were 
incompetent people in the field, some interviewees accepted that there presumably were, 
however the predicted rhetoric of exclusion was not observed; few considered incompetence to 
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be a pressing problem. If this is a general view and shared by those in government, this strongly 
attacks the orthodox network model, since it undermines a professional association being the 
gateway to a competent profession. One professional association noted that identifying the 
competent was a theme in the development of their own foundation, however this was during a 
discussion of the very beginning of the practice. Moreover, not excluding current practitioners 
was a condition for supporting licensing for many. The respect gained from professional status 
was not seen as a primary motivating factor for entry; relatively well-rewarded, stable and 
interesting work were seen as more relevant factors by the educators with regards to student 
entrants. The government interviewee was personally in favour of some form of licensing, 
however felt this was not imminent given that role definitions are still insufficiently defined. 
Along with several practitioners, there was also concern for the financial and administrative 
overhead which might be generated by such a move. 
Practitioners were more balanced. Several were somewhat positive towards the concept but few 
unequivocally so and others were implacably opposed. A professional body would need to 
persuade more of the occupation than at present, otherwise it could present itself as a spokesman 
for a profession which in fact it did not reliably represent. Much seems to depend on the detail; 
a code capturing, effectively, conditions for accepting licensing proved fruitful. Concerns 
centred around the practicality of introducing such a scheme. What knowledge was to be 
mandatory? At what level? Who would administer it? How would one amass experience if it 
were necessary to have an experience-based qualification to enter? These obstacles were not 
insurmountable; if a scheme were to be introduced which the practitioners felt reflected the 
correct mix of skills and areas of knowledge then the uncertainty around what was proposed 
would likely decrease.  
5.5.5 Status and Direction 
Professional status is a curious phenomenon which must be examined more closely. 
There is today widespread use of “professional” and “pro” not only as making a living from a 
trade – particularly one of the vocational graduate trades – but also as a marketing device. Items 
such as shampoo sold as “professional” but clearly for domestic use suggest suitability for the 
advanced user aiming for the higher quality which professionals produce. One might consider 
the term “professional” to be an inscription, in that it has a common but nebulous definition 
written into the network by repetition, which needs only to be referenced to allude to high levels 
of skill, judgement and reliably high quality of output, without detailed examination of the exact 
claim. 
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It is however both simultaneously and conversely used by some as a more formal term for those 
trades for which qualification is by graduate study and subsequent postgraduate industry 
qualification; this sense is still very much alive for some. Its exact definition for this sense is 
dependent on current perceptions of the term, but distorted by the gravitas of the prototypes in 
the field, thus the perceptions of professionalism and what it means to be a professional (as 
represented in Fig. 19) are very much part of the network rather than mere intermediaries.  
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Fig. 19: Partial view of an orthodox model of professional status. 
If “professional” can be simply mentioned to denote a tool brand’s halo model, promise high-
quality electrical installation or attest to post-graduate practice-based qualification, it has 
become a black box: punctualised and used without explanation or examination. But translation 
here is incomplete; no professional body has control, which demands that the unpacking of that 
box to explain the network weakness. Which style of profession is referenced by professional 
certifications in Information Security? To be enrolled by a professional body practitioners must 
themselves want to obtain that professional status, but what elements for them comprise that 
status? What are the demands which a professional body must answer to avoid network 
weakness and thus fail to achieve translation? Since other professions’ identities shape those 
impressions, they too are at large in the network. 
The prevailing impression was that Information Security is too specialist and emerged too 
recently to be accepted as a profession in the traditional sense. To the layperson, the 
practitioner’s services are unclear, forming part of IT or the corporate police force. Lack of 
status to the layman is significant; to this group, contact with the public means exposure and 
thus an identity in the public mind, and consequently status. This would suggest that the public 
perception of professionalism is another entity affecting the network, which again is affected by 
perceptions of the other traditional professions.  
This makes for an interesting aside for the theorist; Freidson (1970, pp.21–22), for example, 
makes a distinction between consulting and technology professions. Whereas medics are 
required to have status in the eyes of the laity, technical specialists need only be respected by 
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peers. To Abbot (1988, p.118), working with the public directly is distasteful; senior 
professionals delegate this to juniors, or entire junior professions (barristers to solicitors and 
doctors to nurses, for example). Professional status for these people was associated with a high 
impact of incompetence, particularly as support for the paramount position of medicine. 
“I think the stakes are much higher for a doctor. No marketing professional’s going to 
kill a load of people if they get it wrong.” 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
Potentially, this limits the ambition of practitioners seeking that status. Two people however, a 
professional body and the government interviewee, noted that security was moving towards 
protecting personally significant interests and safety, as more systems were entrusted to 
electronic operation, thus this may support future changes. 
 “Safety is now reliant so much on security, safety for many many years has looked at as 
component failure and hazards like weather and all that kind of stuff, but it doesn't 
include malicious action. And we're seeing more and more malicious action which will 
now affect safety.” 
[GOV01E-GV01] 
Public perception of absolute status was not the most notable issue. Rather it was the distinction 
itself – the crystallisation of discrete roles and identities within professions and the hierarchy 
between the professions themselves – which was seen as crucial. Whilst these professions are 
seen to have well-established roles with formal paths to qualification, the career path and “rank 
structure” of Information Security is not seen to be present, for good or bad. 
“Again, I go back to medicine; there's lots of specialisms in medicine that have 
developed over many years but everybody agrees that a neurologist does things with the 
brain and not with the kidney. I don't think we're in that position.”  
[GOV01E-GOV] 
This lack of clear terminology creates a difficulty in making comparisons between employment 
roles, which in turn complicates the process of qualification and makes the claim of representing 
a discrete and identifiable profession difficult. One of the principal challenges to regulation and 
greater organisation was thus held to be drawing the boundary around the profession, something 
which Abbot (1988) suggests is a dynamic process over time as adjacent professions jostle for 
control. Without that boundary it is difficult to select and enrol a discrete set of actors. 
The question of coherence was seeded from the literature, given the efforts to codify roles. One 
line of questioning was the broadness of the different skill sets; whether for example a forensic 
analyst or firewall engineer was part of the same profession as someone who creates policy or 
educates an end-user. As seen earlier, the literature strongly suggests this to be the case. Two 
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educationalists saw technical and policy aspects as separate professions, however generally this 
sample simply noted the complexity of the current status without advancing any potential 
ideological boundaries. 
“So while everyone can have quite distinct roles, you actually need all of them to make 
it work. ... [Y]our elliptical curve cryptography person knows everything about how to 
encrypt something and decrypt it but doesn't necessarily understand the wider context of 
why you might need to do it.” 
[TEC72E-AN91] 
It is noteworthy that several people mentioned the IISP Skills Framework as a factor for change, 
either usefully to define the roles and hence education paths for those roles, or less usefully as a 
constricting force which does not reflect the less predictable course of a typical business career. 
Either way this typography of roles is generating comment in the industry, potentially 
representing an inscription in the network, accepted without further discussion as a role reified: 
a physical symbol for its contents. Such entities are useful for creating stable networks, since a 
network whose base elements are constantly having to re-assert themselves against challenge 
will be weak. 
Overwhelmingly the perception was that whilst not yet complete, Information Security had the 
potential to become (or even should be) recognised as a profession; it was felt to have sufficient 
intellectual depth, but had not yet achieved matching gravitas and status of more structured 
examples. It was almost unanimous that a CISO would not enjoy equal status to a company 
lawyer; government noted that it sought actively to improve this status, not being particularly 
high, otherwise there was no clear difference on this point between the source types.  
The above does not imply zero status for all practitioners; status is simply won by the 
individual, assisted by job title, hierarchical seniority and perceived personal competence. By 
contrast it was felt that “recognised” professionals command automatic respect; their claims are 
accepted in the network by reference to the status of their profession alone. ANT here shows the 
power of non-human actants; whatever the motivation of physicians to advance their own status, 
without any likely intentionality on the part of the human doctor the status of their profession 
has effect in a distant, almost unrelated network. 
“Medicine's another great example. Doctors, medical students spend two years basically 
in a classroom where they learn how the human body works. … They start off with a 
broad knowledge, and they narrow down, because the principles work no matter where 
you are.”  
[PRO29E-PO42] 
Exceeding even obscurity and the lack of structured roles and qualification was a perceived lack 
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of maturity and history, charmingly expressed as “It's not old enough. Doesn't even have a nice 
building in London” [GOV01E-GV01]. The “heritage” of other professions qua profession was 
arguably over-estimated; interviewees spoke of medicine as having “hundreds of years” or 
“millenia” of history, whereas Freidson (1970, pp.5–21) places a recognisable medical 
profession no earlier than the end of the nineteenth century. The black-boxed status invokes a 
sense of ancient foundation which would not withstand unpacking. 
“Security is where medicine was many hundreds of years ago, in that we apply 
treatments that sometimes work and sometimes don't, and we don't always know why.”  
[GOV01E-GV01, emphasis added] 
Security was seen to be less mature and of a lower status even than the more modern examples 
mentioned in the interview protocol (pharmacy, nursing and engineering). Two perceptive 
voices challenged the question, denying the implied recent emergence of engineering. One 
noted that civil engineering prior to its professionalisation dated back to Roman times and 
another noted that engineers were socially prominent in the Victorian era but did not protect 
their status (notably similar to Larson’s (1977, pp.25–31) treatment of engineering). It is 
apparently perception of maturity which influenced the sample and thus against which offers of 
representation by a professional body will be judged, both by practitioners and government, 
made more difficult by the short history of information processing. 
“The technology we work on has only really been around since 1945. It's transforming 
itself every two or three years, so we are playing catch-up in a way that other 
professions never had to.”  
[PRO29E-PO42] 
One professional body noted that they had an aim to be more comparable to other professions, 
however another aimed not to be of equal status so much as being equally well-organised and 
ethically practised. Again, the perception of the other professions clearly has a strong bearing on 
what would be required in a regulated network. These comparisons hinted for example at the 
direction the speaker saw for the occupation. 
“Security … is still seen as something you can spend three years doing as part of your 
overall career. Of course yes in three years you might become a bottom-end GP in 
medical terms if you're lucky but the reality is it'll take you many years to become a 
specialist.”  
[GOV01E-GOV] 
As an aside, it is most interesting that the government interviewee should criticise this sense of 
not requiring specialised knowledge but strongly resist the profession being licensed as 
discussed in other sections. 
In terms of structure, the practitioners in the main felt that whilst an earlier IT career provides 
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important technical grounding for key areas of policy enforcement, career background should 
not necessarily determine potential. Earlier sections showed that the practitioners similarly 
refuse to insist on graduate education, something which the educators naturally consider to be a 
natural foundation for a career. One person noted that the general increase in popularity of 
university education may (once more) require a person to be a graduate in order to be 
considered a professional in future. The sense here was that this stemmed from the statistics of 
modern practice and custom rather than a phenomenological analysis of the essence of 
profession. 
Looking to the future, it was felt that the role itself will change. One practitioner predicted that 
recruitment will be from a much wider variety of skill types; this made an interesting contrast to 
the government (DBIS, 2014a) view that more entrants with STEM subjects are needed, 
suggesting a continuing technical bias. All parties agreed on the lack of competent staff in the 
market and the importance of increasing the supply to the industry of trained staff.  
“We're [producing graduates at] way below the amount of people required to cover this 
kind of role.”  
[EDU54-CL11] 
As the government has recognised this, in theory this creates the conditions where it may wish 
to delegate the task of regulation. 
5.6 Work Context 
5.6.1 Overview 
This final section places the candidate profession into its work context in order to extend the 
partial network observed above. The causes of the change around the topic of security are noted 
to determine which are the genuine actants exerting influence in the field. From this can be seen 
why security now occupies its current position and what might cause this to change. This is 
fundamental to an ANT study because it attempts to enumerate and describe the actors at work 
in creating the role, of whatever type. The security specialist exists in an employing 
organisation, thus the network of interest is that which gave birth to the object of study.  
The question of security’s place in the organisation is also examined to note the degree to which 
it has established itself into the hierarchy and how effectively it has distanced itself from its IT-
dominated history. In particular, it is necessary to establish whether the practitioners 
respectively of policy creation and policy enforcement represent strata, kin or discrete atomic 
trades. Next how the profession is perceived internally is seen, particularly with regards to its 
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management, who represent in a bureaucracy the profession’s clients as traditionally described. 
Finally the relationship between policy creators and those affected by it is discussed, to see how 
these people feed back into the policy process and hence fill out the remaining parts of the 
network. 
5.6.2 Change Actors 
Whilst it is convenient to refer to “legislation and regulation”, this varies both in scope and 
context, thus these must be placed into the network with care. These are casually referenced as 
major sources of change, suggesting this concept has become a weak black box. Weak, because 
invoking it lazily by a practitioner (for example to gain funding) would withstand little scrutiny 
by a determined counter-force in the organisation.  
“In retail it evolved as the time went by and regulatory requirements were one of the 
drivers for that. Here that's not so much the case; there are no such regulatory 
requirements that compel us to comply with anything on the security front, really.” 
[MAN61E-SM05] 
This statement makes the assertion by government that security should be regulated not as a 
whole but by sector very interesting, since it is clear that this would then vary enormously 
between industries. There are numerous regulatory pressures which were noted by the 
interviewees. PCI-DSS was seen to have almost statutory effect in merchants; interestingly a 
charity pointed out that they were equally bound by such concerns, but battled an internal 
assumption that charitable status somehow reduced them. Finance mentioned enforceable 
regulatory action as a key source of concern, whereas a Health Service interviewee noted the 
balance of data protection against critically high availability requirements for authorised use in 
the subject’s vital interests. 
“I think that depends on industry. In retail I think they just pay lip service [whereas] in 
the gambling company a lot of resource, a lot of money. Pretty much got what I 
wanted.” 
[FIN22E-AN43] 
Whilst security must reflect the actual threat to the client, thus some variation is natural, there 
could surely be no homogenous profession with such a wide difference in approach and internal 
priority, if regulated according to industry type. Such differences create tension between the 
profession-aligned practitioner and the employer, leading to conflict in the professional 
concerning priorities and best practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
“The emphasis is on the information governance, it's about patient personal identifiable 
information. The rest of Information Security is definitely secondary. And I find that 
difficult.” 
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[HEL42E-AN12, emphasis added] 
The single contributor from a small organisation felt that enterprise size was a significant factor 
in behaviour. Here the importance of agility and flexibility was paramount, with security 
measures facing stringent assessment to ensure no impact to profitability. Resistance to security 
restrictions from senior management is likely to be particularly acute and the security officer 
(possibly a hybrid IT position) would therefore require more support from external sources. 
Another participant suggested that those aiming to avoid security constraints might avoid hiring 
security officers known to favour operational intervention. 
“Actually it depends on the sector. I mean, lots of small businesses just generally don't 
care, as long as they can get on with the job they don't care.” 
[TEC11S-ID48] 
Parallels between security practice and Health and Safety were noted, the latter probably most 
closely associated for UK workers with the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (1974). Through 
such acts society embeds into law that neither public nor private enterprise may, in the pursuit of 
its work, gamble unnecessarily with the wellbeing of staff, something which is now well-
accepted. 
“If you look at anything in here, everything you'll see is Health and Safety and that's 
number one. Has been and probably always will be. And justifiably so as well” 
[MIN48E-SM22] 
This has not always been the case, with the maiming of early industrial workers by unsafe 
working practices sewn into national lore. If the motive is assumed to be profit (additional 
resources required for safe procedures and equipment conflicting with maximum production) 
then clear similarities to security in business emerge. Overheads of procedures such as 
separation of duties or whitelisting of applications, or costs of equipment such as firewalls, 
conflict with the priorities of operational managers.  
In both cases an economic argument exists both pre- and post-legislation. Society has chosen to 
consider risks to the person as unacceptable and skews the risk for company officers in favour 
of proper practice by the use of fines and the threat of imprisonment. Similarly security-related 
legislation, such as the Data Protection Acts, re-balances the risk–reward spectrum for directors. 
Where profit may encourage avoiding reasonable measures for the protection of personal data, 
the threat of fines may change the financial outlook, with personal criminal sanctions affecting 
risk calculations for executives even further. 
Without legislative backing, pressures such as market reputation and the loss of intellectual 
property are risk decisions which can be taken (informed or otherwise) by the senior 
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management, thus the security officer has no power to direct upwards within the organisation. 
They must convince management that they are an OPP for a state which they may only weakly 
wish to achieve; should their cost be unacceptable or should conditions change, the network will 
remove them in favour of another focal actor.  
With specialist legislation, not only must the management comply with the Act but it will not be 
sufficiently expert to know how this is possible or how to execute it, requiring an advisor. This 
therefore firms both the desirability of the target state for which they are OPP, but crucially also 
cements the degree to which they are genuinely the only passageway to that target. Should the 
firm operate in multiple markets, the degree of expert knowledge to claim OPP status is 
apparently increased still further as the international variations in such issues were seen hugely 
to complicate compliance. 
For smaller organisations, the combination of fines and a more active commissioner’s office was 
seen as effective. In larger companies where the maximum fine would not be catastrophic, 
reputational damage was held to be the primary mover. In the former case an overly-officious 
security officer would be susceptible to contradiction by legal staff; in the second judgement 
would be more pragmatic, having regard for market impact.  
Standards, by contrast, have a more nuanced method of action. In theory they are not mandatory 
(aside from quasi-regulatory examples such as PCI-DSS). Backhouse et al. (2006) interestingly 
consider the standard as OPP, being the gateway towards acceptance by a customer as a bidder 
for work. But this is to mis-ascribe the focus of the action. The standard, as they note, is an 
artefact from a process where actors wished to achieve some purpose. Whilst adoption of 
standards might be fully voluntary (as one practitioner noted for example, external standards 
avoid detailed debates over each provision of a proprietary policy), for these practitioners 
adoption was usually for some specific purpose. As Backhouse et al. noted, this may or may not 
align with the stated motivations of its creators; adoption may instead be due to market-based 
mimesis, or expectation and custom rather than some objective benefit.  
“We were also working with the [government], the web front end for the [public sector] 
recruitment site, so we had strong development practices in the business and we were 
used to having audits, but more and more companies were saying ‘You don't have the 
badge’, so we got the 27001; they were happy.”  
[UTL50E-SM62] 
If its adoption is through reference rather than substance therefore it is more likely not an OPP 
but an inscription: an item in the network accepted but never examined. Did the purchasing 
teams of customers who required this standard even know what was written in it? Almost 
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certainly not. The standard is a device of interessement during the problematisation phase of 
some other interaction. The customer is a gateway to money, and the supplier a gateway to 
secure services. The standard itself, regardless of its genesis, is adopted under these particular 
circumstances for its effect and punctualised: reduced to a badge. It is certified compliance 
which gains movement in the market, which is the product of an auditor. 
If the standard itself is considered to be an OPP rather than an artefact, then the translation it 
achieves is a poor one; practitioners report complying only with the sections they actually 
support and do not cause undue effort unless forced. It is not clear whether this is due to the 
security manager being themselves unconvinced or a failure to translate this into internal action; 
there was evidence for both. 
If adoption is not market-based compliance but due to the standard as actor, its interaction is 
with the security manager as spokesman for their internal network policy. Successfully lobbying 
the security manager of the benefits of compliance in its own right may appear to deliver results; 
in reality, though, lack of compulsion causes the standard to be unpacked into constituent 
actions, each with financial and resource costs and benefits.  
“The majority of it's good but there's a small percentage of stuff which given a choice 
we probably wouldn't do.” 
[TRN74E-SM47] 
However enrolled the security manager, this will not further translate into action without a 
reason to comply with the entire standard being apparent to the resource managers. The security 
officer may even resist the implementation, since they will actually have to introduce it and may 
have lower respect for it after unpacking. 
“It's a bit like ISO9000 to me …, you can have a repeatable process, it can be a crap 
process but as long as it's repeatable, job's a good'un. I suppose the other side from a 
cynical perspective is that mandation [sic] – what's the driver behind that? Is it a 
revenue generation thing or is it a genuine desire to wish to increase the professionalism 
or the quality of what's being done out there?”  
[MAN61E-SM05] 
So what is the focal actant here? Standards compliance brings with it the customer as candidate 
actant. But as noted above, does the customer genuinely wish to see those exact measures, or 
have they been successfully enrolled in some other actant’s power play and are merely reacting 
predictably to events? The customer seeks security; the fact that ISO standards are not 
mandatory in most cases ensures that this action is not required of the customer. Some other 
event has convinced them that engaging a secure supplier is a desirable state.  
150 
From the data collected (strongly in line with the literature), this appears to have its roots in the 
change in exploitation of computer coding vulnerabilities from theoretical exercise to malicious 
action. 
“Before if you look at hacking in the 70s and 80s, those people were there for the kicks 
... It was more of an intellectual challenge. ... [N]ow you have people that actually get 
paid to do this, if they manage to get your credit card number and personal information 
at home and your IP address at home they get real dollars in their bank accounts so now 
the motivation's completely different.” 
[FIN99E-SM92] 
Between these two extremes – principled hacker who would avoid damaging the target system 
and modern financially-motivated organised crime – the spur for security was seen to be the 
computer virus. 
“[Security] wasn't in the least bit important to them, right up until they got smacked 
over the head by this virus.” 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
Interestingly this quote could apply equally to the epiphany in the IT department as well as the 
“proto” security officer, since the rise in malicious intent demanded properly-secured computer 
systems. It might be no coincidence that the introduction of computer security programmes by a 
small number of specialists and its academic study were seen to be contemporaneous with the 
outbreak of viruses.  
Whether the virus incidents themselves were the principal factor here or the perception of risk is 
an interesting point. Clearly in large organisations security breaches themselves were damaging, 
however they were also newsworthy and helped create in the minds of the observer the abstract 
and general sense of danger from poor security. 
“There's a lot more exposure, but that's not necessarily backed up with understanding. 
People say, ‘Oh yes, Information Security, I'm really worried about that’ but if you ask 
them what it is they won't be able to tell you, all they know is the scary headlines in the 
media.” 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
Again, the choice of focal actant requires some observation. Where there is the perception of 
danger uncoupled from a detailed understanding of the exact nature of that risk, an opportunity 
is created for a security officer role to become the OPP to achieving safety.  
“But the publicity that cyber-threats get in the press, the publicity of incidents that have 
happened make them think twice, especially if the Information Security professional in 
the organisation is able to make the links with the risks to that specific company.” 
[COM73E-AN44] 
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Interestingly, not all the focus was purely technical. There was also evidence of the later von 
Solms (2000) waves, in that businesses became interested not simply in responding to the 
information systems attacks, but also in some cases in creating proper process and structure 
around the organisation of secure practice itself. 
“It became recognised that there wasn't enough governance, not enough control, not 
enough oversight and not enough resources in place to actually deal with the risk and 
impact. That's when businesses started to realise and actually do something about it.” 
[FIN91E-SM15] 
The participants were apparently not suggesting that this position and the attendant focus on 
security were created for ideological reasons or to protect data as a means in itself, although one 
telling aside relating to “bitter experience” suggested that there was some internal feedback 
mechanism. It was seen that this became a true topic of interest when a lack of security cost 
businesses money.  
“As soon as money is involved and there's a threat of money being stolen and there 
being economic damage of any kind, then it becomes of mass interest.” 
[EDU27E-CL05] 
Viruses are an example of what one participant termed “this week’s buzzword”. Led from the 
literature, questioning discussed whether reports of security breaches were used as a lever 
within the organisation. This was to establish views on this topic in general and then more 
particularly to elucidate what the mechanism of action was (greater access to executive risk 
aversion through fear of the breach, easier business case based on financial impacts in a rational 
assessment, and so on).  In most cases this was rejected and seen as rather cynical behaviour. 
More pragmatically, it was noted that the threat would have to appear very close to home and 
that it was possible to cry wolf. 
“I think people have used it as a catalyst to get attention but I think you only get a few 
opportunities of doing that before people get weary of the story.” 
[FIN31E-AN72] 
This latter point is significant. Much was made in the literature of professionals having power 
over clients; for that era of sociology a profession required credibility. The professionals may 
have been theoretically bound to higher things than their clients’ whims, but surely only where a 
gentleman’s income allowed some independence and the regulation by peers provided some 
shelter; clients were still ultimately paying their salary. The power school claimed no direct 
element of force to the mechanisms at play, rather that by having such great influence born of 
expertise and the credible nature of their warnings of the dire consequences of non-compliance, 
they had a coercive platform, and by controlling knowledge they controlled clients’ options. 
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As was noted in the literature review, professionals are distinguished by giving advice with 
great penalties for disobedience: failure to listen to the lawyer resulted in loss of liberty; the 
doctor, death. As even Freidson (1988) noted, this is not however direct power like the 
Leviathan state; consequences of not following advice have effect only if they are perceived to 
be both real and sufficient. Advice from a competent lawyer must be accepted to avoid the legal 
sanctions they warn of, but even this cannot compel action from their client in the real sense, 
since some people are simply obstinate or self-destructive; the client retains their right to make 
bad choices. 
To achieve similar power therefore, the security professional must credibly produce advice with 
a high cost to non-acceptance, if they are to be the OPP to avoiding that cost. There is therefore 
a fascinating tension in the answers observed here. On one hand, well-publicised breaches are 
known to affect executives’ thinking and have an effect on access to funding and control within 
organisations. On the other, the data suggests (in line with the literature) that only when such 
events are recently in the mind of the management would security have their full focus. In some 
cases such incidents even created the department. This has some resonance with ANT, which 
rejects solid social “forces” and requires these negotiated links to be continually renewed.  
Deliberately using this to gain resources was seen in the main as ineffective, because it would 
not map to the exact risks of the company and thus seem irrelevant. Secondly, even though 
breaches might get management attention for security, to exploit this for resources was seen as 
unethical. One ethical use suggested was as material for cautionary tales for awareness training, 
to communicate the nature of the threat. Whilst therefore breaches might be seen as actants, it 
appears their action is to amplify the effect of the user of the malicious code, which may or may 
not be its creator. Malware thus becomes a device and the breach a conduit and amplifier of 
action. 
That malware was seen as so significant by practitioners is instructive; the emergence of viruses 
created both the functional need and the commercial case for Anti-Virus software, arguably the 
real foundation for the security product industry. One practitioner saw this as causing the 
preoccupation with technical mitigations, linking Information Security to IT controls. This 
contrasts with another view that the industry has moved away from constant development of 
novel technical controls towards creating services and suites, but the “noise” around the practice 
of security has continued to increase. Aside from this “noise”, the impact of the security 
industry seen in the data was surprisingly small. Alongside noting the useful source of advice, 
there was some cynicism towards the “security theatre” attitude of the industry and their 
tendency to oversell. 
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“The very top-level executive people tend to not have any depth of understanding about 
the scale and complexity of the Information Security challenge. Some of the fault of that 
has to lie with the security industry for touting themselves as, ‘We are the answer to all 
your problems; all you do is sign this contract and everything's fine’ or ‘Buy this box’ or 
‘Hire our consultant’ or whatever.” 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
There was little other spontaneous mention of what is now a substantial industry. A possible 
research strand could focus on how its workers fit into the profession’s role hierarchy. Just as 
medical research is not solely performed by physicians, developing the technical controls used 
by practitioners represents a different environment from that of their application. 
Whilst the practice of Information Security management is not exclusively a technical one, the 
data here supports the common view that the occupation’s origin is linked to the development of 
electronic computer communications and mass computer internetworking. It was the 
development of these additional vectors to compromise and exfiltration which seems to have 
separated the protection of stored information from that of any other physical asset. It also 
changed both the skill set for the thief and the danger of their being captured. But this is clearly 
not the limit of the impact of technological change; prior to social media for example the 
concept of an online identity could not exist to be misused. Whilst therefore the emergence and 
popularisation of Internet access is clearly fundamental to that of Information Security, this is 
such a well-documented phenomenon that little is achieved by rehearsing it here beyond noting 
that the interviewees’ data supported it. Thus the ANT duty to hear all things in their own words 
has been completed.  
Far more interesting is to note the significance for many of the pace of change. This scene has 
been set in quite stark terms; people who knew the weight of the words said that at the 
beginning of their career, security did not exist. This brings in itself some interesting 
observations from the group. Firstly it was felt that change was so profound, relentless and rapid 
that it almost precludes any one individual from truly becoming and remaining a genuine expert. 
As a statement this can be debated, however for these purposes it is most relevant because a 
topic which cannot adequately be understood by an individual is ripe for specialisation, which 
speaks to the topic of occupational coherence. Secondly, it produces an obligation to undergo 
bona fide continuous professional development. Thirdly, the public image of the subject has not 
yet had sufficient time to react; public and management understanding of security topics cannot 
hope to keep pace with the development of the threat landscape without interpretation, thus 
there is a more firmly established role for that interpreter.  
A similar generational change has happened in the client community. The industry is running to 
keep pace with topics such as protecting against external threats, perhaps for this sample best 
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exemplified by “Bring Your Own Device”, which was regularly discussed in the security media 
during the interview period. When a generation which had become accustomed to universal and 
unfiltered internet browsing collided with the traditionally conservative and prescriptive security 
function, a clash of ideologies was played out in the world of security policies and corporate 
politics (see Leuprecht et al., 2016). Where management understanding of the threat is in error 
(and quite possibly also understanding of the perceived benefit), they may choose to bend to the 
insistent calls for a more liberal computing environment due to a faulty understanding of the 
balance of risks.  
In ANT terms, the security officer’s position of OPP has been challenged because if they are not 
able to support the demanded flexibility and openness, they cease to be an apparent passage 
point at all to the desired end-state of a secure but flexible and functional computing function, 
thus the alternative path via a less intrusive regime is taken (shown in Fig. 20). Clearly in many 
cases this is because the security officer has been outpaced by movements in the network caused 
by technology, but in others it is because choices have been made without sufficient 
understanding of the risk.  
To this school, the responsibility of the security officer is to engage with what functionality is 
demanded by the business customer and to find a way to provide it securely, so that they 
actually enable the operations objectives of the enterprise to be achieved. In addition, by 
providing training to the user, understanding of their policy position could be increased 
(creating empathy and ideally buy-in), and the user able to better protect their home 
environment, thus shifting the general appetite for derestricted usage and improving the political 
position of the function. 
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Fig. 20: Network instability caused by dissent to restrictions from security policy. 
Obviously the most appropriate policy will depend strongly on the enterprise’s sector and the 
nature of its operations (and hence threats). This data was therefore in accord with the literature 
in seeing sector-specific security contexts, but some interesting nuances were observed. It was 
mentioned that charities may see less ideological threat from anti-capitalism, however the 
organisation could still conflict strongly with dangerous external political actors. An 
environmental charity might be targeted after criticising an environmentally irresponsible state 
which had an offensive cyber capability, for example. As one interviewee noted, their regulatory 
environment (for example processing personal data and financial transactions) can be identical 
to commercial endeavours if the law does not distinguish, even though the internal funding 
available may be very different. Sector-specific principal threats also exist, for example health 
services mentioned the paramount importance of medical data confidentiality, particularly if 
exfiltration would result in costly legal action.  
A further interesting suggestion was that some regulated sectors would be required and thus 
accustomed to employing qualified staff operationally (such as civil engineering) therefore 
internal staff would know and respect more the traditional professional model. In such 
organisations, a certified practitioner may be more easily accepted as a peer by internal clients 
through recognition of ‘certification equalling competence’. 
In summary, this section presents concepts relating to the creation and development of security 
practice as an enterprise role. From 1970s cryptography as the earliest observed action in the 
data, in less than fifty years there has arisen a discipline with vocational degrees and a 
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government campaign to recruit. Intrinsic to an ANT account however is the juxtaposition 
(network) of the actors described above. Latour (2005, pp.63–86) notes that neither hammer nor 
human of themselves place nails into walls; it is the interrelation of these objects for the moment 
of relation which produces the result. Similarly, the creators and creation of malware, the spread 
of the internet, the ubiquity of electronic communications and equipment, the publication of 
malware attack by the media, the vulnerabilities of popular software, the development of online 
transactions, and many other objects and people, momentarily together comprised the conditions 
for the creation of the security specialist.  
As the components of that network developed (for example the security product industry) or 
mutated (the altered motivations of hackers and malware creators), the interrelations between 
them have shifted. Therefore it is somewhat facile to attribute the emergence of the field to an 
event or set of events. It is more useful to describe the components to the network and their 
associations, as was done previously for the profession and its professional and regulatory 
context. The analysis therefore moves on to observe how the practitioner relates to their 
colleagues in the contemporary bureaucratic enterprise. 
5.6.3 Enterprise Organogram 
Interviewees were asked to describe where in the organisation they felt that the security function 
should report. This was partially to gauge what level of seniority was appropriate to the role 
being investigated, but also to elicit whether instinctively the sample believed that security 
belonged within IT. The answer was near-unanimous across sectors that the function should 
report to board-level senior management; the consensus was that this level of access was 
absolutely required to achieve access to implementation authority.  
“I would say the highest person for Information Security should report to someone who 
sits probably at exec level, because you need to have that kind of weight behind you 
sometimes to make sure that things are implemented.” 
[COM73E-AN44] 
The feeling was that generally the CISO would struggle to justify placement at the very highest 
hierarchical levels on merit, but (strongly aligned with the literature reviewed in section 2.2.5) 
depended very heavily on management firepower to get their policy and message adopted in the 
organisation. This reinforces that management is a significant actant in the network. Ultimately 
of course the CISO could aim to join the senior management team itself, although there was less 
support for this despite the “C”-level title. It is apparent from the remarks of the government 
interviewee that this was rarely the case and that this undervalued the role. It can be inferred 
then that government values the role of CISO more highly than their current employers. This is 
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perhaps a sign that they might in time be open to actions to elevate that status. 
“I don't think the CISO sits on the board anyway. There's very few companies who have 
a CISO on the board and I think that just reflects where information risk sits within 
organisations.” 
[GOV01E-GV01, emphasis added] 
As was noted in the literature review, it is common to suggest that there is a conflict of interest 
between the CISO and the CIO and that the former should not report to the latter. Whilst in 
overall agreement with this view, the sample was less definite on this point than on the question 
of seniority. The orthodoxy was certainly heard from many practitioners, for example: 
“I don't think it can sit in IT because so many of the controls you'll use will be 
technology-related because it's typically technology that you deliver information 
though.” 
[ENT22E-SM03] 
There was a significant minority who felt that either of these issues could be overcome and the 
coherence of a unified IT-related structure was useful. 
“If you find issues within the IT department you have a risk there that they don't get 
addressed properly ... but on the other hand if you want to get something done, 
sometimes because you're in that department, networking and all that kind of stuff can 
help to get things done more easily” 
[TRN74E-SM47] 
5.6.4 Intra-Professional Stratification 
This category reflects the role of technology in security management. From the practitioners, 
government and professional associations, the answer was overwhelming. This group saw 
Information Security as distinct from what might be termed “IT Security”, the latter being the 
implementation of Information Security policy by technical controls, such as firewalls, 
encryption systems and similar technology. 
Particularly relevant to this study was the extent to which this separation was seen as both a 
difference in content and in approach or skill set. With regards to the first, this was both in terms 
of “professional knowledge base” and the actual scope of work. Information Security was seen 
to be the protection of the information in any form against any threat. Whilst the storage 
medium was often technologically-based and hence the attack vector often based on technical 
approaches, this was considered only to be a subset of the role.  
“Information Security covers IT controls, manual controls, physical controls, logical 
controls. IT Security covers IT. ... It's not really interested in those kinds of things, 
segregation of duties between manual processes, which are critical. ... I would say IT 
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Security is part of Information Security.” 
[FIN91E-SM15] 
Importantly, this view was shared by the government interviewee, something which would be 
vital to gaining support for a clearly-defined separate profession from IT. 
“It isn't just about computers, there's a huge amount of people involved in it as well. I 
think organisations that focus on the technology will miss the point. Having it in 
organisations that just do engineering, just do computers, it's not the broad church it 
needs to be.” 
[GOV01E-GV01] 
Particularly interesting here was the theme of movement in time. One interviewee described an 
early security role in very different terms to the modern understanding: 
“In [a retailer] at that time security administration was a role that existed, so there was 
what they would call a security manager at that time. He was more, or completely, 
operational. ... In terms of ... how would our risk appetite be fulfilled by introducing a 
particular technology or how wouldn't it be and what were the risks of doing that, there 
was no knowledge in there at all” 
[MIN48E-SM22] 
Another contributor suggested a surprisingly short timescale for this movement: 
“You know, if you'd asked me twelve months ago, I would have said [that Information 
Security is part of IT]. Now I increasingly think ‘no’. ... Five years ago I think it was a 
much more technically-orientated, security-focused role.” 
[FIN31E-AN72] 
It is not clear that these new socially-informed roles are concrete and stable, since there is little 
evidence of a closed network and mobilised practitioners, however from this data a movement 
towards an industry more grounded in human factors can be seen. This matches the reported 
more onerous regulatory burden and evolving mixed threat environment which requires a more 
mature and organised security team. Therefore, instead of a security component to the technical 
mix supporting the company IT, Information Security moved to present the board with the 
ability to control IT on their behalf for security matters, almost switching places in the network. 
“I think it's still coalescing as to how this is all going to work for me, but certainly in 
my head at the moment I see it as a natural move out into some governance” 
[CHA31-SM07] 
The case of Edward Snowden was noted as an example of a case where technical controls were 
not seen as paramount. The authorised internal user typically is not only not the target of many 
control measures, they are also capable of deliberately circumventing them. When the threat 
moves outside the technical sphere, mitigation options rapidly become less tolerable (since it is 
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much more difficult ethically and legally to constrain people than to constrain data flows). 
“People who use computers are the important thing; they cannot be programmed, you 
can't put anti-virus on a person.” 
[PRO29E-PO42] 
Problematisation therefore begins again, since the technical team has no way to offer a 
passageway to security on its own and must seek a partner who is offering an understanding of 
human factors. The example was given of closing access after an employee had given notice, 
causing the employee to simply ensure that all exfiltration and abuse had been completed prior 
to giving notice. The challenge at this point becomes ensuring that such human issues were 
raised as important and hence business time spent on ensuring their success. In the wider sense 
indeed, this position of security near the top of the agenda was seen to be more critical than the 
technical play. 
“The technology challenge wasn't really a huge problem, it was more about getting the 
buy-in to say these are important aspects that need to be considered.” 
[MIN48E-SM22] 
It is interesting that there is talk of distinction between technical and non-technical roles almost 
to the point of dichotomy. The people in an organisation with responsibility for technical 
security were spoken of in a very separate manner. 
“I think there's two types of security people, it's the technical and the non-technical; not 
completely non-technical but people who are more towards the project governance or 
security risk management for example or policies and procedures, that kind of area … 
[Y]ou have IT Security people and you have Information Security people.” 
 
[COM73E-AN44] 
 “You're going to put a firewall in of course but let's think about first of all what you're 
trying to protect, why are you trying to protect it. No is the answer, the simple answer is 
no, it's a separate discipline.” 
[ENT22E-SM03] 
This is surprising as most of these people were originally technical IT staff. Is this area 
particularly ripe to be affected by changing training routes in the profession’s supply line? If it is 
true that security managers and technical staff are separating – and this is of course a theme 
from literature and one of the primary rationales for conducting the study – then this directly 
supports an attack on the black box of “Information Security professional”, whose unity of role 
as was discussed above is central to a claim of an independent profession.  
Certainly any assumption that there is a single career through which one might linearly flow, 
from firewall administrator novice to CISO Grand Master is highly questionable. There was a 
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considerable body of data which suggested that primarily technical and primarily non-technical 
paths diverged at some point mid-career if not earlier. 
But for one speciality to graduate to another is not the only option for both to have status. 
Anaesthetists for example do not generally yearn to become general practitioners. The sociology 
of the professions has much to say on the topic of hierarchy; not just between strata of a single 
profession but between professions and those spun off below. In the same way that medicine 
sought to avoid tarnishing the ethereal physician with the mundanity of physiotherapy without 
losing control over the ground, the competent firewall professional can be governed by the 
security manager without compromising the status of either, provided both have a place in the 
network and a well-forged link. 
“People recognise also I think the value of nursing alongside the value of doctors, and 
although one would argue that maybe nursing is junior to doctors people would see 
them both as having a very relevant position.”  
[PRO41E-PO86] 
The data here suggests that technical professionals did not necessarily view management 
(meaning security governance rather than mere hierarchical management) as being a career 
goal. As the security manager is exposed to the realities of business politics, they make a useful 
shield from that environment for those whose strengths lie elsewhere. Space needs to be left in 
the network for a symbiosis between those with the technical skills but no desire to lobby, and 
those content to seek the higher rewards and wider engagement of management but avoid the 
rigours of maintaining technical expertise (who thus require the advice and support of the 
specialists). Whilst many people develop both technical and social skill-sets and could move to 
a security management track should they wish, the feeling was that in many cases the mindset of 
an outright technical expert clashed with that required to undertake management tasks. 
“I think there's quite a divide sometimes. I've got a guy who works for me ... If I said to 
him, could you stand up in front of twenty people, even people from our own office and 
talk about something, that would be the last thing he'd want to do. He'd be quite happy 
about providing the information for someone else to do it.” 
[MAN61E-SM05] 
For such people the security manager is a source of technology budget and policies which 
require technical controls. They lobby boards for the money to carry out what the security-
aware staff collectively desire, viz. the implementation of security policies (which will include 
technical controls, and thus employment). Some compromise is needed on autonomy, but in 
exchange for isolation from the very social factors which are otherwise a threat to the harmony 
of the old network. Both become passage points for each other, as shown in Fig. 21. 
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Fig. 21: Potentially peer-symbiotic relationship between security manager and technician. 
The distance must not be too great, however. The manager who is technically ignorant must rely 
on competent advice, causing them to seek a technical expert who is the OPP to that advice. 
This weakens the position of the manager to politician and quasi-lawyer; they are no longer the 
OPP to a secure state themselves, they become the person who coordinates the technical 
responses required by the operational, statutory and regulatory environment. The literature 
shows that policies which cannot be technically enforced are useless. The manager’s position if 
coming from complete ignorance could be easily upset by being undermined by being gainsaid 
by the technical professional. Such a role of “policy and regulatory specialist” would be valid, 
but it is much less powerful when a direct peer of the technical specialist. Similarly, one whose 
governance environment was seen to be overly controlling or unnecessarily arduous is likely to 
be challenged. In reality, the skills dichotomy is relative; the disgruntled technical professional 
with political skills would be a powerful enemy to the manager should the relationship break 
down. 
“I think a lot comes down to organisational politics, really. In some companies the 
technical people can bulldoze their way into getting their way and in other companies 
they can't, so I think it varies by company and by how much power the different points 
of view are able to project.” 
[TEC72E-AN91] 
Therefore to this sample, whilst IT is only seen as a subset of the task, governance professionals 
were expected to be sufficiently versed in the realm of technical controls to be able to relate risk 
strategy to selection of controls and mitigation actions. For several this meant a period working 
with the technology was at least desirable, since it was felt to be easier to assimilate human 
aspects with a technical background than to add technical concepts to governance. 
“The skill sets have moved on and changed a lot, but it’s worth saying that having the 
technical background ... makes understanding why and how things can go wrong a 
damn sight easier.” 
[MIN48E-SM22] 
The overall picture therefore involves a governance professional who has sufficient knowledge 
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in both technical and policy areas to oversee and govern both competently. This requires a range 
of skills from some more obviously technical-legal such as forensics (Stahl, 2006), to “softer” 
aspects such as user education. 
“A properly equipped Information Security team should be multi-disciplinary; it should 
have technical people, it should have people who understand the human element.” 
[CHA31-SM07] 
The following sections examine more closely the relationship between the manager, the 
business and the internal client. 
5.6.5 Perception and Management 
The network around data protection is not simply shifting around “company data” itself, but 
rather that concept is itself breaking down. This is a result of technical change and an example 
of the necessity of symmetric treatment of the human and non-human in ANT. Latour (1999b) 
noted that a gun and a man do not of themselves constitute the same pregnant potential as a 
gunman. In the same manner, company information processed in manual ledgers is as valuable 
and nearly identical to the same data stored on a computer, however the possibilities for 
breaching the security of that data on a computer are different. The combination of data, the 
storage medium, the access medium, the state of technical and procedural security controls and 
of the methods to defeat them, the motivations of those who would attempt that defeat and many 
other factors are not static but form a temporary lattice renegotiated with every change in each.  
“Actually to me the question you're asking is, ‘Who owns the data?’ And this is a debate 
that I've seen in a number of companies, because traditionally IT was seen to own the 
data, therefore it was up to IT to secure the servers ... Obviously that is IT's function, to 
have those technical controls, but actually my view is the data's owned by the business.” 
[TEC72E-AN91] 
There were signs here of a Business Ownership, IT Custodian model of responsibility. This 
moves security clearly to a role as mediator and specialist, responsible not merely for ensuring 
the safety of the electronics from within but for the safety of the information from without. That 
suggests the migration across the organogram promised by Neal (2008) and with it the partial 
liberation from a prior career in system administration, but also brings the assault on the black 
box of “Information Security professional”, still very clearly linked with the operation of 
computers. As however the study considers the network today, where this tension has not yet 
been somehow usefully resolved and the security professional exists in a hybrid state, how they 
are regarded in their work environment is highly relevant. 
Distance from the grubby business of operating firewalls may have advantages, however those 
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firewalls must be in some way supervised and brought within the sphere of the security 
professional, to ensure a coherent and comprehensive claim to knowledge. As externals to the 
business processes and – eventually, possibly – the technology of execution, the security 
professional must influence from afar. Power in hierarchies is complex, particularly in today’s 
matrix environment. The organisation seeks ultimately to preserve its resources thus they are 
only usually spent in search of reward or reduction of risk. 
“Everything is always for the business. If it has an impact on the running of the business 
then fine, if that's the way we need to do it then we'll have to do it. Just so long as it 
doesn't have a detrimental effect on the business.” 
[TEC11S-ID48] 
As seen both from the literature and the data here, that relationship changes over time as the 
pressures of easy process and extra margin compete with memories of last month’s now-
forgotten crisis, therefore stability ideally requires a relatively unchanging external factor such 
as regulation for its crux. Outside such direct coercive action, the security team must accept that 
by placing themselves in the position of consultant on processes rather than the experts on 
technology, they lose the ability to instruct upwards. 
“The conversation has to be a dialogue, it has to be ‘OK, well if you don't do this then 
this might happen, are you prepared to accept that? If yes then fine, but you sign that 
risk off. If no, here’s what I recommend you achieve in terms of outcomes by tweaking 
your business process. If I can help you achieve those outcomes then please engage me 
and I will help you’, not ‘You must do this, this, this and this’.” 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
There are voices here which are much more business-centred than might have been expected in 
previous years. The practitioners were very clear that the business had to be able to make the 
decision based on their advice, but that as security professionals rather than operational 
managers they were neither qualified nor able to insist on their own choices. As above, the 
danger is that one’s position may be untenable if one’s advice becomes routinely ignored (or in 
network terms “ignorable”, i.e. not obligatory). As noted from literature, the question arises of 
whether risks can be accurately judged by non-specialists, and in absolute terms even by 
specialists. 
“Social media is a typical example of that – I'm using Facebook because I like it, so I 
tend to over-weight the benefits that social media gives against the risk. This is a typical 
misperception of risk. Security professionals can be victims as well; imagine somebody 
who's not educated enough or doesn't know a lot of security, how easy it is. So security 
awareness I think is the first thing we need to look at before we create a baseline for 
security certifications.” 
[EDU54E-CL11] 
The discussion here appears to be in the realm of judgement rather than calculation. The job of 
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the security professional is seen to be that of two-fold translation. Firstly they must translate the 
business environment and its risk tolerance into a security policy, and secondly translate the 
threat in non-technical terms for management for contextual understanding. Whilst the 
practitioners therefore state that they are providing advice, clearly the rather loose connection 
between risk, occurrence and outcome allows (acknowledged) room for coercion through the 
famous “fear, uncertainty and doubt”. 
Wishing not to “cry wolf” (and perhaps even putting cynicism aside and allowing a little non-
parochial intent) the security manager is required to live in the business. For the management to 
trust the security function (and hence allow its OPP to be continually renewed), there must be a 
demonstration of understanding for business processes. That OPP is not absolute and the 
network rarely irreversible; with a balance of risks it may be that the security action can be 
bypassed if it itself is a risk to productivity. In non-ANT terms, security is in itself only a means 
to an end (the reduction of risk and hence loss); if it generates excessive loss (cost) itself then 
clearly it becomes self-defeating. 
“Sitting in the ivory tower and throwing out diktats is something that's reduced the 
credibility of the security profession in the past, because the business doesn't run for the 
benefit of the security manager, the security manager runs for the benefit of the 
business!” 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
It may well be however that the security manager in addition to being unable to make silo-based 
decisions through lack of corporate power may be unqualified to do so for lack of impact data. 
Just as management must understand their risk in context and thus require expert security input, 
the impact of a problem can similarly only be determined by the process owner who can put the 
unavailability or corruption of a system in its organisational context. Whilst ANT may suggest 
looking for a translation of one actor’s interests into action by others, this exchange is far more 
symbiotic; both sides of the risk-reward balance are weighed by their own expert contribution.  
So much is not particularly controversial, however nonetheless the change is notable. There is 
evidence that the practitioners at least are moving towards this ideal and thus the situation is 
dynamic. 
“I think in five years' time you're going to get much more commercially savvy security 
guys because actually all the [technology] is all in place and works. I think we're in a 
sort of transitional journey to a security world which understands business problems as 
opposed to understands technology problems.” 
[FIN31E-AN72] 
In particular, one change visible from the engagement with the user community and hence 
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seeing personally the impact of security decisions in context is the increased self-awareness 
with regards to what might be termed obstructive conservatism. From the data can be seen that 
security functions developed a reputation for saying “no” to requests and hence being perceived 
as blocking, to the point of users deliberately sidestepping security decisions to avoid being 
obstructed. But far more interesting is the language of self-awareness and intent to avoid this 
mistake in the future: a clear sign of change. 
This is significant since changes towards business engagement require new sets of skills, not 
always matched by older courses taught by some of the less progressive computer science 
lecturers shaping the next generation of entrants. Rather than being selected or driven inside an 
organisation into a new area, these are often expert career technical security staff, sometimes 
with less experience of commercial practice.  
Where then for the specialist adviser? The data from many of the practitioners suggests an 
outward-facing intermediary, who represents themselves as the OPP for advice which is needed 
to safeguard the data of the business. The government view was (reluctantly) more in line with 
the position of the less reactive universities, that security still belongs in practice to the realm of 
computing, but clearly not supportive of the status quo. 
“And actually you see that today, when you talk to large organisations about their 
information risk they largely point at the CTO and the IT department and say, ‘That's 
their problem,’ and that's not the answer.” 
[GOV01E-GV01] 
It appears then that this change is happening within businesses and that there is an intrinsic lag 
between this reality of practice and the reactive mechanisms for teaching and monitoring it. 
5.6.6 Users and Culture 
It was uncontroversial that user education was of paramount importance for the modern security 
organisation, across all types of interviewee. It was particularly interesting to see strong 
agreement to this from education; one interviewee strongly believed this supported risk 
management decisions being taken from an informed standpoint. This is also seen as key for 
users who are able to cause damage through error, ignorance or misjudgement. Whilst this was 
strongly advanced, it is highly aligned with the literature and thus not useful to note further in 
itself. 
More relevant is the rationale and language used by the practitioners who are attempting to 
enrol their workforce. Again, it is perhaps a truism to say that security depends on informed 
users avoiding incidents. Most interestingly for the ANT study is that this set of interactions is 
166 
seen to be the weakest part of the network, and one of the most significant. For example, the 
juxtaposition of large amounts of data and near-instantaneous mechanisms for distributing it 
creates a risk, which has apparently proven difficult (or unpopular) to mitigate technically. 
Neither Data Loss Prevention tools nor other technical means of constraint were mentioned 
positively in terms of the risk discussion. 
“If I were to implement a really, really locked-down security policy across all these 
different systems I would probably be put into a bag and thrown into the canal!” 
[TEC11S-ID48] 
Pragmatically then, although the security officer might wish not to have technology usage 
choices in the hands of a fallible person who is able to make their own policy decisions, it is 
recognised that this is the case and thus an educated user is better than an ignorant one. But they 
must be enrolled despite fierce competition. As was noted in the literature review, the user’s 
primary concern is completing their own work to their own priorities and thus by default 
security concerns will not be paramount. This theme was seen also strongly in the data. 
“If someone's particular job is to get some code done by a particular time, that's what 
their bonus is tied to, that's what the project manager is stressing them about.” 
[FIN22E-AN43] 
In ANT terms this is classic enrolment permanently in play, due to two competing interests. 
Using the above example, superficially we can see this as project manager and security manager 
both competing to achieve that enrolment, with differing devices of interessement. The security 
manager is looking to enrol the user base, to act powerfully as scouts in the enterprise and to 
ensure adherence to security-preferred policy and practice. Seen from another angle they are the 
OPP to an implemented policy for the security manager. The security manager however must 
themselves present a case for the employee. Where the function is strong (due to successful 
enrolment of the board to obtain “teeth”), waving the threat of non-compliance sanctions is 
strong motivation even against competing offers. From the language of this sample however, in 
their experience this is often not the case and the employee has a substantial counter offer 
internally from those looking to achieve delivery of some other activity. This need not be a 
financial bonus of course, simply a more realistic prospect of sanction from another side, 
perhaps line management, reputation or career progression. This adds further data to that of the 
survey-based studies of policy compliance. 
But perhaps this dilemma for the employee can be at least partially resolved by socialised 
security. The account has not yet mentioned general corporate health and success, which are 
fundamental to the goals of all actors. An appeal can thus be made to all internals to ensure that 
they understand the reasoning and justification for the action. This moves the security manager 
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away from competition for the “employee” actor’s effort and an OPP towards a stable 
foundation for business operations. Moreover, the antagonism and competition described above 
are drawn from the orthodox concept of security being perceived as incompatible with efficient 
business practice. Actually the data showed clear alignment with light-touch security if at all 
possible. 
"If somebody has caused a security incident by bypassing a security control that actually 
impacted their productivity so heavily that the only way to get their job done was to go 
around it then that security control was poorly designed and poorly implemented and it's 
not the user's fault." 
[CHA33M-SM54] 
This then is the upshot of that negotiation around problematisation. The security manager has 
had to learn to respect the business process and the user. This “Users are not the enemy” concept 
(Adams and Sasse, 1999) is not new, however the language used in this data is mostly 
pragmatic; autocratic and distant approaches are seen as not effective. Where users must take 
risk decisions, they must understand the concept and they must understand the risk. 
“I've always believed that the first action should be to increase investment in security 
awareness programmes … because security in my view is more like a philosophy rather 
than a profession. ... I do honestly believe that security awareness is one of the most 
important things and we need to train, even cyber security professionals, on how to stop 
misinterpreting risk.” 
[EDU54E-CL11] 
How then is this training performed? One very strong theme was the requirement to put the 
information in the users’ own language. Whilst there were references to the usual aspects of 
marketing a message (a skill in its own right), the predominant theme was translating a technical 
concept and putting oneself into the mind of the user, as reviewed in section 2.2.3. 
“I think some technical people are very much capable of doing a non-technical role but I 
think the majority of IT professionals might have difficulty in explaining technical stuff 
in non-technical terms.” 
[COM73E-AN44] 
This empathy requirement appears to represent a skill fault-line in the profession; a shibboleth 
for informed modern practice. Whilst tolerance for technical ineptitude may become less 
necessary if workforces become “natively” proficient, the requirement to explain security-
specific technical concepts seems more permanent. It appears common to use personal-use 
training as a way to sell awareness information: 
“‘Let’s help you understand how to secure your computer at home and your smartphone 
and your tablet’ because that interests people more than hearing that they need to be 
careful with this month’s figures for France, or something.” 
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[TEC72E-AN91] 
One might posit that this is the use of information as a lure for enrolment, such that a person so 
trained is unwittingly mobilised into action on behalf of the security team. In a sense, the 
personal tablet can even be seen as an actant here, since it has become a passageway to modern 
social life and driven a change in user behaviour such that IT managers seem to feel powerless 
to resist functionality demands which are not essential for work processes. 
Another fascinating code was how security belonged to every role, which supported two 
concepts. One of these was entirely predictable: that it is the responsibility of all to contribute to 
the general security effort. Shorn of the security references, this data could equally apply to 
Health and Safety. It is not however frequently suggested that because of that universal 
responsibility, Health and Safety is not intrinsically a specialist undertaking. The second concept 
did suggest this for Information Security however, from surprising quarters. Perhaps the most 
striking element to emerge from the government interview was their representative’s reluctance 
to embrace security as a speciality of study. The preference here was very strongly for graduate 
(software) engineers to be trained in security (begging the question by whom if it is not a 
speciality), and thus betraying an implicit assumption that Information Security is primarily a 
question of avoiding computing platform vulnerabilities.  
“Again you see, if you've got engineering right then you don't necessarily need security 
so much. Or if you got some of those other professions right you don't need security.” 
[GOV01E-GV01] 
Placed with similar comments from within a major professional body for computer security, this 
is very significant. In themselves these are offhand comments in an interview and not 
completely thought-through statements of policy, thus it should not be over-analysed for 
content. What this shows is that whilst they may have socialised positions on many topics, 
people in influential positions in the professionalisation project of Information Security 
interviewed here have a fundamentally computer-centric viewpoint, and are themselves in a 
state of transition from one state to another. This will be explored further in the next chapter. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter presented those parts of the data which were noted strongly in the analysis, either 
due to the frequency of coding of that concept or due to an analytical memo created during the 
various stages of the transcription and coding process. These have been used to suggest 
fragments of the overall Actor–Network at play, and in particular where that network is 
incomplete, in flux or under tension.  
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This study’s research questions concern the origin, current status and future prospects of the 
Information Security profession. Addressing the first of these, Section 5.3 outlined the 
emergence of Information Security roles over the past few decades, noting the profession’s 
relatively fast rise and a range of events and factors which the interviewees felt were 
contributory to this. By describing the contemporary network, it was possible to show that 
changes to the regulatory and technical environment created a specialised area of knowledge 
and practice, and hence the possibility of a intermediary role between management and IT. How 
that position has developed into a variety of modern specialities was addressed in section 5.4; in 
the following chapter this will be developed further to examine roles in the profession in detail 
to address in particular the second question of current status. Section 5.6 also contributed 
heavily to answering this question, firstly by drawing out the relationships between technical 
and human factors in modern practice as seen in the data, and secondly by describing how 
current practitioners are viewed and ranked amongst workers in their employing institutions.  
Answering the third question of future prospects depends heavily on the issue of training and 
qualification. In section 5.4, views on certification were discussed, showing the early 
requirements for a practice-based qualification to act as a guide for recruiters when personal 
recommendation became impractical. Whilst voluntary professional certification was not 
unwelcome, the primacy of experience was stressed over qualification. Within the sphere of 
qualifications themselves, university- and practice-based qualifications were compared, noting 
no sense of competition. The following chapter will show how, by contrasting the current model 
of entry, training, education and qualification with that of more established professions, we can 
predict a shift in future patterns. Similarly in Section 5.5, by comparing the attitudes of 
practitioners and government to licensing differences were seen between traditional models of 
professionalisation and that being followed by the present profession, alongside how the very 
concept of profession was regarded by the interviewees. How these themes interrelate will be 
examined shortly. 
In the following chapter the major themes which arose from this data are drawn together for 
further discussion and developed to form individual conclusions. Each touches on aspects from 
all of the strands of enquiry established from the literature review, therefore in the final chapter 
these conclusions are finally juxtaposed with the individual research questions to bring the work 
to a close. 
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Chapter 6: Secondary Analysis 
In Chapter 5, founder members of Information Security describe working in a new but 
diffusely-bounded area of knowledge bordering several established fields. The causes suggested 
as contributory to its creation–both technical and social–were several, pointing to an 
assemblage, or momentary confluence of factors. These early workers described admission and 
advancement as by peer recognition, however growth forced this to give way to scalable and 
objective testing. Testing required the establishment of certification [professional] bodies to 
provide a rudimentary independent guarantee of competence to assure HR departments and 
managers, alongside giving the holder much-needed confidence. 
For this purpose, they were seen to be effective enough. The profession however should then 
have entered a long period of consolidation, according to theory, where specialities were 
established and qualification routes created. Over time, these should have experienced 
Abbottonian competition for jurisdiction over discrete areas of new knowledge; ideally, a 
hierarchy of fixed roles would have emerged, perhaps similar to that of medicine and law. 
Ultimately, the unified profession would have approached a sceptical state for permission to 
regulate itself and control entry. 
The data shows that this has not happened. The same network which created the conditions for 
the profession’s creation has developed so quickly that its development cannot occur quickly 
enough naturally, requiring catalysis. The certification bodies are still trying to gain legitimacy 
and perfect their credentials within the model shown in Figs. 16 and 17, which requires a 
“graduate profession” status that was not supported in this data. Government, suddenly aware of 
a grave threat and forced to take up this unrequested role by default, is therefore raising the 
status of an occupation which it feels is losing out to more established professions. Professional 
status however was not found to be a priority for those who are already in employment and wish 
not to be displaced from it, certainly not by something originating from a government whom 
they do not trust. Meanwhile within industry, practitioners report still having continually to re-
win resources and authority which might challenge operational efficiency, and thus have had to 
become operations- and human-centric risk managers. 
Expanding on these findings from the initial analysis, this chapter goes on to describe the 
development and current state of the network in more detail, presented within the major 
overarching themes which emerged during the execution of the analysis and based on 
observations and annotations made throughout the study. For each theme the principal 
arguments arising from the analysis are advanced, leading to their conclusions. Throughout 
these will be related back to the topics of the project’s three research questions: origin, current 
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status and future prospects. 
Section 6.1 principally concerns the first question, describing the origins of the profession as 
identified in this data. Thereafter the chapter turns to the questions of current status and future 
prospects. It is considered whether the network surrounding Information Security practice has 
reached the point of irreversible translation (all actors have defined roles which they accept, 
have been enrolled and mobilised into action) or whether barriers to this state remain. In section 
6.2 the “Information Security professional” actant itself is examined to establish whether it is 
well-defined and stable with recognisable roles. In section 6.3 the process by which 
practitioners are educated and trained is discussed, to further observe the homogeneity of the 
occupation’s professional identity amongst entrants and those who teach them. In 6.4 this new 
candidate is compared with idealised concepts of profession, the current workforce’s degree of 
intent in its movement towards professional status is discussed, and the topic of licensing is 
considered. Finally, in section 6.5 the chapter is summarised. 
6.1 The State and Stability of the Current Network 
As stated above, the first research question concerns the origins of the Information Security 
profession. If it is a profession then it is a new profession; to explain its current position requires 
the analyst not simply to identify this new actor but to describe its task and genesis. The more 
established interviewees of all types have observed the emergence of security within their own 
careers. Management was eventually convinced that there was a threat (during 
problematisation), but maintained its existing links with the IT department which had 
established itself as the OPP for computing matters. 
This network surrounding IT and audit in the workplace was affected by the new actor, whose 
emergence created tension around those established relationships. The literature notes that 
increasing technology complexity creates more opportunities to perform services and hence 
interest others in those services. Security however was different, in that the new actors faced 
particular challenges to achieving network change. Whilst expanding technology capability 
created further specialist IT roles to be added to the existing environment (without threatening 
it), Information Security had contrary priorities to the existing settled players and thus, initially, 
to those of their potential clients. 
Where previously technologists had offered themselves as OPP for computing functionality and 
performance, security pushed for constraint, cost and control, to resist malign actors whose 
presence was only initially felt by the technologists. The new actor had to both prove first that 
their services were useful and desirable (to people hungry for performance and largely unaware 
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of threats) as well as the usual demonstration of competence, in order to establish themselves as 
OPP for that service. Since enterprise policies require changes to behaviour they required 
sufficient powerful buy-in to resist heavily-entrenched and established network links which 
were being continually re-made in the course of daily business. It is not surprising therefore that 
it required a number of events in order to make the prize worth the cost required by its OPP, the 
Information Security professional, at least outside the military. 
To see the rise of the occupation as a successful campaign by the new internal actors is to 
overplay intentionality. The real force here came from both technological change and human 
actors which inhabited the threat landscape. Technology forced choice, mobility and 
responsibility into the hands of the human user, in turn forcing human behaviour and culture 
into the realm of securing computer data. Therefore this should not be described purely as a new 
profession in the Abbott sense, since a criticism of Abbott is that he presents no mechanism for 
concerted action of an as-yet unorganised set of people (Macdonald, 2005). To see the new 
space emerge for IS practice is to see the continuous fracture and development of a network 
over several decades. The new profession might have had intent, but its success is also a 
response to those actors whose interests were catalysed by technical change. 
Looking to that campaign to enter the network, a starting point for the study must be chosen. 
Security itself has deep roots but wartime encryption is the most prominent recent cited example 
of technical progress enabling the protection of or attack on encoded information. One of the 
more experienced interviewees listed it as a foundational topic in the new arena of computing 
security.  
Yet early networks which included security were not stable. The literature notes that several 
stages of maturity were required to move from technical reaction through to structured 
governance and systematic proactivity. The early spokesmen for the network security 
technicians who presented their trade as OPP for a secure state failed, partially because they 
asymmetrically addressed the threats from the machine and its human operator, underplaying 
the latter. But when the first major viruses easily outgunned the technical solutions ranged 
against them, it was the complicity of the untrained internal user which facilitated the realisation 
of the threat. Thus whilst considerable ground had been made bringing security forward as a 
topic, the occupation with purely technical computing spokesmen could not become stable 
whilst the human and governance aspects were excluded, as they could not genuinely deliver 
what their management required. A new class of worker – a new actor in its own right, able to 
understand the technical context but also able to embrace social, legal and behavioural aspects – 
was required to allow the network to accept a new OPP. 
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Why then was there a delay to the creation of a stable network? The caricature above makes two 
errors: firstly assuming a highly simplistic binary world of “secure” and “not secure” and 
secondly to assume that business managers can distinguish between these accurately. The 
successful translation of the new actor’s offer into an established OPP is a more nuanced 
combination of developments. Several interviewees recall early commercial Information 
Security as almost non-existent, with little progress in some places until surprisingly recently. 
As the topic grew in prominence, associations based on mutual interest eventually formed, with 
recruitment into the few early roles reported to be primarily by personal recommendation.  
The range of events to which expansion in security focus was ascribed (amongst them the 
expansion of the Internet in the early 1990s, key mail-borne viruses from later in that decade, 
data protection legislation, standards, the development of online commerce and others) was 
sufficiently wide to suggest that in fact no single technical development was completely 
instrumental. It seems more likely that with each development such as each of these, the 
pressure to secure the computing environment increased gradually and the cost of effectively 
acting maliciously decreased. There was a range of threat vectors, from which a subset might 
affect the network in a particular context and industry, albeit with many areas of commonality. 
In response to one of the research questions then, the motivation behind the expansion in 
security awareness was seen not to be linked to one single actor in this data. 
One interesting mode of action reported was the initiative taken by those first specialists. In 
some instances the security department (or educational course) was founded by those initial 
acolytes who agitated for change in their local environments, possibly with the “reward” of 
being asked to undertake the role thereby created. The developing IT-based actor began to 
experience internal tensions and break down into constituent components of security pathfinder 
and traditional technician. 
Prior to these malicious new threat vectors the early network around Information Security was 
apparently small. There were few external actors to prompt a reaction inside the corporate 
world, no real mechanisms to propagate external threat into internal action, and even relatively 
little work undertaken in academia. The network was in a state of limited problematisation, with 
few people looking for action and few actors starting to offer a passageway to that action. The 
existence of other professions as a mimetic template, later to be highly relevant, had no 
contemporary effect. Yet the growth of those external actors was sufficient to cause at least 
modest recruitment of interested specialists (interviewees describe this). Two professional 
association interviewees noted that this expansion caused a problem for those recruiting (in one 
case for education, in the other for employment): a test was needed of competence since existing 
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methods were not scalable. This change of mode would have acted to force change on the 
network and hence the nature of the profession. It is this change which has the most significant 
potential for development. 
With advancement no longer in the gift of an individual (with all the social interactions implied 
in securing the good offices of another), the route for entry to the profession would surely have 
changed around the new “certificate” device and allowed a wider set of people to gain entry or 
recommendation. Recruitment for advertised roles was no longer limited to those around the 
personal web of people looking to drive and develop the topic through association; scope 
existed for people who wished purely to practise without close links to the association of 
“fathers”. An actor had stepped in as spokesman for the profession and issued a device of 
interessement. The fact that multiple claims were made with differing approaches however 
shows that none was the clear OPP to a settled single profession at that point. 
Armed with a certificate device, the “professional” actor now derived claims to status and 
competence not purely from experience and good standing but through objective testing. They 
possessed competence certification in a specialist field issued by an authority body and started 
therefore to look like a profession – which theory states is significant for acceptance as one – 
bringing the structure of other professions into consideration. But this also created the potential 
for tension between those in the industry with the certification and those without, particularly 
where there was a difference in experience, and hence weakening of the incomplete foundations 
of each spokesman. 
It appears however that the network instability which supported a new discrete profession was 
most prominent in business. Whilst professional organisations and practitioners are alive to the 
modern business context for security, the pace of change has created a problem for those 
responsible for training the new entrants in the universities. Rapid advancement complicates the 
filtering of transient fashions and concerns into new discipline-specific knowledge, a concept 
which only started when vocational university-based training was developed during the 
professionalisation of Victorian engineering and which was rejected by the older professions as 
too narrow (Andrews, 2016). 
Without a source of deeper, conceptual learning, there is no basis for a graduate profession; 
academic institutions teach timeless concepts not train current techniques. Neither though does a 
profession defending against constant technical attack require theorists with no practical skill. 
Medicine solves this with intercalated clinical coaching and anatomical learning; law, with post-
graduate professional pupillage. Government by contrast needs an immediate army of ready-
made security staff.  Having established then the origins of this profession and thus addressed 
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the first of the research questions, the rest of the chapter moves on to discuss how that 
profession is currently faring and how it may develop in future.  
Starting with its current status, the occupation has moved through a long period of constant 
change, which has defied the attempts of any one party irreversibly to establish a firm network 
around its efforts. It is then in a state of flux, constantly looking to establish a new network 
containing one or more well-defined OPPs for aspects of its product (security), whether that be 
the genuine protection of information or simply compliance with some external compulsion. 
It exists in an environment which is not so much artificial as expanding at a challenging speed. 
The sheer pace of technological change and the increasing threat of sophisticated criminal and 
state players has altered its arena and identity far more quickly than most threats to human 
health or wealth evolved. Methods of recruitment have thus been transformed from non-existent 
through mutual personal recognition by peers to large-scale testing within a generation.  
“Security is such a fast-moving feast, I don't think there's anyone that knows everything 
there is to know about security” 
[EDU45E-CL31] 
Given the growth of specialist degrees, today’s entrants are becoming vocational apprentices, no 
longer accidental converts. This workforce increasingly enters directly after theoretical 
preparation, rather than transferring from an IT or auditing career. At the very least they are 
entering a more mature field. As ANT insists on viewing networks not as fixed relationships but 
as bonds made durable by being reaffirmed constantly; such large changes in the character of 
that actor’s constituents must surely challenge the reproducibility of links which were formerly 
made by others with different intentions and backgrounds. 
What changes will result from this? Those who chose a vocational career are possibly more 
likely to associate with their kind more strongly than those currently in post who entered in mid-
career. This is of course only a generalisation; famously converts in many fields often exhibit 
greater zeal. However it seems reasonable that those choosing directly to enter a discrete 
profession actively recognised and promoted by government would be more aligned to its 
identity than those who have lived in a hybrid and confused, unrecognised state, particularly 
given that their initial training and identity formation now occurs first and independent of any 
future employer. 
There must also be a world-narrowing effect from losing the “tour of duty” outside the protected 
sphere of the security team. It seems likely that a security professional who has never been 
controlled by a security team or undertaken business operations processes might lose some 
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degree of empathy with later clients. Success for a security department requires the acquisition 
of power, to have policies obeyed even in the face of operational impact. This is evident from 
the plaintive tone of practitioners unable to compete with the demands of business process 
economy; but notable also is the empathy shown at the same time towards their internal clients. 
Many interviewees understood themselves to be part of a team whose overall goal was for the 
company to succeed, which fails if security takes a parochial or dictatorial approach to its work. 
Where was this learned? There must have been importation of these experiences by those who 
entered from outside, even though their main provenance was IT rather than business 
operations; as a principal tension observed in the data was between security manager and 
technician, this is probably a powerful tool for empathetic training. It seems highly likely 
therefore that a vocational direct-entry profession with increased status and power will find it 
harder to ensure continuity of that business-centred approach, and hence their ability to enrol 
senior management irreversibly is damaged unless this is included in their training. 
Conclusions relating to current status: 
 It was reported (reinforcing earlier findings in the literature) that practitioners have real 
influence at management level only during crises and that resources must otherwise be 
continually re-won, but it was seen here that perpetually referencing problems to gain 
resources was ineffective due to “crisis fatigue”. This suggests that the network has not 
yet achieved a state of complete translation and that other, more powerful actors are still 
competing for the attention of management. 
 Professional status in its own right did not emerge as a powerful motivator for the 
existing professionals. For many the topic was novel and responses hesitant and 
exploratory, in contrast to other areas where answers were more confident and 
considered. Current workplace status was seen to be derived from personal reputation 
rather than simply derived from membership of a chartered profession. In principle the 
government actor by encouraging professional status to aid recruitment, may be 
attempting to position the profession as an OPP to a state which is not actively sought 
and hence its attempts to alter the network to its requirements may be unsuccessful.  
Conclusions relating to future prospects: 
 Conversely as the next generation will choose to enter this occupation against 
competing opportunities its status could be a relevant factor. It was felt however that 
Information Security was not yet well-established as a discrete occupation outside its 
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immediate interface occupations thus this might be of limited effect for school-leavers 
who have not already been attracted by personal interest and hence already enrolled. 
 The network has undergone and is undergoing constant change which has prevented any 
one form of Information Security professional actor establishing itself in a durable form 
and hence the network from becoming irreversible. Those currently practising were 
recruited, socialised, educated and trained differently from those entering today and 
hence any network translation which forms around their interests is unlikely to remain 
completely stable when they are replaced by successors with differing interests and 
experiences. 
 Whilst many were wary of comparison to professions which deal with the vital interests 
of the client, Information Security was felt to have sufficient depth of knowledge and 
gravitas to become a recognised profession at some future point. The lack of maturity of 
the profession was strongly cited as a blocker to immediate progress towards acceptance 
however the occupation was felt to be moving in that direction and this was not 
unwelcome. 
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6.2 Roles Within the Profession 
When considering the current status of the profession, a key topic is how distinct and well-
defined it has become. Unifying the domain was a concern for the IISP (Lacey, 2006) right from 
its formation. This data shows that the existence of a separate profession with its own identity 
and body of knowledge is not at all universally accepted, although the controversy is along 
unexpected lines. From the literature it was seen that Information Security has emerged in large 
part from IT Security; failure to dissociate itself from here as “parent” to some degree would be 
predictable. Similarly there is some confusion between jobs, titles and ranks despite the 
emergence of role frameworks. 
Rather less expected was the suggestion that security was not the preserve of specialists but 
rather was a common property of all areas of practice. According to this line of thought, if 
programmers, technologists and others considered properly how systems might be abused then 
there would be no need for a specialism. 
“Security in my view is more like a philosophy rather than a profession.” 
[EDU54-CL11] 
In itself, this is highly unconvincing. Whilst it is possibly true that at a micro-level good security 
practice minimises vulnerabilities, this does not preclude the study of secure practice itself as a 
meta-activity. This appears to be a corruption of the adage that security requires everyone’s 
vigilance, which is a valid fundamental. A comparison may perhaps be made between “security 
is part of every role” and “mathematics underpins every physical science”, and the consequent 
absurdity of thus deducing the non-existence of pure mathematics. Similarly compliance with 
law or Health and Safety policies is part of every person’s responsibility but these fields 
continue to have specialists. In any case, the problematisation in a professionalisation campaign 
is aimed at providing a passage point to specialist expertise, not exclusive access to all aspects 
of everything touched by the expert domain. 
Whether that position is accepted here however is irrelevant, since it exists as a concept in the 
data. It undermines the position of Information Security as a graduate profession since security 
concepts are seen to be needed prior to undergraduate level as general life skills. But surely 
there is a difference between the study of the subject and learning the fruits of it, such as 
learning healthy eating as a teenager well before going on to learn physiology as a medical 
student. This way of thinking appears to reduce security to a software engineering quality 
concern rather than something with its own conceptual learning. 
The previous chapter positioned security at the nexus of a web of other actors, particularly in its 
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business context as OPP to security and compliance for management, whilst its earlier 
incarnation mainly mitigated technical attacks on computing infrastructure. The advent of 
remote terminal access erected a convenient professional divide between securing a place and 
securing a system inside it, attacking the settled network surrounding physical security and 
supporting a new class of actor. Experts in this technical exercise do not seem to have been 
exposed directly to senior management, being (however specialised) a member of a technology 
team. An important niche was created where they could become the passage point for their 
technical management to comply with the demand for an untroubled IT environment and no 
consequent reputational damage or regulatory action. 
Overwhelming lip-service at the very least was paid to the concept of socially-informed security 
practice, and much of it was apparently heart-felt. This concept is clearly becoming an accepted 
part of the shared culture and values of the lived occupation. Security governance was felt to be 
more naturally at home in the rarefied air of senior management, lobbying for delegated power 
to impose policies and ultimately sanctions in return for safety and compliance. Some 
requirement for soft skills is substantive (it comes from the requirement to present and agree 
policy) and some from pure organisational operation; all departments need resources and need 
their leaders to be capable politicians in front of the board. 
But to present governance as having left its technical roots with IT Security as only one facet of 
its portfolio is dramatically to overstate the situation. This is particularly true where the apparent 
level of risk does not justify a dedicated department and high-profile charismatic CISO. This is 
for two reasons: firstly because boards reportedly still see security as something to be “done” 
somewhere else and only take notice when things go awry, and secondly because the technical 
roles are clearly still fundamental and vital.  
It is not an essential challenge to professionalism nor to the aspiring security actor for boards to 
see security as an important issue which must be delegated; indeed this creates the claim for a 
profession. The Actor–Network requires a security specialist and a buffer role between the 
political realm and the purely technical realm, the buffer being a potential avenue for the 
security manager and hence a discrete professional identity.  
It does not appear however that there has been a successful campaign yet to establish that 
profession with the same gravitas as one of the other advisory professions represented either 
directly or by executive proxy around the board table, i.e. who are present when the bonds of 
association are re-made by the most powerful actors in an enterprise. The accountants (OPP to 
legal and effective financial advice) will be represented by a Finance Director. The lawyers 
(OPP to protection from the vagaries of legislation and lawsuit) are represented by a Legal 
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Director, General Counsel or someone whose word carries equivalent gravitas because of the 
importance of their advice. This sample felt that security had not established anything like this 
degree of influence in the network, outside the immediate drama of an incident or urgent new 
area of compliance, and hence the “professional” status is clearly not fully established. Security 
is a task to be “done” by someone, managed only by exception and probably represented by IT– 
a servant to the business, not a master. By contrast, its opposing voices in terms of operational 
freedom and lack of restraint will be represented by mainline senior management. 
The lawyer and accountant however have well-defined and well-established identities 
referenceable within the network. They are known (inscribed into the network in a way which is 
not ever doubted or checked) to be positions for which considerable study and qualification is 
required. There might be an internal hierarchy and internal sub-division between specialties 
(which is presented as ensuring that the professional skill is at the elite level claimed), however 
each presents expert advice to be ignored at significant peril.  
There has been significant movement towards establishing a similar scheme within information 
assurance, where SFIA-defined roles
7
 have been linked to government-backed CESG (now 
NCSC) Cyber Security Professional certifications and training (CESG, 2015; GCHQ, 2016), 
which in theory would allow the actor to reference the authority of state recognition. The feeling 
from the interviewees however was that not only was this scheme not well known, but the 
concept of a security specialist in itself was unknown outside IT. However these newly defined 
roles inter-relate or rank in terms of skill even if they were well established, the existence of the 
entire occupation was felt to be unrecognised. 
Beyond this, the roles laid out by the SFIA do not show an easy mapping to the roles of many of 
the various security managers and practitioners interviewed. It is not clear how they inter-relate 
with each other hierarchically outside huge government/Enterprise organisations which can 
employ all the roles. Moreover, these roles describe a reporting structure within a company but 
do not define the hierarchy of the professions themselves if there is no technical supervision of 
one by another. A theatre team may be led by a surgeon but the anaesthetist remains a member 
of a peer profession to the functional team leader whereas the nurse’s profession is subordinate. 
The data collected speaks more of a security function responsible for creating policy and those 
elsewhere responsible for technically executing it, with the degree of distinction affected by 
factors such as size, industry and organisational maturity. Security managers establish 
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themselves as the OPP for a secure state but know they cannot personally deliver it; they rely for 
this on the prowess of the longer-established but possibly less management-facing technical 
specialists (who may identify with one of the other SFIA roles). In turn this is probably a happy 
state, since the security manager can also pose as the gateway to those specialists for accessing 
resources without interacting with business politics. 
Looking towards the question of future prospects, for this network to become stable these actors 
must surely need to become less diffuse and establish themselves clearly and distinctly in an 
Abbottonian manner. Can a public (for which read adjacent actors which need to be enrolled) 
really interact with seven or more flavours of a profession they don’t even recognise? In turn, 
does each person in the industry today associate with exactly one of those labels and accept their 
position in a skill hierarchy based on them? Is there a network established in a security team 
based on actors claiming these roles and their associated badges? Management need someone to 
whom security can be delegated, someone who in turn must force them to pay more reliable 
attention in good times as well as bad.  
Completely technical staff require intermediaries as managers, and as they do not universally 
aspire to management positions or work in non-technical aspects of security these intermediaries 
are not necessarily of their own kind. Governance-centric security managers with business and 
social skills able to bridge this gap have begun to emerge and insert themselves into that web by 
acting as diplomats to each side, however they must displace someone’s position in the 
established corporate network. But the linkages from technician to IT Operations to IT Director 
to Board are reasonably strong. This new network has the potential to become fixed and stable, 
however this newcomer intermediary–manager actor has not completely translated their will 
into a settled hierarchy of professions, merely of business roles. Their own identity, both of 
itself and how it relates to IT management and staff, is not yet accepted and defined. 
Conclusions relating to current status: 
 A credible and substantial framework exists to codify a list of roles in very large 
organisations linked to a reasonably distinct body of knowledge. Despite this, there 
remain few well-accepted and understood named roles for Information Security 
workers, particularly outside this scale of organisation, which reflect specialisms within 
those bodies of knowledge, nor workers whose tasks routinely embrace all of them. 
This prevents the quick formation of a network of peers, clients and staff within an 
organisation with established roles based on the claims of professional qualification and 
role definition which are associated with more established professions. Instead it is 
182 
more likely that networks must be formed in each enterprise context around the 
individual’s own ability to interest and enrol their own contacts based on personal 
attributes and skills, whilst peers in other occupations can make use of an extended 
network of negotiated and more established relationships by presenting their 
professional status devices as a primary source of workplace identity and claim to 
expertise. 
 As such, whilst expansion of security knowledge has allowed a new species of 
professional-type actor to appear which is distinct at least in the workplace from the 
Information Technologists, it is not clear how that profession is structured internally 
with regards to hierarchy and form of any sub-categories of professional. Again, when 
relationships between workers are formed within a particular environment, that network 
cannot import easily the templates and identities formed by skills frameworks, leaving 
the individual actor not simply to establish themselves as OPP for a known brand of 
service on the basis of known standards but instead to do so unaided.  
 The principal fault-line for divisions in the data was seen to be the social–technical axis, 
with uncertain relationships between those who sought to be the OPP to competent 
technical administration and those whose interface was directly with management. The 
data suggests distinction between technical workers and security management workers 
which went beyond normal hierarchical control within teams. Instead it was felt that 
these were distinct skill sets and that the technical group, whilst equally important and 
competent, did not aspire to progress to the management group nor saw it as superior. A 
new network where a security manager actor is an OPP to controlled technical skills to 
management – and resources and a shield from management to technicians – is possible. 
Conclusions relating to future prospects: 
 It seems likely that rationalisation to a small number of discrete roles with an accepted 
set of inter-relationships and potentially codified discrete specialities will be needed 
prior to further professionalisation. At present the network is merely problematising and 
cannot move on to forming durable links between the actors thus identified based on 
their various interests. Until the actors can successfully reference and import more 
recognised and durable identities from a network of larger and more powerful 
“regulator” bodies their ability to enrol others will be compromised. Either all roles are 
peers within Information Security and regulated together, or the security officer 
profession is superior to the others as medicine is to the medical para-professions. 
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 The practitioners felt on balance that as an OPP to secure practice, which might clash 
with those seeking to be OPP to technical performance and agility, security governance 
should form hierarchical relationships directly with senior management outside the IT 
hierarchy. Furthermore the practice of IT Security was felt to be only a subset of 
Information Security and hence those actors only able to offer technical competence 
should take a different place behind security management in the network. This does 
however require the development of strong business skills and sufficient vision to see 
security in the context of an effective organisation which is not unreasonably hampered 
by overly-restrictive rules, otherwise they cease being an OPP to a desirable state and 
their bonds will be too easily attacked by others appearing to offer lower cost. This will 
further create incentives to split the profession into a technical enforcement layer and a 
less technical business-interface or management layer with differing emphases in 
competences. 
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6.3 Preparation for Practice 
Implicit in the settlement of roles described above will be addressing the crucial question of 
vocational formation and preparation. The UK Government gave its responsibility to address the 
security skills shortage in the country as a motivating factor for backing a Skills Framework. 
Without well-defined roles with set specialist training, it is difficult both to express and to 
deliver the correct preparation to new recruits and to ensure the correct mix of skills is taught. 
Whilst individuals might be able to function as actors within a network in a work context, at a 
national level governments cannot form relationships with thousands of workers and can only 
interact effectively with spokesmen for an enrolled workforce of identifiable role-holders. 
Whilst a detailed review of cybersecurity education is not in scope, vocational preparation is of 
particular relevance to a study of professionalisation. Aside from the importance placed upon 
graduate formation in the professionalisation literature, it is a key source of network 
reversibility. As mentioned, those in senior positions in both industry and academia (such as 
were interviewed here) had little opportunity to develop a security-based vocation prior to entry. 
Any such vocation would likely have been expressed via a career first in computing, via its 
established academic or non-academic routes. 
It is significant that few interviewees considered security practice to be unequivocally a 
graduate role; to contrast this with law lecturers, the legal regulators and practising solicitors, 
would show a far more powerful and harmonised statement of the essential nature of graduate 
pre-qualification. Is this then a failure to professionalise, or a failure of the orthodox concept of 
professionalism in a modern profession? In reality it is a reflection of failure to define. With 
actors forced to adopt individually-negotiated roles in workplace interaction, there is an 
unordered spectrum of potential roles possible and routes to competence therein. 
The previous chapter showed that universities exist in a market for entrants (quality of entrant 
matched ceteris paribus to prestige of institution), delivering employability in exchange for 
fees. The university aims to be a passage point to an academic degree and must enrol the best 
students it can recruit. This comes at a cost to the student, and when graduate status is not 
mandatory, passage through university cannot be obligatory. This said, where there is evidence 
that graduate status will be highly useful in later career then much traction can be gained during 
interessement; the degree certificate is still a highly prized product in the market.  
The regulation of degrees by government to improve the pipeline of workers suggests that it 
expects – despite saying in interview that graduate status is not necessary – to hire extensively 
in the graduate employment market. Information Security supports extensive conceptual 
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learning, as evidenced by its validated undergraduate programmes; why then a reluctance to 
specify graduation as a criterion for entry? 
It seems that this flows from lack of structure. If one were to ask whether all NHS workers 
required graduate training, the answer would surely be negative. Medicine having devolved 
patient care to subordinate roles, it is possible to establish that, for example, auxiliary nursing 
does not require graduate preparation, that registered nursing does to bachelor level and 
physician to doctoral level. By establishing these lines and their inter-relationship, the nursing 
authorities as spokesman can exert control over their own training. By controlling access to 
registration they become OPP to the university, and thus student, for attracting professional 
status and right to practise. Such a codification was seen to be missing in this regard for 
establishing the boundaries of the graduate, professional security practitioner and its supporting 
workers. 
Predictably, universities certainly appeared to regard security careers as almost necessarily 
proceeding from graduate study, whereas neither government nor the practitioners were as 
convinced. This may further undermine the unity of the security professional role; government, 
currently supporting doctoral research at a number of centres, nonetheless saw security as 
having too many constituent roles and too many levels of practice to be an exclusively graduate 
profession. Its support for inclusion of graduate and postgraduate roles in that spectrum however 
is very clear as it acknowledged the positives of study first at master's level and now at 
bachelor’s. 
To ensure that the profession’s common knowledge remains relevant and captured, a feedback 
mechanism is required between practice and teaching syllabus, and indeed these are being tried. 
In one case, an interviewee was both academic lecturer and practising consultant, a model very 
familiar to the medical profession with its eminent researcher–practitioners. In one institution, 
external speakers were routinely invited to lecture; in another, employers were consulted as to 
which skills would be most useful to teach. In terms of addressing the study’s title question 
therefore, there is a vocational degree system being built with a socialisation process – feedback 
from practitioners to those in formation is underway. 
Furthermore, educators were confident that their courses were suitable and sufficient to place 
their graduates into an entry-level job; moreover it appeared that training for directly-relevant 
employment was the aim of the course. In other words, the universities feel sufficiently 
confident in the worth of their device to offer it as a passageway to not just graduate status but 
employability. The students have been enrolled (in both ANT and university senses), satisfied 
that they will be able to gain both skills and sufficient certification to start work. 
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An accusation of interest may be levelled at the universities (it is trivial to suggest that they 
have financial and other biases towards a graduate profession), however they do not have the 
monopoly on it. A practitioner network led by those without vocational degrees would 
disqualify themselves by agreeing to a graduate test! This is the effect in the network of the flux 
noted above: there might be network resistance from the “vanguarders” to such a minimum 
level of qualification which does not support their personal claim to competence. Any effect 
which arises is likely to be unstable, since the “practitioner” black-boxed actor is again 
unpacked, with the graduate internal stratum replacing their predecessors in senior posts. Given 
the expansion in the industry driven by government action to introduce academic quality 
standards, the network surrounding the symbols of qualification can be expected to be re-made 
on different lines as the occupation’s route to practice alters. 
Courses available are run mainly by specialist security groups within university computer 
science departments, with a relatively strong emphasis on technical aspects compared to statute, 
auditing, culture, standards compliance or similar concerns. This suggests that Information 
Security has not seen within academia sufficient distinction or separation from security aspects 
of computing science to cause it to break away completely, although the groups may of course 
operate with sufficient independence for their own purposes. Whilst not at all precluding the 
teaching of non-technical matters (this was indeed observed as a minor component), course 
roots can be seen as based in technical concerns.  
“[I]t's my mission to get computer science students and pour in security so it becomes a 
natural part of their research, their development, whatever they're actually doing.” 
[EDU24E-CL05] 
Similarly the government interviewee (himself an engineer by training) placed significant 
emphasis on security being mostly an engineering challenge for computing. Given that 
emphasis and that of the universities, it is therefore possible to speculate that there is some small 
disconnect or lag in the network, relative to the hypothetical ideal model for profession-
building. The species of “security professional” conceptualised by the academic and 
governmental input here differs in substance from the less technically-dominant model 
exhibited by the practitioners and recent theory. This preparation is also at odds with the split of 
technician–specialist and manager–generalist needed to buffer the enforcement of policy away 
from the negotiation with senior management for its content. Where is the security officer 
trained if they are substantively different to the forensics and analyst specialities rather than 
simply promoted from them? 
This disconnect may be explained from the academic side by history, but also perhaps by 
perception of the threat. Government is aware of significantly enhanced risk to itself (directly 
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and through loss of business tax revenue) from persistent sophisticated organised crime and 
state actor attack, against whom prodigious technical skill and analytic capability is required. It 
is therefore driving security partially as a response to that threat; even the “cyber” label of the 
CESG/NCSC qualifications standards carries overtones of Internet-based technical vectors. It 
has the power and intent to be a force for development of security but is not directly motivated 
to develop the profession beyond generating capability and capacity nationally. Pragmatically it 
needs security simply to have sufficient status not to deter STEM-oriented candidates from 
entering more established pathways and is not interested in delivering professional power and 
privilege, for example, or pay unless this was a factor in poor recruitment. 
In an Abbottonian sense, there was evidence of this being an “opening up” of the knowledge 
base. The entry-level grade of the profession for which students appear to be being trained 
differs in emphasis from the one being practised in the field, however the education system is 
strongly motivated to train to the needs of employers since without marketability of graduates it 
cannot easily enrol students as an OPP to employment. The vanguard of generalist security 
managers, preside over growing security departments, now require analysts with greater 
specialisation both than they possess and needed themselves– note the number of technical roles 
in the proposed frameworks. Whatever tomorrow’s senior professionals will look like, therefore, 
the network will need to accommodate yet more change to the “practitioner” actor, and 
networks built upon its interests will again shift. 
In terms of future developments, the question for the industry then is not whether to coalesce 
around the set roles created by the skills frameworks (potentially adding more) but whether first 
they represent specialties of the same profession, which appears to be in some doubt from this 
data. In the same way that medicine, law and other professions organise common teaching 
followed by specialisation, should forensics techniques and Information Security Management 
Systems be taught to all entrants? Should firewall specialists and policy creators begin as 
professional stem cells? It is not necessarily required that they use all the skills offered (there 
are elements to all professional training schemes which ultimately are not used) however the 
device used to interest an employer makes use of gravitas arising from that wide and deep 
education. 
Variations in syllabus will occur unless controlled centrally. In the absence of a General 
Council-equivalent, the government has introduced a degree validation scheme which, whilst 
voluntary, will surely cause action within the marketplace. As has been seen with credentials, 
HR departments welcome easy mechanisms of selection; it must follow that graduates of “kite-
marked” courses will ensure their badge is prominent when competing for employment. 
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Similarly those seeking the best education and most prized badge will naturally value those 
which are able to offer the quality mark. 
As government is reacting to external stimulus rather than simply being capricious, this suggests 
that it might be reasonable to bias the workforce output of academia towards that stimulus. It is 
interesting however that this action had effect first on master’s degrees, which at least one 
university reported being more popular with mature students in mid-career, looking to validate 
and develop that career rather than serve as its foundation for entry. Bachelor’s programmes 
have gained in popularity and will now too be kite-marked, however one academic positioned 
the master’s degree as more useful once the candidate had amassed more experience. Not all 
actors seeking a degree device then have the same motivation and thus will seek OPPs to 
differing states depending on their status and needs, thus government intervention may well 
have different effects in each market. 
The government is acting in a space where tradition would expect a degree of self-regulation by 
the profession once a professional governing body had established itself. None of the educators 
noted action by professional bodies in the development of their courses however; it is possible 
that in this case change is so rapid in the industry that normal mechanisms cannot react 
requiring catalysis by those already in positions of power. 
It is useful to maintain a distinction between human-centred Information Security which is part 
of the knowledge base, and “soft” inter-personal skills which are generally-applicable social and 
political tools in the workplace. As one interviewee mentioned, few people leave university as 
fully formed business professionals; much is learned by trial and error in early career. The 
literature however places emphasis on the substantial and theoretical business process- and 
culture-centred contexts to security practice, which can be lectured and examined (but may be 
harder than pure theory to appreciate outside a business context). As mentioned, previous 
entrants had received some exposure here having passed into the practice from outside, but this 
will need to be learned by direct-entry vocational graduates. Aspects such as culture, 
compliance, risk management and awareness appear to receive relatively little coverage in the 
institutions represented (although this was not necessarily to the personal satisfaction of the 
interviewee). 
The existence of undergraduate programmes and the emphasis on preparation for work suggests 
that in principle a distinct, vocational occupation exists. The tension observed in one institution 
between offering training for industry qualifications and maintaining an academic–practice 
divide suggests that there is great potential for the industry to move to pre-registration graduate 
education followed by practice-based professional registration and qualification.  
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Conclusions relating to current status: 
 Whilst the future Information Security workforce may be mainly graduate, due to the 
lack of clearly-delineated subordinate roles beneath a professional stratum, the identity 
of a distinct graduate profession with the characteristics of most accepted examples 
cannot develop. This is mainly a reflection of the relative immaturity of the profession. 
This leaves individuals to negotiate their place in the network without the ability to 
reference accepted status markers issued by a powerful professional body. 
 The changes in industry practice and emphasis to require strong interpersonal skills, 
cultural understanding, empathy and a human-centred approach to corporate security 
are recognised in universities however the syllabus and teaching in the institutions 
represented still strongly reflects their computing science roots. Within the spectrum of 
courses offered there exist highly advanced and human-centric security programmes 
alongside more cynically-placed computer science programmes with minimal security 
content. As the professional bodies have yet to establish control over entry and hence 
develop the ability to dictate standards, government has acted in lieu of industry self-
regulation in the market to introduce a voluntary quality mark, but with potentially high 
costs for universities to comply and the government choosing not to impose compliance, 
the effect is still limited. 
Conclusions relating to future prospects: 
 Acting in lieu of that strong professional body, government attempts to correct this lack 
of structure through the agency of role definitions are incomplete and not accepted as 
yet. Success may not simply be further structuring of a single-tier industry however, but 
considering tiered roles with a codified relationship to delineate the bounds of the 
superior profession. This is distinct from the hierarchical relationships within an 
organisation partially identified in the SFIA framework, as this does not necessarily 
reflect the hierarchy of status between the professions merely between workers. This 
requires the existing workplace networks to adjust to include new actors who import 
recognisable roles, probably using devices certifying their competence within that set 
role. 
 Government’s motivation to interfere in this area is pragmatic: to discharge obligations 
to solve an immediate skills shortage which is not being answered in the marketplace. 
Its action is not motivated to professionalise the industry for ideological reasons. Whilst 
its action will in some ways catalyse a process which might have happened naturally by 
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a professional body, this may be incomplete, for example in extending control over 
syllabus or entry to a professional body. 
 The specialisation of junior technical roles in demand in the modern expanded and more 
mature workplace is higher than was the case for the generalist current managers during 
the infancy of the profession. The network black box entities of “practitioner” and 
“employer” must be unpacked, the former into “experienced” and “new” variants and 
the latter into manager and HR recruiter. The place of each in the network will evolve 
since practice is changing in nature as well as numerical strength during expansion, 
which will change the character and relationships of the central actor.  
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6.4 Professionalisation, Licensing and Regulation  
The section above saw government intervening in the market for master’s degrees (and only 
these, during data collection) due to concerns about the variable quality of syllabuses and the 
lack of a powerful intra-professional authority to approve courses. The sudden rise in demand 
for security workers created a pressure to add security content (at least superficially) to attract 
students, and hence gain funding. Whilst security will undoubtedly grow further in future, these 
actions are a reaction to market conditions and a lack of scrutiny, and not an irreversible 
translation of a particular actor’s interests. 
This can be observed in the network indirectly since some claimed security degrees do not 
survive scrutiny, creating a requirement to assess all. But there can be found no natural assessor 
where theory would expect to see one. The government reported being by default the focus of 
requests to test “security” degrees, to separate genuine leaders and the followers looking to 
capitalise on the market created without the requisite substance. This role is not yet being 
performed by an industry body, even though the execution of the policy is being performed 
outside government, thus it is apparently the authority which is lacked by the current 
professional bodies. Government did not ask for this role and does not display much enthusiasm 
for it.  
Regulation in security is an area of flux. The data does not support there being a recognised 
single marker of competence in the field, thus in ANT terms no campaign by a candidate body 
has been successful in establishing itself as the OPP for entry to the profession either de jure or 
de facto. The literature for the Anglo–American professional model (such as that of Neal and 
Morgan, 2000) suggests that such a body would normally arise from those wishing to 
distinguish themselves, to certify members and unify the voice of the profession. There exist 
several candidate bodies, but with varying levels of commitment to seeking that OPP status for 
membership which would mark ultimate success. Certifications range from pure tests of 
knowledge (generally early-career level) to those which also require experience, ongoing 
training and commitment to ethical practice as a form of professional regulation. The latter 
resemble the route to chartered status exhibited by more established professions, which is 
important since these facets are thus known to be effective devices in similar networks and 
hence might cause similar effects in this developing network. 
Some of the mechanisms for voluntary professional self-regulation are clearly therefore in 
place, but no network closure has been achieved. One failure point appears to be motivation, 
and not just that of one actor; as noted in the previous chapter, positive attitudes towards the 
desirability of professionalisation for its own sake were less visible in the data. Practitioners saw 
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value in acting professionally in the sense of competence and adherence to best practice, but 
were not especially drawn towards status in its own right. Mostly there was a feeling that this 
could be justified in principle at some future point however the profession is “not there yet”. 
Neither is the network still in the stage of problematisation, staking out roles, however. Some 
parts show a clear acceptance of the proffered devices through to enrolment. Those looking to 
hire workers already appreciate a way quickly to establish competence as a minimum bar to sift 
CVs for example, the market penetration effects of the CISSP qualification being easily visible 
in this regard. Externally-validated testing discharges due-diligence obligations for management 
looking to offload risk for hiring decisions to credentialing bodies, which has achieved a degree 
of network stability. Yet the traditional motifs of seeking to exclude the incompetent and obtain 
control are not clearly present, contrary to expectations from the literature. None of the 
certification bodies made explicit references to controlling access to the occupation or to 
obtaining monopoly control. Whilst ANT can support unintentional translation of interests into 
action – which includes virtually all action by non-human actants – since there is usually 
considerable resistance to granting monopoly this is surely unlikely if it is not even being 
sought. 
The educators were broadly very positive towards a more traditional route to professional 
formation, with graduate conceptual education being followed by postgraduate in-role 
professional certification. No sense of competition was observed between education and 
certification, with these seen as complementary, however there was considerable reluctance 
outside academia to embrace mandatory licensing, principally because it was not clear that there 
was an acceptable form of examination. When specific concerns about testing were put aside, 
generally the attitude towards some form of certified practice improved significantly. The onus 
is on the certification bodies to create an acceptable qualification regime. 
Professional certifications however were the only available certificate mid-career for many of 
those currently in senior positions. They therefore occupy a place in the original network 
whereby they were the sole passage point. For any one qualification – in most cases based on a 
single examination – to bear the weight of attesting to similar status to those professions with 
multi-year graduate preparation and postgraduate supervised qualification is simply asking too 
much. It is enough to show intent, even basic competence, however it is probably impractical to 
establish status equivalent to law or pharmacy when the preparation and examination regimes 
for these are so much more rigorous, even if the certified individual could well have equal non-
examined expertise and judgement amassed from pure experience.  
Looking to the future, it is likely therefore that the occupation will have more success in 
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establishing itself when the professional body sets standards for experience and training but 
does not itself attempt to compete with university degrees as the benchmark for learning. This 
may also address the lack of gravitas mentioned by many interviewees. Whilst the IISP’s model 
already appears compatible with this, the very widely-accepted CISSP qualification appears to 
sit uncomfortably between attesting to theoretical learning and certifying professional 
competence. For which service of which actor is it claiming OPP status? Conversely, the (ISC)² 
offers both basic and advanced qualifications which start to map to foundation and specialist 
grades of practice as well as recognising multiple sets of technical and non-technical roles 
alongside its flagship qualification; are these separate classes of actors? Or grades within a 
single class? 
A substantial change in the network can therefore be predicted, so fundamental that the OPPs 
for proofs of learning and competence must surely shift. From the data it is possible to posit that 
the original audience for a security qualification had undergone non-security education and 
entered the workplace before or during the growth of security, probably in industry. Until a 
sufficiently large amount of distinct conceptual and abstract knowledge had been accumulated, 
it was necessary for academics to align very closely with the established field of computing 
science to develop enough material for a vocational degree, besides the necessary apparatus of 
teaching, research and examination. Similarly, during the initial stages of this growth the 
pioneers, who survived on practical knowledge gathered from any available source rather than 
built on specialist training, were creating a distinct profession with its own identity.  
For the early workers therefore, many now in management and with many years’ work 
supporting their authority, their principal claim to competence rests (or rested) on outright 
experience. Their negotiated position in each network was sold more on a personal basis 
according to their reputation and perceived skill rather than by a device during interessement. 
Their judgement comes from viewing both events and budgetary contests at first hand, which 
can be informed by both conceptual and technical training alongside that career but not 
ultimately dependent upon it. The more open-minded amongst them will possess sufficient 
reflexive vision to recognise the benefit of more directed prior training, however moves to make 
graduate preparation essential are likely to result in questioning scepticism unless reservations 
are addressed. In this group there was reluctance to trust any single qualification to be the 
arbiter of competence.  
Although not as a group implacably resistant to requiring certification, no single spokesman in 
has convinced this group that it is able to represent them. Many have however enthusiastically 
embraced mid-career certification as a highly useful addition to experience; it is seen as both a 
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useful source of training and of value in the workplace for proving a minimum standard. Whilst 
the use of a device to persuade others of competence whilst lobbying for a place in the network 
is not unusual, surely the presence of a certification in that network to provide evidence mainly 
to oneself of competence is relatively rare. Whilst others during interessement might take a 
certification device at face value, without a security professional having an accepted and 
understood level of competence and training it is perhaps difficult to know what standard of 
training it represents to the other actors. 
Any mimetic alignment with established professions such as medicine or law is therefore likely 
to be rewarded. The validity of testing initially for taught skills at university and then again for 
competent practice by the profession has been recognised in many areas. As universities seek to 
provide a more rigorous and organised foundation of skills and knowledge, the certification 
providers (who are not well-equipped to provide in-depth education but perhaps better placed 
later to certify competent peer practice) become better candidates for the role of professional 
association and ultimately (as genuine OPP to professional status) that of regulator. 
No tension is therefore seen between academic and professional certification, indeed the two by 
their similarity to existing professional structures and their complementary measuring points are 
somewhat symbiotic provided they clarify their respective roles. In other words, both can exist 
in the network but only if they state clearly to other actors the services for which they are the 
passage point, otherwise the associations will be vague and easily broken by unintentional 
competition and confusion. From the data, it seems that to be accepted as OPP the profession 
must “own” its governing body and not simply be subjugated by a market-derived need to obey 
it, to the point that its authority is unquestioned and hence its certifications become 
automatically accepted as valid. At this point effective control of the syllabus will be with 
whomever the profession chooses to speak for them and the position of the professional body 
will be complete and the network stable.  
To create an identity and a reputation takes time. When asked whether professional status was 
achieved, or when discussing why the status of the profession is less advanced than other 
comparable candidates, the overwhelming factor given was maturity. Information Security is 
still a new area of practice, in the process of defining itself and establishing its own identity, 
culture and place in the organisational hierarchy. This is held in interessement by constant 
change: needing to return to staking out positions and lobbying other actors. Ordinarily as 
waves of vocationally-recruited graduates have replaced the pioneers in the network, the whole 
network would gradually move through enrolment to form durable and repeatable links, being 
re-made with each iteration but not substantially changing. Perhaps unfortunately for the 
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smoothness of this process however, the movements of state actors and organised crime have 
meanwhile made this area of employment the battlefield for a proxy war between superpowers 
and supercriminals.  
As with many conflicts, a rapid expansion in reasonably well-trained infantry is required, hence 
the creation of a technically-focussed STEM graduate cadre of security analysts by the UK 
Government, fearing attacks on not just UK companies but itself and the national infrastructure. 
Its usual course of action (to leave professions alone unless and until persuaded regulation is 
desirable) has been perforce altered by its own position as customer for that infantry. As the 
relevant network around cyber-training has not been established, it has stepped in to create it. 
This creates several issues for the professionalisation project however. Firstly it hugely skews 
the network towards the flighty requirements of that powerful government actor, which can 
impose and cajole in the absence of a professional body but it cannot force trust and acceptance 
in the existing profession. There was significant resistance seen to the concept of government 
administering the profession itself, mainly from a suspicion that government is not competent to 
do so. Government is therefore in a difficult situation: to catalyse development it may have to 
interfere using its well-respected security brands, however if it were to appear to be not simply 
supporting but imposing a system not yet accepted by the profession, it may in fact damage the 
credibility of the institution it seeks to empower.  
Secondly, government reports not wishing to administer the profession and neither does it wish 
to interfere in the market any more than is necessary to complete its tasks. Thus again it is 
interested in ensuring that security has sufficient recruits and they are not dissuaded by the 
perception of security as a less prestigious option, trained by competent people and 
recognisable, however again this is output-driven rather than ideology-driven.  
The creation of a profession from an occupation which is widely practised without formal 
central organisation is to move a micro process to a macro process. An occupation comprises 
multiple individual examples within organisations of individuals or functions claiming to be the 
OPP, in this case for the fruits of proper secure practice. To form a profession requires action on 
a macro scale, where government accepts a body speaking for an industry as the OPP to the 
general national benefits of well-run Information Security. 
That body must therefore enrol its individual members because without a police force and the 
mechanisms of state it must win positive consent for representation. Whilst overt government 
action to assist the sell may temporarily assist the formation of some species of association, it 
skews interessement by changing the interest and identity of the actor seeking the advancement 
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of the profession. The GCHQ badge for degrees is a device of interessement, but not directly on 
its own behalf. An irreversible network is more likely to be formed when a professional body 
legitimately achieves the translation by itself. 
Government’s instinct was to regulate externally to the profession (by the industry’s regulator). 
This would be rather unusual, although the classic case of regulation entirely within the 
profession is now also not the norm. Medicine for example is regulated through the General 
Medical Council (with lay if knowledgeable council members) and physicians’ employment 
interests represented separately through the British Medical Association. Similarly the 
regulatory and representative functions of pharmacy and law have been split recently. A recent 
trend for state-sanctioned delegation for regulation therefore is to a regulatory body ruling on 
fitness to practise and syllabus. Whilst even the pure-regulator approach could organise the 
training and certification profession, it is clear that at the moment the government has not been 
enrolled into a network by such a regulator. It is similarly not clear that any of the candidates is 
exerting itself with any passion in any case, nor that the profession is particularly exercised by 
the concept. 
Conclusions relating to current status: 
 No competition was seen between academic and professional qualifications. The latter 
were however seen only to establish a baseline minimum of expertise rather than 
establishing a state of “qualified” comparable to chartered professions. Security is not 
always regarded as an area which requires advanced learning to practise, which in turn 
challenges the overall status of the profession. 
 There is little appetite from the existing professionals (many of whom could be thereby 
disenfranchised) to exclude people from the profession based on certification, with 
exclusive models of profession also rejected. Whilst there was strong support for 
licensing if a suitable test could be found, no such test was accepted as yet. There was 
rejection of there being a compelling need to exclude the incompetent. Whilst there may 
be a social disincentive to admit to favouring exclusion and elitism, without a desire to 
achieve some degree of monopoly or self-control the traditional network is more 
difficult to form irreversibly. 
 Government has introduced its own certification standard to catalyse the industry but 
does not wish to appoint any existing body as a regulator at this time. The data suggests 
that government is correct to be wary of intervening further but for other reasons. 
Government reticence stems partially from liberal non-interference in a free market and 
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partially to avoid the necessity of supervising the resulting professional body, whereas 
resistance to government-imposed certification from within the profession was due 
mainly to lack of trust in government’s ability to do so competently.  
 Government has acted because it requires the creation of clear and effective pathways 
towards employment in a network where there is no ambitious candidate regulator 
representing the will of a profession aiming to establish a form of control over entry, 
training and behaviour.  
Conclusions relating to future prospects: 
 Professional certifications give confidence to existing professionals who trained before 
academic qualifications were available and which therefore serve as a single certificate 
to attest to learning and competence. Greater graduate entry may force some 
certifications which test knowledge to position their products instead as post-graduate 
markers of professional experience, skill and competence, and hence raise standards 
beyond “basic minimum” level. This movement may in turn assist in the rationalisation 
of certification schemes as universities move to be the sole OPP to recognition of 
learning. 
 Rationalisation is needed in the market for certifications alongside the codification and 
stratification of roles such that the occupation has well-defined borders with a single 
qualification per role. At present the binary status of “qualified” or “not-qualified” is 
diluted by a high number of certificates of variable quality. 
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6.5 Summary 
“The observer does not fix the identity of the implicated actors if this identity is still 
being negotiated.” 
[Callon, 1986] 
Arguably, to streamline education, qualification and organisation of a profession it is necessary 
to provide and examine a general level of knowledge which can then be built upon to provide 
the foundation to a finite number of specialities. Beyond these practical concerns, common 
socialisation and training helps to solidify the identity and image of the professional qua doctor, 
lawyer and so on, applying a broad background knowledge to the client’s situation rather than 
merely possessing those facts needed for their particular task. 
It is therefore to be expected that the role of Information Security professional, in order to 
progress from the status of self-certified keen amateur in a nascent offshoot of computing to a 
“professional” role with all that entails, should need to adapt. Professions exist to control 
practice in an area of knowledge according to society’s overall division of labour. A common 
body of knowledge must therefore be established and demarcated, a separate identity forged, 
internal roles defined, a hierarchy and web of peer relationships agreed, training regimes for 
each role created, and standards set and tested. A discrete area of knowledge must be controlled 
by those who claim that expertise, thus the profession must associate to codify that knowledge, 
agree and publish best practice for its associated techniques, establish of a bar for qualification 
according to grade, and create and (nominally) enforce a code of ethics. A professional body 
homogenises the variable knowledge and practices of individual constituents into standards. It 
defines what a professional does and what they know, and decides who is and is not a competent 
professional, firstly by voluntary membership and eventually by state-sanctioned monopoly. 
In principle many of these traditional network elements of association have met or been brought 
together in the case of Information Security, however there are areas of failure to achieve 
mobilisation and translation on many fronts. Perhaps since failure implies attempt and defeat, 
which is not the case here, a better term would be as yet incomplete. The areas at issue have 
been explored over the preceding sections: diffusely demarcated base of knowledge along the 
borders with the parent professions such as audit and computing, lack of confidence and 
aspiration to professional status, lack of clarity of roles between internal specialities, very rapid 
change in practice, changes in motivation and expectation between generations of workers and 
incomplete establishment of a graduate, highly-educated identity. 
Furthermore it was seen that although much of the apparatus of professionalism has been 
established, the role of professional body and its credentials are still very weak. Note the recent 
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direct government action rather than autonomous action by the profession, severe over-
population of the credential market leading to confusion about a substantial and qualified status, 
lack of status and “gravitas” parity with comparable professions and – inevitably given the 
above – failure to enrol government into granting monopoly control. 
Underlying all these – including and perhaps especially the lack of aspiration to professional 
status – is time. The lack of definition visible in the accounts of the interviewees and other data 
is no coincidence, since this network is still forming. Fundamental to ANT (see Latour, 2005; 
Callon 1986) is that the identities and roles played by actors are not hard and ready-made Social 
Things which can be imported whole into interaction, but rather they are formed and shaped by 
and during that interaction. Some interfaces and negotiations may be simpler than others, 
however it will be by repeatedly forging and testing links, negotiating positions and defending 
ground gained until the network is stable and irreversible that a true profession will be formed. 
Few of the remaining issues are likely to be fundamentally fatal. The relationship between 
multi-tiered specialist practitioners in large multinational and governmental departments and 
those in smaller SME departments is not incomparable to research–industrial and community 
pharmacy for example. Several certification providers offer multiple grades of general and 
specialist qualification, therefore the main issue appears to be rationalising to a common scheme 
or set of standards. Whilst IT forensics and fostering an awareness culture seem distant cousins, 
modern medicine claims psychiatry and pathology within the same profession with common 
basic training despite wide variations in practice, and due to a powerful regulator can force 
entrants to choose a speciality rather than practise in an ungraduated spectrum. All such issues 
of identity and qualification have been faced and solved through negotiation and political 
interaction in many other professions. Even the currently unpersuaded government may alter its 
stance should a powerful, well-organised and competent professional governing body offer itself 
for consideration.  
The current status therefore is of an incomplete network still in the process of interessement and 
the early stages of enrolment. A remaining question, which this study hands over to later writers 
to answer, is simply that of resolve. At present there is some progress but considerable caution 
towards seeking professional status due to the unresolved issues above. When these are 
addressed, the way is open for the coming generation to achieve full professional status. The 
key question will be: will they want it? 
 
200 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
In the following chapter the conclusions of the work are summarised and juxtaposed with the 
research questions identified in the literature review, the contribution to knowledge summarised, 
implications for theory and practice noted and limitations discussed.  
7.1 Answers to the Research Questions 
7.1.1 Question 1: “What are the Origins of the Modern Information Security Profession?” 
Focus Question: “When and why did Information Security roles emerge and separate from 
Information Technology to form a new profession?” 
Section 6.1 showed that the participants included people who had observed the emergence of 
the Information Security profession within their own careers. Some indeed had identified the 
need for (and sometimes created) their own security function around them, recalling 
contemporary Information Security as effectively non-existent. No single cause for the 
advancement of security as a specialist concern was identified from the data; rather, 
interviewees noted a range of events and trends which for them were significant. A key factor 
noted was the expansion of the Internet in the early 1990s since from this the abuse of its 
associated applications became possible, such as mail-borne viruses and attacks on remote 
infrastructure. As a response, data protection legislation, security standards of increasing 
complexity, the development of online commerce and similar issues emerged. With each such 
development the pressure to secure the computing environment increased whilst the cost of 
effectively acting maliciously decreased.  
There was therefore a range of threat vectors, of which a subset were felt to have particular 
effect in a given interviewee’s particular context and others were seen to be more general in 
their action. Most significant is to note that the technological change which made malicious 
action possible and the changing motivation of human actors who perpetrated it are inextricably 
linked. It was the combination and interaction of these which brought forward the conditions to 
which security expansion was a response, which is revealed more clearly by an ANT account. 
The new profession faced challenges, since its effect was unintentionally to hinder the pursuit of 
computing performance which, since contemporary hardware capability was orders of 
magnitude below today’s standards, was a significant issue. Additionally, to win acceptance of 
let alone impose policy required senior management buy-in. Effective security managers as now 
required adroit political and social skills in addition to an understanding of technical matters. By 
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combining inputs from the literature and this empirical observation it is concluded that it was 
this new class of worker – grounded in the technical context but gradually embracing the social, 
legal and behavioural aspects – which formed the basis of the new profession in an Abbottonian 
manner. 
Following the emergence of malicious activity, associations of workers with like interests were 
formed, which influenced recruitment patterns for the few early roles which were gained 
primarily by personal recommendation. Expansion of the profession caused a test of security 
competence to be needed as existing methods were not scalable. This change of mode from 
intensive but subjective vetting to objective but impersonal testing changed entry routes and 
hence the nature of the profession. It is this change which has the potential for most significant 
development. 
Qualification allowed the profession to claim status through competence certification in a 
specialist field issued by an authoritative body. Possibly just as important however is the inward 
confidence that was gained for an otherwise unqualified occupation, now having an objective 
platform from which to pass judgement upon others during audit and policy enforcement. 
Hallmarks of profession are no guarantee of acceptance however, therefore in the next section 
the current status of the profession is examined. 
7.1.2 Question 2: “What is the Current Status of the Information Security Profession?” 
Focus Question: “To what extent does a discrete area of practice exist with which the 
practitioners associate and what is its status?” 
There is clear evidence for a separate area of practice backed by a claim to an independent body 
of knowledge and theory, which can be taught to postgraduate level and certified by 
occupational qualifications. Information Security is demonstrably a candidate profession in that 
sense. There are however a number of challenges to the professional status of the occupation, 
mostly due to the short period of time which has elapsed since its separation from its parent 
areas of practice. 
In section 6.2 it was argued that the area of knowledge claimed is too broad to be mastered 
without specialisation; a key criticism made of the most popular certification is that it is too 
broad and too shallow to establish expertise. Sophisticated frameworks exist to support the 
codification and organisation of the profession however there remain no well-accepted and 
understood named roles for Information Security workers in the industry. This effectively 
prevents the formation of networks of peers, clients and staff based on the claims of professional 
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qualification. This in turn compromises the status of the profession with respect to more 
established peers. Instead the individual’s own personal attributes and skills determine their 
acceptance into locally-negotiated hierarchies and role networks, whereas those working in 
more established occupations can derive status more easily from legitimation through 
acceptance by their own profession. 
Further ambiguity surrounds the internal structure of the profession, with regards to the 
hierarchy between and nature of specialities of professional and any support workers. As above, 
where relationships are negotiated in the work context both around and within the area of 
knowledge claimed, security specialists cannot easily refer to an existing accepted structure, 
leaving the individual to position themselves based on their own identity rather than their 
professional identity.  
The social–technical axis was identified as the most significant source of this ambiguity, with 
tension observed between those who execute security policies and investigate non-compliance, 
and those who interface with senior management (to obtain resources and assent to create 
policies) and drive security awareness and culture. The distinction observed exceeded normal 
hierarchical control between management and staff and provides an empirical basis to propose 
specialities with discrete skill sets. Furthermore, the technical group was not seen to aspire to 
progress to the management group nor saw it as superior. A symbiotic relationship is formed 
comprising the security manager as resource-provider to the technicians and insulation from 
management, in return for nominal superiority in organisational hierarchy manager to specialist, 
but not a hierarchy of specialities comparable to physician and nurse.  
Whilst few practitioners would advance Information Security as comparable to those 
professions which are entrusted with the vital interests of clients, there was felt to be sufficient 
potential in all relevant characteristics to advance to reasonable recognition in future. In section 
6.4 it was noted that current professionals, who could be thereby disenfranchised, showed little 
desire to exclude incompetent people from the profession based on certification, rejecting such 
exclusive models of profession. Whilst there was support for licensing if a suitable test could be 
found, no such test was accepted as yet.  
Taken together with the discussion of education and certification in section 6.3, this strongly 
suggests that there is no current body in a position to command the respect of the profession and 
hence drive the professionalisation process further, and certainly the language of the bodies 
interviewed did not support the highly monopolistic orientation suggested by the sociology of 
professionalisation. Empirical corroboration is given here of suggestions in the literature that 
rationalisation is needed in the market for certifications alongside the stratification of roles 
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noted above. At present there is an insufficiently clear binary status of “qualified” or “not-
qualified” due to the presence of multiple certificates of variable quality. 
The profession then must mature in both structure and training to gain full acceptance from their 
peers. Influence at management level is still reliant on occasional crises and outside these events 
resources must be continually re-won, showing that other, more powerful actors are still out-
competing the profession for the attention of management. 
7.1.3 Question 3: “What Are the Prospects of Further Professionalisation?” 
Focus Question: “Are there ongoing projects to professionalise the industry, what are their aims 
and are these being achieved?” 
One must consider here the question of the polysemy associated with Ritzer (1973) and later 
writers, in that efforts to professionalise might be validly seen as the pursuit of status, the 
trappings of a profession (regulation, certification and so on) or simply striving for high quality, 
competent and conscientious service regardless of trade. Since the latter would be difficult to 
achieve in a concerted manner outside the framework of an organising body, it is the former 
senses of the word which are most relevant. 
Firstly, in as far as people could be expected to admit to such things, in section 6.4 the pursuit of 
professional status as an end in itself was not seen particularly to motivate current practitioners. 
For even senior and self-confident professionals who were otherwise relaxed and comfortable 
during interview, this topic elicited hesitant and exploratory responses, suggesting that it was 
not something which had previously engaged their interest. If this particular sample’s attitude 
was considered on that specific point then the actions of government – to reposition the industry 
such that it does not lose entrants to more respected competition – might be misguided.  
This said, the sample was comprised of people already recruited into the profession, mostly 
socialised, educated and trained outside the profession, or indeed before the existence of the 
profession. Whilst the network has formed around their interests as they have established 
themselves, it is likely that they will gradually be replaced by successors who positively chose a 
career with an established identity against competing opportunities, thus status could well be a 
relevant factor. There was evidence in section 6.2 however that this identity was still not well-
known even within enterprises already employing a security team, therefore this factor would be 
of limited relevance to school leavers had they not already been otherwise attracted by personal 
interest. 
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In sections 6.2 and 6.3 this lack of identity, organisation and gravitas was seen severely to 
hamper the progress of the profession. It is doubtless that government, which showed no desire 
to interfere unnecessarily in the market, has nonetheless been forced to catalyse and develop the 
industry through its interventions in the areas of academic and professional qualifications, and 
the establishment of a more clearly delineated and defined discrete set of roles as discussed 
above. Government, unusually for Anglo–American professionalisation, was made to encourage 
a currently immature profession to develop more quickly, due to the rise in malicious activity 
and thus national demand for skilled workers. 
But government motivation to interfere in this area is mainly pragmatism: it must respond to a 
demand which cannot be sated through the normal course of events. It has no ideological 
commitment to professionalisation in its own right. Whilst it may in some aspects simply 
catalyse the process, this may remain incomplete for aspects not seen as useful for its purposes, 
for example extending control over syllabuses, and it strongly rejected requiring membership of 
a governing body for entry to the profession. Its actions have replaced those which would have 
normally been expected from a professional body emerging by popular subscription from 
amongst the profession itself, however no such body has convinced government of the necessity 
to regulate the profession; establishing a full articled profession is clearly some way off at this 
point. 
Resistance to government intervention was not the monopoly of government itself. Whereas 
government reticence to regulate came from both non-interference in a liberal free market and 
not wishing to supervise the resulting regulator, government oversight was rejected by some of 
the practitioners themselves citing its record in doing so competently elsewhere. It appears 
therefore that further professionalisation is predicated on the establishment of a strong 
professional body who can offer a test acceptable to the industry and then advance its cause. 
When questioned assuming the existence of an acceptable test, resistance to mandatory 
certification was lowered. The resistance was seen to be mainly that of trust in the testing 
authority rather than implacable ideology. 
In section 6.4 the field of certifications was seen to be a further obstacle to future progress. For 
existing professionals, who generally entered the profession before vocational academic 
qualifications were available, these acted to increase confidence and to attest to learning and 
competence. Nonetheless, the plurality of schemes available suggests variable standards and 
thus damages the perception of all. These must clearly be rationalised (despite opinions to the 
contrary from both government and – counterintuitively – the certification bodies), but they 
must also adapt to the emergence of academic qualifications. The current “home study and 
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single exam” schemes, whilst fit for their original purpose of proving a basic minimum, were 
seen as far too insubstantial to grant genuine professional status on such a very limited 
engagement. In future, with greater graduate entry and socialisation, it is likely that the industry 
will force certification paths towards the more common undergraduate teaching of knowledge 
and postgraduate certification of professional competence, and thus raise standards. This is 
closer to the peer-reviewed IISP model than the current examined certifications. 
Looking to that undergraduate pipeline, the change in formation routes, whilst encouraging 
depth and breadth of curriculum, brings challenges. Changes in industry security practice, the 
recognition of human aspects of security and business-centred emphasis require strong 
interpersonal skills, cultural understanding, empathy and a human-centred approach to corporate 
security. There was evidence that this was recognised in universities however whether this was 
being incorporated into syllabuses and teaching was less clear, with courses strongly reflecting 
their roots in computing. As no professional body has yet to establish control over entry or 
ability to dictate the curriculum, something which the literature demands for professionalisation, 
government has again acted in lieu of industry-generated initiatives. The existence of a 
government-backed quality mark was seen to have had some effects, however given the high 
compliance cost and the voluntary adoption model, the effect is still limited. 
In summary, many of the necessary foundations to greater professionalisation are in place 
however the industry has yet to fully embrace and demand certification rationalisation and 
regulation, and without this any attempt to lobby government (which is already resistant to 
introducing such regulation) is unlikely to be sufficiently well-coordinated to be effective. 
7.2 Theoretical Considerations   
7.2.1 The Contribution of Actor–Network Theory 
This study highlights the value of ANT for enriching a professionalisation account. Beyond the 
convenient taxonomy for the constituent stages of social action provided by Callon (1986), it 
provides a model for the negotiation of reproducible and settled arrangements between actants.  
Harmony is evident between focal actants as “OPP” and the centrality of monopoly to theories 
of professionalisation as market closure (see Fig.7 in section 3.10). An actant seeking to enrol 
and represent others and protect their interests–as part of advancing its own–is literally true for 
the traditional professional body as gatekeeper to its members’ services. An array of devices of 
interessement is visible in Chapter 5 in their attempt to recruit practitioners, employers and the 
state as allies. By adopting the viewpoint of each focal actor as OPP in turn, it was possible to 
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show not simply how the network was built, but also how it adjusted to change by renegotiating 
the interrelations between its constituent objects during the introduction of a new actant. This 
contextualises Neal’s (2008) theoretical maturity and separation model of enterprise security, by 
showing how the new function becomes OPP to desirable new states for pre-existing actants. 
Also useful is ANT’s micro-social ontology, described in section 3.4. ANT rejects macro-social 
forces, requiring accounts of action to identify assemblages of a plurality of elements, similar to 
Latour’s gun-man example. It prevents the ascription of security’s emergence and separation to 
“power” or “class”; it is instead shown as the product of a momentary convergence of both 
human and non-human artefacts. The development of the web, browser and DSL technology 
driving online human consumerism and social media usage, and consequently social 
engineering, malware, data protection legislation, breaches, executive liability and security 
standards–amongst other factors–produced conditions wherein a security specialist could 
develop. Moreover, both policy creation and policy enforcement workers find opportunities to 
be employed and to negotiate their roles and relationship in a changing technical and statutory 
context. The importance of ANT’s generalised symmetry, which treats these disparate materials 
as fully equal in potential, is thereby demonstrated. 
ANT is similarly helpful for describing the failure of a network to achieve a stable and 
repeatable end-state. The inability of spokesmen to deliver what they claim to represent (or 
“mobilise” others) can be seen. Cynically designed degrees have failed to represent proper 
training, thus the network developed additional tests and standards to reject them. Certifications 
designed to create a basic baseline have been positioned as attesting to education similar to 
comparable professions, but failed to establish comparable substance to those professions and 
hence fail to attract the same power and status. The ANT concept of the “black box” can 
likewise be used to represent the established professional model, where the term is so ingrained 
into common conceptions of occupational status and gravitas that it is referenced without 
examination by government in its strategy, and to the action of standards whose contents are in 
reality less relevant than their market acceptance. 
7.2.2 Professionalisation Theory 
Within the professionalisation arena, the work of Abbott (1988) was the foundation for much of 
the analysis, and proved particularly well suited to an ANT account. Informed by this work, for 
example, the emergence of the IISP alongside the BCS was seen as potential evidence of 
fracture and dissatisfaction with the status quo by specialists within existing professions, 
following the establishment of new areas of knowledge through socio-technical development. 
The failure of the BCS to be a “spokesman” for the emerging discipline is particularly 
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reminiscent of the narrative in Callon’s (1986) seminal paper. Similarly, the dynamic nature of 
Abbottonian formation and the continual renewal of what appear to be fixed boundaries, 
especially before state monopoly (compare ANT’s irreversible translation) is achieved, is 
aligned with ANT’s major themes. 
Perhaps the most notable contribution of Abbott to the key question of security roles, since the 
prior work here has very limited theoretical foundation, is during the discussion of role 
networks (section 6.2). This finds resonance in the unresolved tensions reported here concerning 
what constitutes the outer edges of the entire profession, and the arrangement and hierarchy of 
any constituent specialisations and/or para-professions– aspects overlooked in previous studies. 
Abbott and Larson showed that control over a discrete area of knowledge–its education, 
socialisation and practice–is central to a professionalisation project, underpinning the 
conclusions above that resolution of role identities, then rationalisation to a unique and highly 
abstract certification path for each is a prerequisite for further professionalisation. 
Beyond Abbot, in section 2.3.4 substantial criticism by writers such as Freidson and Larson was 
reported regarding the unwelcome effects of monopolistic ambition and market closure. 
Strikingly, contrasting positions from this were observed in the data. Practitioners were resistant 
to modes of licensing which would exclude existing currently unqualified peers (contrary to 
even the moderate theoretical orthodoxy), and even the professional bodies rejected this despite 
a clear contrary financial motive.  
Similarly, assertions by Freidson that professions inevitably act to constrain their clients were 
refuted by the highly business-oriented data reported in section 5.6. The still extant calls in the 
literature for a more socially-informed approach to security may therefore have more resonance 
in academia than enterprise. Conversely, writers who stressed the contribution to the public 
good made by professionals through their altruism (section 2.3.2) would doubtless be surprised 
how sparsely this argument was advanced here. 
Building on theoretical discussions of definition, absolute precision appears here not to be 
useful, since professional status has become black-boxed and thus referenced without detailed 
examination. When attempts are made to use that understanding to form policy however, as was 
done for example by UK and US governments, an insufficiently developed understanding of 
professional models and development can lead to errors of assumption and over-simplification. 
The historical literature examined in section 2.3, for example, suggests that Anglo-American 
professions evolve gradually by fracture, competition and consolidation prior to seeking state 
recognition. Government catalysis to solve its immediate recruitment issue may be precipitate 
and even counter-productive in the long term. 
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7.2.3 Socio-Philosophical Considerations 
From a methodological point of view, whilst the appeal of generalisation is appealing to some as 
noted below, this work strongly supports the use of interpretative, qualitative approaches in 
professionalisation studies. This approach may avoid the false appearance of unity of mind 
which can lead from the statistical treatment of survey data within a more traditionally positivist 
epistemology, particularly in areas where the underlying theory is not well developed. Many of 
the earlier examples of such work in compliance programmes were somewhat unsatisfying in 
developing truly useful directions for developing user education programmes, whereas a move 
to include more interpretative work could be helpful in exposing why human actors do not 
behave as intended. 
7.3 Implications for Practice 
To summarise the implications for practice from the main text above, these relate to the areas of 
role and licensing. As noted, the impact of the various frameworks has not yet been sufficient to 
create well-accepted roles within a hierarchical functional or power relationship, which was 
seen to prevent the occupation presenting an image of established professional status. Discrete 
specialities will therefore be needed prior to further professionalisation, ideally with a single 
certification path per identity to establish a condition of “qualified”. Certifications at present are 
not perceived to have sufficient depth for the holder to rank amongst peer professions.  
From theory and observation here to attain that status is likely to require the occupation to 
become a graduate profession, thus existing certifications which currently attest to education 
will need to cede this to the universities in return for the status which derives from granting 
recognition to degree courses, wresting this from government. In turn the professional bodies 
will ultimately need to gain government sanction to license, to restore a role for a rationalised 
subset of their certification schemes. Government, which aims not to interfere in the market, 
may inadvertently so do by its actions in the certification and education sphere intended to 
catalyse the industry, which may be misguided if they do not convince the industry that it is not 
imposing a solution, whereas supporting a practitioner-respected body may be more effective. 
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7.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
Whilst Information Security itself is the subject of considerable study, the professional status of 
the practitioner has received relatively little coverage therefore this study is an early work in 
what it is hoped will be an expanding field. Taken with the published interim findings, this study 
is the first academic work to consider the professional status and licensing of Information 
Security in the UK in depth, and the first academic work to analyse that status informed by a 
substantial coverage of the major sociology of the professions. It is the first work to cover this 
status using an interpretative approach and adds to the demonstration of Actor–Network Theory 
as a valuable analytical tool in the study of professionalisation. It provides empirical contrast to 
and analysis of the published policy direction of the UK Government and is the first academic 
work to include interview data with the department responsible for the development of that 
policy on this topic. 
7.5 Limitations 
The following principal limitations are acknowledged: 
 Size: This is a small-scale study, particularly with respect to the non-practitioner 
categories of interview. As noted in the theoretical review, this is an interpretative and 
qualitative study which does not seek to to establish highly generalisable statements 
concerning the behaviour of the populations. It is a descriptive ANT account which 
represents a commentary on the movements of actors seen in the data gathered. The size 
of the study was limited by the time available, the travel resources and the single-
student capacity for interview administration, execution, transcription and analysis. In 
particular a greater response rate from academics might have enabled greater 
comparison between practitioner and academic positions on areas of mutual interest. 
 Time: Conversely, the data collection took place over a multi-year period in a relatively 
new and fast-moving area, therefore the interviewees at different stages of the research 
may have been speaking in different contexts with respect to then-current issues, 
government action and development. Given the level of activity of GCHQ and the Skills 
Frameworks for the Information Age for example, it is very likely that the position of 
the UK Government will be changing regularly and may have been developed since that 
data was collected. 
 Cultural Issues: The model of professionalism, the government’s intervention and the 
attitudes to professional development all apply mainly to the UK. 
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 Participant Recruitment: The participants were all volunteers, and in the main were 
recruited by response to an impersonal request for assistance. As this requires 
considerable altruism (particularly given the amount of time required from very senior 
people in their respective organisations) this may have affected the representativeness of 
their attitudes to professionalism relative to the general population. 
7.6 Recommendations for Further Work 
Although this is a relatively new field and much can be usefully done to explore it further, the 
following areas may be profitable lines of research in the immediate future: 
 There is likely to be an effect from the changing nature of practitioner recruitment from 
mid-career generalist to graduate- or postgraduate-entry specialist, thus the attitude of 
the students being socialised at university and the school-leavers making their degree 
selection is also highly relevant. Although an interview protocol was created and ethical 
procedures completed to include students into the study, it was not finally practical for 
both time and access-to-data reasons to do so. To explore this area of the topic would 
make an extremely helpful complementary study. Similarly, to expand the observed 
network further those who employ security staff may be able to offer a different 
perspective concerning certificates and other symbols of professional status, as would to 
include those working in the security products industry whose voices were not heard 
here. 
 The context for practice in this industry is extremely fast-paced. As was noted above, 
there is a possibility that due to the novel influx of graduates and the changing global 
security situation affected the data collected even within the time of this study. It would 
therefore be useful repeatedly to explore the topic with workers in the industry and 
particularly within the (very active) UK Government to determine the direction of this 
critical area of movement, both longitudinally within a speciality (the nature of change) 
and across the profession’s entire jurisdiction (the breadth of body of knowledge).  
 As was helpfully identified by an anonymous reviewer of the paper linked to this 
project, it might be useful to compare the attitudes of the classes of workers covered in 
this study with those of other countries. As the type of professionalisation assumed is 
the “Anglo–American” model, the data might be usefully combined with that from the 
United States in order to compare results in different regulatory cultures to determine 
whether different governments’ actions and different cultures produced similar findings. 
Similarly the experiences of those workers in a French, German or similar non-
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Anglophone culture could be extremely instructive. 
 Having exposed some concepts from this small, qualitative data set, those who prefer to 
take a positivist and realist approach might wish to derive hypotheses to extend 
generalisability, in order to determine to what extent unity can be claimed for one or 
more of the stakeholder groups overall. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Instruments 
The instruments as actually used are recreated in the following order. Due to differences 
between margin and footer sizes between documents there may be trivial differences in layout 
from copies physically used. 
Section 1: Notes for Participants 
 Academic (Course leaders in UK Universities) 
 Professional Bodies (Senior managers of certifying institutions) 
 Government (UK central government) 
 Practitioners (People with IS responsibility organisations in various sectors) 
Section 2: Interview Protocol 
 Academic (v.1) 
 Professional Bodies (v. 1) 
 Government (v. 1.02 as used) 
 Practitioners (v. 1.02 Original, for Pilot) 
 Practitioners (v. 1.1 Updated for Main Phase, see Section 4.7.3) 
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Interviewee Explanatory Notes and Consent Form [1 of 4] 
(Academic Participants) 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research. Please take a moment to read through the information below 
which explains what is being requested, your rights to withdraw and how your information will be processed and 
stored.  
 
What is the purpose of the research?  
The purpose is to investigate issues of professional status amongst those who manage information security in 
commercial, public, charitable and other organisations. It aims to examine these issues from the perspective of those 
who perform the role themselves, those whose work might affect the professional status of the occupation (for example 
national associations, universities and qualifications bodies) and those in government who are in a position to regulate 
it. Please feel free to discuss the aims of the project in greater detail before deciding whether to participate. Your 
information will be used only for the stated academic purposes.  
 
What is the format of the research?  
Your contribution will take the form of a semi-structured interview. In this format the interviewer has a list of topics to 
help guide the conversation, however the participants are free to follow any points of interest, or examples which the 
interviewee considers particularly relevant, as they arise. If English is not your first language and you would like any 
adjustment such as slower speech or being accompanied by a translator, please do feel free to request this.  
 
Why do you want an audio recording of the interview? 
As is common practice with such interviews, with your permission the interview will be recorded. This is because the 
particular method of analysis which will be used requires the interview to be first transcribed verbatim. This is 
considerably more efficient if performed later from a recording as it allows the conversation to flow naturally, and is 
more interesting for the participants. You will be sent a copy of the transcript so that you can correct any errors of 
transcription if you choose. This is also an opportunity to identify any data you would prefer not to be used in the 
analysis (see below) for whatever reason. As the location for the interview is often at the interviewee's place of work, 
please bring to the interviewer's attention any possibility that private, personal, confidential or commercially sensitive 
information might be inadvertently captured by the recording device from surrounding areas. 
 
Who is the interviewer?  
The interviewer is a part-time postgraduate student studying for a research degree with the Centre for Computing and 
Social Responsibility at De Montfort University in Leicester, UK and is bound by that institution’s ethical and 
disciplinary codes. The interviewer is also a network engineer employed in the aerospace industry however he is acting 
entirely in the capacity of student and not in any way in his capacity as an employee of any other organisation. Although 
this is unlikely, if you are aware of any potential conflict of interest which may arise from your participation please 
bring this to the attention of the interviewer.  
 
Will you ask me about my organisation's IT security or other confidential information? 
No, this is not the purpose of the study; the intention of the research is to understand the professional status of 
information security practitioners from the perspective of the interviewee and does not concern the security policy or 
practice of their employer. The topics covered will be: your career background and how you came to work in the field, 
the importance of security as a topic and the events which have affected this, the origins of your organisation's security-
related degree programmes and their content and syllabus, student demographics, perceived motivations and attitudes, 
comparison of academic and industry qualifications, and the professionalisation of the industry and its relative status. 
 
Should you wish to decline to answer any question to avoid revealing sensitive or confidential information, or for any 
other reason, you are entirely free to do so. Should you happen to use specific information from your current or a 
former organisation (or student thereof) to illustrate a point it will be treated as confidential or made anonymous as 
described below, and you are free to request that whilst doing so the recording is paused and/or that the information not 
be used in the analysis. You are also able to request withdrawal of that information later as described below.  
 
Can I withdraw?  
Participation is entirely voluntary and your consent may be withdrawn at any time during or after the interview. Should 
you withdraw before the end of the interview or later but before any analysis has begun, all recordings and transcripts of 
the interview will be destroyed and this will be confirmed back to you when complete. No further use of any 
information provided by you will be made. Alternatively you may indicate that certain passages or responses should be 
removed, in which case these will not be transcribed (or removed from the transcription as appropriate) and these 
sections will not be used in the analysis.  
241 
 
Should you withdraw after the interview has been transcribed and analysis has begun, information from your interview 
may have already been combined with that of other participants to form theories and conclusions. In this eventuality, the 
recordings and transcripts of your own contribution will be destroyed and take no further part in the analysis, however it 
may not be practical to remove those theories and conclusions which were based in part on your information. In these 
circumstances, all reasonable efforts will be made to remove data from your interview from the analysis.  
 
How will you handle my data? Will my contribution be confidential?  
Recordings will be transcribed as soon as possible after the interview and thereafter stored in an encrypted format. The 
original recording file will be stored offline on optical media in a secure location for backup purposes. Once the 
interview has been transcribed and the accuracy of the transcription confirmed by the interviewee, the recording will not 
be accessed again unless the examiners wish to check the quality of the transcription process or for another official 
university purpose. All materials other than the submitted dissertation (and published papers or interim results, if any) 
will be stored and eventually destroyed according to the provisions of the De Montfort University research records 
retention policy, which is available at http://www.dmu.ac.uk/documents/about-dmu-documents/quality-management-
and-policy/records-management/research-records-retention-policy.pdf 
 
Each person participating will be assigned an anonymising code which is used to identify their data during analysis and 
in the dissertation. This code contains a serial number and an indication of job role. Thus, once the data has been 
transcribed it will no longer be personally identifiable by anyone other than the student and his supervisory/examination 
team. Likewise, the name of your organisation will be removed from the transcript and replaced with an identification 
code during analysis which specifies only its approximate size and industry sector. Any excerpts quoted will be edited 
to ensure that the identity of the speaker cannot be deduced from the context. Any reference to specific institutions, 
brands or individuals will similarly be made non-identifiable unless this is clearly unnecessary. The version sent to you 
as a transcript (after any changes requested have been made) will be the version used in the analysis therefore you will 
be able to request any further removal of information necessary. 
 
Why use codes- why not remove all identifying data?  
Firstly so that you can be sent your own transcript for verification. Secondly, it may be necessary to identify and remove 
the contribution of someone who later withdraws from the study.  
 
What will my contribution be used for?  
Information – once transcribed, anonymised and analysed – may be presented in the student’s dissertation, internal 
progress reports, academic or industrial journal or magazine articles, conference posters or presentations to support an 
argument or conclusion, or to demonstrate examples of opinions observed. This may take the form of verbatim quotes 
or as summarised, interpreted or paraphrased text, numbers, tables or other formats. This information may be attributed 
to the source, if so this will by serial number, pseudonym or terms of the information listed above (job role, and 
employer size and industry sector) and never the identity of the participant.  
 
Consent  
I agree to participate in the research for the purposes described above. I understand that my participation is voluntary 
and that I can withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. I am eighteen years of age or older.  
 
 
 
 
Signed _______________________________ Date ______________________  
 
 
 
 
Name _________________________________________________  
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 Interviewee Explanatory Notes and Consent Form [2 of 4] 
(Credential/Professional Body Participants) 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research. Please take a moment to read through the information below 
which explains what is being requested, your rights to withdraw and how your information will be processed and 
stored.  
 
What is the purpose of the research?  
The purpose is to investigate issues of professional status amongst those who manage information security in 
commercial, public, charitable and other organisations. It aims to examine these issues from the perspective of those 
who perform the role themselves, those whose work might affect the professional status of the occupation (for example 
national associations, universities and qualifications bodies) and those in government who are in a position to regulate 
it. Please feel free to discuss the aims of the project in greater detail before deciding whether to participate. Your 
information will be used only for the stated academic purposes.  
 
What is the format of the research?  
Your contribution will take the form of a semi-structured interview. In this format the interviewer has a list of topics to 
help guide the conversation, however the participants are free to follow any points of interest, or examples which the 
interviewee considers particularly relevant, as they arise. If English is not your first language and you would like any 
adjustment such as slower speech or being accompanied by a translator, please do feel free to request this.  
 
Why do you want an audio recording of the interview? 
As is common practice with such interviews, with your permission the interview will be recorded. This is because the 
particular method of analysis which will be used requires the interview to be first transcribed verbatim. This is 
considerably more efficient if performed later from a recording as it allows the conversation to flow naturally, and is 
more interesting for the participants. You will be sent a copy of the transcript so that you can correct any errors of 
transcription if you choose. This is also an opportunity to identify any data you would prefer not to be used in the 
analysis (see below) for whatever reason. As the location for the interview is often at the interviewee's place of work, 
please bring to the interviewer's attention any possibility that private, personal, confidential or commercially sensitive 
information might be inadvertently captured by the recording device from surrounding areas. 
 
Who is the interviewer?  
The interviewer is a part-time postgraduate student studying for a research degree with the Centre for Computing and 
Social Responsibility at De Montfort University in Leicester, UK and is bound by that institution’s ethical and 
disciplinary codes. The interviewer is also a network engineer employed in the aerospace industry however he is acting 
entirely in the capacity of student and not in any way in his capacity as an employee of any other organisation. Although 
this is unlikely, if you are aware of any potential conflict of interest which may arise from your participation please 
bring this to the attention of the interviewer.  
 
Will you ask me about my organisation's IT security or other confidential information? 
No, this is not the purpose of the study; the intention of the research is to understand the professional status of 
information security practitioners from the perspective of the interviewee and does not concern the security policy or 
practice of their employer. The topics covered will be: your career background and how you came to work in the field, 
the importance of security as a topic and the events which have affected this, the reasons for the foundation of your 
organisation, the nature of information security practice, the role of credential-issuing bodies, comparison of academic 
and industry qualifications, the nature of professional status, the professionalisation of the industry and its relative 
status and maturity. 
 
Should you wish to decline to answer any question to avoid revealing sensitive or confidential information, or for any 
other reason, you are entirely free to do so. Should you happen to use specific information from your current or a 
former organisation to illustrate a point it will be treated as confidential or made anonymous as described below, and 
you are free to request that whilst doing so the recording is paused and/or that the information not be used in the 
analysis. You are also able to request withdrawal of that information later as described below.  
 
Can I withdraw?  
Participation is entirely voluntary and your consent may be withdrawn at any time during or after the interview. Should 
you withdraw before the end of the interview or later but before any analysis has begun, all recordings and transcripts of 
the interview will be destroyed and this will be confirmed back to you when complete. No further use of any 
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information provided by you will be made. Alternatively you may indicate that certain passages or responses should be 
removed, in which case these will not be transcribed (or removed from the transcription as appropriate) and these 
sections will not be used in the analysis.  
 
Should you withdraw after the interview has been transcribed and analysis has begun, information from your interview 
may have already been combined with that of other participants to form theories and conclusions. In this eventuality, the 
recordings and transcripts of your own contribution will be destroyed and take no further part in the analysis, however it 
may not be practical to remove those theories and conclusions which were based in part on your information. In these 
circumstances, all reasonable efforts will be made to remove data from your interview from the analysis.  
 
How will you handle my data? Will my contribution be confidential?  
Recordings will be transcribed as soon as possible after the interview and thereafter stored in an encrypted format. The 
original recording file will be stored offline on optical media in a secure location for backup purposes. Once the 
interview has been transcribed and the accuracy of the transcription confirmed by the interviewee, the recording will not 
be accessed again unless the examiners wish to check the quality of the transcription process or for another official 
university purpose. All materials other than the submitted dissertation (and published papers or interim results, if any) 
will be stored and eventually destroyed according to the provisions of the De Montfort University research records 
retention policy, which is available at http://www.dmu.ac.uk/documents/about-dmu-documents/quality-management-
and-policy/records-management/research-records-retention-policy.pdf 
 
Each person participating will be assigned an anonymising code which is used to identify their data during analysis and 
in the dissertation. This code contains a serial number and an indication of job role. Thus, once the data has been 
transcribed it will no longer be personally identifiable by anyone other than the student and his supervisory/examination 
team. Likewise, the name of your organisation will be removed from the transcript and replaced with an identification 
code during analysis which specifies only its approximate size and industry sector. Any excerpts quoted will be edited 
to ensure that the identity of the speaker cannot be deduced from the context. Any reference to specific institutions, 
brands or individuals will similarly be made non-identifiable unless this is clearly unnecessary. The version sent to you 
as a transcript (after any changes requested have been made) will be the version used in the analysis therefore you will 
be able to request any further removal of information necessary. 
 
Why use codes- why not remove all identifying data?  
Firstly so that you can be sent your own transcript for verification. Secondly, it may be necessary to identify and remove 
the contribution of someone who later withdraws from the study.  
 
What will my contribution be used for?  
Information – once transcribed, anonymised and analysed – may be presented in the student’s dissertation, internal 
progress reports, academic or industrial journal or magazine articles, conference posters or presentations to support an 
argument or conclusion, or to demonstrate examples of opinions observed. This may take the form of verbatim quotes 
or as summarised, interpreted or paraphrased text, numbers, tables or other formats. This information may be attributed 
to the source, if so this will by serial number, pseudonym or terms of the information listed above (job role, and 
employer size and industry sector) and never the identity of the participant.  
 
Consent  
I agree to participate in the research for the purposes described above. I understand that my participation is voluntary 
and that I can withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. I am eighteen years of age or older.  
 
 
 
 
Signed _______________________________ Date ______________________  
 
 
 
 
Name _________________________________________________  
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Interviewee Explanatory Notes and Consent Form (Government Participants) [3 of 4] 
Thank you for considering participating in this research. Please take a moment to read through the information below 
which explains what is being requested, your rights to withdraw and how your information will be processed and 
stored.  
 
What is the purpose of the research?  
The purpose is to investigate issues of professional status amongst those who manage information security in 
commercial, public, charitable and other organisations. It aims to examine these issues from the perspective of those 
who perform the role themselves, those whose work might affect the professional status of the occupation (for example 
national associations, universities and qualifications bodies) and those in Government who are in a position to regulate 
it. Please feel free to discuss the aims of the project in greater detail before deciding whether to participate. Your 
information will be used only for the stated academic purposes.  
 
What is the format of the research?  
Your contribution will take the form of a semi-structured interview. In this format the interviewer has a list of topics to 
help guide the conversation, however the participants are free to follow any points of interest, or examples which the 
interviewee considers particularly relevant, as they arise. If English is not your first language and you would like any 
adjustment such as slower speech or being accompanied by a translator, please do feel free to request this.  
 
Why do you want an audio recording of the interview? 
As is common practice with such interviews, with your permission the interview will be recorded. This is because the 
particular method of analysis which will be used requires the interview to be first transcribed verbatim. This is 
considerably more efficient if performed later from a recording as it allows the conversation to flow naturally, and is 
more interesting for the participants. You will be sent a copy of the transcript for approval so that you can correct any 
errors of transcription if you choose. This is also an opportunity to identify any data you would prefer not to be used in 
the analysis (see below) for whatever reason. 
 
Your particular attention is drawn to the following: 
As the location for the interview could include secure facilities, please bring to the interviewer's attention any 
possibility that private, personal, confidential, protectively marked or otherwise sensitive information might be 
inadvertently captured by the recording device from surrounding areas. It would be very much appreciated if you could 
arrange for a private area such as a meeting room or office to be available for the interview if possible. It is assumed 
that all information discussed will be deemed public unless explicitly notified otherwise, i.e. is not subject to embargo, 
is not protectively marked and attracts no handling descriptor, national caveat or similar restriction. Other than for 
embargoed information, please request that the recording is stopped prior to revealing any information for which this is 
not the case. 
 
Who is the interviewer? 
The interviewer is a British part-time postgraduate student studying for a research degree with the Centre for 
Computing and Social Responsibility at De Montfort University in Leicester, UK and is bound by that institution’s 
ethical and disciplinary codes. The interviewer is also a employed as a network engineer and manager in a European 
aerospace and defence company, whose customers include the UK and other national governments, however he is 
acting entirely in the capacity of student and not in any way in his capacity as an employee of that organisation. If you 
are aware of any potential conflict of interest which may arise from your participation please bring this to the attention 
of the interviewer. 
 
What are the topics for the interview? 
The intention of the research is to investigate the current status and future prospects for the professionalisation of 
information security. The purpose of this interview is to gather the perspective of those responsible for UK Government 
policy in this area. The guide topics covered will be: interviewee career path (how they came to be in their role and 
whether they trained in information security), the origin of their role, the nature of modern information security 
practice, current availability of skilled staff, present and future security career paths, CCP scheme (reason for creation), 
the role of security certifications, the role and control of academic qualifications, the nature of professional status, the 
status of the information security industry, and the role of government in the regulation of information security. 
 
Should you wish to decline to answer any question to avoid revealing sensitive or confidential information, or for any 
other reason, you are entirely free to do so. Should you happen to use specific information from your current or a 
former role to illustrate a point it will be treated as confidential or made anonymous where possible as described below, 
and you are free to request that whilst doing so the recording is paused and/or that the information not be used in the 
analysis. You are also able to request withdrawal of that information later as described below.         (continues overleaf) 
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Can I withdraw?  
Participation is entirely voluntary and your consent may be withdrawn at any time during or after the interview. Should 
you withdraw before the end of the interview or later but before any analysis has begun, all recordings and transcripts of 
the interview will be destroyed and this will be confirmed back to you when complete. No further use of any 
information provided by you will be made. Alternatively you may indicate that certain passages or responses should be 
removed, in which case these will not be transcribed (or removed from the transcription as appropriate) and these 
sections will not be used in the analysis.  
 
Should you withdraw after the interview has been transcribed and analysis has begun, information from your interview 
may have already been combined with that of other participants to form theories and conclusions. In this eventuality, the 
recordings and transcripts of your own contribution will be destroyed and take no further part in the analysis, however it 
may not be practical to remove those theories and conclusions which were based in part on your information. In these 
circumstances, all reasonable efforts will be made to remove data from your interview from the analysis.  
 
How will you handle my data? Will my contribution be confidential?  
Recordings will be transcribed as soon as possible after the interview and thereafter stored in an encrypted format. The 
original recording file will be stored offline on optical media in a secure location for backup purposes. Once the 
interview has been transcribed and the accuracy of the transcription confirmed by the interviewee, the recording will not 
be accessed again unless the examiners wish to check the quality of the transcription process or for another official 
university purpose. All materials other than the submitted dissertation (and published papers or interim results, if any) 
will be stored and eventually destroyed according to the provisions of the De Montfort University research records 
retention policy, which is available at http://www.dmu.ac.uk/documents/about-dmu-documents/quality-management-
and-policy/records-management/research-records-retention-policy.pdf 
 
Please bear in mind that whilst the name of the individual(s) participating and the agency or department for which they 
work will not be revealed outside the above provisions, interviewees will be identified as influential staff in the agency 
responsible for the regulation and professionalisation of IT security in the UK. It is therefore very likely that the 
identity of the agency and the interviewee could still be deduced by knowledgeable readers. The text of the 
transcript may be explicitly presented by the student as – and/or inferred by the reader to be – the official and public 
position of the UK Government as of the date of the interview, unless stated otherwise. 
 
During transcription, wherever possible and appropriate any references to specific institutions, brands or individuals 
will be made non-identifiable unless this is clearly unnecessary. The version sent to you as a transcript (after any 
changes requested have been made) will be the version used in the analysis therefore you will be able to request any 
further removal of information necessary. 
 
Why use codes- why not remove all identifying data?  
Firstly so that you can be sent your own transcript for verification. Secondly, it may be necessary to identify and remove 
the contribution of someone who later withdraws from the study. 
 
What will my contribution be used for?  
Information – once transcribed, anonymised and analysed – may be presented in the student’s dissertation, internal 
progress reports, academic or industrial journal or magazine articles, conference posters or presentations to support an 
argument or conclusion, or to demonstrate examples of opinions observed. This may take the form of verbatim quotes 
or as summarised, interpreted or paraphrased text, numbers, tables or other formats. This information may be attributed 
to the source, if so this will by serial number, pseudonym or terms of the information listed above (job role, and 
employer size and industry sector) and never the personal identity of the participant.  
 
Consent  
I agree to participate in the research for the purposes described above. I understand that my participation is voluntary 
and that I can withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. I am eighteen years of age or older.  
 
 
 
Signed _______________________________ Date ______________________  
 
 
 
Name _________________________________________________  
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Interviewee Explanatory Notes and Consent Form [Practitioners, 4 of 4] 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research. Please take a moment to read through the 
information below which explains what is being requested, your rights to withdraw and how your 
information will be processed and stored. 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The purpose is to investigate issues of the professional status of those who manage IT security in commercial, public 
and other organisations. It aims to examine these issues from the perspective of those who perform the role themselves, 
those who aim to advance the status of the profession (for example national associations and qualifications bodies) and 
those in government. Please feel free to discuss the aims of the project in greater detail before deciding whether to 
participate. Your information will be used only for the stated academic purposes. 
 
What is the format of the research? 
Your contribution will take the form of a semi-structured interview. In this format the interviewer has a list of topics to 
help guide the conversation, however the participants are free to follow any points of interest, or examples which the 
interviewee considers particularly relevant, as they arise. If English is not your first language and you would like any 
adjustment such as slower speech or being accompanied by a translator please do feel free to request this. 
 
As is common with such interviews, with your permission the interview will be recorded. This is because the particular 
method of analysis which will be used requires the interview to be first transcribed verbatim. This is considerably more 
efficient if performed later from a recording as it allows the conversation to flow naturally and is more interesting for 
the participants. You will be sent a copy of the transcript so that you can correct any errors of transcription. This is also 
an opportunity to identify any data you would prefer not to be used in the analysis (see below) for whatever reason. 
 
Who is the interviewer? 
The interviewer is a part-time postgraduate student studying for a research degree with the Centre for Computing and 
Social Responsibility at De Montfort University in Leicester, UK and is bound by that institution’s ethical and 
disciplinary codes. The interviewer is also a network engineer employed in the aerospace industry however he is acting 
entirely in the capacity of student and not in any way in his capacity as an employee of any other organisation. 
Although this is unlikely, if you are aware of any potential conflict of interest which may arise from your participation 
please bring this to the attention of the interviewer. 
 
Will you ask me about my company’s IT security? 
No, this is not the purpose of the study; the intention of the research is to understand the professional status of IT 
security management from the personal perspective of the interviewee and does not concern the security policy or 
practice of their employer. The only such information which may be requested will be: 
 an overview of reporting structure (how your role fits within the overall management structure of your 
organisation and how IT security decisions are made), and 
 your experiences of how your profession is seen within your organisation compared with other occupations of 
similar status, responsibility and skill. 
Should however you wish to decline to answer any question to avoid revealing any commercially or personally 
sensitive information you are entirely free to do so. 
 
Should you happen to use specific information from your current or a former organisation to illustrate a point it will be 
treated as confidential as described below, and you are free to request that whilst doing so the recording is paused 
and/or that the information not be used in the analysis. You are also able to request withdrawal of that information later 
as described below. 
 
Can I withdraw? 
Participation is entirely voluntary and your consent may be withdrawn at any time during or after the interview. Should 
you withdraw before the end of the interview or later but before any analysis has begun, all recordings and transcripts of 
the interview will be destroyed and this will be confirmed back to you when complete. No further use of any 
information provided by you will be made. Alternatively you may indicate that certain passages or responses should be 
removed, in which case these will not be transcribed (or removed from the transcription as appropriate) and these 
sections will not be used in the analysis. 
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Should you withdraw after the interview has been transcribed and analysis has begun, information from your interview 
may have already been combined with that of other participants to form theories and conclusions. In this eventuality, 
the recordings and transcripts of your own contribution will be destroyed and take no further part in the analysis, 
however it may not be practical to remove those theories and conclusions which were based in part on your 
information. In these circumstances, all reasonable efforts will be made to remove data from your interview from the 
analysis. 
 
How will you handle my data? Will my contribution be confidential? 
Recordings will be transcribed as soon as possible after the interview and the original media then deposited in a secure 
location. Once the interview has been transcribed and the accuracy of the transcription confirmed by the interviewee, 
the recording media will not be accessed again unless the examiners wish to check the quality of the transcription 
process. On completion of the project (in other words when the work has received its final pass or fail assessment) all 
materials other than the submitted dissertation will be destroyed. 
 
Each person participating will be assigned an anonymising code which is used to identify their data during analysis and 
in the dissertation. This code contains a serial number and markers of length of experience and job role. Thus, once the 
data has been transcribed it will no longer be personally identifiable by anyone other than the student and his 
supervisory/examination team. Likewise, the name of your organisation will be removed from the transcript and 
replaced with an identification code during analysis which specifies only its approximate size and industry sector. Any 
excerpts quoted will be edited to ensure that the identity of the speaker cannot be deduced from the context. 
 
If your employer requires access to a transcript of the interview as a condition of granting access, this will be explained 
to you beforehand. 
 
Why use codes- why not remove all identifying data? 
Firstly so that you can be sent your own transcript for verification. Secondly, it may be necessary to identify and 
remove the contribution of someone who later withdraws from the study. 
 
What will my contribution be used for? 
Information – once transcribed, anonymised and analysed – may be presented in the student’s dissertation (and/or 
academic journals or conference posters or presentations) to support an argument or conclusion, or to demonstrate 
examples of opinions observed. This may take the form of verbatim quotes or as summarised, interpreted or 
paraphrased text, numbers, tables or other formats. This information may be attributed to the source, if so this will by 
serial number, pseudonym or terms of the information listed above, i.e. job role, length of service, employer size and 
industry sector, never the identity of the participant. 
 
Consent 
I agree to participate in the research for the purposes described above. I understand that my participation is voluntary 
and that I can withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. I am eighteen years of age or older. 
 
My organisation has requested access to the transcript of the interview and I expressly consent to this/ 
My organisation has not requested the transcript and will not have access to it*. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed _______________________________ Date ______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Name _________________________________________________ 
*Please delete as applicable 
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Richard Reece DeMontfort University P10458616   Code:______________________ 
 
 
Semi-Structured Interview Protocol: Academic in Information/Computer Security Field [1 of 5] 
Version 1.0 
Target Time: 90 Minutes 
 
Notes:  Ensure that the consent form is signed before beginning.  
 It is expected that any non-disclosure agreements will have been signed before this point. 
 
1) Introduction and Housekeeping 
Thank the interviewee for their time. 
Explain the purpose of the research in general terms (without seeding answers if possible). 
Confirm if any points from the participant notes require explanation. 
Reiterate the presence of the recording device, confirm consent & switch it on. 
 
2) Career Background 
a) Could I ask you first, what is your career background? How did you come to be in this role?  
Notes: This should serve partially to relax the participant thus avoid unnecessary 
interruption, but attempt to concentrate on their original career, intentionality of 
entry into security, the reasons for it and the reasons for the creation of roles rather 
than too much detail about non-security-related roles. 
 
 Probes: What was their original subject of study? 
Are they a career academic or did they return from industry? At what stage? 
What prompted entry into security specifically? 
Did they enter the field by active choice or happenstance? 
What led to the creation of any security roles before this one? 
 
3) Course Origins and Content 
a) How long have you been running a dedicated security course here? 
 Probes: Had there been security content in any other courses? 
 
b) What prompted its introduction? 
 Probes: Who pushed for this, e.g. was it student interest, academics or the university? 
 Has security increased in prominence or importance? If so what caused this? 
Which disciplines/faculties were involved in its creation?  
 
c) How much of the course content is technical? Are any non-computing topics covered? 
Probes: Is there a distinction between computer security or information security? 
Do you cover such topics as legal aspects, standards, management systems, 
education of internal clients, risk management, ethics and so on? 
How do you decide and review the syllabus?  
Has that changed? If so, why? 
How is the balance struck? Which factors are involved and who directs this? 
 
d) Is the course sufficient foundation for work in an entry-level post in an information security team? 
Probes: Are any “soft skills” required? Are any needed for later senior roles? 
Do you attempt to teach those? 
How do you keep the content up to date and relevant? Is it? 
Does that task differ from other courses? 
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4) Student Entry and Intention 
a) What sort of people do you recruit as students?  
Probes: Are they chosen on pure academic ability alone or are there other factors? 
Are they mid-career, pre-change or pre-career, for example? 
 
b) Which roles will your students typically take on? Are you training them for any particular role? 
Probes: What is the target or ultimate position for their career? Where could they go? 
 
c) Do your students see security as exciting or glamorous? 
Probes: Do their perceptions of the occupation change during their course? 
 
d) Do well-reported breaches or events have any effect on your applications process? 
Probes: If not is this because applicants are unaware of them or unmoved by them? 
 
5) The Role of Certifications and Qualifications 
a) Some people suggest that many of the current holders of senior security roles were often educated before 
security-related degrees were introduced. [Seek agreement or dissent.] Do you think they suffered a 
disadvantage because of this? 
Probes: What would graduate entry have given them? 
 
b) How would you contrast obtaining an academic security degree with the process of passing industry 
qualifications such as the CISSP or CISM? 
Probes: Do you see yourself as in competition with these certifications? 
Notes:   Not just “commercially” but also are they even seen as kin? 
 
c) If the government were to make it mandatory to hold a qualification in order to practise as an information 
security professional, would you see that as a positive thing or a negative thing? 
Probes:  At what stage would it apply? 
  Positive for whom- the profession or the population? 
  What would be the primary driver? 
  Is excluding “quacks” a factor? 
Degree or certification? 
   
d) What will be the typical career path for CISOs in future? Where will they be recruited from? 
Probes: Higher education, specific qualification, membership of a body,  
qualification period. Has this changed, will it change and what are the factors 
affecting this? 
 
6) Professionalism - General 
a) What do you think of when you hear an occupation described as 'a profession'?  
Probes:  If they do not spontaneously give specific criteria, question this but do not 
suggest examples (to avoid bias in answering later questions). 
Request examples if not given. 
If only doctor/lawyer/accountant given, query pharmacy or engineering. 
 
b) Do you consider information security to be a profession? 
Probes:  Why/why not if answered as a closed question. 
Is it distinct from computing/IT? 
 
c) Do you think that your students see information security as a profession? 
Probes:  Why/why not if answered as a closed question. 
  Is the prospect of professional status important to them? 
 
d) Do you think people in general see information security as a profession? How do you think it compares to 
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occupations such as medicine or engineering? 
Probes: If not what factors do they see as relevant to this, can they explain any 
  disparity? 
Should the roles be considered equivalent? Is the situation described “right or 
wrong”? 
Is this because of hierarchy, budget, number of reports, depth of the knowledge 
required or the actual role? 
 Has that changed? 
 
e) Is information security a graduate profession? 
Probes: Should it be? Will it be? Is it trying to be?  
If not, what is missing? 
Is this changing?  
 
f) Do you think the information security occupation is seeking to attain equal status to the more “established” 
professions?  
Probes:  What evidence is there/why do they think that? 
  Do/would they support that? Is it justified? 
Is it succeeding? Why/why not? 
 
7) Additional Points 
That concludes all the questions I had prepared. Are there any points you would like to add at all or which 
occurred during the interview? 
 
8) Wrap Up 
Switch off the recording. 
Thank the interviewee again for their time. 
Explain that the transcript will be mailed to them to verify its accuracy. 
Clarify what markings are required to ensure that it will only be opened by them personally rather 
than by an assistant. 
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Richard Reece DeMontfort University P10458616   Code:______________________ 
 
 
Semi-Structured Interview Protocol: Security Credential Body [2 of 5] 
Version 1.0 
Target Time: 75 Minutes 
 
Notes:  Ensure that the consent form is signed before beginning.  
 It is expected that any non-disclosure agreements will have been signed before this point. 
 
1) Introduction and Housekeeping 
Thank the interviewee for their time. 
Explain the purpose of the research in general terms (without seeding answers if possible). 
Confirm if any points from the participant notes require explanation. 
Reiterate the presence of the recording device, confirm consent & switch it on. 
 
2) Historical Factors 
a) Could I ask you first, briefly what is your career background? What did you train as originally? 
Notes: This must be relatively brief and avoid unnecessary biographical detail.  
 Probes: What was their original subject of study? 
What prompted entry into security and at what point? 
Did they enter the field by active choice or happenstance? 
 
b) How did you come to be involved with this organisation? 
 Probes: Was it for career/salary/etc. reasons or strong orientation with its goals? 
 
c) Why do you believe this organisation was formed? 
 Probes: Had security become a more prominent topic? If so, what caused that? 
Were there any negatives which needed to be corrected? 
Why then- did anything in particular happen to cause it to be formed? 
How has the practice of Information Security has changed over your career? 
 Probes: What factors caused those changes? 
 
3) Social-Technical 
a) Is information security a technical occupation?  
Notes:  This is deliberately open- do not expand on the question unless drawn. 
Probes: Is there a distinction between computer security or information security? 
 
4) The Role of Certifications and Qualifications 
a) Is information security a graduate profession? 
Probes: Should it be? Will it be? Is it trying to be?  
If not, what is missing? 
Is this changing? Why? 
 
b) Do your credentials replace or complement a graduate education? 
Notes:   Not just “commercially” but also are they even seen as kin? 
Probes: Do you see yourself as in competition with graduate certifications? 
  Why are these degrees needed and getting more popular? 
 
c) Now that security degrees are becoming much more common at Master's level and even at undergraduate 
level, how do you think this will affect uptake of your credentials? 
Notes:   Trying to elicit whether they are in competition  
Probes: Do you see yourself as in competition with graduate certifications? 
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d) How many credential-issuing bodies should there be? 
Probes:  Is the status quo acceptable? 
  Who should win out if rationalisation is needed? 
  Should there be a “regulator” for the industry? 
 
e) If the government were to make it mandatory to hold a qualification in order to practise in information 
security, would you see that as a positive thing or a negative thing? 
Probes:  Positive for whom- the profession or the population? 
  What would be the primary driver? 
  Is excluding “quacks” a factor? 
Are there any negatives? 
 
f) What should the role of government be in the regulation of information security practice? 
 Notes:  Might be answered above. 
   Do NOT say “profession” 
Probes:  Would it be useful if your institution had control over entry to the profession? 
   
g) What will be the typical career path for CISOs in future? Where will they be recruited from? 
Probes: Higher education, specific qualification, membership of a body,  
qualification period. Has this changed, will it change and what are the factors 
affecting this? 
 
5) Professionalism - General 
a) What do you think of when you hear an occupation described as 'a profession'?  
Probes:  If they do not spontaneously give specific criteria, question this but do not 
suggest examples (to avoid bias in answering later questions). 
Request examples if not given. 
If only doctor/lawyer/accountant given, query pharmacy or engineering. 
 
b) Do you consider information security to be a profession? Do your members see themselves as 
professionals? 
Probes:  Why/why not if answered as a closed question. 
Is it distinct from computing/IT? 
 
c) Do you think your members enjoy similar status to accountants and lawyers in their daily work? 
Probes: If not what factors do they see as relevant to this, can they explain any 
  disparity? 
Should the roles be considered equivalent? Is the situation described “right or 
wrong”? 
Is this because of hierarchy, budget, number of reports, depth of the knowledge 
required or the actual role? 
 Has that changed? 
 
d) Are you seeking to raise the status of the information security occupation to be equivalent to other 
professions? How does it compare at the moment? 
Probes:  Where are the gaps? Are they just gravitas/time or are they CBK? 
Are they succeeding? Why/why not? 
 
6) Additional Points 
That concludes all the questions I had prepared. Are there any points you would like to add at all or which 
occurred during the interview? 
 
7) Wrap Up 
Switch off the recording. 
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Thank the interviewee again for their time. 
Explain that the transcript will be mailed to them to verify its accuracy. 
Clarify what markings are required to ensure that it will only be opened by them personally rather 
than by an assistant. 
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Richard Reece, De Montfort University P10458616   Code:______________________ 
 
 
Semi-Structured Interview Protocol: Government (Central/Policy) [3 of 5] 
Version 1.02 
Target Time: 75-90 Minutes 
 
Notes:  Ensure that the consent form is signed before beginning.  
 It is expected that any non-disclosure agreements will have been signed before this point. 
 
1) Introduction and Housekeeping 
Thank the interviewee for their time. 
Explain the purpose of the research in general terms (without seeding answers if possible). 
Confirm if any points from the participant notes require explanation. 
Reiterate the presence of the recording device, confirm consent and switch it on. 
 
2) Career Background 
a) Could I ask you first please, if you are able from a security point of view, to tell me briefly about your 
career background? How did you come to be working in security? 
Notes: This is aimed mainly for the demographics record to establish what background this 
person happens to have and to establish a conversation. Do not dwell on this at the 
expense of later topics. Be aware that this subject may also be sensitive if this person 
has come through the ranks in the security services. 
 
 Probes: What was their original subject of study? 
Are they a career civil servant or did they come from industry/academia? 
 
b) What caused your current role to be created?  
 Probes: Are they the first person to perform this role? 
Was it formed because of action from within the department or through the actions of 
an external party? 
Was any other agency or department looking after this before? 
 
3) Security Practitioners 
a) Is information security a technical occupation? 
 Notes:   This is deliberately open- do not expand on the question unless drawn. 
 
 Probes:  Is there a distinction between computer security and information security? 
 
b) Is there a shortage of information security practitioners? 
 Probes:  If so, why? 
   Why now, what caused this to be a problem now?  
   How long has it been in place 
 
c) [IF B=YES] What sort of people are needed in the industry? 
 Probes:  Are the roles for technical specialists or policy writers? 
 
d) What will be the typical career path for school leavers in security? 
Notes:  Do not seed answers but follow up specific points mentioned in more detail.  
 
Probes:  Has this changed, will it change and what are the factors affecting this? 
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4) Certifications and Qualifications 
a) Why did you introduce the CCP scheme?  
 Probes:  What was missing from the existing certifications dating from the 1980s? 
   Does CCP status complement or replace the existing certifications? 
Is the priority to establish a benchmark of competence or raise status? 
 
b) The CCP can be assessed by multiple certification bodies. How many such bodies will there be in the 
future? Is there an ideal number? 
 Probes:  Is the status quo acceptable? 
   Who should win out if rationalisation is needed? 
   Who will decide this? 
 
c) Why has CESG begun the scheme to assess the quality of Master’s degrees? 
Probes:  Who should control the content of university security courses? 
  Will you make compliance compulsory? 
 
d) Is information security a graduate occupation? 
 Probes:  Should it be? Will it be? Is it trying to be? 
   If not, what is missing? 
   Is this changing? Why? 
 
e) How would you contrast obtaining an academic security degree with the process of passing industry 
qualifications such as the CCP, CISSP or CISM? 
Probes: Are universities in competition with these certifications? 
 
Notes:   Not just “commercially” but also are they even seen as kin? 
 
5) Professionalism 
a) What do you think of when you hear an occupation described as 'a profession'? 
Notes:   If they do not spontaneously give specific criteria, question this but do not 
suggest examples (to avoid bias in answering later questions). 
Request examples if not given. 
 
 Probes: Is a profession regulated? How? Why? 
 
b) Do you consider information security to be a profession? 
Probes:  Why/why not if answered as a closed question. 
Should it be? Does it have the required depth of knowledge? 
Is it distinct from computing? 
How wide is the profession- are a firewall engineer and a security awareness trainer 
part of the same profession for example? 
 
c) Do you think the information security occupation has equal status with engineering, nursing or teaching?  
Probes:  Why is that? 
Is that justified? 
If no, where are the gaps? Are they just gravitas/time or are they CBK? 
Note “are you seeking to change this” is the next main question. 
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d) Are you seeking to raise the status of the information security occupation to be equivalent to 
other professions? 
 Probes:  Why? (either way) 
   Is anyone else doing so? 
   Are they succeeding? Why/why not? 
   Would you help them? How? 
 
6) Regulation 
a) Does information security need regulation? Does it need for example a similar body to the Law Society or 
the General Medical Council? 
 Probes: Should membership of such a body be mandatory?  
Should anyone control entry to the profession?     
  At what career stage would mandatory membership apply? 
 
b) What should the role of government be in the regulation of information security practice, if any? 
 Notes:   Might be answered above. Do NOT say “profession” 
 
 Probes:  Should government control entry to the industry? 
 
c) The government has arguably been active in the field of encouraging people into information security; do 
you think the NHS or DoJ would do something similar in medicine or law if there were shortages? 
 Probes: Would you have taken this action had there been a full professional body? 
  
7) Additional Points 
That concludes all the questions I had prepared. Are there any points you would like to add at all or which 
occurred during the interview? 
 
8) Wrap Up 
Switch off the recording. 
Thank the interviewee again for their time. 
Explain that the transcript will be mailed to them to verify its accuracy- ensure details are in place 
for this as this particular interview transcript must be agreed before analysis. 
Clarify what markings are required to ensure that it will only be opened by them personally rather 
than by an assistant. 
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Interview Guide: Security Practitioner [4 of 5] 
Draft 1.02 
 
Notes:  Ensure that the consent form is signed before beginning.  
 It is expected that any non-disclosure agreements will have been agreed before this point. 
 
1) Introductions 
 Thank the interviewee for their time. 
 Present a very short biography but do not align with or against IT Security. 
 Explain the purpose of the research in general terms without biasing. (3) 
Confirm the interviewee agrees with the size and industry sector codes assigned. 
 Explain the presence of the recording device, confirm consent & switch it on. 
 
2) Career Path 
a) “I'd like to talk about your career and how you came into your current role. Could you talk me through 
your career since leaving school and what led you to become a security practitioner?” 
Notes:   This is designed to be a straightforward first question to relax the   
  interviewee, thus provide suitable non-verbal feedback, but as a narrative  
  question avoid interruption. 
 
3) Professionalism - General 
 a) “Could you describe for me please what you think of when you hear the term 'a professional'” 
 Notes:   Ensure use of “a” to stress the noun rather than the adjective. 
 
Probes:  If they do not spontaneously give specific criteria, question this but do not 
suggest examples (to avoid bias in describing their own status later). 
 
Request examples if not given  
if only doctor/lawyer/accountant, mention pharmacy or nursing. 
 
Is it a positive or negative term for this person? 
 
b) “Do you think that people in general want to be thought of as professionals?” 
Probes:  Follow yes/no with “why would you say that is” or similar. 
Allow spontaneous answers then question status/cachet, power, salary. 
 
4) Professionalism and Status - Security 
a) “Do you consider your own role to be a professional role?” 
Probes:  Why/why not if answered as a closed question. 
  Are professional status and influence important and/or useful? 
 
b) “Do you think others see it as a professional role? In your organisation for example, would you say that 
your role carries equal weight to someone like a financial accountant or legal counsel?” 
Probes: If not what factors do they see as relevant to this, can they explain any 
  disparity? 
 Is this because of heirarchy, budget, number of reports or the actual role 
 status? 
 
c) “Has that changed at all? Does your role have more status or influence than it did ten years ago?” 
Probes:  What caused the change, but do not suggest specific examples if possible. 
 
d) “Do you think that academic qualifications are important in your role?” 
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Probes:  Have they seen advertisements for these? 
  Are they required to gain employment or advancement? 
  Are they substantial/”worth anything”? 
 
e) “How about industry qualifications? Do you think those are useful or important?” 
Probes:  As above. 
 
If not answered in (e): 
f) “Do you have any of these qualifications yourself?” 
g) “Why did you decide to pursue [that/those]?” 
 
5) What is Security  
a) “Do you think of information security as being a part of IT, like software development or database 
administration, or is it separate?” 
Probes:  In what ways is it separate? [if applicable] 
 
b) “Is an IT security officer role primarily a technical position?” 
Notes:  Offer “Which is more important to a company, its firewall or its security 
  policy?”if the question is not understood. 
 
c) “Ideally, whom should the security manager report to in an organisation?” 
Probes:  What are the reasons for this? 
 
If within IT hierarchy: 
d) “Do you think there is a danger that the IT Director might over-rule the security team for operational 
convenience or to keep budget down?” 
Probes:  Is that a bad or a good thing? Who should have the final say? 
 
e) “Does your role involve educating people? Is that important?” 
Probes:  If no, establish whether this is because it is a colleague's role or that it's not 
  performed at all. 
 
f) “Whose responsibility is it to ensure that the company's information is secure?” 
Probes:  Roles of Board, CEO, CIO, users. 
 
g) “Overall, thinking about what we've discussed, what do you think the ideal education and career path 
would be for a security professional?” 
Probes: Higher education, specific qualification, membership of a body,  
qualification period. 
 
6) Origins 
a) “During your career, have you ever been employed at an organisation where a new security-related 
position was created, like a security manager role?” 
 
“yes” b) “Could we talk more in depth about that development then - could you talk me through 
 what you saw as being the reasons why the position was created? Can you remember 
 whether this was a response to something in particular or was it a gradual process?  
 How did it come about?” 
 
Notes: Designed to elicit a narrative. Try to encourage a substantial story without interruption. 
 
“no” c) “Thinking of your own role then, why do you think that came about- what do you think 
 might have caused the role to be created?” 
Notes: As for (b). 
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7) Additional Points 
Switch off the recording 
a) “That concludes all the questions I had prepared. Are there any points you would like to add at all?” 
 
8) Wrap Up 
Thank the interviewee again profusely for their time. 
Explain that the transcript is usually mailed to them to verify its accuracy, is this acceptable or 
would they prefer not to receive it.  
If they are to receive a transcript ensure what markings are required to ensure that it will only be 
opened by them personally rather than by an assistant. 
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Richard Reece DeMontfort University P10458616   Code:______________________ 
 
 
Interview Guide: Security Practitioner [5 of 5] 
Version 1.1 
Target Time: 80 Minutes 
 
Notes:  Ensure that the consent form is signed before beginning.  
 It is expected that any non-disclosure agreements will have been agreed before this point. 
 
1) Introduction and Housekeeping 
 Thank the interviewee for their time. 
 Explain the purpose of the research in general terms without biasing answers 
Confirm the interviewee agrees with the job role, organisation size and industry 
sector codes assigned. 
Confirm if any points from the participant notes require explanation 
 Explain the presence of the recording device, confirm consent & switch it on. 
 
2) Interviewee's Career Path and Motivation for Entry into the Occupation 
a) The first question is about the choice of security as a career- what did you train as originally and how did 
you come to be in security? 
Notes:   This is intended partially to relax the interviewee and allow them to become more 
comfortable talking around a familiar subject, thus provide suitable non-verbal 
feedback, but as a narrative question avoid interruption early on in the answer. 
 
Probes:  Attempt to identify and draw out any specific factors which led to the establishment 
or expansion of security departments or resources, avoiding questions about their 
employer's current security arrangements. 
 
3) Factors Affecting Change  
a) Thinking back over your career, do you perceive information security as a business topic to be treated 
more or less seriously than before or has there been no change over that period? 
 Notes:  determine whether any change is in business perception or resourcing. 
 
If change has occurred: 
b) What factors would you say have contributed to that? 
Notes:  Do not offer specific examples apart from to clarify the question until no further 
spontaneous examples offered. 
 
c) Have the resources that are put towards it changed to compensate? 
 
d) During your career, have you ever been employed at an organisation where a new security-related position 
was created, like a security manager role? 
Notes:   To be adapted according to the answer given in (2) 
 
If “yes”  
e) Could we talk more in depth about that development then. Could you talk me through what you saw as 
being the reasons why the position was created? Can you remember whether this was a response to 
something in particular or was it a gradual process? How did it come about? 
Notes: Designed to elicit a narrative. Try to encourage the enumeration of factors without 
unnecessary interruption. 
 
4) The Role of Certifications, Qualifications and Barriers to Professional Practice 
a) I'd like to talk a little about the various academic and industry qualifications which are available in this 
261 
area. Firstly, do you think that academic qualifications are important in your role? 
Probes:  Have they seen advertisements for these? 
  Are they required to gain employment or advancement? 
  Are they substantial/“worth anything”? 
 
b) How about industry qualifications? Do you think those are useful or important? 
Probes:  Do you they have any of these qualifications themselves? 
  What was their motivation in doing so? 
Is this different to an academic qualification and why? 
Would they hire a CISO without one? How about a junior employee? 
 
c) You may have heard of the Government's CESG Certified Professional Scheme, which recognises some 
industry qualifications as meeting certain criteria for Information Assurance credentials. If the government 
were to make it mandatory to hold such a qualification in order to practise as an information security 
professional, would you see that as a positive thing or a negative thing? 
Probes:  At what stage would it apply? 
  Positive for whom- the profession or the population? 
  What would be the primary driver? 
  Is excluding “quacks” a factor? 
Could there by grades of qualification? 
   
d) What will be the typical career path for CISOs in future? Where will they be recruited from? 
Probes: Higher education, specific qualification, membership of a body,  
qualification period. Has this changed, will it change and what are the factors 
affecting this? 
 
5) Professionalism - General 
a) What do you think of when you hear an occupation described as 'a profession'?  
Probes:  If they do not spontaneously give specific criteria, question this but do not 
suggest examples (to avoid bias in describing their own status later). 
 
Request examples if not given. 
If only doctor/lawyer/accountant given, query pharmacy or nursing. 
 
b) Do you consider your own role to be a professional role? 
Probes:  Why/why not if answered as a closed question. 
  Is this status important to them? 
Is it a positive or negative term for this person? 
 
c) Do you think that people in general want to be thought of as professionals? 
Probes:  Why/why not if answered as a closed question. 
Allow spontaneous answers then question status/cachet, power or salary. 
  Are professional status and influence important and/or useful? 
 
d) Do you think others see Information Security as a profession? Would you say that your role carries equal 
status to someone such as a financial accountant or legal counsel of equivalent experience? 
Probes: If not what factors do they see as relevant to this, can they explain any 
  disparity? 
Should the roles be considered equivalent? Is the situation described “right or 
wrong”? 
 Is this because of hierarchy, budget, number of reports or the actual role 
 status? 
 
e) Has that changed at all? Does your role have more status or influence than it did ten years ago? 
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Probes:  What caused the change, but do not suggest specific examples if possible. 
  What about regulation/statute/standards? 
 
f) Do you think the security occupation is seeking to attain equal status to the more “established” 
professions?  
Probes:  What evidence is there/why do they think that? 
  Do/would they support that? 
 
6) Security in the Business  
a) Do you think of information security as being a part of IT, like software development or database 
administration, or is it separate? Is an IT security officer role a technical position? 
Probes:  In what ways is it separate?  
  Is there a technical/non-technical split? 
 
b) Do you think technical security staff aspire to be CISOs or security managers? Do you see them as being 
part of the same career? 
Probes: Are different skill sets required? 
Do they make good CISOs? 
Is there a glass ceiling for people without soft skills? 
 
c) Ideally, to whom should the security manager report in an organisation? Should they report to the IT 
director, for example? 
Probes:  Examine both functional reporting line and grade. 
  What are the reasons for this? 
  Do they mention a conflict of interest in IT? If not, do they see one if asked? 
 
d) Whose responsibility is it to ensure that the company's information is secure? 
Probes:  Do they own that responsibility? 
  Has this changed over time? Why? 
 
e) What is the effect, if any, of high profile security breaches reported in the media or of private ones within 
the organisation? 
Probes:  Does this act as a lever to push/pressure senior management? 
  Does this assist with the credibility of the message? 
  Introduce standards as a comparison lever if not covered. 
 
f) What is the role of user education in Information Security? 
Probes:  Is this done by technical staff or non-technical staff? 
Is this a different skill set? 
Is it important? Why? 
 
7) Additional Points 
a) That concludes all the questions I had prepared. Are there any points you would like to add at all or 
questions you were expecting to be asked? 
 
8) Wrap Up 
Switch off the recording 
Thank the interviewee again profusely for their time. 
Explain that the transcript will be mailed to them to verify its accuracy.  
Clarify what markings are required to ensure that it will only be opened by them personally rather 
than by an assistant. 
 
[End of Instruments] 
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Appendix 2: Coding Frame Details 
 No of 
Sources 
No of 
Coding 
References 
No of 
Words 
Coded 
Category 1: Housekeeping 
I don't know 3 5 127 
Interviewee Clarification 20 54 455 
Interviewee Conversation 24 153 4182 
Interviewee Housekeeping 9 14 152 
Interviewer Clarification 24 123 1470 
Interviewer Conversation 26 296 4783 
Interviewer Housekeeping 16 53 1648 
Interviewer Question 27 1271 41999 
My thoughts on this subject are not fully formed 12 28 574 
Not comprehended 6 8 123 
Category 2: Certifications 
Sub-Category: Certifications - Academic vs Professional 
Academic study is or should be conceptual and timeless 5 18 940 
Balance of technical and non-technical aspects 6 32 2017 
CESG accreditation effort is assessed on commercial terms 2 8 311 
CESG Accreditation is important as a validation of course quality 1 5 179 
Comparison of academic and professional qualifications 13 20 1748 
Factors affecting degree course content 5 15 781 
Students gain real-life lessons from industry speakers 2 5 432 
The role of formal university education in security 17 38 1814 
Theory differs from or is inferior to real-life experience or skills 17 67 5118 
Transition from study into paid work 2 6 334 
Sub-Category: Certifications - Certifications Market 
Certification providers depend on candidate fees to survive 3 6 225 
Competition and perception in the certification market 20 39 2527 
Events prior to the launch of a certification 3 5 362 
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International considerations for certification 9 14 1110 
Professional and academic qualifications are in competition 1 1 44 
Professional and academic qualifications are not in competition or 
are complementary 
6 13 1120 
Recruitment of overseas students 2 2 45 
Recruitment of students from current paid roles 2 5 231 
Recruitment of students from school or university 4 8 265 
The number of certifications 8 25 1645 
We created our course to fit a demand in the market 5 11 660 
Sub-Category: Certifications - Role 
Certification requires significant investment by the individual 4 9 464 
Certifications are not an absolute prerequisite for employment 14 34 1463 
Certifications are only needed when inexperienced 3 4 199 
Certifications help demonstrate competence or give my voice 
weight 
17 56 2874 
Certifications prove commitment to standards to partners and 
customers 
4 5 417 
Certifications prove competence when changing role or applying 
for a position 
19 64 3003 
Current practitioners did not have the current range of training and 
certification options available earlier in their career 
5 9 258 
Experiences of pursuing certifications 13 26 1483 
I couldn't enter security because I wasn't qualified to get the level or 
type of job I wanted 
1 5 150 
I regret not having a qualification which I could have got 3 4 248 
My employer does not actively encourage me to undertake training 
or development 
1 4 84 
My employer encouraged me to undertake a qualification, or 
insisted 
5 12 509 
Undertaking a certification allows one to learn more about security 11 21 750 
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Category 3: Personal Aspects 
Sub-Category: Personal Aspects - Biography 
Active pursuit of security role or enhanced security content in role 5 5 240 
Description of responsibilities, achievements and structure in a 
specific security role 
17 52 4579 
I observed or was attracted to security whilst working in a non-
security role 
15 32 2017 
My career experience and skills do not yet justify a senior role 2 7 235 
My interest in security developed pre-career 6 12 381 
Pragmatism towards career direction or chance 16 35 2176 
Security is exciting, challenging, interesting and rewarding 16 38 1492 
Security learned 'on the job' on acquiring new responsibilities 5 8 635 
Security staff originally trained in an unrelated discipline 24 37 2754 
Security-neutral explanation of work experiences 10 60 4446 
The effect of a suboptimal previous academic record 3 7 394 
Sub-Category: Personal Aspects - Role Origin 
A combination of circumstances led to a requirement for increased 
security resource 
4 4 252 
I identified that there was a lack of security focus from outside 11 30 1213 
My employer had a requirement to do something new 5 6 359 
My position was new and I had scope to define my role 5 7 290 
The increasing importance, focus or complexity of security caused a 
new role to be created 
8 15 1074 
The requirement for a security position was identified by an 
external party 
1 2 28 
Category 4: Professionalism 
Sub-Category: Professionalism - Definition and Characteristics 
I consider myself to be a professional 13 18 264 
I do not recognise a distinction between professions and trades 8 9 601 
I do not regard myself as a professional 2 3 70 
Influential advisers must be credible 2 6 145 
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Ongoing training and continuing professional development 11 22 1432 
Professional and professional titles are sometimes used too lightly 7 10 556 
Professional is a negative term 1 3 136 
Professional is a positive term 10 14 338 
Professional means... 27 67 2236 
Professional status brings duties and obligations, such as acting 
ethically 
14 28 1168 
Professional term definition includes formal and informal aspects 2 2 122 
Professionals bring externally-derived standards into unique 
situations 
5 6 352 
Professions provide a benefit beyond increasing commercial 
profitability 
2 4 229 
Professions such as security must occupy a broad area of expertise 
with specialisations 
4 7 786 
Within a particular professional discipline there is a hierarchy of 
status 
5 9 913 
Sub-Category: Professionalism - Government 
Government departments cannot directly exert control themselves 1 2 31 
Government keen to have a test of competence 2 8 599 
Government should not directly regulate the market itself 4 10 832 
Government wariness of imposing regulation 2 10 702 
Government's main priority is public sector security 1 3 197 
Sub-Category: Professionalism - Licensing 
Mandatory registration is not justified 7 15 1160 
Mandatory registration must not exclude current competent people 7 13 387 
Mandatory registration would have practicality challenges to 
establish a workable and equitable system 
9 18 779 
Mandatory registration would have resource implications 7 14 557 
Mandatory registration would improve quality and be a positive 
step 
20 42 1643 
People in the occupation are generally competent 3 5 243 
Some people in the occupation are not competent 6 9 251 
The roles of professional association and regulator should be 
separate 
1 4 185 
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Sub-Category: Professionalism - Status and Direction 
Background as a factor in security career progression 11 24 1425 
Entrants to security are attracted by financial reward or career 
security 
3 4 154 
Fixed career paths are limiting or inappropriate 3 5 457 
New entrants to a profession require a mentor 2 3 145 
Professional status is associated with a capacity to do harm when 
incompetent 
4 4 223 
Professional status is important 5 8 203 
Professional status is not important 4 7 264 
Professionalisation is limited by lack of resources or will from 
powerful actors 
2 6 311 
Security career structure, status and comparison to other professions 19 65 4127 
Security is not fully mature as a profession 12 23 947 
Status is influenced by the individual not just the job 7 9 657 
The availability of competent security professionals 6 10 454 
The coherence of IT Security as a discrete occupation 11 34 1717 
The future of the Information Security occupation 17 36 1581 
The impetus for association came from within the industry 1 1 9 
The professional status of the Information Security occupation 23 68 2591 
Category 5: Work Context 
Sub-Category: Work Context - Change Actors 
Changes in the perception of security and its importance over time 20 51 3075 
Networking as a source of information and influence 3 5 549 
Security is a large and growing area of knowledge 5 8 343 
The effect of changes in technology and connectivity 16 43 3313 
The effect of customer requirements 3 6 240 
The effect of industry sector and agility 11 30 1734 
The effect of organised crime and foreign states 6 8 779 
The effect of security breaches and the media 20 59 4615 
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The effect of standards, regulation and legislation 21 70 5843 
The effect of supplier relationships 4 8 557 
The effect of user behaviour and IT familiarity 9 21 1762 
Sub-Category: Work Context - Enterprise Organogram 
Other Reporting lines for the CISO 6 7 458 
Responsibility for specific security tasks may not be clear with 
well-known lines of demarcation 
2 5 489 
Security should not report to the CIO 11 26 1045 
Security should or could report to the CIO 6 11 486 
Security should report to senior or board management 12 27 1268 
The effect of organisation size on security organisation structure 4 12 476 
Sub-Category: Work Context - Intra-Professional Stratification 
Non-technical skills are career-learned 5 5 219 
Non-technical skills should be taught alongside technical skills pre-
career 
2 3 140 
Policy is empty without audit and enforcement 3 4 392 
Possession of the correct approach and mindset is important 2 6 542 
Security is a technical or computing discipline 3 10 400 
Security is not exclusively or primarily technical 25 61 3859 
Security managers need not be hands-on technical experts 14 27 1737 
Security professionals must understand technology 11 19 1255 
Security professionals need non-technical skills 12 34 2878 
Some technical security staff do not aspire to non-technical or 
management roles 
11 16 1215 
The relationship between security and technical staff 7 18 940 
Sub-Category: Work Context - Perception and Management 
As externals to the operations teams, security professionals can only 
advise 
9 29 1731 
Distinction between perception and substance 3 6 100 
Security is an important thing to get right 6 10 477 
Security is delegated by senior management as something which 
must be done 
5 11 536 
Security is not a priority for software companies 1 1 45 
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Security is perceived as difficult, blocking or not business-focussed 7 14 586 
Security processes enabled the business to work more effectively 2 8 213 
Security professionals may have to say no to protect their clients 
from harm 
4 8 641 
Security professionals must understand and live in the wider 
business 
9 20 1160 
Security-related decisions are a question of risk management and 
judgement 
16 25 1601 
The relationship between security and business management 13 46 2054 
The role of a security-focused individual in the organisation 4 6 312 
Sub-Category: Work Context - Users and Culture 
Cultural issues as a function of nationality 3 6 400 
Educating people is an important part of security 15 49 3662 
Ignorance of good security practice causes bad decisions and 
frustrations 
1 10 487 
Internal clients have their own priorities which are not necessarily 
aligned with good security practice 
8 17 707 
It is important to embed security into the culture as an accepted part 
of proper process 
3 7 957 
Policy and controls must be practical and not unreasonably affect 
efficient work practices 
10 20 1442 
Requirement to translate and empathise to enrol the non-technical 13 30 2659 
Security is part of every role and not exclusive to specialists 15 35 1963 
Ultimately some trust must be extended to the individual 6 7 280 
User education is not practical, achievable or a priority 2 4 89 
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Appendix 3: Interview Codes and Details  
Interview transcripts were assigned a working code using the following format: AAABBC-
DDEE/F, where AAABBC identified the employing organisation, DDEE the person and F the 
serial number (in case the interviewee participates on more than one occasion). 
AAA: Industry type. Many specific-purpose classification systems exist which are quantitative 
and complex with a particular aim in mind (Peneder, 2003) and may not include, for example, 
public and not-for-profit sectors if developed for capital markets. Since the research is intended 
to be carried out across many sectors in the UK, the general purpose UK Standard Industrial 
Classification of Economic Activities 2007 maintained by the UK government (ONS, 2007) was 
considered appropriate and adopted as the coding method. This scale assigns an arbitrary single 
character to each group; these original characters were recast as trigrams to be more human-
readable during analysis. Those used are explained in the table below. 
BB: A two-digit code was chosen to distinguish the organisation should multiple interviewees 
participate from the same institution. The number was randomly chosen to ensure that observers 
with access to the order of interviewing could not identify the source of a quotation. 
C: Size of organisation. On the advice of the Office for National Statistics (pers. comm., 30 
October 2012 15:40) categories were adopted from those used by the Department for Business, 
Information and Skills (DBIS, 2012), viz: Small: 0 to 49 employees. Medium: 50 to 249 
employees. Enterprise as 250 or more employees
8
. 
DD: A code for the role or job title of the interviewee. No suitable existing set of codes could be 
located therefore this was constructed from roles observed during the literature review.  
SM CISO/Security Director or Manager 
AN Technical Analyst 
CL Course Leader (Academics) 
ID CIO/IT Director or Manager With Responsibility for Security 
GV (Single-use-class for Government) 
DM Deputy IT Manager 
DS Deputy Security Manager 
PO (Single-use-class for Professional Associations) 
 
EE: A two-digit code to identify the participant, selected at random. 
                                                     
8
 DBIS use “Large” instead of “Enterprise”, the latter being felt to be more common in the security 
industry. 
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The interviews were conducted as follows (* denotes pilot phase interviewee): 
Interview Code Date Industry Type Protocol 
CHA31E-SM07 Sep 2013 Charity Practitioner Pra 1.1 
CHA33M-SM54 Sep 2013 Charity Practitioner Pra 1.1 
COM73E-AN44 Apr 2013 Communications Practitioner Pra 1.1 
EDU24E-CL05 Mar 2014 Academia Educator Aca 1.0 
EDU27E-CL05 May 2014 Academia Educator Aca 1.0 
EDU45E-CL31 Sep 2014 Academia Educator Aca 1.0 
EDU54E-CL11 May 2015 Academia Educator Aca 1.0 
EDU66E-CL71 Oct 2014 Academia Educator Aca 1.0 
EDU79E-ID24* Nov 2012 Academia Practitioner** Pra 1.02 
ENT22E-SM03* Oct 2012 Academia Practitioner Pra 1.1 
FIN22E-AN43 Dec 2013 Finance Practitioner Pra 1.1 
FIN31E-AN72 Aug 2013 Finance Practitioner Pra 1.1 
FIN91E-SM15 Nov 2013 Finance Practitioner Pra 1.1 
FIN99E-SM92 Apr 2013 Finance Practitioner Pra 1.1 
GOV01E-GV01 Feb 2015 Government/Public Cen. Government Gov 1.02 
GOV21E-DM38 Oct 2013 Government/Public Practitioner*** Pra 1.1 
HEL42E-AN12 Aug 2013 Health Services Practitioner Pra 1.1 
MAN61E-SM05 Aug 2013 Manufacturing Practitioner Pra 1.1 
MAN86E-DS66* Oct 2012 Manufacturing Practitioner Pra 1.02 
MIN48E-SM22 Mar 2013 Mining Practitioner Pra 1.1 
PRO29E-PO42 Aug 2014 Professional Association Professional Assoc Pro 1.0 
PRO41E-PO86 Nov 2014 Professional Association Professional Assoc Pro 1.0 
PRO62E-PO74 Jul 2014 Professional Association Professional Assoc Pro 1.0 
TEC11S-ID48 Jul 2013 Technology Practitioner Pra 1.1 
TEC72E-AN91 Oct 2013 Technology Practitioner Pra 1.1 
TRN74E-SM47 Apr 2013 Transport Practitioner Pra 1.1 
UTL50E-SM62 Aug 2013 Utilities Practitioner Pra 1.1 
 
**Although at an educational institution, this was an IT engineer with responsibility for security 
and not an academic. 
*** Regional rather than central government. 
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Appendix 4: Transcription Rules as Used 
 Transcription begins at the point that the first prepared question is asked (including the 
question); prior conversation is omitted. 
 Transcription ends after the last response to the last formally-asked question including 
any immediately linked conversation. 
 Each passage of speech by one individual is represented as a single paragraph 
terminated by two paragraph marks. No paragraph marks are used inside a passage of 
speech by one person however long. 
 Short phrases which could compromise the speaker are (where practical) replaced by a 
grammatically compatible phrase in square brackets, e.g. “When I worked for 
Microsoft” would become “When I worked for [a large software company]”. 
 If a substantial identifying section (i.e. more than a few words) is removed this is 
indicated with “[Identifying section removed]”; an ellipsis in square brackets is used for 
very small redactions. 
 Where the exact wording cannot be made out this is indicated with “[indistinct]”. 
 Italics may be used to represent heavy emphasis only where to do otherwise would give 
a misleading impression of their speech. They may also be used where word has been 
used demonstratively, such as in “They like this lemonade rather than that lemonade”. 
 Where the interviewer is (by audibly laughing or by their inflection) clearly making a 
joke and without this knowledge the text would be misleading, this should be indicated 
with “(!)”. 
 Where the interviewee anticipates and begins to answer during the reading of the 
question, provided it is not misleading to do so the text is represented as they had 
waited so that the question can be read in full next to its answer. If the response causes 
the interviewer to stop or trail off this is represented as “rabbits, would you do that or...” 
before starting a new section with the interviewee's response. 
 Non-verbal noises are not represented, except where this would omit a response or be 
misleading, for example where the interviewee clearly agrees with something, which 
must be captured for analysis, but indicates only with “mmm-hmm”. In this example 
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this can be either rendered into text or represented as “[Yes]”. 
 No attempt should be made to “correct” errors in syntax or grammar of the speech, 
however the desired result is a sentence which is comprehensible thus where absolutely 
necessary fragments of nonsensical or confused words are omitted.  
 Where possible, where the speaker is imitating direct speech or reporting a conversation 
(real or in their view typical) grammatical conventions for direct speech are used.  
 Abandoned phrases are removed unless they are substantial. Where the speaker tries to 
form a sentence and abandons their wording to attempt a different wording the fragment 
is omitted. Where a reasonably substantial part-sentence is spoken then abandoned then 
this should be represented, if necessary by indicating “…” at the point of abandonment. 
If the speaker actually corrects themselves then the corrected version is captured and the 
part they corrected is deleted. This is not indicated in the transcript. Care should be 
taken to omit phrasing which the speaker realised did not represent their view. 
 Where the speaker has a very repetitive verbal tic which would make a completely 
accurate transcription more difficult to read and which is not relevant to the meaning of 
the text (such as repeatedly using “so”, “you know” or “like” not in their accepted 
grammatical senses) then this should be judiciously removed for clarity. 
 Where the speaker uses conjunctions to continually link multiple sections of text so far 
that the sentence so produced is rather rambling, then this may be separated into 
sentences containing distinct and discrete concepts. 
 Minor verbal prompts from the interviewer whose function is purely to indicate 
comprehension or elicit further answer text (such as “OK”) are omitted in order not to 
break up what are essentially continuous answer texts. 
